 Good afternoon, and welcome to New America. Thank you all for coming to our session. America's first foreign fighter for al-Qaeda after 9-11. Bryant Neil Venus tells his story. My name is Melissa Sallek-Virk, and I'm a policy analyst with New America's International Security Program. For those of you new to New America, we are a think and action tank, a civic platform that connects a research institute, technology lab, solutions network, media hub, and public forum. The International Security Program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the toughest security challenges facing American policymakers and the public. Our research has addressed homegrown American terrorism, the United States drone wars abroad, and the proliferation of drones around the world, and the profound changes in warfare wrought by new technology and societal changes. I'd like to introduce you to our two panelists today, Bryant Neil Venus and Mitchell D. Silber. Bryant Neil Venus is an American citizen who traveled to Pakistan in 2007 to fight United States and coalition forces present in Afghanistan. He ultimately joined al-Qaeda, received basic training from the group, participated in al-Qaeda military operations in Afghanistan, and discussed a plot to attack the Long Island Railroad before being captured in late 2008 in Pakistan. He subsequently cooperated with the US government and its allies, and is considered to have been one of the most prized sources of actionable intelligence against al-Qaeda. He recently completed his prison sentence for his actions and has been working with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and with Mitch. Mitchell D. Silber is the former director of intelligence analysis at the New York City Police Department, and is currently an adjunct professor at Columbia University's Graduate School for Public and International Affairs. At the NYPD, he supervised the research, collection, and analysis for the intelligence division's entire portfolio of ongoing terrorism-related investigations and was responsible for strategic assessments of emerging and future threats to the city of New York. Mitch co-authored the 2007 NYPD report, Radicalization in the West, The Homegrown Threat, and is the author of The Al-Qaeda Factor, Plots Against the West, published in 2012 by the University of Pennsylvania Press. He is also the chief executive of Parallel Networks, a new nonprofit committed to working with former terrorists to combat violent extremism. Brian and Mitch co-wrote a featured article for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published this month, tied to Al-Qaeda's first American foreign fighter after 9-11. This afternoon, we will begin with an NYPD introduction by Mitch and how and why Brian's story became so important, and then Brian will share a brief account of his background and history. We'll follow with an engaging discussion and we'll save the last 30 minutes or so for audience questions. And with that said, we'll begin with Mitch. Thank you, Melissa, and thank you, New America, for hosting Brian and I here today. Really appreciate the fact that this organization focuses a lot about CT issues in the homeland and overseas and always a pleasure to be at New America. I thought, since most of you are here, really, here, Brian's story, I'm just gonna provide a little context to why Brian is so important, why he was of such concern to the NYPD, to the greater US intelligence community, and sort of try and bring you back to 2008. Unlike some people in Washington, I don't have my calendar from that year, so I won't bring that, but I did bring slides, and some of these slides are actually from NYPD presentation given in that time period looking at the threat and looking at, frankly, Brian, and what that meant to New York City. It was something that looked at al-Qaeda, plots against mass transit systems in major cities, New York and London, and also the role that Westerners played in those plots. So just a quick moment, Brian and I connected just about the time this article came out. This was last spring, and we'd been working together, and as Melissa said, since last spring, and recently, we co-authored this piece in West Point Sentinel, talking about his experiences overseas. But really, the way Brian came on to my radar screen is in late 2007, early 2008, when the first indications became available that there was an American overseas in Pakistan, Afghanistan, involved with al-Qaeda. And the question was, who was that individual? And within a relatively short period of time, the determination was made by the federal intelligence community that it was a New Yorker, and in fact, it was Bryant. New York City, NYPD didn't have an investigation on Bryant before he went overseas. In fact, he was not known to us. However, in New York City, we were looking at a group called the Islamic Thinker Society. And this is a group that is an American analog of an organization overseas in the UK called Amur Hajarun, an Islamist group that does a lot of provocative street dawah, is very ideologically oriented in Islamist way toward al-Qaeda. And frankly, when speaking to colleagues in the UK was a bit of a Petri dish for many individuals in the UK who went on to turn towards violence. And in New York City, we called them a bit of a bug light for aspiring jihadists. And in New York City, we were investigating this group, and in particular this individual on the bottom left, Ahmed Zerini, who turns out as a friend of Bryant's from Long Island. In looking at plots and threats, New York City was beginning to be concerned about the outer boroughs, about Nassau, Suffolk, New Jersey in the wake of activities that had occurred in the UK. But really that's the way Bryant came on our radar screen. There's an American overseas, he's from New York, he's from Long Island, oh by the way, he's