 I'm Jay Fidel here on Think Tech. We're talking about global connections right now, and we're talking about the new security law in Hong Kong, which doesn't mean security at all, with Michael Davis and Victoria Huey, both skilled in Hong Kong, having spent years there. So welcome to the show, Michael and Victoria. Welcome to the show. Thank you, Jay. Okay, we're going to talk about what happened in Hong Kong over the past few days, and it's a sad discussion. It's a sad show because the Chinese PRC has been writing notes, taking notes on what's happened up to this point, and they really have come down with a clamp. Why is this clamp different from all the other clamps, Michael? Well, this time around, they're no longer hiding behind Hong Kong officials. They've taken direct charge in Hong Kong of law enforcement. And in doing so, they're literally imposing a kind of mainland style control over what goes on in Hong Kong with warrantless searches, secret surveillance. They mobilized a committee in Hong Kong under the chief executive to issue rules and regulations, allowing the police to do pretty much anything they want to do without judicial restraint in most cases. And it's interesting today, they issued two regulations under this, but there's no way they could have written these regulations, let's go on for pages and pages, about how they're going to control everything. They could not issue them, write them in the last week. These had to have been written in Beijing and handed to them. This committee in Hong Kong on safeguarding national security has a mainland appointed advisor, and it answers to the central people's government. So everything it does basically is being dictated in Beijing. We know that on the very first day, this law came into force, 370 people were arrested, 10 of them arrested under this national security law. A guy who approached the police on his motorcycle with a flag was basically a flag declaring something they don't want to hear was arrested for terrorism. So there's no fooling around. This is really by a kind of communist regime taking over an open society playbook. So Victoria, they say this is good for you, that everybody's going to learn to live with this, and that people will be happy once they get used to it. What do you think? Well, first of all, to go back to your title of today is that this is really not about national security. I say that this is not about national security. This is about regime security. It is about Xi Jinping's own power security. And therefore, if we understand that, then we can see why this law is so harsh. And I also want to quote Jerry Cohen, basically the dean of China Law. He said that this is not a second hand over. This is a Chinese takeover of Hong Kong. Essentially, we're going to see with all these new laws and regulations, not just that, Beijing has destroyed Hong Kong's one country, two systems. Because some people may say that, well, you know, it's one country, two systems, and then maybe Hong Kong is just going to be more like Shenzhen or Shanghai. And Shenzhen and Shanghai have been fighting. So you know, what's the fear? And we know that in Shanghai and Shenzhen, a lot of people do live properly. So what's the wrong with it? The problem is that in Shenzhen and in Shanghai, the majority of the people do buy the regime's bargain that you make money and keep your mouth shut. Now, why this is not going to happen in Hong Kong, not the design, is that especially with today's new announcements, that the regime also seems to want to, you know, if you are subject to any of those criminal charges of subversions, secession, terrorism, and collusion, you also, you're under circumstances of villains, you don't need to get any court warrant, they can freeze your assets, they can even confiscate your assets. And at the point when even the rights to private property, not just the rights to free speech is taken away, how can everyone happily bear after? Well, you know, it strikes me that, you know, had we waited, had Xi Jinping and the Politburo waited until 2047, we might have expected a, what do you call it, a more civilized transition. But they accelerated that. And not only did they accelerate it, but they made it really draconian. Am I right about this? This is worse than it would have been, than it would have been had it just gone the normal course. They couldn't wait. Well, the one thing is that, and many people will say, you know, you have Hong Kong's going to be part of China by 2040, 4047. If you're going to die someday, you know, what does, does it make any difference if you're going to die sooner or later? It doesn't make a difference for most people. And then another thing is that for a long time, the idea was not that the promise to Hong Kong was not that, you know, you guys have only a lifespan of 50 years. But after 50 years, China is going to become like Hong Kong. And therefore, there will not be any need to protect Hong Kong from the mainland system. Now everything has been sped up. And also that's what the way that the national security law has been imposed in Hong Kong, it's really a nuclear option. Beijing could have done it in another way. For example, by May, they managed to just push aside the democratically elected legislators who are doing filibuster of the national anthem law. They just kicked out those guys with the themes like in them from their own committee. And so it was passed in no time. So Beijing could have done the same thing with the national security law, but they chose the most struggling way. So I think all gloves are off. Yeah, but why, Michael, why, why have they taken such an aggressive stance? Was it necessary? This is obviously going to create big problems in Hong Kong