 So anyway, some committee members will still be joining us, but why don't we get started? Excuse me, that'd be great. Good morning, Ann Donahue. And I want to say at the outset, I understand that in terms of my first of three amendments, reasonable minds could interpret various ways. It is not my intent in any of these three amendments to, in any way, restrict access to abortion as established in the bill voted on last night. To whatever extent I disagree, I acknowledge and accept that that is clearly the will of the body. I do have three amendments and the first one, I should say this off the record, but, you know, that's stolen from me yesterday. It's stolen and changed. The first one is the identical word for word amendment that passed the House or bill that passed the House in 2001. Representative Bancroft presented it yesterday with a significant, I think a very significant change, and that was a change from notification to consent to requiring the consent of a parent barring a judicial bypass. This is the exact wording from 2001, which was on notification. And I think there are a couple of important aspects in terms of some of the concerns that were raised on the floor yesterday. First of all, all but five states do include either notice or consent, even those who may have the most expansive laws. I'm assuming everyone has a copy of the amendment. It is in the calendar. So I really want to, this is the first one. This is parental notice. 992 a.m. It's in the calendar. So what I really want to point out is kind of the specific provisions that were not really focused on yesterday. First of all, it only applies to minors who are unemancipated. An emancipated minor is not included. And it's noticed that it has to be provided 24 hours beforehand. There's no barrier after 24 hours. There's no barrier to proceeding regardless of what effect that notice may or may not have. In other words, it doesn't require any consent or any response at all from a parent. And there is a health exemption if it needs to go forward even before 24 hours. But I really want to focus on the judicial bypass because of the concerns yesterday. Because there are a number of really key elements in terms of the ease of access, the support in access, and the speed of the decision-making process. So if you look at, I'm sorry, I'm still getting used to the fact that my eyes now require different classes to depending on what I'm looking at. I couldn't put them in one set. My eyes are too weird. So in terms of the process, which if you're looking in the calendar, it begins on page 348. Let's see. Okay. So first of all, this is assisted by, it's with the help of a provider. This is not the young woman who has to strike out on their own. It's specifically required to be a non-traditional form. The court is required to provide, trying to find a language. This will help me be ready for the floor. The petition shall be in a simple form prescribed by rules adopted by the Vermont Supreme Court. So it specifically has to be a simple form, not a routine kind of filing. The minor is then appointed an attorney and a guardian. The hearing is ex parte, which means doesn't require the presence of the parents or so forth. But also, please notice it's in a setting other than it may be in a setting other than a traditional courtroom. This is not a situation where it needs to happen with all the trappings and intimidating aspects of a courtroom. It can be held in a very informal setting to be less of a barrier, to be less fearful or fear evoking. And the other really critical thing is about concerns about the risk of delay. The court doesn't issue a ruling for a couple weeks. All of a sudden we're talking about a more risky procedure. There's a three-day default. If the court doesn't issue a ruling within three days, it's automatically granted by virtue of law. And, you know, the considerations that a court, they're a series of war. That parental, I don't understand the wrong one. There is actually, I apologize, we're going to have to have this redrafted because there is an error in, as I'm looking in the calendar. Because it goes back to using, under the ruling, it goes back to using the relevant factors as parental consent. That is not the intent of this bill. And that needs to be corrected to say parental notification would cause those things. I apologize. Thank you for this in the calendar. And there's the corrected version now. There was a mix-up in our corrections and if that's the wrong one in the calendar. So I'll give you the correct one now. Thank you. Yeah, I know. It's been swamped, right? Right. So just so everyone's clear, this is not a consent and all of that's obviously going to be corrected. And I think one of the other things that's important to recognize that I just want to reference is the issue of evidence of rape or incest, which under existing law, under what's passed, there is no protection for a minor where there is that evidence. While, you know, if there's no notice, there's not that perceived or feared obstacle. This girl might be going right back home to the same situation, whereas through creating some review or opportunity to be looking at what's going on, it also requires reporting if in fact it turns out that there is evidence of incest or rape. So this is completely focused on support and help for a minor. I think we probably all recognize in the vast majority of situations, that's what's happening anyway. But for those situations where it's not, I think we owe it to young women, minors under 18, to make sure that that is happening. And if it's not happening through parents, because she's clearly afraid, does not want to have her parents notified, then we have an alternative route to ensure that that support is occurring. There is the additional section, which is about providing information and counseling. And again, I don't think any of us want to see a situation where a minor is being pressured by a boyfriend, there are circumstances at home which are putting her under pressure. And so this is just assuring that there is support and information that for a frightened young girl, maybe facing kinds of pressures where this information is not available to her as part of what she's thinking about and worried about. So this is focused on being supportive and protective and in every way possible is trying to avoid it being any kind of a barrier instead. Well, I think you started to get it a little more just in the last minute or so of what I was going to ask, but I keep hearing you talk about the support and information that the judicial bypass system or the, like I'm trying to understand what support is, what is the support that this provides. Well, the support is the notification for parents to be able to offer that support. I think parents have to even consent for medical records to be released. So if parents aren't involved, the provider doesn't necessarily have access to that. So the intent for support is to bring parents in. But if that's not possible, the intent is to have a very accessible process to not need to involve that. Then we have the support and information also provided through the counseling component, which is at the end of the, which is in section seven of the bill. Yesterday, I appreciate the walkthrough. I just asked that we are able to hear from the representative of the judiciary. Excellent points raised yesterday that I don't see whether it's consent or informing would make a difference to the judicial aspect. I think that's my concern. Just among others. If I can, the purpose of us meeting together is for us as two committees to hear the presentation of the amendment and to hear legislative counsel explain, then in our various areas of expertise, we will divide and conquer. We will divide? I'm just using the expression. I'm not attributing any meaning. So no questions. Thank you, Anne. Yeah. I mean, I mean, I mean, questions about content. I mean, that's the thing. Because otherwise we'll just be having a disloyal thing. And the question is. I just had a quick question. So the age of consent in Vermont is 16. Obviously, I wasn't around when that was created. But the age of consent in Vermont is 16. And if the state feels that a person is mature enough to enter a relationship at the age of 16, how come we're proposing a amendment that they have to be 18 or older to avoid having to notify their parents? I'm not sure of the statute you're referencing. The age of consent for any medical procedures in Vermont is 18. And so that's what it was based on. Unless, of course, it's an emancipated minor. I'm going to ask my committee in terms of what Anne is just. Do you have any questions for Anne in terms of what it means or what her intent is? Do you have, do you want to have the, yes? I just have a quick question. Would parents have to be notified for the morning after pill and the pharmaceutical piece as well as this cover? That's a really good question. I don't think that under Vermont law those are considered, I mean that's available at a pharmacy. Or if you're talking about that, that's not under the statutes for abortion. That's a pharmaceutical. There is a medical procedure. Right, there are two different ones. I just want to make sure, we're talking about the amendment on parental notification, right? Except as corrected, because as in the calendar there are some references to consent and it is supposed to be notification all the way through and that's being corrected. Okay, I have a question on Sonia next amendment. I think that we can walk us through this amendment and then the next committee. For the record brand here from Legislative Council, my apologies for that mix-up. Mike has the correct version of the amendment and so that should be posted to the website pretty soon and the correct version is also then sent to Representative Donahue and the clerk. So that should be corrected shortly. So this amendment as Representative Donahue just indicated is quite similar to the amendment that you looked at yesterday requiring parental notification. It is essentially identical to