 We have three speakers today. Our first speaker is Claude Komp. Claude is a particularly big energy expert at TSC and has worked a lot on electricity among other subjects. Claude is going to talk to us today about hydrogen. Claude, I think you're with us today. Do you have your microphone on? I hope so, is it? Thank you for being here Claude. Okay, hello everybody. I believe you have five minutes Claude to talk to us about hydrogen. Just a quick introduction perhaps. Across Europe, governments are hedging billions of euros on a bet that hydrogen will gradually become a clean, safe and affordable energy carrier. But you believe this may be wishful thinking unless there is a significant decline in production and distribution costs. Can you tell us more about this? Well, a little bit more, yes. So we start with some kind of momentum in favour of hydrogen and it handed out a kind of frenzy more recently. It is true that over the past summer France, Germany, the European Commission and others have pledged to spend billions of euros to invest in hydrogen technologies. These public commitments are motivated by the objective to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 and hydrogen is viewed as a critical part of this decarbonisation process. All these plans, national or not, have some common features. They aim at building global leadership in the hydrogen domain, bringing together renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production, demanding industry, mobility and other sectors and hydrogen transmission and distribution. And of course they also promote the creation of many, many jobs as usual. On the supply side, the objective is the greening of hydrogen production. It means switching to water catalysis fed by power from renewables instead of the current technology based on fossil fuels. It is an important prerequisite since hydrogen is an essential input in some industries, for example for oil refining and the production of fertilisers. But greening will not be easy. A study released in June by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs notes that green hydrogen is almost four times more expensive to produce than conventional grey hydrogen which is broadly used across Germany's industrial sector. Then it will take a considerable drop in the cost of electrolysis to make hydrogen environmentally friendly at the production stage. On the demand side, the objective is even more ambitious. It consists in enlarging the use of green hydrogen to energy storage and the fueling of all kinds of transport. Indeed, the big advantage of hydrogen is that it is climate friendly as it does not emit any carbon dioxide when used, that is at the consumption locations. But despite this quality, green hydrogen is not a panacea. Let me focus on two reasons. First, it must be recalled that hydrogen is an energy carrier. It is not an energy producer. It can replace the fossil fuel burned by cars, trucks, buses, ships, even planes when equipped with fuel cells. It can replace natural gas in industry and in district heating. It can replace electrical batteries. But a storage facility cannot replace electrical plants. Green hydrogen must be extracted from methane or water which requires energy. Then it is not a substitute to power plants. It is a complement. It can transport energy in time like a wise transmit energy in space. Hydrogen transportation is used for fueling vehicles. Hydrogen is light but bulky. The energy density of hydrogen is very high when measured in megajoules per kilogram, but it is very low in megajoules per litre. This makes it a core to store on board any vehicle. It must be either pressurized to 200 or 700 bar or liquefynt at minus 250 degree Celsius in an insulating and bulky container. This necessitates even more and more energy. On top of that, there is no established infrastructure for making and distributing it. To conclude this very brief presentation, I see that considering past experiences and the current state of the art, we have a long road ahead before meeting the great expectations which politicians have placed in green hydrogen. It will take much more than marginal technical improvements and it will also necessitate clear advances in the regulation of the energy industries to integrate the storage technologies. And I stop here. Thank you very much Claude. Congratulations, you respected your five minutes. I'm very impressed. We will just remind everybody we're going to let the three speakers go through their points first of all and then we're going to go through all the questions and answers. So over to you, Christian, so Christian Gaulier. You have flown the flag for a universal carbon price as a strong policy solution to climate change for quite a long time now. Do you still hold this position? Are you confident that policymakers are actually going to take action? Can you talk to us a bit about that please? It's more than ever. I'm convinced that it's at least in this very condition to attain the climate ambition that we collectively decided to generate. So first point, I mean we all need to realise that we are responsible ourselves, you and me, of the climate damages today and for the next three centuries at least. So just to try to give you an idea