connected to this individual in the Islamic Thinker Society. And the question is, is there some possibility that if he's with al-Qaeda, he's able to communicate back in some way that we won't know to Zerini, to the group, and can that be some type of trigger for some type of an attack? So New York City was on very high alert with that in mind. And the background of that goes back to London and the fact that there were situations where individuals from the West, London specifically, UK specifically went overseas, linked up with al-Qaeda and we were turned around and sent back. July 7th bombing in London with 52 people died. The July 21st plot where the explosives failed, but nevertheless you would have had five suicide bombers in the London Metro and on buses. And a year later, we frankly had our own New York City version of that with the Zazi case in the fall of 2009, where again New Yorkers went overseas, trained with al-Qaeda and then were turned around to come back and do something in New York. Why did these individuals go overseas? For a variety of different reasons, military training, recruitment, inspiration, sanction, but the reason that Bryant went, he'll tell you more in detail, was similar to many others. They went to fight overseas. They didn't go overseas with the intention to do something back in the country from which they originated. That was their original intention, is to fight overseas against US and coalition forces. And frankly, in their own words, Zazi, the plan was to fight against the Taliban, against the US. Mohammad Sadiqi Khan, who was the leader of the 7-7 attacks in London, 2005. I have to do this thing. I'm doing what I'm doing for the sake of Islam, meaning going overseas and volunteering, being a foreign fighter, as we now call it, we didn't call it that terminology then. And in Bryant's intent was similar. And again, this concern was that even though they went overseas to fight there because they were a Westerner, because they had the ability to come back into London, back to the US, these individuals were turned around overseas. And that was really what we were concerned about with Bryant. And although that wasn't the case, because as Melissa mentioned, he was ultimately arrested overseas. In the Zazi plot, they did come back to the US. They did plan something against New York City, unfortunately, it was thwarted in the fall of 2009. And frankly, from the NYPD and law enforcement's perspective, you don't have a lot of time to figure out who's back before they operationalize. For the 7-7 plot, you had from February to July, right? So five months. For the 7-21 plot, you had less time, four months. Zazi a little bit more time, nine months. But you don't have unlimited time before individuals who have trained overseas come back, turn to action. And our conclusions at the time were that number one radicalization is happening in the US, as well as overseas. These different theaters of war, these different fields of jihad are attracting people to go overseas, to go fight. New York City, because of a variety of different elements, is a likely target. And again, this similar point that you don't have unlimited time to be able to identify these people when they come back to stop the threat. So that's sort of the context in which I first came to know about Bryant. But let me stop there and hand it over to Bryant. I'll tell you a little bit about his origin story. Hello, everyone. Thank you for coming to see me. I'm here to clarify some inaccuracies about my story and hopefully give you a better understanding on jihadism. I'm gonna tell you a quick rundown on my life. I grew up in Long Island. I was born in Queens. My father moved the family out to Long Island when I was about a year old. And I grew up there. I grew up in Medford. I grew up going to Longwood High School, the Longwood School District, sorry. And, you know, life on Long Island can be tough. If you don't have a car, you're kind of stuck in your neighborhood. And you know, so I'm gonna take it from here. My family is Hispanic. My mother's from Argentina. My father's from Peru. I grew up middle class, lower middle class family. Didn't have too much sports or hobbies growing up. My neighborhood was also a mixture of different ethnic backgrounds, some blacks and whites, some Hispanic, so mixed everybody. After high school, I joined the army. It was in that period of life where, you know, after high school, you're trying to figure out what to do with your life and which direction to go in. I talked to an army recruiter, and he may have seemed like the army was the greatest thing in the world. And, you know, I fell in love with his pitch and I signed up and I realized that wasn't for me. So I got discharged in the army for a general discharge. And then from there, I was lost for a little bit. I started working in a factory. And then a friend, he put me on to the possibility of going to Cuba, talked about it. It was a Cuban friend of mine. And then from there, decided to set my goal. One day I wanted to go to Cuba and see what it's like for myself. So that had to wait a little bit. You know, I had to save up some money. During that time, I started training in boxing, out on Long Island. And then after I had saved up some money, I went out to Cuba and saw it with my eyes. And, you know, I fell in love with the sport. I fell in love with the training, the discipline, the good diet, the, you know, how to take care of yourself very well. And when I started learning about Islam, it related very similar things, where you have to take care of your body, say a wing from pork and alcohol, how to treat others with respect. And it drew a lot of similarities that I liked. And over time, I eventually became Muslim. The story of how I became Muslim, I was in Astoria and there was a mosque that I'd always walked by many times. So even