 So, Henry Kissinger once said, those that need no introduction crave it the most. I think this is not true of the president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, an entirely rare figure in the modern world in being a genuinely world-class academic, a genuine thought leader, a person who worked at the highest levels of the international system, who then went on to lead a country and has been very successful at it. So, with that Ashraf Ghani, pleasure to have you. Well, thank you for that marvelous introduction, and it's a great pleasure to see you and to have an opportunity to exchange views with you. So, the first thing I have to ask you is about what appears to be some breaking news. It is not confirmed, but there are reports that in Doha there has been some kind of a deal made with the Taliban involving the withdrawal of American troops, presumably some kind of deal that the Taliban accepts. Is there any truth to these reports, and what can you tell us about those negotiations? Well, thank you. Peace is an imperative. A war that has gone on for 17 years must come to an end, but this war is multi-dimensional. It is very strong levels of interrelationships, and it's not as simple to arrive at a date and think that the war simply ends because of that. Because on the side of the government of Afghanistan, we have binding legal agreements with the United States in NATO, bilateral agreements, and of course, multilateral agreements internationally regarding assistance trade and others. The Taliban have a series of interrelationships that are below the surface. They have a relationship with all known terrorist groups. They have relationships with the largest criminal mafia and on earth, which after cocaine is the heroin mafia. They have an organic relationship with the state of Pakistan that has provided them sanctuary, resources, support, and others, and they have a patron-client relationship, them being in relationship with clientage with others. This is a cluster of relationships. U.S. is committed to see a timeline to the engagements, but to just think that the relationship has arrived, I think is exaggerate. We need to be able to get the relationship because the dimension that is national, namely the Taliban and the Afghan people and the Afghan government, must be resolved politically, but the dimensions that continue the violence and the reason that international forces are present in Afghanistan is not because of Afghanistan, but because 9-11 and one estimate cost the U.S. government a society of $500 billion. How do we deal with all the sets of relationship? We have a roadmap, we have detailed discussions. Let us not also forget that Ambassador Khalzad, my old friend and the special envoy, was not able to meet with Taliban representatives in Pakistan. That's doha have that authority and the function of Ambassador Khalzad's office is to bring the Afghan government and the Taliban into face-to-face discussions and negotiations. Within that, then the larger issues of U.S. presence and other international issues will be addressed. But there is no breakthrough you are saying in recent days? Not in that sense. There would be, there's discussion, but this discussion needs to be shared back. A discussion that does not involve the region will not last. Afghanistan is national dimensions, neighborhood dimensions, the regional dimension from India to Russia, the Gulf, Islamic and international. If we don't get all the pieces right, one piece alone doesn't suffice. How would you respond to people in America, maybe in other western countries where troops that have sent troops, but they say this has gone on for 17 years. What have we gotten out of it? We have failed in some sense, they would argue. No, absolutely. But the first thing is the United States is not there because it's fighting in Afghanistan. It's fighting for its security. Second, we have engaged in a very open dialogue. The United States as a sovereign power, as a global power, is entitled to leave. But we need to get the departure right. Are the fundamental reasons that brought the United States to Afghanistan are those objectives accomplished? So the first issue is cost. We completely agree that the cost must come down, must become more efficient. So the first thing I request is that everything under the sun should not be built under the war in Afghanistan. When the US Navy needs money, when the US Army needs money in the US Air Force, it builds it under Afghanistan. What's the cost of the war in Afghanistan? Second, the number of troops. We are engaged in a discussion. We had initiated this to see that the number corresponds to the essential needs. Because every US soldier, essentially at least, costs a million dollars a year on making it more efficient, on making it this is crucial. And we understand that our relationship is based on mutual interest, which flows from mutual threats on the one hand and mutual goals on the other. So my answer, first, I pay tribute to every mother and father who have lost their children in Afghanistan. This has included the highest levels of government, like Secretary Kelly, Chief of Staff, who lost his son in Elman. Second, over a million American soldiers, men and women in uniform have seen action in Afghanistan. We pay tribute. But the job that we started together needs to move. Thirdly, since I've become president, 100,000 troops left, over 45,000 Afghan security personnel have paid the ultimate sacrifice. The number of international casualties is less than 72. So it shows you who's doing the fighting and the support is mutual. We need to get as stable Afghanistan as an entity that can ensure security of America and Europe and others on the one hand. But more fundamentally, our own democratic rights and institutions and our right to live in peace and harmony. And if I look at Afghanistan today, what I'm struck by is you have a functioning democracy. You're up for election elections again in July. There have not been major terrorist attacks in recent months. The economy