of what that means, each ton of CO2 that you and I, we emit will generate the damage that we can estimate around 1,200 euro, which takes place on average in 18 years from now. So and if you take into account that each European emits on average 7% of CO2 every year, you do the math by yourself, we are each of us creating a big climate debt and we are responsible to our future generation about that. So there is a simple solution to this extremity problem that economists have been submitting for a long time to the policymakers and with lawyers and social scientists. We all agree that we need to apply the political principle, that is, you for you should pay for that. That's not punitive, it's just incentive. So you align the private interest with the common good by forcing people to pay for the damage they generate. So that carbon pricing, you can put it in place toward carbon tax or by market for permits. And keep in mind, I mean, prices affect our life. When you change prices, people react to that. And I have no time to put an example of that, but there are millions of examples of why prices can radically perform our behaviour. So we have an objective to get to net zero emissions in 2050. Look at the myriad of fractions that the myriad of people will have to perform in order to attain this objective. We need to attain the objective of the least cost. And the best way to do that is to impose a carbon price that is uniform, universal, everybody should pay the same price because each molecule of CO2 imitated in the atmosphere generate the same damage. But the carbon price could also be interpreted as a shadow price associated to the climate constraints. And that's the minimum, that's the price we need to impose to the whole agent in the economy to guarantee that those efforts will be performed with artificial intensity to get to the zero net emissions by 2050. So, there is a wide variety of possibilities, a wide variety of costs that could also be saved. Claude was just presenting the idea of hydrogen to be transformed into methane. The actual cost of CO2 saved of the technology is currently estimated at least in France around 770 euros per ton of CO2 saved. To give you the idea of the variety of costs compared to, for example, a repeat in coal by natural gas in Poland, it costs only 30 euros per ton of CO2 saved. So, let me finish with a few words about what's the solution. Of course, carbon pricing is a theoretical idea, but it's also easy to put in practice. In France, we have a carbon tax. We also have in Europe a market for permits, the EUETS, and it works relatively well. It covers 45% of all EU emissions. What I propose is to expand this EUETS in such a way that it covers all emissions on the European soil, including housing, transportation, shipping, airline industry, everything. No exception. Everybody should pay the same price in Europe. And also, we should talk about the importance of goods and services that are high-carbon items to pay also for the emissions generated by those products to European consumers. We should also impose the name of that carbon burden adjustment that is currently discussed under the EU Green Deal project. We should also impose a condor for carbon prices that should go at around 5% per year in order to give credibility and insurance for the entrepreneur who will be Christian for the triggering of this energy transition. And finally, we should also distribute the carbon dividend generated by the spending of the auctioning of these permits on the EU market. So, thank you very much. Thank you, Christian. We'll come back to this in the question and answer session. Jean-Tyrôl. As with this today, Jean-Tyrôl, whilst joining, I think, Christian on the aspect of the carbon pricing, more generally you advocate an international climate coalition based on three criteria. Economic efficiency, incentives to respect commitments and fairness. Can you tell us more? And are you optimistic about this kind of international climate, despite, for example, the cancelling of the COP26? Jean, we just need you to put your microphone on, you are allowed. Thank you. Thank you, Jenny, for this very simple question. I will have a five-point overview of the international dimension. Point number one, you are going to tell me, is not really about international matters. We have to stop coal. Coal is a very low-hanging fruit. Remember, it's 30 to 40 euros per ton removed. But for that, of course, we have to compensate losers in Europe. It's Poland and Germany. The just transition fund is going to do that. That's a good thing. It's more complicated worldwide because 80% of the coal production today is in Asia. So compensating is not that easy. Point number two, what can the EU do? You have to realize that EU 28 is a very small, small piece of the climate change puzzle. 