 Welcome to another episode of Islamabad today on Think Tech Hawaii. I'm your host, Hamza Raffa-do-San. Ramazan Mubarak to everybody in the United States, here in Pakistan, and all across South Asia, as well as across the Middle East, and all across the world, for that matter. And we're hoping that this entire occasion brings out the best in you spiritually, and you're able to reflect on all the good tidings of the world and God's blessings. But when we talk about the tidings of the world, the state of India-Pakistan relations has been in flux for quite some time. The 2024 elections here in Pakistan have just taken place with the new Shabash Sharif-led administration and the cabinet actually taking oath just recently. Many political parties have declined to accept the mandate of this particular government. And obviously, the possibilities of that are from the Pakistan People's Party is now the president of the country. Indo-Pak relations, you know, when we talk about the revocation of Article 370 of India's constitution, which resulted in the annexation of Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir, two Indian allegations of Pakistan sponsoring a cross-border terrorism has been in the state of flux as well. Whether or not the relations will improve after the 2024 elections have taken place here in Pakistan, that's exactly what we're going to be discussing today. I have with me a professor and a head of department of the School of Politics and International Relations at Kadyatum University, Dr. Zaffir Nawaz as well. Dr. Zaffir, thank you so much for having, you know, for coming on my show. Thank you very much for the invitation. All right, so let's start off with the results of the 2024 elections. Obviously, you have the Pakistan Muslim League, a Nawaz-led government in power. Do you think that there will be a policy shift from Pakistan or a policy shift from New Delhi with regard to how, you know, bilateral relations would actually move forward, or do you think that the status quo will be maintained? I'm sorry, when the Prime Minister Shivaj Shiv took the oath, we heard that the Prime Minister Moody greeted it. And after that congratulation message, Prime Minister Shivaj also responded. But those exchange of messages were important because it took place after a long interval. But at the same time, there was no indication that both sides were willing to, or are willing to change the, this current status quo, which you very rightly mentioned. Of course, the Pakistan has a new government, but the same coalition. Of course, Pakistan is a party which is not joining the government, but at the same time, it is the part of the coalition and at this time, President Zardari is sitting in the presidency. If we see the President Zardari's mindset or his past politics, he desires to break the ice and he sport the dialogue process between India and Pakistan. Same as against the previous PML and governments Prime Minister Nawashi was used as a Prime Minister and now Shabashi, the PML and governments also tried during their time to improve the relations with India. So if we can focus on this political mindset, which is now part of the government, I think that they desired, they tried to change the status quo, restore the full diplomatic relations and improve the relations. Now, this is the one side that Pakistanis are discussing, but there is a big obstacle. Pakistan has a very clear stance that India has to change its position or make some kind of a gesture on the sea in which it took place on August 5, 2019. My understanding is that Prime Minister Modi is not flexible on it. And recently, if you see, he is now in the election and after the election, of course, you are expecting me to answer in the post-India election as well, which will be completed somewhere in June and then we are anticipating the situation after the June, 2024. But if you see the trend in India for instance, a few days back, they implemented this controversial citizen act. Minorities will be suffering, especially the Muslim minorities. Then we have to wait and see how the election works. But in the last one and a half year, Indian, not Prime Minister Modi, but Indian other cabinet members of the Modi government, they were signaling something as you can say jingoism or this kind of the thing. Keeping in mind that we have to wait and see if Prime Minister Modi is able, or better be able to muster the support of ultra-nationalists, where people in the election by highlighting the threat on the Chinese side, deploying on the Chinese side or threat from the Chinese side, then maybe there's a chance. But my understanding is to muster the vote off in Guptua, they have to target sooner on later Pakistan in the election campaign, which Prime Minister Modi did in 2014, 2019 and a gig. Then certainly this rhetoric, of course, it could be an election rhetoric, but one can be not too optimistic about the breaking of the ice and changing of the status quo in the near future. Okay, yeah, that's a fair enough analysis, but Prime Minister Modi also visited Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Just recently, he said that the revocation of Article 370 was the right gesture or the right policy adopted by India because it could actually result in greater employment prospects. However, the indigenous Kashmiri population rebuffed his entire narrative and said that unless and until a political solution to the entire Kashmir crisis does not materialize, then