that amendment except for that rather than requiring parental notification prior to an abortion, it requires that a parent or guardian of an emancipated minor be notified of the minor's intent to have an abortion. So I'm not sure if the committees would like to go through the amendment with the same level of detail that they went through the parental consent version yesterday or if you'd rather I answer any questions about the amendment. Just point out where the differences are. They are throughout. So everywhere that yesterday, almost everywhere that said that required a parent to consent to an abortion, that word has been changed to requiring a parent or guardian be notified of the abortion. So that is throughout. I'm not sure I could point out every... As far as the procedure itself on the probate court, did that change at all? Nope. So it still requires that the judicial bypass procedure is the same. So the probate court would have three days from the time of the filing of a petition for a waiver of the parental notification requirement to either grant the petition or not. And the appeal process is the same. So if the waiver is not granted, the minor has the right to appeal to the family division and that family division has to make those same findings based on clear and convincing evidence and that has to be granted within three days and it provides for the same procedure. So if the petition is not granted within three days or the petition is not ruled upon within three days, it's automatically granted and only the minor can seek to extend that time frame. Counseling provision. The counseling provision is also here? Yeah. And that is also the same? Okay. Sure. Bryn, in yesterday's bill there was an appeal provision. Is that the same essentially? That is the same, yes. That is the same here as it was in the consent requirement I mentioned. And does that also state that if there's not a decision within a period of time that it's automatic? That's right. So within three, if the family division hasn't issued a ruling on the petition within three days, then it's an automatic grant of the waiver of the notification requirement unless the minor has requested an extension and then it's automatically at the end of that extended period. Are there a difference in terms of the average notification that I can send in terms of speech and appeal? So I'm a parent and I've just been notified that my child has asked for an abortion. Right. So can I appeal the decision of the court? So there's still that provision which is the same as it was in the consent requirement amendment that limits any appeals to an order author... So an order authorizing an abortion without the notification requirement is not subject to an appeal. It's only if the court denies the petition that a minor can appeal. So the parent can only appeal if the court has said, you know... Right. That's right. But presumably they wouldn't if they had already been notified. But yes, that's accurate. Do you want to see all the time constraints are based on after the letter has been... or the notification has been personally delivered? Is there any allowance for if delivery is not available or is not possible? Or does that create an instance of appeal or is that recognized in the court proceedings? I see that it provides that the notification has to either be personally delivered or sent by a certified mail with return receipt requested. And the time of the delivery is deemed to occur at the time the return receipt is signed by the recipient. So are you asking if, for example, it was returned without delivery receipt? Yes. I don't believe that there is a procedure set out for what would happen in those circumstances. But I would imagine a minor might be able to request an extension at the time period. Question around potential timelines. The way the law is now, potentially what's the shortest amount of time before a minor could have an abortion if they went to their doctor at a hospital or whatever. The way it is now, and with this, and I guess the way it is now, the longest amount of time before a procedure could happen in the same questions that this was implemented. Right, so currently we don't have a statutory requirement that a minor seek parental notification prior to having an abortion. So presumably right now a minor could go to a healthcare provider and receive an abortion the same day. And so this would add an additional at least three days to that process, assuming that the minor filed the petition and the court granted the waiver within three days. It could potentially be longer if the court denies the petition or if the minor requests an extension. Oh, I was just going to ask about kind of the upper limits so that it could be longer, would be more like a couple weeks, right? Yes, depending on how long it takes the minor to access the probate court and if the waiver is denied and the minor has to petition the family division on an appeal, that may take some additional time. So yes, it could add weeks, days or weeks to the process. And even say that the minor has talked to their parents, but under today they would talk to their parents, make a decision, go in, see the physician, be able to have the abortion. If they now, under this, what kind of proof would they have to present to say that their parents, could they just bring a sheet or does their parent have to do something as an active role for their parent? Right, so the abortion provider would have to, upon a minor presenting herself to a clinic or to a facility, the provider would not be able to provide that abortion until notice was sent to a parent. So it requires written notification delivery to at least one parent. And written notification would be by certified mail? Right, or personal delivery. So you have to, it would have to be mailed, you can send it to the woman and have her bring it home, get it signed and bring it back. It would have to be mailed and then mailed back to the provider? No, I don't think it would have to be mailed back. It would just, the time of delivery would be the time the return receipt was signed by the recipient. I'm, I apologize if I don't, if I'm not getting my mail, terminology right. But I believe, that doesn't, I believe you can give a, I'm sorry. So I just wanted to note that under, under 52.97, that the, the notice is not required at all if the parent or guardian who's entitled to notice certifies that they've been notified. So if, if a minor comes in with a note, note from the parent saying I've been notified, they don't need to mail or have the provider give it. That, that section, 52.972, is an exemption to the notification that's required. And that's if the parent or guardian who's entitled to notice certifies with their identity that they've been notified. So that could be same day. That, that does not require mail or personal delivery by the, by the provider. So certifies, would you like make a copy of their license and sign it with the neighbor and send it back? I mean, I'm just trying to think of how much onus is on the parent to make sure that the physician knows that it was the parent. Not, not when it's sent. Yes. If, if it's happening on the initiative of the parent to verify, as opposed to it being mailed by the provider. If the parent is, you know, coming in that day, then the parent needs to certify in writing and give proof of their identity. So yes, that would be on the parent to verify they've been notified if it's going to happen without any of the required mail or certification by the provider as providing it. So what, what happens when the minor is in the carer and custody of the state? Like foster care. So as long as a, as long as the minor is not emancipated or the minor has not had a guardian appointed. My understanding is that the requirement would stand that either, either a guardian who's been appointed for that minor or a parent of the minor would be notified. Right. So it would be, it would be the state would be the guardian. Right. So I mean, it would be the department of children and families would be the guardian. It's not, it doesn't require a court appointed guardian. It's whoever is the guardian, which would be either the parent or the state if they have custody. Right. The guardian. It's a little complicated in that gray zone for time. Can I follow up to represent Christie's question? Because I believe there are certain medical procedures when a child or youth is in the custody of the department for children and families that require court permission to perform absent this. So I'm just trying to figure out if there's any conflict between that requirement and this requirement. Okay. I would have to look into that. Okay. So those procedures, I don't know what those are. Because that was the question. Don't be ready for these. This amendment begins on page 353 of today's calendar. And to me, the critical thing here is that unlike the, you know, the codification of existing law in terms of reproductive rights and abortion, we are also codifying recognition of the fundamental right as a fundamental right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term or to give birth to a child. And recognizing a right without giving protection against that right being infringed upon is not much of a right. The bill goes on in terms of protecting the right to have an abortion by saying it cannot be denied restricted or infringed upon by a governmental entity. However, a mother who wants to bring her child to term, who wants to give birth, does not have any protection against external actors who might have either reckless or homicidal intentions shooting someone. I think it's important to note that this is a very narrowly drafted. Can you repeat what you just said about the mother who wants to bring the pregnancy to term? Or give birth, right. It is not protected against the actions of someone who wants to interfere with that fundamental right. By doing something that would be a criminal act otherwise against someone else. This is narrowly crafted because it's creating a definition that just simply goes