 Actually, what I'm going to do in the few minutes that I have, and please shout if I go beyond my time, is just to go back actually to some intuitions that I got when I was doing some research in Lebanon by the end of 2014, beginning in 2015. I was doing research actually on the evolving needs assessment techniques that international organization had to assess the needs for assistance and protection for Syrian refugees in the Baker Valley and in the north of Lebanon. And I was also looking at the shift from in-kind to cash-based assistance. And as an economist, I was shocked somehow by the fact that what I could see, and especially the perceptions of the crisis as I could understand it from the host communities, was completely different from anything I had heard while doing my master degree in economics 20 years before. And getting into the world of what Neil actually told us, the world of what are the main economic models and economic theories on migration. And this gap between theories and perceptions and reality in Lebanon intrigued me and pushed me to try to put together a few ideas that I will share with you now. But let me say that this is work in progress, so this is why I have my power point. But it's also because it's not yet, I'm very much looking forward to exchanges, inputs and discussions. And I have to say that I'm not an expert of migration and I recognize in the room a few experts of migration, so I feel a bit humbled. And again, look forward to your inputs. So let's say the red thread or the logic of my presentation is to say that there is a gap between the reality of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon and some of the mainstream theories on migration. And I see that there is a similar gap between mainstream policy discourses, as we heard it in New York at the General Assembly last week, and how basically voters in host countries understand, perceive the crisis and react accordingly. And I think this is a very interesting kind of parallelism in gaps and discrepancies. And my main conclusion is that through looking at costs and benefits, we can also understand that if the theory tells us that migration like trade is not a zero sum game, then there is ample room actually to tax benefits and have a much more generous redistributive policies in order to compensate for losses and for adaptation. So let's start with Lebanon. I don't know if it's an archetypical forced migration crisis, but it's kind of an extreme one. Let me give you to start with a few elements that you certainly know, but in less than two years you had about 1.2 million Syrians refugees entering Lebanon, accounting for arguably more than 25% of the total population. And actually Lebanon maintained an open border policy for at least two and a half, three years. It was changed by the end of 2014. They maintained a no camps policy, which means that the refugees were directly living within host communities, especially in urban and semi-urban areas. And just to give you one example, it's had as a result a huge hike in rental prices, especially in poorer quarter, where within a year and a half or so, you had an increase by 44% of average rents. So I was looking at this yearly vulnerability assessments that have been done for Syrian refugees, so-called VASIR, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees, 2014, 2013, 2014. In 2013, what was interesting is that out of the sample, they found out that the majority of refugees said our primary source of livelihood is the ability to work and overwhelming majority in the informal sector. So wages actually, well income in the informal sector was the major source of livelihood followed then by remittances and receiving aid. Next the year that followed, the picture changed a bit in the assessment done for 2014. One of the major constraints for refugees was security and mobility, mainly because of violent reactions and resentment from host communities who were extremely generous in 2011, 2012, party 2014, but as the crisis became protracted, then the situation changed and some refugees reported not being able to move to bring their children to school or to go to work because of mobility constraints. And this, I think, is important. We are in a context with a largely dysfunctional sectarian state and where public service, if we can call it public service, but essential service delivery is weak and actually raises a lot of issue which I will come back later on when we are thinking on how to envisage redistributive policies, how to envisage social protection both for the host communities and the refugees in a protracted crisis situation. So thanks to Neil before I won't spend much time on the economic migration theories. As he very well said, the basic theories which are quite old by now focus mainly on pull and push factors. But the main issue here is that migrants are supposed to behave rationally, to make cost-benefit analysis, look at net outcome, and then decide about migratory patterns based on this cost-benefit analysis. At the macro level, the interesting thing for me is that the focus was to start with mainly on wage differentials between different labor markets and also labor market regulation. But the new economics of migration, especially since the 1980s, brought to the fore is to look also a bit more at structural factors, at markets, and to consider household as a unit of production and consumption and to see what kind of strategies and portfolio of risk management households take, including migratory patterns of some of the members of the household members. And for those of you who know for instance Somalia and Somaliland, this is clearly a strategy that has been very much present in the strategies of Somali households in terms of how to get access to a range of income options and portfolio of risk, managing risks that would actually reduce vulnerability. So I won't go into that. So mainstream economic models show that migration is a win-win. And the question is, is it really and if so, for whom? Indeed, migration is seen as an engine of poverty alleviation, growth and development. And I think this is very much also the discourse that we heard last week at the UN General Assembly. And that's gaps in earnings of production factors, mainly labor, relates to marginal factor productivity differentials, wage differences, but also including technological aspects, technology and physical capital associated with the productivity of workers. So basically migration improves the efficiency worldwide of factor use. The disconnect between this literature on migration and forced migration and actually the literature, the gray literature that I have seen for instance in Lebanon to try to grasp the impact of the Syrian crisis on the Lebanese economy is that the focus of the gray literature and some of the academic literature as well is on needs, costs and the impact of aid on vulnerability and livelihood of refugees. And I looked