seems to be moving forward. Is it fair to say that Afghanistan has turned the corner? Afghanistan is turning the corner. My first tribute is to the Afghan women. Afghan women have come to voice their own. In 33 provinces of Afghanistan, there have been discussions in the last one. It'd be taking place now. We're going to have the first jirga, the gathering of all Afghan women in the coming months. These are people who grow, come from the grassroots. What do they want? A democratic orderly system. Second is the youth. The youth of Afghanistan has really come to its own. Please understand that Afghanistan of today is a very different Afghanistan in terms of demographic composition. And three are the poor. Different even from the Afghanistan of on 9-11, 2001, right? Absolutely. Because this generation, we lost three generations to war. This is the first generation that has gone directly from refugee camps and internally displaced people to the best universities on earth. Educational capability. We are now able to staff a modern administration and run it. So the ownership and leadership that has come. And it's also a networked generation. They talk. They are rooted on the ground, but they are able to talk with all our neighbors and to the global community in a language. And the economy is beginning to move fundamentally. But the most important thing is our constitution. As you mentioned, presidential elections will take place in July. The people of Afghanistan will select their leaders from 1747 when the last incarnation of continuous of one state is taken place until I succeeded President Karzai with a couple of exceptions. Every succession involved a conflict. And in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime, there was no agreement on rules of the game. Kabul was destroyed. The country went to a level of deprivation and destitution that didn't know. Why? Because a number of people with all been friends could not agree on the rules of the game. The rules of the game are now placed in the constitution. 390 laws have been passed only in the last four and a half years. This is a different country where I think I'm confident that we can turn the corner. And by 2024, it would be a country that would be able to pay for itself as a going proposition because you need an economic base in a country that has a vision of itself as a roundabout where ideas, people, goods can flow. After 117 years, we've again become an integral part of Central Asia. We have fantastic relationship. We look at every aspect of our relationship as an opportunity. So on the one hand, United States, our foundational partner. Western countries, NATO and non-NATO countries. But the region, we have come with a positive vision of good relationship with every single one of our neighbors near and far. So would it, you know, as you know, there's a great debate in the United States about nation-building. And there is a great frustration. People say, why did we go into Iraq and Afghanistan with the idea that we could nation-build? I think what people really mean is not nation-building, but state-building. It's like democracy-building. Is it your view that the situation in Afghanistan proves that that kind of nation-building does work? That kind of nation-building works, but not through the foreign agent. Foreign aid needs to be rethought fundamentally. The key is both national ownership and international partnership, with that proposition in making sure that things are not done for you, but that you can really take ownership. I just give you a very small illustration. The Afghan agricultural sector is vital, but it's not received. Last year, we were the largest producer of pine nuts in the world, but didn't know it. So the international figures showed that our production was 3,000 tons. Actually, it was 26,000, because everything was going to Pakistan and then to China, as they did value. We created an air corridor. We've just sent, in three months, 500 tons of pine nuts to Shanghai, and 4,000 are going to be going to Istanbul to be distributed. This type of relationship is fundamental, so you get it right. And what is important, business administration has become a discipline. Political science, unfortunately, is still at the realm of theory. So state building as a discipline is not consolidated. And we need to bring this a lot of people who work in international organizations. My former colleagues, I hope they don't mind, are amateurs. They are not disciplined. The discipline comes from democratic accountability. Democratic accountability is crucial to make a bureaucrat, a leader, responsive. It forces them into a national debate. You need to learn. At times, I'm told, when I speak English, my international interlocutors think I cannot talk Pashto or Dariye or Uzbekye, and when they see me talking those languages, they're amazed, because you need to connect. The vocabulary is different. The substance is the same, but the vocabulary changes. What is the biggest revelation to you, having been an academic who studied these issues as a practitioner who now has to actually live these issues? First is the nature of resistance. Short-term interest, unfortunately, Trump's medium and long-term national interest. And this resistance really needs to be taken very seriously. But the second thing, which is the pleasant revelation, how much a citizen-focused agenda gets response, and how extraordinary the ordinary people are. What a woman who has lost three sons comes and embraces you and says, take my fourth son, but give me dignity. That is truly something that you cannot put a price on. It's worth billions. Or you see a young child who marches with you and takes a review, a head erect, or comes, rides on my shoulders saying, this is my grandfather, the president. On the one side, this immense decency of the general public, the citizen. On the other hand, the short-sighted. And the last issue is, a lot of our international colleagues who provide advice are out of touch with the times. They provide you a turn of the 