into, reflects in any other aspects of criminal law that protect individuals. In this case, it narrowly expands that definition of a victim over a homicide or a negligently caused death to a viable fetus. And I think, I mean, there was a lot of good discussion on the floor yesterday about sort of the vagueness of what does viable fetus mean. And this bases it upon both medical, I heard the member from Jericho talk yesterday about, you know, 20 weeks is when a death certificate is required to be filed. This bases it on medical information. It actually uses the language defining viable fetus the same way that New Hampshire law does for the same statute. So it is very specific. That would obviously be an element of proof in a case that would be brought. There are other states that do not use that narrower definition that are much, much broader. People may have heard about statutes like that. That is not what this is. What does it model after? Well, the statute itself is modeled after the bill that was introduced in the Senate a few years ago. But the language that goes further and defines because the Senate just said a viable fetus. The definition of a viable fetus is taken from New Hampshire law. This isn't a new idea that's being brought, but 38 other states have such laws as I referenced. Some are much broader. Some are not restricted to a viable fetus. I think that's basically, you know, we're passing a statute which identifies this as a fundamental right. I think it's the right time to also address this issue which has been around in the state house for quite a while now. Question over here. So you said narrowly defined. It looks like it's particularly pertaining to operation of a motor vehicle. No. No. Okay. It's inserted anywhere in law where it is, it's added there. In terms of, if you see in section 3D, prosecution may be maintained for a violation of section 2301 which is murder, 2304 manslaughter, and then there's the additional clarity around motor vehicle. So it covers any homicide. I'm on page 216, actually line 17. So in the case we have under the influence of, and I see more drugs, and because we've done so much work on testing of cannabis, I'm just thinking of a scenario where you're curious what your thoughts are. Let's suppose that you're receiving medicinal marijuana and we don't, as we know, have tests for impairment. We have tests for presence of. And you're pregnant and you're driving and someone runs a red light and slams into your car. How would you, and there's a death resulting, how would that under this amendment be treated? It would be treated exactly matching what would happen under current law. But it's simply, I guess, a way to think about it is if there was a passenger in that car that you're referencing who died as a result, the law, as it exists currently, there's no change in the underlying motor vehicle law would apply. This attributes a viable fetus as basically a passenger in the vehicle. From legislative council, I think representative Donahue did an accurate description of what this amendment does. It provides that in our homicide statutes a viable fetus is considered a person under the homicide statutes. So, and it provides for an explicit carve out for any acts that are performed during a lawful abortion or presented to any usual or customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment or to acts that are committed by a pregnant person towards that person's own viable fetus. So that's for the purposes of the homicide statutes. And then as she mentioned, it adds some additional language to the gross and negligent operation statute and the DUI statute that provides that a prosecution can be maintained for either gross and negligent operation or DUI with death resulting when the violation results in the death of a viable fetus. And the door to a broader interpretation of a fetus for all kinds of other? Well, as we talked about before, courts are very reluctant to expand the scope of criminal statutes beyond what is in the plain language. So I think what's intended here, these are criminal statutes, is to make it very clear that a person for the purposes of these statutes includes a viable fetus. I don't necessarily think that it would lead a court to interpret any other criminal statutes more broadly that do not make that specific provision that a person could constitute a viable fetus. I just would reference in support of that the specific language, the first words in the amendment as used in this section. So this definition applies only to this section. This deed shall not be construed to confer, deny, expand, or contract the legal status or legal rights of a viable fetus. So it really tries to make it incredibly explicit. I'm understanding what you're saying, but the other thing that is also right through my mind is whether a parent, a parent of a child now who has a death resulting of that child due to potential neglect or accused neglect, could that, let's say that parent is charged with manslaughter, could that also apply to a fetus in this situation? Let's just say the parent had poor nutrition or something like that. I think if you're referring to that first section about the homicide statutes, I think that that language clarifying that it doesn't apply to acts committed by a pregnant person towards the person's own viable fetus would exclude that conduct. I apologize if I missed this, but we heard from Representative Till yesterday that there were rare occasions that people have an abortion after the 20th week for grave danger to the mother or the situation with the fetus being very unlikely to have a regular lifespan, etc. Would this make it a criminal act for someone to, because it's talking about an abortion pursuant to usual and customary standards, but I'm wondering if the 20th week is meaning if one were performed in the 21st week, if that's going to be considered criminal? I don't think so because that carve out in section C says that it shall not apply to acts performed during an abortion. So I think that excludes all abortion related care or pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment. So might not worry about A kind of setting some little carve out around C? I think that because that language in C says that this section shall not apply to acts performed during an abortion, I don't think it's going to have the effect of criminalizing abortion after 20 weeks. This is sort of hypothetical, but let's say the fetus victim happens to be a fetal demise and the person has not either a miscarriage yet or something else. The fetal demise count as somebody, as a victim, with the person be charged with the crime. It does say viable, so I don't know, maybe they're... Right, so it's because it pins it to that viability benchmark? Are you referring to a fetal demise prior to that viability benchmark? I would say I don't think so, because it appears to set that line in the sand for when the section shall apply. It is after 20 weeks, so prior to that, I don't think it would apply. But after that, it would be fetal decline? Yes, to the extent that... I think mine might be something along the lines that we were talking about. I think that the definition of viable in here is clear as to this section, but supposing, say, after the 20th week that the fetus was dead, but you still had the car accident or something, would they say, well, it was dead beforehand? Or would they be able to tell that? That's a good question. I'm not sure how that would work. If the fetus was already dead, I'm not sure how the prosecutor would know that, except based on the testimony of the pregnant person. But I don't know if that's answering your questions. I just seem like a sticky... It's just a reminder that for any kind of criminal prosecution, it's the burden of the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. So if the actions did not result in the death of the fetus, because the fetus was already deceased. For this last amendment, which is on page 354 of today's calendar, I think it's really helpful to see the language directly in context of the existing intent language, because it does not remove any existing intent language. So I made that... I made enough for both committee members. I apologize, I didn't think enough for everyone in the room. So let's move around. It's a large print. I need the large print. So as standard drafting, it underlines the new proposed language. As you'll note, there is no strikeout of any of the existing language. So to me, this really goes to the heart of this entire debate. And I would suggest, regrettably, it's not really a debate. From most of each of the sides, there is a lack of recognition of any validity of the other perspective. So most folks who identify as being pro-life say this is about the life of a human person, and therefore it should always take precedence. On the other side, this is about the right of privacy of a woman to make her own reproductive decisions, and there is no acknowledgement of any other interests. So I think the pro-life side doesn't recognize that this is not the same as any other life, walking around on Earth or whatever. This is a developing life inside the womb of a mother and attached to the mother. That makes the issue different. And on the other side, this is not a cluster of cancer cells. There is an interest here. And I actually think it was perhaps best stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Dovey-Roguey Wade decision, which said the pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and later a fetus. So this discussion applies to all stages of pregnancy. The situation, therefore, is inherently different from marriage, procreation, and the other rights of privacy that the court acknowledged. The woman's privacy is no longer sold, but the court went on to say, but the state's interest in that developing potential life is not compelling until potentially in the last trimester, the state can assert a compelling interest. It's not automatic. It's not assert that the interest is compelling until the third trimester. And in Vermont, we