and for the world to watch. I think this is a case of how they categorize Hong Kong. They categorize Hong Kong as one of those peripheral areas of China. That's a national security problem in their views. And it could be Xi Jinping's security or the Communist Party in general, which she treats as the same thing. And so Victoria's point earlier that this isn't Hong Kong isn't becoming Shanghai. No, it's becoming Xinjiang or Tibet. It's becoming one of those border regions of China, where the regime knows that nobody there really, the local people don't like them at all. And so the local people have to be contained and repressed. That's the model that's being applied, not not the model of make Hong Kong more like other Chinese cities. Because other Chinese cities, as Victoria pointed out, aren't populated with people that are out to throw the regime. So this is how they view Hong Kong. And so they've created a surveillance state. And it's chilling to read the regulations that they've issued today under this law. The law itself was chilling enough. But now the regulations they're issuing essentially give policemen and law enforcement officers carte blanche to do pretty much anything they want to do to silence the internet, to surveil you without you knowing it, to search your premises without a warrant, and to arrest you and charge you. And if they charge you under this law, the latter part of the law allows for the setting up in Hong Kong of an office for the safeguarding of national security that's to be staffed by members of the Public Security Bureau in the mainland. We don't know how many of these people will be in Hong Kong, but they're going to be there. And on their own, they're not subject to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. On their own, they can decide that what you're doing should be tried not in Hong Kong, but in mainland China. And you'll be taken across the border with no right to have a judge oversee the legitimacy of your arrest. What about the extradition controversy only a few months ago? Well, this makes the extradition law look like child's play. This is really no longer having to ask the Hong Kong government as the extradition law seemed to give the chief executive a lot of power. Of course, that may be meaningless distinction because the chief executive is clearly taking all instructions from the central government. She's in effect part of it, part of the central government. And so now they'll do all these things as they please. And there's an article in there that prohibits a kind of collusion with foreign forces. Beijing always believes when people resist their rule that there's foreign collusion. They can't imagine that people would simply not want the kind of governance they provide. So there must be foreign collusion. And now, basically, if you consult or get advice from an international human rights organization, you could be charged with collusion. I'm very much worried about many friends who work for NGOs on human rights in Hong Kong. And I'm sure they're worried as well because that could be treated as foreign collusion. Listen, doesn't this go beyond the borders of Hong Kong? Isn't it possible that somebody could be outside of Hong Kong and charged under this law? I mean, you, for example, if you speak against the PRC and here in the United States, theoretically, you're violating this law. Can you go back, Michael? Well, that's the question we don't know. And a lot of academics foreign, the universities in Hong Kong are among the top-rated universities in Asia. Many of them ranked among the top in the world because they have international faculties, high levels of academic freedom that distinguishes them. And so they're, and they have acceptable salaries. So a large portion of their faculties are foreigners. And so now there's a big question, what does the impact even on universities there? Will they be degraded because foreign faculty members are fearful of coming in? Now, I'm a person who comes regularly to teach in Hong Kong. And there's a judgment going to have to be made, I guess, about what, you know, whether I can go there and teach. I would say Victoria, because she's even more active on these issues than I am, pretty much has concluded that she can't return to Hong Kong now unless something changes. Because Victoria, can we talk about that? In Notre Dame, you have spoken on this issue. You and Michael, both, I guess it's a fundamental point for the two of you. Can you go back? Do you recommend he go back? Would you both go back? Or are you in danger to go back? Are you in danger to be here in the United States under this law which reaches so far? This is a very important question. Essentially, Beijing, one of the clauses says that this law applies to non-residents as well as residents of Hong Kong. If you have permanent residency in Hong Kong, you are going to be subjected to the same treatment as local residents. If you do not have permanent residency in Hong Kong, then you could be deported plus some other kind of punishments unspecified. Essentially, according to Jerry Cohen again, actually according to Don Clark, another legal scholar, that this is Beijing exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. Why? Essentially, one thing I think is precisely because Hong Kongers in the past year have been very effective, very organized in mobilizing for international support, mobilizing for Washington support, London support, EU parliamentarian support, Japanese support for the protests going on. And so this is why Beijing added the collusion charge. And then at the same time, that Beijing has long been saying that we are really nice, we don't worry about China's rise, this is really our peaceful rise. And