though I was a Muslim, I was still practicing fasting. I guess it was like a sign of solidarity. And I had to make a donation to have my fast be accepted. So I, since that was the only mosque that I knew in Astoria, I walked in with my checkbook and I asked a young kid in the lobby area, what's the name of this mosque so that I can write out a donation? So he said, give me a few minutes, let me find out. So he leaves, he comes back and he says, come on in. We have a few people that I want to talk to you. So I'm like, sure. So then I go in, there's a group of guys sitting in a circle on the floor. One guy has a book. And one of them turns to me, he says, do you want to be Muslim? I'm like, yeah. And then he says, repeat this. And he says some things in Arabic. And then I repeated them. And he says, okay, now you're Muslim. So I said, in my mind I was thinking, I said, well, I didn't mean I wanted to be Muslim right there that second. I eventually wanted to become Muslim. But he got me, so. From then on I was Muslim and they were really big and to believe Jama'at were very similar, some similarities with Jehovah's Witnesses where they visit people's houses and they encourage them to come to the mosque. And I was there for a while and then I moved back to Long Island because at the time I was living in Nassau County and I moved back to Suffolk County. And then from there that's when I met a caretaker of the mosque that I was going to in my local mosque and he was of Afghani descent. And he used to tell me stories of Afghanistan. He was from Kandahar. So he told me a lot of stories about the Taliban and its origins. And that's how I got introduced to Afghan culture, Afghans, I guess traditions. And then little by little I started learning about conspiracy theories of different secret organizations in the world. I started listening to Anwar al-Aulaki on these MP3 discs that I got as gifts from certain friends. Back when YouTube was unregulated you could see a lot of jihadi videos on YouTube. And that was I guess the beginning of me starting to shift into being pro jihadism. So eventually, and the big turning point was a friend of mine at the time, he was in the military and we were debating back and forth in an email of things that I didn't like about US foreign policy. And he said, you know what, you're a lot like most people where they just talk and they never do anything about something that they feel is wrong in the world. And then afterwards I thought about it and I said, you know what, he's got a good point there. And that was like the turning point, the major turning point of me wanting to go overseas. So a friend of mine, he put me onto this book by Omar Nasiri called Inside the Jihad. And it was about this young guy's journey from Western Europe, how he got into Pakistan and made his way into Afghanistan. And then he joined Al Qaeda when Al Qaeda was still the guest of the Taliban when they controlled Kabul. And I decided, you know what, this could be a template for me to sort of use to figure out how to get my way into Afghanistan and join a Sunni group. And then set up my, I saved us some money. I went overseas, I went to Pakistan. I had a friend set me up to have a guide into Peshawar. And then from Peshawar, I joined one group. And they sent me into, well, that was the journey of me going into the tribal areas and that's a different world on its own, so. And then once you're in that network of different militants and different fighting groups, eventually I found my way into Al Qaeda. And then eventually in, let's see, November of 2008, I was captured and I got extradited back to New York and I cooperated with the government. So I think I pretty much covered what I was hoping to. I don't know if, is there anything else? Okay. We also have as well, so I'd just like to start with if there's anything you feel like you can't address, please let me know and then we can move on to a different topic. But Brian, you took us back to the beginning of your journey into adulthood. And just as an outsider trying to be as objective as possible, it seemed to me that a strict and structured lifestyle became important to you. And so you were raised in a Christian family, you went into the military, became a trained boxer, and then found Islam. So some may say that there's no connection between sports, military, and religion, but all those activities do require dedication and a formal structure. I'm wondering if you could share your thoughts. Sure. When you're trying to figure out what to do with your life after high school, either getting into sports or having religion as sort of a guide to go about your day-to-day life can be important for some people. I know it's very important to me and that it stuck with me. Unfortunately, I took it a little too far and I ended up in Afghanistan, so I agree with that. And so I'm wondering after your time in Fort Jackson and then when you went to Cuba and then you came back to New York, something changed. So what compelled you to be on the other side of the conflict with them and now war on terror? I think it was a combination of several things and I feel that Anwar Aulalaki propaganda was very influential. Like I mentioned before with my friend at the time, him telling me, you know, stop complaining and do something about it. That was also another thing. And also I didn't have any kids, I wasn't married, so I didn't have anything to hold me back in New York. And I said, you know what? I think going overseas is easier for me than people who do have kids or have a wife or have close family structure to stay home. But so a combination of several things caused me to go overseas. Okay, and at that point, there were a lot of demonstrations or I guess just reactions that weren't causing people to travel abroad, but you felt like that was something that you wanted to do. Was there