have asserted we are not finding it compelling. We are finding the right to privacy as the compelling interest through all three phases of pregnancy. I think if we're ever going to get to honest discussion about these interests, we have to acknowledge that they do exist. And the majority does have an interest in the fact that the woman's privacy is no longer the sole interest at state when we are weighing these interests. So I made an effort in this proposed intent language, and it's only intent. It doesn't carry other implications, other intent. I did not use the word person. I used the term begins the development of a genetically distinct human life. I don't think there would be a disagreement that that's scientifically accurate. So it's simply stating that we recognize that that fertilization begins the development of a genetically distinct human life. However, however, it prioritizes the individual's choice to decide whether to sustain that life in utero. This is a fundamental issue for a woman. They are making the decision about sustaining or not sustaining what is happening in their own body. And therefore, the General Assembly intends this act to safeguard that existing right. And I specify access to abortion and reproductive health services because calling them only reproductive health services does eliminate the reality that abortion is not just reproductive health services. It is not the sole issue in abortion. It's intent. What is its impact? So the impact, it does not just section of law will not be codified in the green books. It will essentially become session law or sometimes look to the legislative intent of a bill or of a law when they're interpreting that statute. So the court may look to this language and decide for some intent. Thank you. And so I would further that by saying, yeah, the court may look to it and it makes it really explicit what the General Assembly's intent is. And that is the decision to prioritize that individual's choice and the intent to safeguard the existing rights to access abortion or reproductive health services. So it... This may be an unfair question. If we put something like this in there, would you then support H57 interest? No, I don't think it's an unfair question. I think that for myself, I would not necessarily make the decision to prioritize every aspect of what H57 says over the other interests. However, what I'm saying is I recognize that that is the will of the General Assembly. And so I am suggesting that we frame that intent in what the real issue is. But I would not end up in the same balance, necessarily, or it's a much more complicated... I mean, we could talk, yeah. Thank you. I think you can start now. Yeah. Yeah. You can start now. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I'm getting the cage. Yeah. Yeah, I'm going to... Thanks. I can't apparently get a ear off that. I know. I was like, wait, did I miss the message? We're designing, talking before for the letter. This amendment, after listening to the last three, this one's going to be easier. This simply allows abortion to take place throughout the entire pregnancy. If the fetus is not viable or the abortion is necessary to protect a woman's health or life. Health is defined as both physical and mental. This amendment also allows abortion to take place unrestricted up to the first 24 weeks from the commencement of the pregnancy. It's been stated that the purpose of this bill is to codify what's allowed now in Vermont in terms of abortion. I believe this amendment does it. We heard the good doctor who represented from Jericho yesterday say that abortions after 20 weeks are very rare. This one's unrestricted for 24. He described in detail the conditions that have to be met and verified by the health care provider before the abortion after 20 weeks is performed. So I say again, this amendment does codify what the practice is in Vermont now. That's what we want to do. It allows for unrestricted abortion up to 24 weeks and it allows abortion to take place when the fetus is not viable and it protects a woman's life and health. It also allows those difficult decisions concerning abortion to be made by the woman and her health care provider and anyone else that she chooses to be part of that decision-making process. So I believe this amendment reflects and codifies the common practice in Vermont and I ask that you support it. So it's a great question because we, Jewish Right Committee does have letters here. Can you say what the purpose of this amendment is? To codify what's existing in Vermont now in terms of abortion. So if I want to have an abortion now I don't have to have a conversation with my health care provider for my first few weeks that I'm doing it because of a physical or mental health concern. This provides unrestricted abortion for the first 24 weeks. And then it's for mental health or physical issues. Physical health, physical health, viability of the fetus. After 24. No, during those 24 weeks too. So if I have an adjustment disorder I have to, I mean I have to go and get a mental health diagnosis of adjustment disorder or something in order to have a valid reason. It provides. It's unrestricted for the first 24 weeks. You don't have to do anything. Very clear. After 25th week it's not allowed. It's not restricted. I mean it's not restricted up through 24 and then it's the viability of the fetus, the health of the mother which is defined as mental and physical. But that's throughout the time. If in the first 24 weeks if you wanted to say there's a mental issue then you can do that. Good. I'm sorry. I'm not really in that way. Okay. So it provides, so what is distinct from this between this and what is currently existing along the line is that this would restrict access to abortion to the following circumstances. So within 24 weeks of the commencement of the pregnancy the fetus is not viable or the abortion is necessary to preserve the life for physical or mental health. Okay. So anything performed outside of those criteria would constitute unprofessional conduct. And just to be clear that determination on the necessity to preserve the life to call the mental health of the fetus in this amendment would solely rest with the medical provider. It's up to the provider's professional judgment based on the facts of the patient's case. Can you repeat that for me? So it's the determination determined on the provider's professional judgment as it is based on the facts of the patient's individual case. So in that situation, for example, I used the other day from the story that I got it was above a couple that were pregnant in late term. I remember right, it was in eight months they discovered the baby had spined. An abortion later in pregnancy. Late term abortion is... So what would happen in that case where would it be would it be just the personal opinion of the provider at that point for that couple? About whether or not that fetus was viable? Right, while whether, I mean now before the bill is being proposed they could, you know, they could choose to to have an abortion. Right, so this would subject a provider to unprofessional conduct discipline if the provider provided an abortion under circumstances that go beyond what are listed in A. So if the provider finds that the fetus is viable in other words would survive outside the womb then the provider would be prohibitive from providing an abortion unless he or she found that the patient's life or physical or mental health would be at risk and therefore the abortion is necessary. So it would be a viable fetus? So just to follow on that line there could conceivably be a situation where a doctor and patient have different views on whether the fetus is viable? I think that is conceivable. So can you doctor shot? I mean is that going to be what happens? You'd imagine that if you counter some providers may be unwilling under certain circumstances because they would be concerned about being subject to professional conducts violations then maybe another doctor would be more comfortable and not as concerned. You wouldn't be able to abort the fetus because it's viable outside the womb in any case, right? That's right. I think the other piece of it is the provider can provide an abortion at any point if that provider thinks that the abortion would be necessary to preserve the life or health of the patient. When you're talking about health it's specifically said the physical or mental health of the patient. Brenda, we have other instances where the legislature tells the medical practice board what shall constitute under federal conduct. I'm not aware of any but I would like to confirm that. I'm not aware of any. I'll take up idea. The last amendment is to present any crime and it is financial counseling which I'm sure you all in the judiciary find very interesting but we're going to go upstairs. I'll follow you here to our witnesses. Each he's he's up to the same thing. Right. I know, isn't it a clown cover? You know best. Make sure you get my good 7.5. We heard some chief's peer judge in the clock yesterday morning. It was not my comments yesterday. We're directed to an amendment that related to court procedure. And essentially the same discussion we had yesterday accepted the change from consensus parental notification. So again the procedure in the court would begin with the understanding by a judge that the parent has not been notified and that's why the child is there, the minor is there. And so I would not repeat all the arguments I made yesterday. I think they're essentially the same. And this starts in the probate court and I think that's the beginning of the problems that the probate court is just not structured in a way to handle this in the timeframe calls or the resources that are required by this bill. The lack of attorneys and guardian is just not available. Those resources are not there. Over the bill, my concern, I guess I would re-emphasize that the timeframe is such that it really does not give the court the opportunity, sufficient opportunity in my mind to deliberate on what is a significant issue