19th, of the 20th century or mid-20th century advice. We need to become much more dynamic, much more people-focused. The short-term perspective, does it make you wish you had the kind of power that President Xi in China or President Putin in Russia has, that way you could think long-term for the country? No, I think long-term for the country, democratically. We tried authoritarianism. We had one of the worst despotisms at the turn of the 20th century. And we had the Soviet style. No, Afghanistan, there's a man called Elphinstone who wrote a book in 1809, and he really got it right. He said, this country is most suited to democratic governance. Afghans have a sense of equality. When I talk to another Afghans, I'm her or his equal, and that moves me to tears. We're not circumference, and authoritarian regimes might suit others, it doesn't suit our culture. Our culture is one of equality, hierarchy, market. For the market, we are willing to accept hierarchy. For the state, if we don't engage in discussion, we have a saying, if you put a meal in front of Afghans, but they have not been engaged in cooking yet, they will criticize it. The single biggest strategic challenge you and your predecessor have had has been that you face an insurgency in the Taliban that has funding, training, and geographic support bases in the neighboring country, Pakistan. The Pakistani military has used this to destabilize Afghanistan to secure what it sees as its interests. There's a new civilian government in Pakistan, a new prime minister. Do you sense any change in Pakistan's attitude towards Afghanistan? We've talked on the phone, we have not met in person. The proof of the pudding is there's the fundamental issues in action. We've been promised repeatedly in the past so much as saying that next week there will be change, and next week we've seen an identification of the conflict. Afghanistan wants an engagement with Pakistan. Our relationship falls in three buckets. One, removing the shadow of violence. For 14 years there's been engagement. This engagement is against all international rules, all norms of decency, a neighboring country that recognizes and enjoys particularly close cultural relationship, does not sponsor subversive movements, in arms subversive movements. So that's one discussion. The second is what should normal relationship, cooperative relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan look like. We, I think, will be the greatest asset to a prosperous and stable Pakistan, because we are the source of power from Central Asia and others, and the source of transit and connectivity. And three, the joint issue. What do we do with the continuing problem of terrorism? We need to engage. The key is, we as a nation and as a state, we are dedicated to overcoming the past. The question that Pakistani leadership needs to face is, is there conduct of the last 17 years benefited them, harmed them, isolated them, made them central? And can they? How would they get to 2047? The year when they celebrate their 100th anniversary. An excellent analysis has been done by the World Bank. If they continue the current course, they will be a very poor country. But if they change and engage in regional cooperative and fundamental economic and social political reform, they could be a middle-income country. The choice is theirs. The Trump administration, when it came into office, in a way, relieved you of some of the uncertainty of the Obama administration, which was always debating whether or not to stay in Afghanistan. And the Trump administration said, no, we're going to stay. We're in fact going to increase the intensity for engagement. But they said the same in Syria. And rather bizarrely and dramatically, President Trump decided to withdraw forces. Do you worry that you're going to get a phone call from Mike Pompeo saying, guess what? The President's just tweeted, we're going to leave Afghanistan tomorrow. Well, the first issue is, President Trump and I have had an excellent relationship. The South Asian strategy was a very thoughtful response to a situation. And let's not forget, the core of the South Asian strategy was to bring peace to Afghanistan. And we've welcomed it. Second, it's a condition-based strategy. And this condition-based strategy, we've interpreted as putting conditionality on ourselves, not to say that the conditions are going to be left to others to change. We've changed our security forces' root-stocking branch during this. An inherent reform of the inherent law brought the age of retirement for a general to 56 years. Our four-star generals now retire at 62. Over 2,000 generals and kernels have been retired. We are really focused. We've used this. And day by day, we're gaining strength. Now, as I brought to your attention, a sovereign state. The world's most powerful has a right to disengage. But we don't think it's going to disengage. The reason is not because of wishful thinking. The reason is because of a dialogue that is based on reason and mutual interest. We've had this dialogue because you need to think in scenarios. The problem is that the public panics when they think when a scenario is reality. But as you know, the United States has 100, at least, scenarios that defense department for every conceivable situation. One of them leaked. We've had discussions. The South Asia strategy is the strategy. Proof. The level of cooperation that we've received from the U.S. military and from the U.S. security forces has been immense. During the past months, General Miller has leaned backward, the commander of the Resolute Support Forces, to remove uncertainty and to be able to work with us. But the ultimate goal neither of the United States nor of Afghanistan is to make this interpermanent thing for ages. Our goal is to become a partner, not a dependent. Because of this, we need to be able to pay for ourselves, for our security, and to make sure that the relationships are such. Bottom line. Our cooperation depends on the level and threat of terrorism. If that threat is lowered, of