we think about Confucianism, Confucianism always preaches peace. And so don't worry about it. And a lot of people bought that argument about China's soft power. But several years ago, the National Endowment for Democracy already said that while Beijing was not really using his military, was not sending anyone out in uniform, but this is really sharp power using economic coercion. What's striking about this law is that Beijing doesn't even bother with only economic coercion, but also using the law to repress people so that people would silence themselves. So after the BBC booked me to speak at the six o'clock news, and they produced a comment a little bit, they said, are you sure that we don't want you to subject you to life imprisonment and more? And so a lot of people are silent, a lot of people I know actually would be raised, every trace of them ever seen anything. Michael, what about the academic community outside of Hong Kong that looks in? For example, you're associated with Jindal University. How do people there feel about this? How does the academic community around the world feel about this? There must be a reaction. They all know about it, and they must all be concerned. Am I right? Oh, yes, I get a lot of, I mean, I'm also associated with Columbia University. I think in general, both in America and in India, the two examples we've mentioned here, there's a lot of concern. I've actually been on a TV program in India as well to talk about this, and scholars on India, because it's a less developed country, has in some sense admired China because China's rapid economic development. And so a country like India faces this dilemma, do we become more hardline to be like China? Or do we insist on staying with our Indian democracy? And I think the sentiment in India is to be more democratic. But at the same time, there's certainly a kind of populist leadership now that tells the other way. So China is presenting its neighbors with a dilemma. And of course, China has had an open conflict with India on the border. So this is the context. So what about academics going to Hong Kong, conducting academic exchange and so on? I think it's a tough question. We don't know yet what the impact will be. But we know that, as Victoria just pointed out, that this law reaches non-residents and residents alike. It applies to everybody in the world, even you, Jay. Journalists are worried about this, about whether if they say or do things about Hong Kong and China's practices in Hong Kong, will there be some kind of consequence? So academics face the same question. And right now, it's an unknown exactly what the risks are. And so if and when they start arresting academics or journalists, then I think all bets will be off that then at that point, everybody will assume they cannot go to Hong Kong where they could risk being arrested. So Victoria, what effect in the business community in Hong Kong? I have a recollection that back in, what, 1997, the PRC sort of undermined the business community by offering them special arrangements and special deals. And that way, they assuaged them into the takeover. Is that happening again? Is the PRC offering the business community special deals and funds and arrangements so as to, you know, subpoin them to undermine their any alliance they might have with the with the people who are calling for democracy? Well, there's no question that because China has enormous economic power, so it's been used in an enormous portion, even before the law was propagated, people were compelled to line up to touch support for the law. They didn't know what, you know, what the law said, but they were told to to touch support. So Hong Kong's richest man, Likashin, he pledged support. HSBC, along with the Senator, these British banks, because they, most of the businesses are done in Hong Kong, most of the profits are made in Hong Kong. They also were made to touch support. And what is really striking is, I mentioned too, that the new regulations released today are striking in the sense that not just that you, that residents, if you criticize Beijing, that you are vulnerable to repression, imprisonment, torture and more, but that international businesses, they are especially information provider, that if there's any material involved, you know, because the definition of collusion, subversion, secession, terrorism, so broad, and anyone who provides assistance can also get into trouble. So these international providers are told that they have to provide information. They do not have the right to remain silent, and if they do not cooperate, they are subject to happy fines as well as imprisonment. This is essentially telling the international community that, you know, follow my way, or you get into trouble. Why would Beijing want to do that? Apparently, they really want to cover Hong Kong. They don't care about the business and economic environment anymore. What about the people in the street, the people in the umbrella movement? All those are relatively young people who have protested, a lot of them students. How have they taken this? There have been indications in the news that they have withdrawn from protest organizations. They've resigned from roles in protest organizations, and they're backing off and trying to disappear so they don't get prosecuted. It sounds like this is having the desired effect that people are really, really intimidated in the streets of Hong Kong. Am I right? You're quite right. Essentially, the law, as you know, all the Beijing advocates have been saying that the law has to be really, really harsh to have the desired deterrence effect. And then the democytor, for example, you talk about the young people who are the forefront. First, the anti-national