and to say that she missed the point. It's about if the court doesn't reach that decision about it assuming that they were able to, they're unable to make the decision in that timeframe the statute calls for it to be essentially a default. And so the opportunity for the court to weigh in and make a decision that is lost. But I was looking for the section on what happens in that event and I think it says that obviously the petition is granted essentially by default, but then I wanted to say that the certificate of some sort is issued to the health provider. And if the court hasn't acted, it's nothing that would be, there would be no orders coming from the court on default provisions. So I'm not sure. Yes, I'm looking at the top, I think you're on the top of page four on this morning's draft, the correct draft. If the court fails to rule within three business days of receiving the petition or fails to rule in the expiration of any extension and remember it's only the child that can ask for the extension of the petition to grant a certified copy of the automatic waiver of parental consent shall be delivered. I don't know what that is. I don't know what that document is. Obviously the court hasn't entered its decision and that's why the petition is granted by default. There isn't any document emanating from the full size. The court's decision, again assuming the resources that are not there, assuming the time frame if they have this hearing and if you look again at the matters they have to consider in order to issue that order, the court has to make finding on each and every one of those issues. I have the same concern as to the process laid out. To some of the concerns of yours that we shared on the floor yesterday about the time delays, you touched on a little bit was well, if the court can't get to it, it's, you know, there's an automatic, there's a default that bypasses the bypass, right? So I guess one of the things I heard you say yesterday was that the court would feel compelled to issue a ruling potentially to the point of you need to set something else aside that didn't have such a finite time frame and I guess I'm wondering like how that works. Would the court just be like, well, we're not going to get to this one so we'll just let the default decision decide or would there be more of a compulsion to have to meet the... If I said compel, it's because the legislation says resources to suppress it, but what I was trying to say we would not say it well. I mean, we already have a statute that basically says juvenile matters. You have to take a priority. So this obviously is a probate court so I wouldn't interfere with that, but if the probate court is not in session on a particular day in order to meet these requirements we would be asking the other courts. I mean, the probate courts sit in most of them. I'll use an example. The court down the street is the civil division but it also houses the probate division. They had certain days set aside for probate matters and the rest of the time the court is being used and the court is being used for civil matters. They... If this time frame would require them to set aside other matters in another division I mean, that's what the statute calls whether or not the court could do it on that short of notice is the real question. For the most part our dockets, our schedules are set out two months in advance at a minimum so it would complicate it. I don't know that we could meet this requirement particularly in some of those smaller courts. They're small. And to be clear I don't think you said that the courts would be compelled. This is my language interpreting what you said. I think the statute calls for that. I don't know that we could ever meet that with what the statute calls for. I think I was responding to hearing the presenter of the amendment sort of... I don't want to put words in their mouth but sort of say like it's okay, it's okay. It's no big deal if... You know, there's a provision for that. It will just be decided by default so it's not really... This question of the courts being unable to keep up with it is another issue. The decision is made. I think it's a forward way to make a decision on something as important as this. I don't see that as a viable option for the issue of this. It is by default. Thank you. Thank you very much. I think I could simplify it by saying, for instance... That's great if you... On the amendment that talks about 13 VSA 2312s, one of the representative John Hughes amendments the caption I had is a viable, fierce treatment of the victim. And I listened to the discussion because the court and I think some of the court would have to interpret this at some point in the process. I would not certainly offer my opinion on this at this time. What's on the legislative intent and all I can say is that and again, one of the witnesses mentioned that the court sometimes will consider that if it's there, they may consider it. So I'm glad you... I was curious about the intent. One, because it does seem like it's putting a stake in the ground saying that the fertilization of the human egg begins at the... I mean, it's staking. So when you're saying the courts will look at it, they're going to look at everything that we're putting out there, like it's making a value judgment that will be... I'm saying you could have this in the statute. I would not the language that's here, but what I don't want the committee to understand is even if it's included in the bill because it's legislative intent that doesn't mean that every time this issue comes it's not necessarily accessible. I would hope they would get but I can't... It's important obviously and it's helpful. But if it doesn't exist, it's going to work. Thank you. We're going to be a joint effort. Great. I'll move back after I... So for the record, Joshua Dunn and Deputy Attorney General are here. I'd just like to make a preliminary statement about the amendment to now to make for the comment. In fact, the General Dunn has been testified previously before this committee with the three channels of office supports unequivocally H57 without the amendments because it does something very important. It codifies current practice and the status of Vermont law where there are no legal restrictions upon women's right to access abortion. And that decision fundamentally resides between a woman and her medical provider. These amendments are inconsistent with that intent and purpose of the law and therefore we oppose them and with that I will turn it over to Assistant Attorney General to share for further comment. Thank you and I will just briefly run through the amendments that we've seen this morning described. So actually I'm sorry definitely can we say what you said I don't have it typed up but I'm happy to shoot you an email that we did. Great. I'll just briefly run through each of the amendments that we've seen this morning and describe the ways in which they defeat the purpose of H57 by making changes to current law which is not the object of the court. Looking at parental notification first Presently the abortion act is a decision that resides between a pregnant woman and her health care provider. This is clearly a significant alteration for that and a significant alteration among statutes. Looking at the viable fetus amendment this would directly overturn Vermont a precedent that spring court breast custody all over. We talked a little bit about that yesterday a decision from 1989 stating that there is not criminal liability with regards to the death of the fetus. This is as I said a direct overturning of that holding. And you can just see that case one more time. This is the all over. And that's a framework. Are you using that? I was. As Deputy Diamond expressed we believe that this bill the purpose of this bill is to codify the current state of Vermont law and not change it and this defeats that purpose. I got that. I mean I'd like to understand so as far as I get that and I agree with that but so if you could comment on how the law currently addresses sorry go ahead how the law currently addresses the situation that this amendment is trying to get. The law currently addresses the situation by making criminal any act that would be criminal under this amendment. Obviously the current law would have different victims but I don't think that you can present a hypothetical in which an injury that would be encompassed by this act would not already be a crime and it would be extremely difficult to think of any hypothetical that would present that case. So for example it's hard to imagine how a murder or manslaughter has applied to a viable fetus would not also be at the very least an aggravated assault against a pregnant woman. Can you comment on the definition of a viable fetus you might have presented? Certainly I think when it comes to proving beyond a reasonable doubt whether you have defined in this section A I think it would be a significant challenge to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or it may be a significant challenge to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the timing of conception. Is it does it matter if this definition has picked a particular time of 20 weeks and we're going to call that viability? I understand that it's hard to tell when 20 weeks has happened because you don't know what the conception is but is there any other kind of issue that comes up that we're established in 20 weeks and whether the fetus is viable in 20 weeks can verify this might understand or is it fine that you say 20 weeks and we have this set and there's enough rationale for being 20 weeks as long as we can understand conception. I would say the medical rationale for choosing 20 weeks is well outside of my area of expertise and another witness would probably be better. It is absolutely the case that by legislating about the definition of viability you are significantly beyond what Vermont law currently does. If I may share the current law and I believe the intent of this legislation in age 57 is to leave that decision fundamentally between a patient