9% of global emissions, France actually is less than 1%. Nonetheless, I believe that Europe has its part to play. First, by leading by example, the demonstration effect showing that things can be done. The shaming effect. Second, as Christian said, by having a border tax adjustment, which is going to level the playing field between domestic firms and firms located in countries with lax enforcement of climate regulations, and put pressures on those countries to join a climate club. Of course, we would like this to be as rule-based as possible, maybe with the WTO involved if possible. Third, Europe can engage in green R&D. I will come back to that and give the technologies to the poor countries. Finally, Europe can play a leadership role in designing efficient and credible international agreements. Point number three, boosting innovation. As you all know, innovations come primarily from the pride sector, but that doesn't mean the public sector has no role to play. Actually, I am in favour of creating an APA-E agency. We have too little R&D. As you know, 4% of the world R&D public and private is actually dedicated to climate change, which is chicken feed, even the steaks. Now, an APA-R&D in Europe will fund high-risk, high-reward research. But of course, you have to avoid wasting the funds. And you need an agency which is independent as a true high-level manager with substantial operational flexibility to set goals. So, for example, in terms of battery capacity and longevity, rather than a way of achieving those goals. It will grant resources using peer reviews process. It will not spread funds. It will include a sunset close and withdraw the money when things don't work. What about the ECB, point number four? The ECB has to run climate stress test, which is already within the mandate of central banks. I'm much more reluctant to have the ECB relax prudential standards on banks for that green landing. Both for legitimate reasons that can be fixed, of course. But also because I don't think green finance should be the new subprime. And the issue with financing of green innovation has nothing to do with the shortage of vulnerable funds. Actually there are many, but rather with the lack of associated income prospects. Same thing with ECB financing the energy transition itself. This will be debt financing and it's up to the state themselves to engage in debt financing in full transparency and without putting the credibility of the ECB at risk. Finally, the ECB can divest, eliminate carbon intensive assets from its portfolio. I'm in favour of a strong expressive content, but you have to realise that there's only so much we can expect from that because of course there are other buyers. There is a leakage which is obvious. Point number four to conclude is a diplomatic channel. Actually I don't have that much to say about that, but I just want to say that the United Nations is a fine process. But when you give veto power to 196 nations, what you end up with is a least common denominator outcome, just like COP 21 has shown. Many people have said we should have a climate club which will include a number of large emitters agreeing on a set of co-reaction, then putting diplomatic pressure on other countries to join. Of course the election of Joe Biden is a good news respect to that, but there are still a lot of hurdles to meet. Thank you. Thank you Jean, thanks very much all three of you. OK, so we're running even ahead of schedule. Thank you for being very brief. I know we could listen to you for a lot longer. Let's keep listening to you through answers to the many, many, many questions we're receiving. Let's start, I think, let's go back to Claude, to have a little come back a little bit to the questions of hydrogen. We have people who share your concerns about hydrogen and wonder whether there will be any applications for which it actually does make sense. Thank you for the question. It's true that my presentation has been quite critical. One of the questions we face here is that there is an important geographical dimension of the hydrogen deployment. Where to invest will be the source of political bickering between countries, regions, large cities and so on. It is feared that efficiency will not be the main driver for investments. Actually, instead of scattering the resources, investment should be concentrated at spots with high capacities and demand. I think it's not my own idea. I read that in a report by the International Energy Agency. I think it's a good idea. At the beginning, funds should be concentrated at sea ports, at large sea ports. Why that? First, because sea ports have already expertise and the equipment to process liquefied and pressurized gases. So we import and export of liquefied natural gas. They know how to process that. There is a second reason that these ports are close to some offshore wind farms. So they can have access to green energy and because they are not too far away from these wind farms, the thermal losses online will be low. A third reason refers to the curse of volume and heavy I was discussing formally. Because they could fuel large capacity vessels because any floating engine is less subject to this curse than to penalize the terrestrial vehicles. There is maybe a fourth reason that these sea ports in general are well connected to highways and railways. So they are like hubs with spokes used by heavy duty tracks and trains and these could be sold by hydrogen. So maybe here there is an interesting starting point for technical application. Yes, we have an extension of the question that could hydrogen be used as a carrier in extracting oil from oil sands, for example in Canada? That's much more