it's very difficult for Kashmiris to move forward with the Modi government. Now, Modi clearly does not have a lot of appeal in Kashmir. And when we talk about Pakistani domestic electoral politics, then India bashing is not part of Pakistan's election. Yes, the political parties internally, but they don't really necessarily bash India. Shabash Sharif is known to be a more, you could say, yes, he is also pro-establishment and he's also known to be very much receptive towards dialogue with India as well. So do you think that there's going to be a break in the past with regard to how Pakistan views it? Because Modi clearly is not getting a lot of traction, whether it's in the Kashmir electorate or whether it's in the Pakistani election campaigning. But do you think Shabash Sharif will be the first one to extend a friendly hand or a gesture of peace towards India? Or do you think that Modi should be doing it instead? Hamza, you were rightly pointed out when we critically examined the last five general lectures in Pakistan, India bashing did not take place. Even the religious political parties did, especially in Islam, it did not bash India. So it means that political forces in Pakistan realized that India bashing is not worth in the election campaigns and it makes them handicapped. But on the other side, when you look about India's 2014 and 19 elections, you have to not forget Pakistan bashing was very much there. And from 2016, India used the surgical strike or militaristic postures to win the election. In the BJP win the election, in the, you can say, state elections as well as the general election. No, it is an interesting thing which we have to not ignore. Prime Minister Modi is using the natoism or traditionalism when he says centuries of the Hindu exploitation. And on the basis of that, he's making or gaining the vote, targeting the Muslim artificial, targeting the Pakistan. Realizing that it will not serve the India as a state purpose, but for an election that is the bashing is very important. If India stopped, I mean, BJP stopped bashing Pakistan or as you can say, selling the victimhood narrative, they failed to get the Hindutva vote or establish the Hindu identity. This is it. But in the case of Pakistan, we have moved ahead in this context. Now, here is the question is that whether in the coming days, Prime Minister Modi, as you referred, acceptability in Kashmiri. Prime Minister Modi or BJP government lost acceptability in the Kashmir because in the Kashmian occupied Kashmir, there are two groups. One was considered pro-independent, pro-Plevisite, pro-Pakistan. Right. And there was an important group like Mahbubah, Mufti, Abdullah, Abdullah, this group, there was pro daily group. Kashmiri leadership pro daily. Right. But since that 2019 August 5, this pro daily group had already denounced their UK's allegiance towards the daily. They are simply saying that daily lost them. So it means that there's no pro daily group now. They all are united on Kashmiri's right. In this context, I think of course in the last five years, Kashmir is, or even before, since Prime Minister Modi came into power, Kashmir is facing or entire Kashmir is in a curfew kind of a position. And terrorism is there or state, what you call it, high-handedness is there. But I think that they can manage it. Demographic can be changed. The unrest will continue in the occupied Kashmir. And India is so big. And international community as a lesser, you can say a third for the Kashmiri's sufferings. We have seen the international community or in a real policy, all these words, human rights, or you can say these kind of things lost their significance. Why? Because see in Gaza what is happening, see what is happening in Kashmir. So international community pressure is very less on the India and Modi will continue. Now, here is my point. If Modi will continue with his current Kashmir policy, Kashmiri's will continue with their resistors, violent resistors as well as political resistors. And Delhi is lacking the pro-Kashmiri lobby or pro-Deli lobby. Certainly the current situation will continue to whom they blame. Easiest ways to blame Pakistan and they will continue to blaming it. Because believing Pakistan, it also serves the Hindutva purpose, narrative of victim. So it's such a situation, even if Prime Minister Nawaz Shabashiv desires and then desires. Oh, and Pakistan is looking for breaking the ice and moving ahead. Even if it desires, is there willingness in Delhi or will the generally trend indicates Prime Minister Modi will be again a third-type Prime Minister of India? Will Prime Minister Modi prepare or able to shake head? Don't forget, after 2014, he added three attempts, shaking hand with the Prime Minister, former Prime Minister Shabashiv, but you have to miss. He take one step forward, two step backward. So even if we say, send a gesture after his reelection that he wanted to move ahead, break the state to school and improve the relation, nuclear arms states cannot live in a deadlock, that will be a gesture. My fear is, immediately after that we will take two step back. That is the trend which we have noticed with the Prime Minister Modi. So I'm not very much optimistic. Of course, we desire in Islamabad. I mean, we mean Pakistani establishment, Pakistani politician, Pakistani academia, that there's need to break the ice and move ahead with India. Right, absolutely. Let's come to the 2024 Indian elections now. I mean, Modi enjoys the