and her healthcare provider by defining viability you are removing that paradigm if you will of decision making which I think as identified earlier would be unique to Vermont law. I think as the general had reflected he's not aware of any that would receive similar types of regulations or restrictions upon a man and therefore to do so for a woman would just be would be wrong. It would seem that would raise equal protection questions concepts of equal protection identified but also would be wrong. I'm not sure I have a respect to the environmental I think whenever you treat genders differently you raise a question potentially of equal protection and certainly given the fact that Vermont law does not restrict medical procedures on men to do so for a woman and it raises questions of the concept of equal protection as recognized in the comments. So what I'm confused about is this amendment is dealing with if you can charge but you're saying that will then carry over into other issues because in state view Oliver it wasn't about a woman's right to choose it was about is this 34 week old BDS being treated as a person in terms of charging a crime against them. I'd like to just bring it up another 10,000 feet. I think again we support H57 at the Attorney General's office because it codifies the current practice in law that there are no restrictions on abortion because it's important it's grounded in the concepts of people protection as well as personal privacy and anything that would change that which we think these amendments in this one in particular does it's a way of that. And state view Oliver was considered a good solid decision it's because again like back to our right to make changes it's not like oh my gosh we found this awful loophole in law it sounds like there are implications from state view Oliver that 30 other cases and other states don't know were similarly Yes, state view Oliver was decided in 1989 it's been long standing precedent here in the state of Vermont for more than 30 years or about 30 years and there hasn't been reason to revisit that because I understand it. It's about the impact of yesterday's various unintended consequences or more testimony needed thinking how it's going to impact our courts DCF what are the concerns here? I think in complete candor this is more narrowly drafted than the person we were looking at yesterday some of the concerns around the effects on DCF on family court proceedings on parentage proceedings that are not implicated by this that's my answer you also mentioned that that these charges are already covered elsewhere in the law so I mean I don't know the words so given that are you saying that we don't need this? Yes, I don't think that public safety requires the addition of these laws that the public is adequately protected by the laws that are on the laws so in questions about the medical exception and the U.S. Supreme Court case there is a little bit of a medical exception clause here that I think I'm sorry to ask you this question yes so so have you satisfied the requirements for that clause? We were trying this morning we were trying to do quick research on this and we don't have a definitive answer to be honest we believe that on an initial glance it certainly seems to address the constitutional concern however to know if it does it we have to look through parental notification decisions and understand what the courts have decided is a sufficient carve out and I couldn't tell you right now this is a sufficient carve out I've decided by the one of four cases addressing parental notification we would need more time and research in immigration in a sense the sausage may look good the bill on the issue that you had with that Sure so specifically the issue with that is that no United States Supreme Court has recognized any legal significance to the moment of so this would be a significant change to the state of the law as that legislative council has mentioned that can affect court decision making even if it's not an issue when courts are trying to ascertain legislative intent and we do think that is making a significant change beyond the state of law on this issue but if it wasn't being tied on to this bill would you be interested in it? would you be interested in it? yes can you just review what you just said? certainly so no United States Supreme Court case has attached any legal significance to the moment of fertilization doing so in this legislative intent piece would be a significant change in the state of the law as legislative council mentioned that can have an effect on how laws are interpreted when judges are trying to understand what was made by legislative action would Dr. Till touch on that to like and let it start not you yes yes right he's a good person Chloe I imagine you were wanting testimony at all on all the ones that you all will be doing right or whatever I have to offer I did and it should be on your desk and that's what I'm pulling up right now so I thank you for having me and for all your work on this we strongly oppose all these amendments offered today and urge you to find them unfavorable again as the attorney general's office said the intent of the bill is to codify what's already legal in Vermont and all of these amendments would undermine that intent so I wanted to speak specifically to the fetal victim amendment and the parental notification amendment so on the fetal victim amendment there's several concerns first despite what section D set claims which says that it doesn't give independent rights to the fetus we shall not be construed to confer and I expand the legal status of legal rights to a viable fetus we find that it does in fact it would confer independent rights on the fetus because there will be a separate crime for causing the death of a fetus and second and I think most significant section C says this amendment shall not apply to acts committed by a pregnant person the person's own viable fetus so the word toward implies to me an intentional act geared toward the fetus so an act that a pregnant person would do specifically aimed at causing harm to the fetus so it is plausible to me that for instance a woman who is in a car accident and not wearing a seatbelt and who subsequently lost the pregnancy could be charged with grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with death resulting or manslaughter for the death of their own fetus compounding the trauma and grief that a woman losing a moment pregnancy would feel in another example if a woman attempted to commit suicide but was unsuccessful yet lost her pregnancy as a result of the attempt it's conceivable she could be charged with manslaughter or homicide someone dealing with suicide probably as we've talked about as a public health approach here maybe more need of mental health counseling and help rather than being charged with manslaughter or homicide and this is precisely what's actually happened in Indiana in 2011 to Baby Shui who was a Chinese immigrant and served many months in prison before being released and charged with a lesser crime so you're going to tell me about Sure, this is there's a woman named Baby Shui in Indiana she attempted to commit suicide by ingesting rat poison she had recently even broken up with the father of her own born fetus she survived but the fetus did not and she was charged with with homicide and was jailed during the length of her trial and was eventually commenced to seek a plea deal where she applied guilty to criminal recklessness right detain, exactly you know this is contrary to a lot of what we talked about here about public health and the response proper response to someone experiencing those sorts of issues there have been others where a woman has given birth to a excuse me a woman has been substance use disorder her fetus is parish and has been charged with murder because of the death of fetus again it's really because the implication is that if there's an intentional act geared toward the fetus but if there's not it seems like there's plenty of space for someone to be charged with murder despite not with no intent to murder a fetus and then speaking and I had this thought after writing this test money as well you know adding this usually when you have a statue and you need a scientist or you need the mens rea to the intent to commit an act there is no by adding this by adding viable fetus the victim of homicide is a viable fetus someone can be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter but I would encourage you to look at you know is there the requisite mens rea or scientist in there because will there be an intent to cause the end of the pregnancy which is separate from causing violence to the person the carrier of the pregnancy so I think it's worth an examination of what kind of change does this enact to the mens rea inherent in the murder and manslaughter statutes yes please sir yeah I was trying to certainly in there were times where person didn't even know that that anyone was pregnant right right exactly so I would urge an examination of that do you want to say also regarding the parental notification amendment I think I was really affected by Jed Gerstin's testimony regarding the feasibility of the process I would also note that the amendment treats pregnant people differently on the basis of their decisions regarding their pregnancies so Representative Donahue was talking about how the amendment was necessary to ensure that there was parental support and parental care involved unless of course there were exceptions in what you go through the judicial bypass but but the same notification requirement would not apply to a teenager who would want to continue their pregnancy but would not want to inform their parents for whatever reason so treating people differently on the basis of their decision and the amendment also wouldn't apply to a teenager for instance who would just seek the vasectomy so that could be one look at that unequal treatment of these teenagers on the basis of sex so that I think that's also a concern I think if one is saying that this amendment