course, the forces need to be lowered and leave. But we need to understand, and you're in a better position than all of us, is this threat over or actually other forms? It's morphing constantly, and as the latest is, is Daesh gone to version 4? If you're talking about globalization 4, we need to talk also about version 4 of terrorism. That issue requires the attention of all of us. And you, just to clarify, you are saying that Daesh, that is ISIS, and presumably the Taliban, the more radical elements of the Taliban, still remain real terrorist threats to the West? They do. And instead of taking my word for it, I think we need to arrive at consensus. To the region also, the problem with some of the regional behaviours is, it's reverting to 19th century thinking. They think spheres of influence are a better concept. Let us not forget, Middle East, Southwest Asia, and South Asia have still not arrived at a full embrace of the Westphalian system, where sovereign states interact with each other. My argument is that both for the economy, for environment, and for security, we need to arrive at state-to-state-centered relationship so our people can interact, our businesses can interact. But we cannot be seeing zero-sum games in interference as a way of securing our interests. The Trump administration has also done something which I assume you welcome, which is it has taken a tough stand on Pakistan. But has that been real? Again, there was a certain rhetorical outburst where the Trump administration and Trump himself threatened Pakistan with the withdrawal of aid and such. Have you seen an increase of an American pressure on Pakistan? I have. First of all, $1.2 billion will withdraw. It's a location that is never going to be restored in the future. Second, the level of engagement, the discussion, quiet, but it's been very systematic and very focused. The level of engagement leaves nothing to be desired. It is principled and we welcome it, but it's also catalytic because it's not pressure for the pressure's sake, it's a pressure for the sake of engagement. It's an engagement agenda. Pakistan is a pivotal state in the region. Its stability is vital to Afghanistan's interest, to India's interest, to everybody's interest. We hope that Pakistani leadership would come out of the scars of its creation. Partition was painful. The wounds have been immense, but for South Asia to become whole, like Europe, they need to overcome this trauma of the birth. 70 years is enough time and in this regard, I think embrace of the 21st century by Pakistan will make all its neighbors and all its international partners and Islamic partners come to a supporting stand and come to co-operative. We think the advantages of cooperation for Pakistan are immense, the advantages of confrontation are close to net. But if there are sections of Pakistani state that still think that, those we hope need to rethink. So you are that rare foreign leader who has had a very good and productive relationship with Donald Trump and you think his policies have basically been supportive and successful. Why do you think that is? Well, first because I don't talk much. No, literally. Yeah, you have to be able to get your main arguments in two minutes. President Trump is engaging. And if you get your points across, urgently, then he asks you questions. Our first phone call when he was President-elect lasted 15 minutes more than we thought because it was a real conversation. One cannot dismiss the questions, the fundamental questions of a world leader and think when it's getting away with. In the other is you need to be able to represent your country with dignity. I don't ask. I've never begged for myself anything. For my country, I want. And third, you need to know to show that you care a lot more about your country than your foreign friends and partners. And fourth, we are very lucky because we've had a very large range of American diplomats, particularly American military personnel and others who've gotten to know my country and particularly me during the years of President Karzai. I was responsible pro bono basis for bringing the security transition of the U.S. and international forces. So that gave me an opportunity to see both my country and to see the relationship. As part of this modern leadership, particularly for one of the poorest countries on earth is representation. We have to know the networks. And when context changes, a lot of people fight the context. Our approach has been to say what are the opportunities in the new context. And that enables us not to be defensive. So when policy is made, you need to understand it's going to take a process. When the Afghan policy was being made by President Trump, a lot of my American friends came when they came to my room. They were very uneasy. This is taking too much time. And I assured them, I said, to President Obama, it took longer. You have a friend who understands that policy making, and because of it, I pride myself never having lost an international colleague and friend by because of short term worries. And when questions are raised, we answer them. So when Americans look back on this long engagement in Afghanistan, you think they can take pride in feeling that they achieved something? Enormous. First, thank God there's been no recurrence of 9-11. It's not because of luck. It's because of the immense sacrifice and effort. Second, the Afghan people are a very different people. We are thousands years old civilization culture. But in terms of youth, we're one of the youngest countries. And through the fundamental numbers have changed. Democracy, as you've written and articulated every other day on your program, is not an overnight dose that you inject or an injection. Democracy building requires that patience. And I think we are at the cusp with the elections. I hope that the transition will consolidate and we will be able to show that the investment that was made in us was worth it. President Ghani, pleasure to have you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much.