education campaign in 2012, and then the umbrella movement in 2014, they disbanded in need just several hours before the national security law was passed. And at the same time, some students were also trying to organize boycotts and medical workers in different unions. They were new reform and they were trying to also organize strikes, but people were intimidated. And so what about the people who are not intimidated, who have still been protesting since July 1st? And they're all subject to arrest. So because the government banned the slogan, liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times. And so yesterday, people were just holding up blank sheets of white paper. And even those people were arrested. So essentially, yes, so there is really no freedom of expression in Hong Kong. Even a white sheet. But what is important is that Beijing, apparently, his time is not satisfied with just the people out that did not have the right to remain silent. But it's also reaching a heavy arms to international businesses. Even the rights to property rights is also in jeopardy now. So Michael, what's left? You know, people are going to be very intimidated and their right to be intimidated. They'll wind up in a retraining facility. They'll wind up being tried, extradited, summarily tried in mainland China and sent to retraining or prison for a long time for a really minor First Amendment conscious expression. What's left for them? Well, this is the big question that we're going to have to see as this thing evolves. The message seems to be quite clear, for example, that if they engage in any kind of protest, no matter how innocuous it may appear, that they could be arrested and charged. And they charge with a very serious crime. So the punishment for these four crimes range from three years to life in prison. And if they're drugged across the border to the mainland, it could possibly be the case that they, because then the national laws apply, the Hong Kong law stops applying. None of the national security laws, they could be executed. So it's very severe. Now the British have, you know, offered an escape route because they're saying that all Hong Kongers who hold this passport, the BNO passport, could then go to Britain and establish citizenship there. And that reaches about three million Hong Kong people, nearly half the population. As I understand it includes their family members, so maybe more than half the population. Of course, Hong Kong people don't all want to move to Britain, but given the situation that's evolving, there will be a lot of them wanting to do that. And so Chinese officials now have proclaimed that they're going to impose an exit permit requirement to try to stop people from leaving. So this is a very relentless effort to repress and contain any opposition in Hong Kong. And so the pretence in the basic law that Hong Kong people would be ruling Hong Kong has been thrown out the window. How about the US? Is the US offered people who want to leave any sanctuary? Well, the US right now is kind of ambiguous in that. I mean, the Congress is trying to enact laws that would offer asylum. But then we know the current administration has virtually no asylum cases. So we don't know whether anything done in Congress will result in anything done in the White House, whether they will be executed. Let me add to this is that so Hong Kongers, as I said before, that have become very organized and very supportive of what is going on in Hong Kong. And that is invited Beijing is also the crime of pollution. But precisely because of the crime of pollution, so then we actually have to step up our work. Hong Kong people in the US have formed the Hong Kong Democracy Council. We have been very effective at pushing for the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in amendments to the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. And just in the past week, we also managed to get the Hong Kong Autonomy Act passed by Congress and then essentially because these acts are passed by unanimously and so therefore they are veto proof by the President. But still, passing the acts is one thing. A lot of those acts when empowered, the administration, the President, has to translate them into policies. And that is also where maybe American voters can also help with that. Another bill that we are pushing for is the Hong Kong Safe Harbour Act and the Hong Kong People Freedom and Choice Act. And these acts would give asylum and refugee status to Hong Kongers, whether they are apart from Hong Kong or they are here in the US. And at the same time, if there's enough American support, then those acts can get passed. And then at the same time, I think ultimately even the President, who's been calling the Presidents my friend, my buddy, I like him. I think he likes me, too, would also then translate these acts into policies. Victoria, how does this all intersect with COVID? Because every day, the headline is about COVID around the world, including in Hong Kong, including in China. So how does it intersect? I mean, could it be that Xi Jinping wanted to do this at a time when we had a pandemic? How does the pandemic affect all these events we've been talking about? I think you're quite right. China got hit by the coronavirus first, and then it also recovered early. And then by the time it was recovering, then the virus actually got spread to Europe and the US and with mismanagement. The US is now suffering even more and new spikes. And so definitely, I would say that China, Beijing calculates that people make care about what happens in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, in Taiwan, and the Indian-Chinese border if they are just sitting around with extra money and extra