technical, so I prefer not to answer this question. Coming on to maybe a question still for you, Claude, but coming on to the notion of carbon pricing. So Christian and Jean, at any point if you'd like to reply even if the question is for a colleague then please do. Given that such carbon pricing is put in place, would that put the people of lower income who already have limited access to resources overall in a much more disadvantaged position? And if yet, how should we deal with this inequality? Christian, you might like to step in also on this. It's an important question. I mean it's clear that we need to have everybody on board, not only the western world but also the south. And it's also true that the north bear a special responsibility in the mess created by climate change. Also, I mean when you look at the emissions of capital, it's completely clear that you know people from the living in the US emit so much more than people in Congo for example, something like 100 and 1000 more. So there is one argument, one ethical argument that would suggest that if we would like to organise a mechanism where we would allocate permits in the world in order to review the emissions to be sure that we do not emit more than what we can if we want to fulfil the two-devisances target, there would be a solution where everybody should get the same number of permits, the same emission permit per capita and in that case, of course people from Congo will get something like I don't know, 5 tonnes of CO2 permit, they could sell most of it because they know only it now to the American citizens and that could generate a large benefit for those developing countries, but of course that's an ethical proposal. Of course that will not be possible because in the US they will not accept that, but there is an idea that by using a market for permits we can redistribute implicitly when across nations by offering free permits to the citizens of the world on something related to a per capita basis. And do you think that the EU is prepared, for example we think about Europe, we have people from all around the world today so there may be obviously a different perspective from different areas, is the EU prepared for the adjustments to the broader tax system implied by switching away from taxing fossil fuses to raising tax through carbon pricing? Do you think the EU is and or should be preparing for this? So in terms of taxation we know that Europe needs unanimity for that kind of decision, that's why 20 years ago Europe opted for a market for permits rather than on a carbon tax and it's still the problem today. And we see of course the resistance everywhere. France, that image, relatively less CO2 that many of the members of the union has an advantage of promoting a pricing solution because the first to be hit by a larger price of CO2 permit in the union will be Poland for example, which currently produces electricity by using the EU. 80% based on coal and we know that if you increase the price of the permit by about something like 30, 35 euros per ton of CO2, which is currently the region of the price on the market, coal will not be competitive anymore and it will be replaced by natural gas. Natural gas is not a long-term solution, but at least in the short run, natural gas emit much less CO2 per kilowatt hour than coal, so that's a solution. But the point is that Poland will lose by doing that and that's why Poland, we have seen that in recent weeks, resists any solution based on the carbon pricing solution, but that's a free-riding problem. And we know, I mean, if we would have a world government, we could implement the easy solution with carbon pricing, the fact that we have, as said by Jean, we have almost 200 countries, that mean 200 vetoes and 200 free riders. And there is no simple solution as long as we cannot send tanks and our soldiers to impose a fair and efficient climate solution to the world. Yes, thanks. Two points in your reply, Christian, that bring me on to other questions. Can perhaps come back to Jean afterwards with the notion of this coalition and how to avoid free riding. But just for a moment, to come back to Claude, you mentioned Christian, your reply, different, you mentioned coal. And obviously we have all these different sources of energy and it's not easy to work out what is the best mix of energy. Claude, some countries are still using coal to produce electricity. Can they really and how can they switch quickly to low carbon, for example in Asia? Well, I have no idea of what engineers will propose for the end of the century, that for the next decades, given the decarbonation priority, of course natural gas is better than coal. But it's not a solution either. I think that investing in nuclear energy is the best way to replace coal and natural gas in power production. As far as I remember, there are currently more than 400 or maybe 450 nuclear units operating in probably 30 countries and some 50 units are actually under construction. And as for Asia, there are many construction sites in India and in China. So I'm not sure it will suffice to replace coal and coal will have an opportunity for some time, a very important hole in these countries. But for the next decades, the investment in nuclear energy