a bit at the literature looking at the situation in Pakistan or Kenya with also projected refugee, hosting refugee situations. And the literature has the same bias on costs. The assumption is that there is a negative impact of massive influx of refugees, migrants in those countries on the labor market with drops on remuneration for unskilled or low-skilled labor, that there is a negative impact in terms of price hikes on essential goods and services, that there is a pressure on public services with the deterioration of access to public services for host population, and that there is also pressure on the environment with environmental degradation and so forth. Yet the question that I never found in the literature is actually who is benefiting from all these changes. Higher price, higher rental prices obviously is a boon for those owning property and houses and renting apartments or land for informal tented settlements. Lower labor costs is a boon for employers who can then reduce labor costs to produce and market goods and services. And I think there is a lack of focus on those aspects. And you may know especially the migration experts and refugee experts among yourselves more about that, but I just found a few studies like a study on the Dada refugee camp which looked at the situation for 2010. And that found out that actually the income brought to the region where the Dada refugee camp is located on the coast of Kenya close to Somalia would amount to an increase of 25% of the provincial GDP. And that there are more evidence also of an increase in jobs related to the Dada refugee camp for the local job market about 1200 in the case of Dada for 2010. So for the case of Lebanon, indeed when we hear that most of the at least in the Vazir 2013 the majority of refugees have income from the draw income from the informal labor market. This means that indeed this has a huge impact on wages in the wages because of this increase in labor supply. And the daily remuneration for construction workers, for petty traders, for agricultural workers was cut by more than half. Just to give you one example, daily remuneration for agricultural workers in the Bekavali has been cut between 2012 and 2014 from $15 a day to $6 a day. But there has been ample evidence and reporting also of deterioration for domestic workers, female in particular, who are doing in average 40% less income than men. And deterioration also in the situation of Lebanese sex workers. So you can see that this has a wide ranging impact indeed with as a result a high level of resentment among the youth, unemployed and poor Lebanese within host communities. So the result has been actually a big pressure on the government of Lebanon first to close the border. Second to prevent workers, to prevent Syrian refugees from accessing the labor market from opening shops and so forth with an entering frustration from breadwinners in Syrian refugee families with regards to the fact that the result was higher dependency on foreign aid and shrinking foreign aid. So again, a few studies on the benefits money on the cost. The World Bank did a big study on the overall impact of the crisis on the Lebanese economy saying this costs Lebanon at least two or 3% of GDP every year. And actually no analysis of the impact of increasing demand. Knowing that refugees may have brought just during the first year about over $100 million in cash and that cash and food voucher program injected over 800 million in the economy in 2013-14. And with this system there is more than 400 shops that are involved in the food voucher program. There are banks, Lebanese banks involved in the cash distribution, etc. So for me as an economist it's clear that there are much greater profit margins in the sector where wages fell by 50% and that landowner and house owners benefited from higher rents, basically higher return for capital, lower return on low-skill labor. So migration can be seen not as a win-win but as a win-lose at least in the short run and if we look at distributional impact. And for that reason immigrants serve as scapegoats to blame for unemployment or lower wages, insecurity and so forth. Yes, the host country benefits from an influx of resources, of skills, of foreign aid. And the issue here for me is that looking at the benefits of such an influx the question is how can we actually tax those benefits? Compliment as need be those tax that the host state is able to draw with foreign aid and then make sure that this is put into good use to compensate losers and to also pay for adaptation. And I would argue that it's just like a freer trade. We know that free trade creates winners and losers. I think that the supporters of Donald Trump in Michigan and elsewhere have very well understood what is the impact of freer trade with China for them and their reaction is quite clear. The question is again that the losers are not compensated whatsoever and there is not enough effort being put into funding, education, vocational training and the rest of it in order for low-skill labor to adapt and come back to let's say get greater skills for adaptation. So my conclusion is that if the overall macro impact is not a zero sum game for trade as for migration as we hear again and again then we can posit that we can simply tax part of the gains to compensate for the losses. And then I was thinking how can we do that in Lebanon? And I must say that it's a huge challenge because of the sectarian nature of the provision of social protection and assistance and it's also a challenge because maybe the most functional arm of the Lebanese state is designated as a terrorist organization and as long as we have and especially major donors have counterterrorism measures which prevent to engage with the Lebanese state and especially with Hezbollah not to name it then we have a huge problem in trying to figure out how to set up a system which is redistributive not in the sense of patronage politics but which is redistributive in the sense of compensating for losses. So option for Lebanon and this is working progress better document the cost but also the benefits on the whole state and communities focus simultaneously on the likelihood of Syrian and Lebanese vulnerable people and design and face out the cash assistance program for Syrian consistent with social protection system for the Lebanese poor and increased taxation and aid in order to have stronger and more resources for compensation. A question which is open which we can discuss is to what extent should Lebanon introduce much stricter labor regulation to try to reduce options on the informal market and to enforce labor laws and regulations there are pros and cons it's a very important topic and then to improve the channels for remittances that should be safer and cheaper. Okay so as I say it's working progress and I really look forward to the discussion with you and to get also feedbacks on that on these reflections. Thank you.