is here toward the ensuring that there is parental support around decisions, around pregnancy and around the ability to around reproductive ability I think that it's rather unequal treatment so that those are my concerns with that fall under your jurisdiction these amendments and I'm happy as always to answer any questions or respond to concerns also I don't want to put the rival previous amendment to the general's office also stress concerns down I wasn't able to look into that but I think they were I think you're right you know it is I think it would bring up some concerns but I just haven't had the opportunity to investigate that and Nora really has the committee unfortunately I guess I'd love to hear how much this type of legislation while on the face of it you could see situations where people might say oh gosh you know a scenario could be presented that could be theoretically well intended I guess I just wonder about like does it open the door for the precedent for fetal rights the fetal victim amendment I think absolutely again it this is the first stand in a way I mean to an extent possibly I mean I mean I think it is it says that it's not intended to endow conferred and I expand or contract the legal status or legal rights with viable fetus but it in fact it does because previously the legal fetus there was no crime for when the victim of a homicide is a viable fetus as it says in Section B and so this does expand that legal status and the legal rights it's just not I mean notwithstanding Section D it absolutely does expand those legal status and rights and it's another way to toward fetal personhood as I think as the Assistant Attorney General said I mean it is more narrowly construed than yesterday's fetal personhood but it still does confer this personhood onto a fetus require I think yes I mean I heard the testimony that Chloe just gave and I agreed that I think it's possible that there could be a protection issue or a conflict issue under the Constitution for a specific requirement that by its very nature can only be imposed on female and non-male. Along that line when I asked the question about the minor in care of the state the process we heard from Judge Greerson that just the process for the court is crazy and it just doesn't fit a normal constraint you know it's not like it can't happen but it's going to take time so in a situation where a child is in foster care and they're under the care and custody of the state you know until 18 and in some cases longer that process of decision making is shared now by the state of Vermont. That's right and I can certainly see in that kind of situation there may be a concern that the timing would be even more prolonged in a situation where a person is under the care or custody of the state. Someone in foster care would have to get permission from the state yeah because there is a procedure there is a procedure right now for any kind of medical intervention that a minor might need you know has to be agreed upon you know by but not good for the whole foster parents do have certain requirements that you know emergency safety situations but there's still that do notification component as a foster parent you know back to the state you know we're on our way to the emergency room so and so that kind of thing a year or two then last year we relaxed some rules or laws around foster parents I don't remember what it was all about but I do remember we did it and just come to mind that maybe this is certainly not something to deal with in this bill but maybe something to look at in the future so one other thing I would add is that Article 7 the common benefits clause in the Vermont Constitution has been interpreted more broadly than the US Constitution so it may be that it confers more benefits to the individual citizens of Vermont than than the actual United States Constitution so I would say that Article 7 is generally more protective than people protection clause so how would that apply to this amendment? so just to back up what I said and what Chloe said earlier about about the potential that amendment has to fringe upon the constitutional right I don't think it's a question that the court has looked at so I can't give you direct jurisprudence about it but I think it's helpful to know that the common benefits clause is widely regarded as more protective than the US Constitution yet more protective of individual rights versus the Northern New England Supreme court case which kind of hinged on emergency carve out and it's okay if you don't have your answers just the same like we would need to do more work more work on it we had heard from the AG there might be some constitutional concerns about whether or not that would be considered an undue burden yes I think the question is is the emergency carve out sufficient I would like to I would like to look at that before I comment on it I'll look at that case I wonder if there's any concerns regarding establishing the religion versus amendment concerns to me this feels like a more appropriate for religious discussion philosophical discussion I'm not sure whether or not it's appropriate for us to legislate when life begins that's one concern I think the testimony was that the US Supreme Court hasn't ever determined that whether a legislative intent can be considered by a court in interpreting a statute I think what we were talking about was when a court will undergo a consideration of legislative intent but also in terms of I'm technically I think we're actually when life begins if there was a question about this legislation I mean is that a type of thing that legislators guide them to enforce I don't think I understand the concern about fringing upon the right to freedom of religion with an amendment like this I think but when I read it I feel like first we're saying this is what we recognize this is when life begins but then we intend to safeguard this is due access to abortion are they in conflict and then how does that impact um age 57 it worked to pass because my understanding is that the representative who would want this to be part of age 57 as it stands right now having passed you know on the floor so far well I can understand that concern especially since this committee has thought so much about the beach and peace which found that the statute criminalizing abortion yielded sort of an illogical result by providing the individual had the right to have an abortion but then criminalized a provider providing abortion so I can understand why you'd be focusing on sort of the um the nature of this amendment as saying two things at once so I guess I would just comment on um how courts use legislative intent in interpreting the statute um so typically courts use the plain meaning rule when they interpret a statute meaning um if a meaning is plain from the text of the statute the court doesn't need to look elsewhere to decide what the statute means um but if the court finds the statute to be ambiguous like a word or a phrase in the statute to be ambiguous then the court will look to rules of statutory construction and there are lots of those rules and um one of them is that the court can look at any legislative intent that was set forth with the legislation um so there what that means is that a court can um construe the legislative intent section to give a particular meaning to a word or a phrase in a statute um so if the court undertook an analysis of the first part of that amendment that the general assembly recognizes that the fertilization of a human egg begins the development of a distinct human life um it may ascribe meaning to the statute um to age 57 based on that legislative intent um and the second phrase of the sentence that the general assembly prioritizes an individual's choice may or may not influence the court's interpretation um so in other words courts can find ambiguity in some places and not in other places sometimes the court will find ambiguity in order to um base base its decision on what it it believes to be a fair outcome in other words um so I think by recognizing um by the general assembly setting out legislative intent that it recognizes that life begins a conception um could potentially have an implication for how the court interpreted age 57 in particular the that first purpose of policy section where it talks about the fundamental right of a person to um choose to have an abortion so for example the court could look to that acknowledgement of the legislature that life begins of that conception and then disregard the second part of that sentence um by finding that a legislature can't find that life begins a conception and then simultaneously prefer a reproductive choice um and I'm not suggesting that a court would do this I'm just saying this is how in um courts use legislative intent in their interpretation of the statute can you say that again sure so um in the section because the language is here I'm seeing it um where she um and gave it where um this where we actually have the whole thing like the word passed what somebody established you had right and then the second part of her sentence um is but the general assembly prioritizes an individual's choice to decide whether to sustain life um don't have fur and then thank you so you say that the court might stop I think the what I'm trying to say is that a court can um if a court finds something ambiguous it can choose to look to legislative intent and it based on what it finds to be ambiguous the court can look at pieces of the legislative intent and disregard other pieces um so I think my understanding is that the concern might be that a court could look at that at that first phrase of the sentence that life the general assembly finds that life begins a conception and then say if this if the court if the general assembly is finding that life begins a conception or the second part of that sentence and find that if life begins a conception life deserves protection under the constitution and the legislature can't therefore prioritize reproductive choice over the life of a over a living person so it pretty much