probably will go on. Talking in that case perhaps about Asia, India, different countries, Jean, maybe we can come back to this notion of the climate coalition. Do you think that China and India and most of all Asia will join the climate change coalition? If they don't, could it be a big risk for the other developed economies for Europe elsewhere? Well, China is a big question mark, of course, because they have become much more climate conscious and they invest a lot in green energy. At the same time, there are also 52% of the coal production in the world, which is huge. So the question, and I'm not in a diplomat, so I don't know much about the chances of bringing China on board. But they find it is one of the partners we should look after. The US, of course, is a big partner. With Joe Biden, it's possible, but remember there's still a lot of coal there and still a lot of energy consumption per inhabitant, so it's difficult. And then there are a bunch of other big countries we have to bring on board, and that's not going to be easy if you think about Brazil or Russia and countries like that. Would it be right to say your view is that there should be a small, strong coalition of the major polluters and then try to bring everybody on board from there? Well, I think that's part of the thing is that you bring some people around a project, some countries around the project, and then you create a board of tax adjustment. It's not a great thing. We all agree on that, but it puts pressure on the level of the playing field. And then you try to spread the thing, and who knows. We have a few questions here about who, what's the role that different institutions, different bodies, different parties have to play. For example, central banks. We have a question about the role that central banks have to pay. This is a question coming in from somebody who's at the NY Fed. How about central banks? Maybe I couldn't get in here. When first I'm not completely aligned with the position on nuclear. I think nuclear is part of the solution and existing nuclear footprint and the low cost per kilowatt hour. This levelized cost of electricity. But you know, when you look at the technological progress in solar and wind technologies in the future, there will be a share of the electricity mix for a relatively large one for renewable energy. I mean, not on the end. And I don't know whether you can declare renewable energy or not. So concerning the role of central banks, whether it's, I mean, of course, we need, as I said earlier, we need everybody involved and central banks have their role to play there. But we need to keep in mind that central banks have much less power than executive governments. States. States can impose a ban. They can impose a civil deal. They can impose a current price. It's much harder for a central bank to do something like that. And not only central banks and financial intermediaries could help, but for example, the solution to divest from the coal industry. We have seen that it's not necessarily very efficient. I mean, when you divest from the coal industry, another two investors come to replace you. And keep in mind, I mean tobacco industry. The tobacco industry has not be weakened by the divestment movement. It's rather the tax on tobacco that has been imposed in the western world that reduces consumption and eventually impose control on the problem. It's not the financial sector that did that. Thanks, Christian. Yeah, you mentioned states. Perhaps we can talk a little bit about France because obviously we're here today from a whole range of different places across the world. But quite a lot of us are in France naturally given that we're from the Toulouse School of Economics in the south of France. What Christian and Jean, you're both heavily involved. You're actually chairing and chairing the Climate Subcommittee of an Economic Commission for France's President Macron on economic solutions for the post COVID era. How about France? Is France holding the Paris Agreement? Is France planning strong action? How does the French position seem to be today on an international scene? I could intervene with the baby. Jean wants to say something on that. First thing, Europe is a good student here. Over the last 20 years, physically Europe has been able to fulfil its commitment. We reduce emissions in Europe by something like 20-25% compared to the 1990. So we did something very positive compared to many other international payers. That's not too bad. In France, with its nuclear electricity is one of the best countries in that dimension. That's the first point. Of course carbon pricing is something important for France and everywhere else. But we know that that will not be enough. Everybody knows we have many other possibilities that come on pricing. One important point, as I tried to express in my five minutes earlier this afternoon, there are a lot of actions that are possible that are not very efficient. In terms of cost per ton of fuel to save. Claude talked about hydrogen. Hydrogen is not a good solution. It could be a good solution in 10 or 15 years from now. And there are other solutions. Many of them have been submitted by the commercial citizens for the climate. Those 150 proposals, some of them