immense amount of popularity within India, but we've seen the results of state-level elections where the BJP is actually lost. We've seen the election results in Karnataka and there has been a lot of resistance to the Modi rule from farmer protests in Punjab as well. And from the predominantly Sikh community. And that has resulted in, you could say, the galvanization of the Halestan movement in Canada, as well as in different parts of the Western world as well. So Modi clearly has policy challenges as well. Faced with Pakistan would ensure that India's insecurity would actually be addressed. Now, just to be, you know, I don't endorse this entire narrative, but India says that Pakistan also sponsors terrorism, which results in, you know, dialogues and CBMs and you could say track two level, you could say negotiations being compromised. Now, when we look at what will happen in the Indian electoral landscape after April or June 2024, do you think that A, number one, the Modi regime will be challenged by the Congress party or if Modi is to stay in power, does that mean that any sort of, you could say confidence building measures with Pakistan would be, you know, very illusive? I think that the campaign of the Sikhs or protestors Sikhs will serve the Modi, Modi's Hindutva narrative. And that's what is required. That's why it's not settling it. Second is 80% Hindus and Hindutva forces are going to support him. Is the Congress or the Collegiate party or the 26th party's collision with the abbreviation of India? India, yeah. Yes, in some states there was, but India is too big. And a few states results which were not in favor of a BJP, they may create that in those states maybe Modi lose, but not in the entire India. So the entire trend is that he will be winning at the big business. The entire big business in India is in favor of the move. So whether we like him or not, Narendra Modi, economic policy, Narendra Modi's foreign policy, Narendra Modi's what you call it naturalistic policy, they are successful in Indian perspective and he has a voteback and definitely he will be winning. Now here is the point that after victory, what he will do. Some people think that he maybe it will be last year and he will be looking for a Nobel Peace Prize to resolving the Kashmir Corona dispute, but to say, I think wishful thinking. The entire Prime Minister Modi's successor like Amit Shah or other, they are hardcore, you can say BJP or Indutva, I have sort of thing. Secondly, by establishing good relations with Pakistan, what they will gain? They will be, they have to compromise on their narrative, exploitation narrative, or taking the negative narrative. They are not willing because if you take anything or flexible position on Kashmir or change his view, it will not serve as Indutva policy. So realistically speaking, I think there is no attraction for the Prime Minister Modi for the time being to establish a good relations with Pakistan. And in the international arena, he has a better position and in the international arena, Pakistan is viewed as a political instable state. Of course, our establishment of this new government, we aspire that the things will move on the better, move towards better situation, but we are still in the government that has just started working. So Pakistan has to make itself attractive, keeping in mind we cannot, even if we are attractive for Modi as a politician, it definitely not compromise on his domestic costuance. Right. So let's come to the point that you just alluded to, just about a few seconds ago with regard to Pakistan's profile internationally. There'd be those who would argue that if Pakistan does economically prosper, GDP growth rates increase, human development indexes, actually many of these indicators, whether it's gender empowerment or the state of welfare in the country, that actually improves as well. That could result in some sort of, you could say, fold peace with India with economic cooperation taking place, even though many of the political disputes remain unresolved. Do you agree with that notion that if Pakistan is economically prosperous or manages to put its own house in order, then you could have trading ties with India, but you could also have fold peace where political issues remain unresolved? I think that it's a too, you can say optimistic observation. Okay. Pakistan had historically economic good times. And India at that time, early 90s, better. But still the relations were having ups and downs. Pakistan's economic stability or a political stability, definitely improve the image of the state and make the state more attractive for direct, foreign direct investment of these kind of the case. The problem with India is not economic, Pakistan is a big economic market for India or India is a big economic market for Pakistan, we both know each other. But the problem is India's strategic narrative and India's South Asian viewpoint. The problem is the United States endorsing India since 2009 as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. So where India looks itself as a successor of British Raj or the things in the South Asia, it's a great power and Pakistan is not willing to compromise or its sovereign state. So these are the, what you call it, constructs of the region and those constructs always create the huddles. India is a big power, major power, but not too big that it can snub Pakistan or rub its nose in Pakistan. It's equally a strong military power, but not in a position