attention. But if they themselves do not have jobs, they worry about what happens in the morning, then people will pay very little attention to what goes on around the world, especially you know that Americans tend to pay less attention to international news than Europeans. But again, Beijing could have done this law through other ways by pushing it through the Legislative Council, and then the world would probably have preferred to look the other way. But it has taken the most blatant approach so that the world cannot look the other way. I think that this is backfiring. And I'm thinking that maybe you know the new regulations by even depriving people of the right to preserving their private property, maybe that would get so backfired that you know, different countries are providing exits for Hong Kongers, and Hong Kong will lose its autonomous status. And then Beijing will wind up with an empty shell. I think an important issue here is there's been a contest going on in the world between the Beijing model and the sort of free market model that the American United States has long sponsored. And a lot of the poor underdeveloped countries sometimes may think, well, Beijing, you know, let's work with Beijing because this is going to be to our advantage. I think what's happening in Hong Kong is kind of a microcosm of what the price of the Beijing model is. You know, when there's a big country like China, and it's getting richer, and you know, we're obviously doing better than it was during the more extreme periods in the past, then people might say, well, look at this, this is quite successful. I know a lot of my friends in India would in recent years look at Shanghai skyline and say, wow, that looks a lot better than Mumbai. And so they're impressed with it. But I think what we're seeing here in the Hong Kong example is that this is much more than just getting rich, that there's a real heavy price to pay for following that model. And I think so in some ways Hong Kong has very pointy elbows and it's finding its way into international attention in spite of COVID-19. Well, that's good. I wanted to ask you about the long plan for China and for Xi Jinping. So we have seen them take over Tibet and repress Tibet. We have seen them push Taiwan around unsuccessfully lately. We have seen them on the Mekong affecting the river and energy in the Southeast Asia. And most recently we've seen them on the border in the Himalayas fighting over a border with India. In each case expanding, and of course we have the Belt and Road Initiative and we have the East China Sea and the South China Sea and all that, all this stuff is happening under Xi Jinping. And it all seems to have a common denominator and that is he wants to expand China's geography and China's influence all over the world. Isn't this part of that? Isn't this part of a larger expansion plan by Xi Jinping? I would say, let me explain that. I think I would say that this is Xi Jinping's China dream because when he came to power he was talking about the China dream, the dream of reviving China's historical greatness. But essentially, you know, it is about essentially, and this is also why that he abolished the term limits several years ago. And so that he in his view that, you know, if I can reign into that, I can reign in Xinjiang, I can reign in Hong Kong, I cannot, and many people will including believe that if Hong Kong, if nobody cares about Hong Kong, just as they look the other way from the education camps in Xinjiang, then the next will be Beijing, or sorry, it will be Taiwan. And so after all of that, then essentially, and all this surrounding areas, and then this is, you know, China's revival of greatness, this is history, and then he will go down in history as the greatest ever Chinese leader. Yeah, he makes himself out to be like Mao. He wrote himself into the Constitution, gave special preference to his words. He extended his term. He's a lot different than Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintai. He's really looking for expansion here. So is this about China or is it about Xi Jinping trying to make himself an emperor for life and giving himself the legacy of an expanded China? I will say that he's way more than Mao. As I said, he really wants to go down in history as the greatest leader of all time, from the beginning up to the first emperor of the Qing Dynasty all the way down. And Chinese emperors have always had this desire, every single one of them says that I can do something that my predecessors could not do. I think this is what Xi Jinping wants to achieve is that I'm at the long line of this Chinese history. I'm going to make China the greatest ever. The only problem is that a lot of the recent actions in particular have really backfired. So just two days ago, again, we have, we have seen a lot of Chinese scholars who've long really criticized containment of all-long champion engagement, including for example, UCSD Susan Schur. And she said, with Hong Kong, I can see that this completely fundamentally changes my understanding of what China stands for and how the U.S. should react to this. And also beginning from last fall, when I testified at the Congress on September 4th last year, I said that, you know, the world now, Washington finally now talks about the China Reckoning. They should have looked at Hong Kong. Hong Kong represents, the Hong Kong Reckoning represents what the China Reckoning should look like. So do you think Congress is going to do anything about this? Do you think Trump is going to do anything? Well, the Congress is very, as I said, Congress is really very united in support, behind supporting Hong Kong. And of course, we know that Republicans and Democrats pretty much hate