are excellent. Some others did not necessarily pass the test of a positive cost benefit analysis. But that needs to be done. I think we should decide what's the carbon value, what's the benefit of those actions in terms of emissions of CO2. That's required of valuing carbon and compare that to the cost and to see whether the balance is positive or negative in terms of cost and benefit. That will need to be done. Many of those actions are very useful. I just mentioned the example of the plan to ban a thermic engine by the year 2040, which is currently in the French law. I hope that the carbon price will be large enough earlier than 2040 to eliminate a thermic engine on our roads before 2040. OK, thank you. Let's hope so. Claude, can we come back to you to zoom slightly back in again into one question that's been coming up quite a lot in the questions that have been coming in about transport. Electric cars, are they the solution? We would think perhaps not, should we? What could be the green solutions for transport? We've made errors in that field. How do you feel? Where are we at with research and development in that field today? Is there merit in committing to just one clean vehicle technology to enhance network effects and to accelerate uptake? Could you perhaps talk to us about any technological advances that seem promising? Well, for all those who have already worked on network economics, know how hard it is to give predictions on the equilibrium with network externalities. More generally, in most economic problems, the multiplicity of constraints and objectives result in so-called internal solutions. What in the energy lingo, we named the technology mix to manage the climate crisis. We need everything, renewable and nuclear production, demand response and flexible plants, storage and interconnection and so on. There is not one single solution. And for transport, the key is really, I think, autonomy. Without the carbon tax, it would be hard to do better than gasoline, at least in the short run. Liquid hydrogen is difficult to store in passenger cars. Compared to gasoline, you need much more, much heavier and much larger tanks on board cars. So it is not just from one to two. It's one to ten, almost. And in the future, if gasoline is banned from towns, as some municipalities commit to do, the outcome of the battle between electrical cars and electrical motors and fuel cells will depend on the network. On the density of loading and fueling stations and the feeling speed also. So I will not do a bet on which will be the winner or will be the winner in both. OK, risky bet. Jean, Tyrol, perhaps we could talk a little bit. We've had quite a lot of comments or questions in about the notion of growth. And this is one of the elements we put on our initial slide. Can we realistically keep on growing as we are? Do we need to reduce our energy consumption? Well, I don't think we have to stop growing, to be honest, and I don't think it's even feasible or politically. I mean, if you think about the yellow jackets in France, the effort which was required was very small and the purchasing power issue was huge. So if you think about the rest of the world and they all want to grow, and that's legitimate. So I think it's really not an issue about growing or stopping to grow because that's not acceptable for most of the world. The issue is one of adding the right institutions. We talk about carbon pricing, which is the obvious thing for an economist. But I want to emphasize R&D very much because we are late in the game. And, you know, if we don't do R&D, we are not going to succeed. And to do R&D, carbon price will help, of course, because the royalties you get on your green innovations actually come from the carbon price. Because if it's cheap to pollute, then you are not going to be willing to pay much for innovations, for licenses to innovations. We are going to need breakthrough innovations. So that's the kind of thing that I think is very important. So that's why I was mentioning an RPAE framework for Europe. We need something for the longer run. That's where the biggest market failure is. And as long as we don't have that, we are not going to succeed with all those net zero targets that we have assigned yourself, which would be real pity. So we need actually to make progress. And that cloud I would not make any bet on anything. And that's actually part of the thing, which is that we just don't know what is going to succeed. We need to have something which is peer reviewed, which has a chance to succeed. And then we have to take bets and we have to accept to fail. Thank you. OK, we have a few more minutes left. I'm just a quick comment to Marcel Boyer, just to say Marcel was one of the members of our community who would like to ask a question. It's just that we had a technical issue with the chat and your question hasn't come through to me. So if you'd like to put it again in the comments, that would be really helpful. Thank you very much. In the meantime, what I thought I might ask, I like ask the three of you to do as we close it. I'm going to have a short talk from our students today, which is very interesting. And I was I was quite keen for us to take as many questions as we could from students. We