a trigger that made you feel like I need to travel or was it just because of your personal circumstances that you just mentioned? Our personal circumstances and like I said, it was an accumulation of several things that made me decide to go overseas. Thank you. And so just now and also in the article that you and Mitch recently wrote, you highlight Omar in a series book and I've also read that. You mentioned that it served as a template for travel but what else about it spoke to you? It talked a lot about how if a guy was dedicated enough and I guess if he was charismatic enough because he was a charismatic figure in the book. And he had some good instincts, street instincts that he could hopefully find his way over to Afghanistan and I thought, you know what? I think I can do it as well. And based upon your interactions abroad and also what he wrote, did you feel like it was an accurate portrayal of what to expect now in retrospect? In retrospect it was a little off. Obviously when he won it was before 9-11. After 9-11 it's a lot harder and I'm pretty sure even while I was incarcerated it's changed even more difficult right now. But it was good enough just to give me an idea of what to expect overseas. Okay, thank you. So once you reached did you have any difficulty adjusting to life outside the US? I know that you had some sort of illnesses which many people can have to manage but apart from that did you feel that there was any difficulty adjusting? A little bit of a culture shock. I mean growing up in New York is different than growing up in Peshaw or Lahore or the tribal areas is a very different lifestyle. Yeah, language was obviously a problem. Not everybody speaks English but it used to be a British colony so English is studied well out there so I could just do enough to get around. And it's just the culture is so much different so I guess it was like a culture shock in the beginning but eventually you adjust. Okay. And did you feel the same sense of belonging once you arrived there or did it bother you that people thought that you might be a spy? Well I understood if people thought I was a spy but over time I was able to win a lot of hearts over. I even had one guy tell me he's like you know in the beginning I thought you were a spy. So he told me straight up but I think over time once people saw that I wasn't doing anything suspicious I wasn't trying to create any problems any chaos that over time a lot of them just let that go. Okay. And can you tell us any more about your training apart from what's in the article or can you for people who haven't read it yet tell us a little bit about that. Basic training camp is about three weeks long and you deal mostly with Soviet weapons AK-47, RPG-7 rocket launcher, PK machine gun. They go a little bit into explosive theory, landmine theories and then on the last day you go out for target practice and then afterwards you can move on to other courses afterwards but it's just a quick basic history on the weapons and how to fire them that's basically it. And at any point while you were in training did you start to question your actions? You know it's often highlighted that you did not want to conduct a mission in the West. Can you tell us a bit about that? Yeah I was asked that a lot by certain people even just people that just met me just for a few minutes they're like why don't you do something you know back in the West and I said well I made all the effort to come over here why would I go back and do it there and if I wanted to do something there I could have just stayed there and done it myself. Okay. But I made all the effort to get to you know the tribal area and that's where I thought I was gonna stay. And also in the article you talked about feeling manipulated by people you were with and that you didn't have enough religious training to become a suicide bomber. So I'm wondering why do you think they told that to you and what did it mean to you? And so did you feel that you had a higher purpose which is why they were telling you you didn't have the training yet or did you feel like you were being betrayed? Later on I figured out from somebody that was familiar with the group that they were using me to raise money. Okay. So they were telling people look we have an American here if you could help us out with some money so we could take care of them and they would pocket all the money and never give me anything. So they were using me almost like a mascot and that's what I feel is the real reason why they didn't want to send me out to any type of missions whether it's combat or suicide bombing. I just, they were connected with the ISI so they had their own agenda. Okay. And did you talk to people about that or was it sometime later that you found out that they had a different purpose? It was after I left the group I found out. So you also talk about how advanced training courses seemed accessible to those who had more money? Can you tell us more about that? Yeah, so if you had some money you could sign up for either a sniper course or a pistols course and you had to pay for either the ammunition or the weapons that you needed for that and if you're from the rich golf countries it's no problem. Like me, I didn't have income coming in. I didn't have a family to send me money. You know, it was a lot harder for someone who didn't have money to take those courses so I thought it was a little unfair but nothing I could do about it. And did that bother you at all knowing that just because you had to even pay to get advanced training when you had gone there to receive it in the first place? Yeah, a little bit because I thought it should be available to everybody but if it was expensive and that's the way, you know that's how they ran the courses is no thing I could do about it. I wish everything was for free and it was for fair for everybody but that's