each other on every single issue. The one thing that unites them is Hong Kong. So all these acts have had bipartisan support. The only question is, all these acts, you know, so far have not really been translated into policies, except for two baby steps. The first baby step that the administration took was that they're going to impose these sanctions on Chinese officials. Well, Xi Jinping's daughter really graduated from Harvard, so he doesn't care. He doesn't have another young daughter. Maybe, you know, he's great grandkids, but he doesn't care. And then the second policy is to put a ban on the export of dual use technologies to Hong Kong, because a lot of state-owned enterprises have been using Hong Kong to then bring in dual use technologies, you know, input them into Hong Kong, turn them around and bring them across the border. These are baby steps. Beijing is essentially completely killing Hong Kong. Then, you know, why should Hong Kong continue to and why should the world allow Beijing to enjoy all the privileges that Hong Kong has based on its autonomous status? So, Victoria, if I want to know more about this, if I want to see, you know, your testimony, if I want to connect up and maybe help some of these organizations that have been formed, where do I go? Where do I go? Well, my blog is Victoria T. B. Hoi. It's Victoria T and B in the HUI dot wordpress.com. And also, follow the work of Hong Kong Democracy Council. Go to the Facebook and follow us on Twitter. We have been basically taking a lot of these actions that are very important for, you know, essentially, we need the world to pay attention to Hong Kong. Otherwise, Hong Kong would be sent into like Xinjiang and Tibet. And then, despite the threat of pollution, Hong Kong people in the U.S. are very, very deterrent. So, Michael, you and I have talked about this so many times, you know, and each time our discussion, well, it's sadder. Each time this is a greater tragedy than before. And it has all, you know, the elements of a Greek or Roman tragedy, operatic, if you will. Where are we going on this? Have you got a sense of direction? Have you got a sense of what the future will bring? Well, I think it's one of those kinds of debates where people cannot really give up. I mean, you and I, being abroad, we could go visit a country, pick any, and we could see their problems and maybe be horrified and think, well, there's nothing that these people are going to lose. They can't do anything about this. It's horrible. When you're there, you can't do that. When you're there, when you're the people of that place and these things are happening, then you're really motivated to stick with it and address it. Two possibilities. One is people will take to the streets there in Hong Kong and perhaps overload the jails. And instead of being hospitals overloaded in Hong Kong, it'll be jails. Or if the situation is in their view so hopeless on the ground, then they're going to flee. And they'll either leave Hong Kong legally without having some exit problems, or they'll take to boats and leave Hong Kong. But they will leave. And if they're overseas, then they're going to be a huge overseas constituency influencing political leaders around the world, like Victoria's organization does, to pay attention to Hong Kong and congressional bodies to pay attention. And so on. So this is kind of where it's headed. It didn't have to go to this. Quite frankly, I've always believed that if China was simply carried out what was in its basic law, allowing Hong Kong people to rule Hong Kong, trust their judgment a bit, then there would have not developed such an extreme opposition, as we saw last year. That opposition last year was an expression of total frustration with what Beijing is doing. And this year that frustration is turning into fear because of Beijing's more extreme response and continuing erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy to the point now where they've essentially taken it away entirely. So this is where the game is right now. But I expect people will keep working at this one. We have another example that we all know, which are Tibetans. 70 years later, they're still organized around the world. And what to the rest of us may seem sometimes hopeless. But if you're one of the people that's affected in this way, hopelessness is not an option. Yeah, I also want to just add that I wrote another piece in on the eve of the National Security Laws Enettement. And I was thinking that my God, because I also teach courses on different democracy movements around the world. And it occurred to me that Hong Kong has become even more repressive than South Africa during apartheid. More repressive than Prague under Soviet control. More repressive than Burma under the under the military hunting ratio. And almost as bad as Denmark during Nazi occupation. And then, but in every single one of these cases, when people don't give up, so Asa Sushi, before she became a defender of genocide, she also championed freedom from fear that we have to basically make sure that we keep the fighting going. And at the same time, so as we do not give up, we haven't failed. And this is actually the message that people have really been kind of like ingrained in mind. It strikes me that this is not only a test of the people of Hong Kong and Hong Kong as a society. It's also a test of the world in the way the world watches and hopefully acts on this. It's a global test. Well, thank you, Michael. Thank you so much. Thank you, Victoria. Thank you so much. I hope we can circle back at a later time and catch other events, which I'm sure will be equally interesting or frightening, as the case may be. Thank you so much, Michael, Victoria. Aloha. I'd be welcome.