have a lot of students following us today. So if you just give me three seconds. Anybody who ever might feel like replying question from a student, how do we measure a country's greenhouse gas emissions according to its companies, even if they're not located in the same country or according to its territory? Well, Jenny, I think it's more about the question of do we need to tax value carbon on the basis of consumption of production? The difference between the two is export and imports. It's true that Europe has been quite good as I said earlier in terms of reducing emissions on its territory. But it has been at the cost of a digitalisation and a transfer of the most emitting activities to other parts of the world. It's a difficult question. I mean, and currently the debate in Europe, in particular around the EU Green Deal, is about transforming the system, the EU ETS system from a production-based system where we tax emissions, where they take place. That's where the goods generating those emissions are consumed. And currently we are shifting from production to consumption. And I think we should do both. I think if Europe wants to really place a big role in the world, it should at the same time impose a carbon pricing to all production within the continent. Not only those consumed on the continent, but also the goods that will be exported somewhere else. And on top of that, we should also tax emissions generated by products imported to Europe. So it will be the sum of the production and consumption in Europe. OK, thank you. Just one last question. I found your question, Marcel. So we're going to change continent and skip across to Canada. Marcel would like to talk about the Canadian government who has just announced a path for a generalised carbon tax, which will reach 170 Canadian dollars per tonne in 2030 with the early increase. The proceeds of this tax will be redistributed so it is revenue neutral. Do you think this is adequate? Well, it's not enough, but it's already something. Probably, I mean, in Europe, the idea is to have a carbon price around 200 euros per tonne or two by the year 2030. It's much more than the 170 Canadian dollars by that time. So what is good is that that's a clear commitment. I don't know whether it will pass a test of the control of the province and the state. But at least if it succeeds, it would be, I believe, the first country in the world that will impose not only a quantity but a price on carbon in 10 years from now. And with a clear message for all producers and emitters in Canada that if they want to maintain emissions, they will have to pay the cost. And that's something good and we don't have that in Europe. We have a quantity target and that implies a very large uncertainty born by the entrepreneur about what will be the cost of emitting CO2 in 10 years from now. And I like the Canadian solution of having a clear price objective. Okay, thank you. Okay, thank you very much for the times on question and answers. We have just a few more things on the programme for today. Right now we'd like to give the floor to some of our TSC students, students here at Toulouse School of Economics, who have received a grant for their carbon footprint calculator for all. We'd just like to give a few minutes to the students to talk us through their project. If you're there, I think we should have William talking to us about the project. Yeah, I'm there, thanks. Hi. So I'm just going to share a small presentation. So does it work? Yes, it does. So first of all, thanks a lot for receiving the financial aid from the alumni community because without this financing we couldn't have done this project. So I'm here to present it with Raime, which is in the public I think. But we also would like to thank all the members of the team. So there is also Tiffane, Vincent and Anise. So first of all, as Christian Goulier said, just said, we think it's very important to take into account the carbon footprint of countries because in a globalised economy it's necessary to account for the emissions from the government. The emissions from the goods that are produced domestically but also the goods and services that are imported and consumed in the country. So just to give you an example in 2016 in France, the carbon footprint of a French person was around 11 ton per year. While the Paris Agreement compatible trajectory, which aims at limiting global warming to Celsius degrees by 2100, would need to divide this figure by four to reach around two tons of CO2 per inhabitant. So this is very important that everyone could be aware of the carbon footprint. That's why we want to bring, by creating a carbon footprint calculator, awareness to all individuals, public and private actors about this fact. And we think that allowing people to know about the carbon footprint could incentivise them to encourage them to take concrete action to modify the consumption patterns and to reduce this carbon footprint. That's why we want to create a free and available to all carbon footprint calculators. So the idea of creating this calculator emerge when we notice that the existing calculators for individuals are very fragmented, meaning that some calculators are only looking at specific emissions. For example, air