not how it worked. Okay, thank you. So Mitch, I'm wondering, have you come across similar information about the cost of an access to training with other international violent extremist groups? Not so much in that you had to pay for particular courses for training. Certainly there have been other Americans, other New Yorkers, other Brits who brought funding with them, who brought material with them to Al-Qaeda just because Al-Qaeda to some degree was in the business of raising funds and trying to get material from wherever they could get but not so much that it was correlated that you cannot participate in a particular course unless you essentially enroll in it like you might at a university or some type of vocational school. So that was a really interesting element to the discussion with Brian and one that we thought was worth putting out there in the public domain. Okay, and is there anything else that you've learned after having these conversations just to kind of, I guess, engage people to figure out what the next steps are for understanding why groups are structured this way or have you received any other feedback, I guess, once you put in the public domain about how things are structured in terms of training? Well, I know a lot of people have picked up on some of Brian's comments that it was boring for the most part in the camps and I think there is a very romanticized view when you're in Paris, New York, London, LA about what it's like overseas and we'll talk a little bit about countering violent extremism later but if there's a way, and this is one way to sort of get out the word that, well, that's not quite what it's like. You're gonna be surprised when you get overseas. Yeah, maybe that will dissuade some people who might otherwise consider going to in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen. So I think that's, and hearing that from Brian that seemed like something worthwhile to highlight that in a sense only he can say is he's been there, he's been in the camps. Thank you. So Brian, you discussed in the article that you were wary to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan for missions. Was there anything beyond what you just mentioned a moment ago about why when you traveled there in the first place, you just didn't wanna leave? Is, does that summarize it or was there anything else about not wanting to leave that territory? Yeah, there's always that element that you could get arrested at the airport if I wanted to go home. It was always the fear of people informing on you. So even if I wanted to go back home, which a lot of people do feel homesick and they think about going home, the risk of getting apprehended by authorities is very high. So you're kinda stuck there until something happens. Okay. After not being caught for so long, did you feel like it was a matter of time or were you surprised when you were confronted in Peshawar? I was a little surprised because I was in the marketplace looking at a rifle scope and a cop came in and was yelling in Peshaw at me and my friend. And my friends said, no, we gotta go outside, step outside. So I'm thinking, okay, it's probably just a misunderstanding. He sees a foreigner, what is he doing here? So I said, no, hold on, hold on. So I showed him my passport, my visa was good, my passport was still valid and I thought it would get cleared up in a few minutes and I would go about my way, but he never let me and my friend go and eventually I was handed over to US authorities and I got extradited. Okay. So Mitch, why do you believe that Bryant was able to operate under the radar for so long? You know, I think we go back to 2008, 2007 as Bryant is changing and coming to the viewpoint that he wants to do something, he wants to travel overseas. I think Bryant was unique in that he wasn't part of a group per se and to some degree, our view that oh, he's part of this Islamist thinkers society group is wrong and that's something that also came out of our discussions. Yes, he was friends with one individual, but at least from the standpoint of investigations, investigations are always easier from a law enforcement perspective when there's a group that gives you some type of indication they need to be looked at and there's some predicate for that. So, Bryant really operated on his own and to some degree, it was fairly disciplined about it. He was looking at websites, but he managed to figure out how to travel overseas without setting off what normally might have been red flags, even where he chose to land in Pakistan and a lot of his radicalization was online. People would call self-radicalization, but it wasn't in, again, a group and there wasn't a lot of communications which can also be something that might set off tripwires for law enforcement or intelligence to know that there's a person turning toward violence. Okay, thank you. So, just to follow up to that, Bryant, did you feel like there was anything you were doing online that should have alerted authorities sooner? You know, I was very careful not to go into any jihadi chat rooms. I was trying to reach out to certain individuals on the phone talking about jihadiism. Any time I wanted to talk about it, the few times that I wanted to, it was only with a handful of friends that I trusted. I was afraid to talk about anything like that over the phone in case somebody was tapping my phone. So, I was very cautious, very careful who I spoke to and how I spoke about jihadiism, so. So, Mitch, in the article, you and Bryant discussed that it was difficult for the Joint Terrorism Task Force to believe that there was no formal ceremony or contractual agreement to join the group. Can you tell us more about that? Yeah, I mean, I think and Bryant should respond to that as well. I think just in general, not at the point to figure out a particular organization, but in general, law