could be could that double I think an interpretation of the court could could say wait a minute no what is the court a public entity all of you know could there be could there be a cause of action well I guess could there be a cause of action under H57 if if we had this language let's say we're just to interpret and stop that this is our right it seems in conflict with the underlying bill and I do see how the language does seem to be in conflict with the rest of the bill and I could and I would just say it's not inconceivable that a court could look to that language and find that if life begins a conception that should ascribe a person status to a piece again that would be the court's decision and I'm not saying that that would happen but the potential outcome see that was the interesting point that Judge Gerson you know having you know 12 judges and all possibly interpreting it a little differently because there's not always consistency in interpretation so by having such a big opening you're opening up the possibility for more very interpretations right and I think what one judge may find ambiguous and other judge may not find ambiguous and then you move on to the rules of statutory construction from there we see to an interpretation undermining H57 and the protections therein I think it's possible and that there also could be first amendment concerns it's more to statement than a question but this makes me incredibly uncomfortable because it is there's incredible debate among lawyers like everybody about when life begins and for us to declare when life begins seems but I don't see it I just I find that difficult and one thing I just just discovered which I didn't know is in Judaism life does not begin it's not recognized to beginning until birth which is again when you talk about first amendment stuff and religion it just seems like it's important to not make religious assumptions for people what you have to appeal is consider contraception yes it's designed to prevent fertilization okay with this if we determine when an egg is fertilized somebody takes a morning after the egg is fertilized is there any ramifications there well again I would just say that you know because we're setting it out in legislative intent it doesn't have any immediate ramification I don't think but it's legitimate to point out that if a court were to interpret this interpret age 57 in a way that imbued meaning to the legislative intent I think it's possible it could have an impact on a person's ability to take a morning after pill to me it seems like I didn't know how long it took an egg to be fertilized and it can be as little as 30 minutes and so with this language I mean not that I'm a lawyer but I would interpret that morning after the pill becomes abortion feel homicide actually I'll start with so again here we would be putting 20th week in the law do we I mean again this is science this is medicine it's changing it's um do we tend to talk about medical practice in this way so I did reach out to some of my colleagues that specialize in health care law to find to sort of think about whether or not we prohibit a medical procedure based on the timing of that procedure anywhere else in statute and they couldn't think of any other examples the one that I found is that in the patient choice the end of life statute patient choice is only available to a person with a terminal condition and a terminal condition is defined as an incurable and irreversible disease which would in reasonable medical judgment result in death within six months so you have to be with in a provider's medical judgment within six months from death to have access to a prescription that would end your life but that is the only example that we could come up with a place where and it's also different because it's a it's not a procedure it's a treatment to end a person's life and also that applies to men and that applies to children it's accessible to men and women so here we're talking about a medical procedure talking about and this goes back to the question of I think this is where the age talks about the time that at this pause that we were inserting law to a procedure that applied equally so I couldn't find any other instance of a a medical procedure that is limited based on time there's one question that is something I heard yesterday that I wanted to clarify or verify rather in order for a person to be a victim of a homicide or manslaughter they have to be born alive what is that what does that come from that comes from case law it's a state versus Oliver case I think it's a 1980 Vermont Supreme Court case actually that might be 1989 on that for purposes of the criminal statutes in order to be considered a person for under a criminal statute you must be born alive and we talked about that in the committee a little bit that's historically the prevailing common law view some states have set out fatal personhood for purposes of the criminal statutes so some states have moved away from that prevailing common law but that is from the time of the 17th century the historical common law view that you had to be born alive in order to be considered a person under the criminal code so this would overturn it would and so what we talked about yesterday that still could have been located and I just don't know I would need to hear from prosecutors and others I mean I think as the presenter of the amendment said that it does say as used in this section a viable fetus is this but as we just talked about a court if it finds ambiguity in a statute it can go to the rules of statutory construction and again I'll just say again that there are lots of rules of statutory construction so a court can look at how the legislature has legislated in other areas of the criminal code so again courts are very reluctant to expand the scope of a criminal statute without express intent of the legislature but I think it's possible that a court could look at this statute and say this is what personhood means and apply it to other places aren't we worried about putting the issues related to abortion aside getting in the middle of legislating medical treatment so thinking about our purview and the play if we broaden the scope of the existing bill we're almost creating an environment that could thinking about a crystal ball it could throw everything out of whack so to speak if the courts are used to looking at the legislation as is and the definition as is it is the purview of the legislature to change things but what we do if we don't look at the changes of the change it can have incredible ramifications I think in this person especially I think I'm interpreting what you're saying to mean by overturning and established pulled by the Supreme Court that a person has to be born alive for purposes of the criminal statute so that could render some instability in the way that we look at our criminal code incarceration we have a lot more women incarcerated in this facility that we're currently looking at and asking another committee to ask whether or not everything needs to be on women's offenders there is potential for incarceration yes the grossly and negligent operation oh yes in general yes the second part of the grossly negligent operation and the DUI statute I don't think that there would be anything that would prohibit a pregnant woman from being prosecuted for the death of her own fetus in those circumstances so he's in under right I just think that the first section of the homicide section is it does have that specific carve out for a person who undertook action acts committed by a pregnant person towards her own viable fetus so there's the carve out in the homicide statutes but not in the negligent operation or DUI statute sorry is it because we're not really we'll just put that back in so the way the amendment is set up is that the fetal personhood for purposes of the homicide statute can't apply to acts taken by a pregnant person against their own viable fetus that's in subsection C section shall not apply to acts performed during an abortion and then they're on lines 50 and 16 or to acts committed by a pregnant person towards that person's own viable fetus but there is is there potential to architecture intentional or not yes I think that as it's written it's nice clear what the mens rea is for a homicide upon a fetus but I think what the point I was making is that in section 4 and 5 the grossly negligent operation and the DUI there's not that same carve out so that a person could conceivably a pregnant person could conceivably be prosecuted under those two statutes if the person drove in a grossly negligent fashion resulting in the death of her own fetus or if she were convicted of a DUI with fetal death result I guess I'm just saying that that carve out doesn't apply to those other two statutes so I mean we have persons smoking in a car with a child and again this is targeting basically we're criminalizing potential women's behavior I think well we do that I mean that's I can't think of another place that we had a statute could only apply to a person who is just to take it to another crazy level so we have women's skiers and they're one of the best in the world if not the best so let's say she's pregnant and she hits a gate and you know the father you know goes to the prosecutor I know this is but you know it's a situation like you said that is targeting one protected class you know I don't know right there that it's conceivable that the father could have a civil action against her currently under the valent court decision finds that wrongful death persons can recover for wrongful death if he does but that's a civil civil but if you got a prosecutor that said well you should have known better and why would you do that you know I just people so just taking that into account it's hard to say where somebody could go with that right all the miscarriages that people have or it's going to start in question like what did you do to cause your miscarriage right so I feel reluctant to speculate on all circumstances all of the facts of the scenario if we have more time