to defeat India. So in this kind of a balance or strategic imbalance or a balance, definitely India desires that we can accept. So economics is overruled by the or the strategic issues taken ahead, prioritized and economic is secondary. So even if Pakistan become very economically skewed, obviously economic security is going to strengthen your defense, but economic security cannot make you attractive for India. Right, absolutely. Let's come to the possible or the probable or you could say absolutely abstract notion of nuclear weapons usage. Obviously, Pakistan and India being two nuclear powers, non-signatories to the NPT, you've had a limited war actually taking place in Kargil. You've had fears of a nuclear escalation. Obviously you've written a book on this as well. Don't tell me about the possibility of India and Pakistan actually moving towards nuclear escalation because this is a narrative which is very popular in the United States. Obviously I consider it personally to be an alarmist narrative. It's not as if two countries would decide to actually use nuclear weapons for the sake of it. And various theorists such as Scott Sagan have actually said that your nuclear weapons also has deterrence value as well, where two countries would not necessarily be inclined towards attacking each other and it's war for deterrence value. But given the Hindu nationalistic tendencies in India and you could say, well, not necessarily a pro-India government or a more friendly government of Pakistan, if there is a skirmish, for example, a Pulwama attack which actually takes place or cross-border terrorism which takes place, I'm not talking about Pakistan towards India. It could also be Baloch nationalists and Balochistan, which are also sponsored by India. In such a scenario, it does take place and given that Modi has a second term, do you think that nuclear escalation is a possibility? It depends on the world trend. The trend is more nuclear weapons. Whether you'll see the American nuclear poster review 2022, Russian policy, Chinese policy, or other policies. Indian policy, yeah. Yeah, it pops. Now here scenario which you built, it's correct, Pakistan and India are the only nuclear arms states which had it here compared in 2019. And one state lost its nuclear crops and its pallet was arrested. Though India is a conventionally bigger number, but failed to have, but it lost its confidence in its conventional defense and Prime Minister Modi started signaling of the nuclear, use of nuclear. India went for deployment of the naval asset, including Arihan submarine, were immediately deployed in the sea. So that deployment and then the way the nuclear rhetoric and then Pakistan's limitation indicates that a limited war, which India thinks that it can use it for pursuit of its objectives, could not remain a limited war. Americans or the others, alarmists, you can say a position is very much justified. If you see, India tested on 11th March, a Agni five with the MoV technology. Now MoVing Agni five make Agni five a one missile with the five to 10 warheads. And those warheads can be used against Pakistan. So what it is it? So they are with the one delivery vehicle that are using warheads. Pakistan had already tested the MoV technology or MoV missile Ababil and retested recently, first time in January, 2017. In case of Pakistan, I wrote a recently a column in the Arab news of this and number of the sense that you were saying in 2017 that the MoV will be going to bring stability. The reason was that I was keeping in mind India's missile defense system. So MoV technology is to defeat the missile defense system. So it was restoring the balance of terror. Now here when India comes, India is coupling the MoV technology and BMD together, bringing to the armed forces naturally, what is the net result? The journal analysis says that the MoV technology increases or make crisis stability move for giant. This is a consensus of the international scholars and it indicates. Secondly, the way India and Pakistan are investing in the delivery vehicles and within the delivery vehicles investing in the MoV, opposite now here, I'm not blaming India or Pakistan either. What is the net outcome? Armed race always leads to the escalation of the crisis or at least towards the escalation of the conflict, having some kind of conflict, having a probability of uses of the nuclear weapon. So in limited world, I do agree with you. Pakistani scholars or Pakistani policymakers confidently say that India and Pakistan know each other. We had a five, you can say conflict in the aftermath of the nuclear test, Gargle, 2001, 2002, 2000, Mumbai, then we have a, you can say surgical strike, so-called claim by India in 2016 and ultimately, but point here is in all these four, India's compel strategy work, but in the same type, Pakistan's deterrence also work. Right. Now, in the case of this Pulwama situation, as you can say, got out of the air and India's were not thinking about it. India's were not expecting that there's this undercut, they knew this was a surgical strike. It was not a surgical strike, they only violated the international board. They dropped the payload, no killings in the Pakistani side, there was nothing, but their propaganda was so high that at Barakot, they destroyed Syria at something and as a result, Pakistan retaliated. But Pakistan retaliated, India also retaliated and lost the aircraft. So it was a dogfight, or you can say here combat in a correct