enforcement and intelligence, we all thought that if you're joining this group, this elite group, this group that you're essentially willing to lay your life on the line for, there must be some obligatory oath or something to sort of formalize your joining of that group. So, I think that was just sort of the operating principles that writ large, the intelligence communities in the West were operating that you had to swear some type of biot or oath. So, when Bryant explained that to the JTTF to me, that was sort of surprising. Would you like to respond? Yeah, for people who are used to dealing maybe with organized crime or with gangs, there's this, I guess, misunderstanding that all groups, you either have to prove yourself or you have to swear some type of oath and I didn't have to do any of that. I think once you're there and as long as you're not causing any trouble, they kind of leave you alone and they believe that you're there for the right reasons and you don't need to prove yourself. Okay, thank you. So, switching a little bit to CT and CVE for both of you, there are many theories on the concept of radicalization and extremism. So, what are your thoughts on them? How would you define either of the terms? And then, Bryant, based on your definitions, do you consider yourself to have been radicalized? Yeah, I went through a phase where I was right up the lies. I admit it. Not very proud of it, but I think once I spent time in prison and I was working with the FBI, I was working with other law enforcement from around the world. My judge, he gave me a second chance at life and I'm taking full advantage of it as best I could, to de-radicalize is, you know, if you want to leave that old life behind, you have to cut ties with everything. And as far as, what was the other part of your question? If you, what your definition of extremism and radicalization is and then based on your definitions, do you feel like you were radicalized? Yeah, I mean, you can get carried away listening to a message or taking one thing and misinterpreting it, listening to the wrong people, give you a wrong angle of certain things. So yeah, I think that's the best definition that I think that I understand the way it is and how I experience it. All right, thanks. Mitch, would you like to respond? Sure, I mean, you know, we spent a lot of time at the NYPD looking at the phenomena of radicalization of Westerners. And, you know, I've used Bryant, in fact, in presentations because so much of his process seems to have fit the parameters of what we looked at. He was an individual who you wouldn't have thought he was going to take that pathway. He wasn't someone who, you know, there was any predetermined reason why you'd radicalize. He had a bit of an identity crisis as he described after high school. What is he going to get involved in? You know, you found an ideology that resonated with him that appealed to him. So he began to self-identify with that. And, you know, ultimately sort of adopted that ideology as his own, you know, converted to Islam, took on a new persona, and then ultimately, you know, decided that there was a grievance that he needed to redress. He needed to take some type of action. Dawa protests against the war wasn't going to be enough. He needed to travel to a field of jihad to do something and essentially turn to violence. And in his framework, the violence was going to be against an unjust invader of Muslim lands. And then, you know, and then the final piece was what happened in Afghanistan where a discussion was begun about, well, what about? Where do we look to hit in the West? And, you know, for specific reasons, at a certain point in time, Bryant was willing to consider that there are legitimate targets in the U.S., in New York City, and spoke to al-Qaeda about that. So in your respective opinions, why is there such a large gang focus, and you touched a little bit on that, with regard to countering violent extremism, programming, development in the U.S.? I just think there's not enough information on every group. I think every group is different. And I think as, you know, I guess cooperators help law enforcement get a better understanding of every group, I think over time, techniques on learning how different organizations are. It'll help law enforcement combat that. So I think a lot of it involves cooperators helping out law enforcement. So do you feel like the way that it's approached with kind of a gang structure, or kind of how law enforcement or individuals go to manage that is in line with other types of extremist groups or terrorist organizations? Do you feel like that's the correct approach, or should it be altered? No, I think every group should be analyzed differently. Okay, so every individual group needs to have its own approach? Yes, because even though some groups may have similarities, there's also differences in every group, and I think the best way is to approach each group differently. Okay, thank you. And then, Brian, since you've completed your prison sentence, I'm wondering, have you connected with any of your old friends or family on Long Island? No. So now I'm hoping that we could do a little bit of future casting. So what do you both believe it would take to end the conflict with al-Qaeda in the West? Well, that's tough. There really is no right answer, because if you make one group happy, another group wouldn't be happy. If there's withdrawal of military forces, Afghanistan would probably turn into civil war again. There really is no right answer to make everybody happy. I don't have a good answer for that, unfortunately. Would you like to respond? I think the US is doing much of what can be done to degrade the threat, as it's concerned, al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. There's a military element trying to remove safe havens. There's a counter-terrorism element