travel emissions, but I'll come back to that later. And many of the calculators do not provide for detailed methodology. So we don't know actually where does the data come from and whether it's from or not. And when we looked at the offer for the businesses, especially small businesses and local authorities, we identified that most of the calculators are actually too expensive for them, even though they would like to know their carbon footprint to take, as I said before, concrete action to reduce it. So just to give you an example of all the calculators we've been through, just to take some examples. For example, the one of WWF is only specific to Switzerland, which has a very different energy system than France. So, of course, the emissions of housing, for example, would be very different. The one of the DGAC only provides a methodology to estimate air travel emissions. The one of the Foundation Good Planets is quite comprehensive but does not provide for the methodology it uses. And to provide you with the last example, the one of the ADEM, which was launched a few weeks ago, is still very light and too simplified for us. And our goal is really to provide a comprehensive tool that could either ask you just a few questions and be a broad estimate of your carbon footprint. Or you could either dive into the specific aspects of your carbon footprint with much more detailed questions. So, in terms of the timeline and the next steps of our project, so we are a bit late due to the situation, the crisis situation, and because we were all students of the TSC last year, so we now have a job, so that's a bit more tricky to combine this project with our job, but we are working hard on it. So, for now, we established the methodology for accounting for the carbon footprint of individuals. So, it relies mostly on two databases from the ADEM, which is the State Agency for Ecological Transition, which are the Bascarbon and the Acre-Ballies. And just to give you some clues, it includes BRICS on food consumption, transportation, housing, leisure activities and habits, and also waste behaviour. And we want this calculator to be updated very regularly because the databases are updated very regularly. So, we want it to be up to date and to include the latest methodical advances. So, we are currently developing the websites which will host the carbon footprint calculator. So, I'm afraid we will have to wait a bit more. We think we're going to launch it in the first semester 2021, maybe in a few months. So, this website will contain all the questions to assess your carbon footprint, but also all the detailed methodology. And of course, we would be very keen on exchanges with users on the methodology and we will update it regularly so as to simplify the access to the websites and to the results. And we are also in the initial phase of developing a methodology to assess the carbon footprint of small businesses and local authorities. So, this is a much more comprehensive work because it includes more dimensions than only for individuals. So, this will come a bit later in the year. So, thank you again for the financing. It helped us a lot especially to implement and to create the website and to host it. So, thanks a lot because without this help, we couldn't have done it. So, now I'll leave the floor to some questions. Okay, thank you. William, thank you very much. Congratulations for your project to you and obviously on behalf of the whole team. Whoops, my zoom just disappeared. I think we're still here. We have had, what we'll do is we'll keep a hold of them for you in case you haven't seen them. We have some questions coming and I think some comments for you. Some interesting points, for example, from Eric Chanay, who's a close to TSC, who's given you some advice about some data and his sources of data. So, we'll keep hold of that conversation for you in case that can be of use. And unfortunately, we don't have much time now to carry on with that in terms of live questions. We're also being a bit careful about live questions today, given how we started our session, unfortunately. I'd like to pass the floor now to our outreach manager here at TSC, Jean-Baptiste, who is just going to speak to us very quickly about finding out more about today's topic. Jean-Baptiste. Hello, can everyone stay me? I can. Perfect, fantastic, okay. So, yeah, we wanted to tell you about the new TSC magazine that is coming out tonight. We will find in it more on what our free speakers talked about. And you will also find an exclusive interview with Google's chief economist, Al Varian, with Mactar Diop, the World Bank vice president, as well as the latest news and events from TSC and other point of view on climate and the fight on global warming. So, I invite you to go and read it. You can Google TSC Mag online or go on our website, tsc-fr.eu-tsc-mag, and you will be able to read it. We will also put the link in the chat. And it's available both in French and English. Thank you very much. Thanks, Jean-Baptiste. Thank you. Yeah, you'll find the articles indeed by our speakers today and also this other TSC faculty that couldn't be with us. We'll make sure we'll send the link to you even if it has gone through the chat in the post-event email.