manner, once between the two nuclear states. What is the next step? Next step is, you cannot rule out false flag. Indians are always saying the terrorism is falsehood, but of course, what is happening in Balochistan and what is happening in KPK sport to TTP is according to Pakistan's special environment Afghanistan is said of through the Afghan groups, these TTP, Baloch, Buahubut, these people are provided financial sport, material sport by India. Of course, Pakistan is not making a terrorism as an excuse and attacking on India, but India could make it. India did a false flag for Obama for the sake of elections, India could do it. So by this way, we cannot ignore because initiative will be on India's side, unfortunately, since last two decades, Indian strategic funders thinks that India has the potential to start a limited war and control a limited war, but they fail to realize every war has its own dynamical and those dynamical forces are having their own trends. So if India started limited war or even if Pakistan started limited war, it is no one can guarantee it will remain limited. So when I say no one can guarantee, it means that we will be on a slippery road ending up into exchanges of the nuclear weapon. So that is maybe alarmist, but it is tragically speaking and practically realizing what cannot ignore. One of the final questions that I do have is that there are certain peace platforms and I say peace platforms in quotation marks is because when you look at Aman Ki Asha, for example, which means this desire for peace or between the Jung group at the times of India, and then you also have diasporic relations between Indians and Pakistanis. We know for a fact that India and the Pakistanis, whenever they live abroad, whether it's in the United States or whether it's in the UK, Australia, for that matter, they tend to have very good relations with one another. Do you think that such you could say people to people contacts can actually result in any sort of de-escalation or do you think that initiatives such as this desire for peace or Aman Ki Asha are more elitist and they do not necessarily represent policy making on the ground, whether it's at the governmental level or whether it's based on populism with the rise of Hindu nationalism in India or certain elements of Pakistan. Do you think that such peace initiatives are more idealistic, to be honest? I think that it's correct to say initiatives are idealistic, but you know that without idealism, we cannot change the status. So everyone is supportive in Pakistan. You and I also support the peace initiatives at least one step forward. At least a baby step can lead us to a situation where we will be not exposed to nuclear armaged. So that's why I do recommend all these forces, all these groups, all the CBFs groups that restarted. I understand they are frustrated. People start a peace process, we reach to a U.S. gold poster before kicking the ball in the goal we come back. So it's a pendulum. But at the same time, these groups efforts or these you can see initiatives played their role, key role in avoiding the crisis escalation of a crisis or establishing crisis stability in the region. And today we need it more. My understanding is India, Pakistan are nuclear arms state. It's the responsibility of Delhi and Islamabad being a nuclear arms state that they shall talk with each other. And there's a responsibility of the U.S. who in every field of both states that they try to convince the government or they have to initiate back door. Because if you are both states are having a mobbed missiles, if they're deployed there, we will be more vulnerable. Our geostrategic location, our geographical integrity is such as that in deadlock, we cannot afford. So of course, these groups have their say, but practically if somebody thinks that these groups have no tangible, no, they have a tangible impact. But the way we expect that may be a degree of impact could be lesser. I have a lot of hope in the track to back door diplomacy or these human rights or people to people context. Of course, every time these contacts are needed to mature and fit, but still we get something. Out of that, we get non attack on each other's nuclear installations. Out of it, we get a prior notification of ballistic missiles, long-range ballistic missile test. What is the need of the R? We need it include the side, you can say, cruise missiles in prior notification. We need in it to negotiate because we are heading towards an emerging technology or devastating emerging technology era. There both states cannot afford this kind of a deadlock that we are not willing to. At least this is not means compromising on each other's principle statuses, but negotiations, dialogue is required for avoiding the conflict escalation. HOD of the School of Politics and International Relations of the Kite-Alderman University and the professor as well, Dr. Zaffron Nawaz as well. Thank you so much for joining me on the tour. Thank you, Hamza, for the duty. That's all that we have from Slaba today on Think Tech Hawaii. Do provide us with your feedback and comments. We can all pray that Indo-Pac relations actually, you know, move in the right trajectory. But for that, both sides, particularly India, needs to demonstrate more, you could say, magnanimity in order for tensions to be diffused. That's all from me, Hamza Rehmet. Take care. If you liked this show, why don't you give us a like or subscribe to our channel? Thanks so much.