to prevent individuals from traveling overseas, intelligence collection, intelligence sharing, study of these groups. The piece that potentially is missing is that these groups, as we talk about different franchises, beyond al-Qaeda core and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, there are also regional conflicts in which they're arising in, because there's a vacuum. There's not a strong central government, and people are looking for some alternative answer, and this form of Islamic governance or protest against a central government ends up being something that appeals to people in Yemen, in Ismailia. So there are multiple layers, but at least in many of the pieces, the US is doing much of what it can do. Thank you. So, Bryant, do you feel like you've been able to reintegrate into American society? I'm trying the best I can. It's not easy, but little by little, I started going to school for, asbestos and lead paint removal. I've been working with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, doing some projects with Mitch, to give me opportunities to come places like here. So I've been laying low-key since I came out, and just recently I started working and trying to just help people get a better understanding of jihadism. So I promised my judge I'd turn a bad thing into a good thing, and hopefully I keep on doing that, and it'll help me reintegrate and be a productive citizen society again. And are your views on the war on terror different from about 10 to 15 years ago? Oh, yes. When I went overseas, you think that it's a very beautiful path to go to the battlefield, and it's not. There are a lot of different groups out there, not just al-Qaeda, not just Taliban, a lot of smaller groups. There's a lot of people doing behind-the-scenes dirty work, for example, like the ISI has their hand in the war. You have different warlords that wanna protect their own land, they have people protecting the open fields. So it's a mixture of hidden agendas mixed in with the war, and that's not taught to you during the jihadi videos that you see. So my perspective is much different from my experience over there. And do you feel that your story's told with accuracy, and is there something you want people to know about you that's often not discussed? Yeah, in the beginning there's a lot of inaccuracies, and slowly I'm trying to correct some of the inaccuracies. It's just that, I guess, people that I, for my perspective, what I'd like them to know is that, you know, I made a mistake, I'm very sorry, trying to work with people like Mitch, continue working with other groups to help educate them on jihadiism, and I'm just gonna do that for a while. And what is your hope for the future? To live a peaceful life, and to just keep on helping people. Yeah. Well, thank you. Thank you. I'm wondering if we have any questions from the audience, and we'll have a microphone coming in the back, so just give us one moment please. So we'll start just in the back here, here, Wesley. Thank you. Thank you. You touched on the ISI a couple of times, and in your article you talk about how extensive an influence they have on the war in Afghanistan. Could you talk specifically to what level of interaction they had with al-Qaeda itself, based on what you observed and what you heard? Yes, I remember, the only connection that I remember hearing at one time was the leader of the first group that I was with, his name was Shahzab. And from what I heard, he was in a meeting with some al-Qaeda leaders. I don't know which ones, but then afterwards I'm thinking, why are they having like a meeting together when Shahzab was with the ISI? So that's the only thing that stunned me to learn, and I don't know what they were talking about, but it was something that I didn't like, so. Move forward, so in the purple shirt, please. Thank you, and thank you for coming to speak with us all. If you wouldn't mind going back to the US military for a minute, I'm struck by something that jumped out at our moderator as well, that you mentioned at several points, structure, discipline, in all of these places that you were looking to go, the military would seem an obvious place to find all of that, so I'm curious about the dissonance, why wasn't it for you, and if there's something in there that you could speak to in a little more detail. Sure, the biggest problem I had that really upset me being in the military was being punished for somebody else's mistake, and that just didn't fly with me. You could do everything fine, and somebody in your group could do something wrong, and then everybody's getting punished, and I said, you know what? I'm doing everything right that I'm supposed to do, so why am I being punished for him? And after a while, it started getting to me, and that wasn't for me, so. Hi, I have two questions. One, you had mentioned that your reintegration back into civilian life hasn't been particularly easy, and I'm wondering what would make it easier, or what would have made it easier, and then the second is, was there a potential for a turning point prior to departing from the United States? Could someone have said something, someone intervened in some kind of way, and would that have prevented you from going overseas? Thanks. First part of your question, let's see. Repeat that one more time, just want to make sure I answer it correctly. Yeah, I think if somebody would have intervened or talked to me, yeah, I think if somebody would have came, somebody with experience overseas and would have told me, you know, it's not the way it is, it's portrayed, it's not the way that it's told, and the different MP3 audios that you have, or the jihadi videos that you've seen, I think that could have made a big influence on me deciding whether to go overseas or not. Now, what could make it easier to get back into society? I think in prison, they don't have a lot of vocational training where I was at, maybe like a support system so that when somebody with jihadi charges comes out, they have somebody to lead on, I didn't have any of that, and I kind of had to figure it out on my own, so. Please, Wesley, thanks. So building off the question of the military experience, your experience with the groups, did you feel camaraderie with those groups? Did it feel like a team when you were on the ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan? Yes. It didn't have a military feel, like traditional US military feel of strictness or everybody had to do things an exact certain way, otherwise there's consequences if you don't do it. It was more of like a bunch of good friends together hanging out. So even though it was military training, it wasn't as strict as it was in my time in the US Army. There is some camaraderie because a lot of people that we all get dysentery, we all miss our food back home. A lot of them miss their wives and kids and family members. So there is that unity of everybody being homesick, everybody wanting to go back home just to say hello to somebody just for a few minutes. So all of us share that same problems and it helped bring us all together a little bit better. So I agree, yes. You talked about seeing videos online. Can you talk about some of the visual materials you looked like that you read like Al Qaeda's Inspire magazine online. These things are really easy to find. Some of the photographs and when you went over, did you actually see anyone creating these things or what kind of materials were people looking at or listening to music videos that inspired you and kept that romanticization alive? Yeah, a few brothers had some laptops with them so they may have had some jihadi videos on their laptop and to kill time maybe we'd all gather around their computer and see these videos. There's always audio available on MP3s that people have. Trying to think. Obviously talking about it amongst the brothers that were educated enough. And sometimes you actually saw people that were in jihadi videos and you spent time with them. For example, I was around Abu Yahya al-Libih so I spent time with him even though I didn't talk with him because he didn't speak English and I didn't speak Arabic but just the presence of around him was something special. As far as what I saw, in the beginning when YouTube was getting around, they didn't really take off jihadi videos that fast so sometimes you could watch jihadi videos for weeks before we get taken off. Most of the stuff that I saw online was on YouTube. I hope I answered your question. Okay, good. I'm struck that a New Yorker is here having this conversation with us so I'm curious if you can share with us what your experience of the World Trade Center attacks was and whether or not we have a shared experience together in that and if you've had a chance to reflect over time on how that event may have actually led to your eventual travels over to Pakistan. I wasn't in New York during 9-11. I was in South America, I was in Peru visiting family on my father's side of the family and I was watching it on TV and it looked like a movie. It didn't look like it was really happening. It felt surreal. And then afterwards, a friend of mine, he was talking to me about different conspiracy theories about this group was behind it or it was pre-planned and I fell into that. Looking back on it now, it's a sad thing and I remember I was watching it on TV and I was very sad and my views haven't changed. It's still a sad day. I remember like if it was yesterday, the moment that I saw it on TV so nothing's changed as far as that. I have two questions and I will say the first one, feel free to decline to answer because I know that it can be difficult to talk about like the details of time while incarcerated but I'm curious to know how the specific charges that were brought against you impacted your interactions with other incarcerated people and then second, I think that this is a really interesting way for a collaboration to be happening between law enforcement and somebody who has formerly been involved with al-Qaeda. I'm curious to know how you think this can act as a model for future efforts towards reconciliation and future efforts for kind of reintegrating people who have gone down a similar path back into the US. Okay, my time in prison, some people had a problem with my charges because they were like, oh, look at that terrorist and some people didn't talk to me and some people did and some people didn't care. I carried myself in a way where I wasn't instigating or I wasn't trying to cause problems and usually in prison, if you're quiet and you're to yourself, that's usually the best way to avoid trouble. And what was your second part of your question, man? Yeah, I mean, as part of my plea agreement, I had to tell everything and I think that if cooperators follow that rule and then they give everything that they have that it could help with your prison time being shortened as little as possible and obviously you build a good connection with law enforcement if you're honest and you give everything you have. I was treated well once I started telling everything that I knew and I think that helped my relationship with my FBI agents when I was cooperating. I think being honest and telling everything that you know helps out a lot. And did your relationship with law enforcement once you started speaking with them, did that help you to change your perspectives on what was going on? Yes, that affected me a lot. My FBI agent, Eddie, was very good to me. Erica's been very good to me. She's actually in the audience, so. I miss your chocolate chip cookies, you said. So I had a good relationship with my FBI agents, yes. So the overall you felt that that was a way to help you I guess change your viewpoints. So we had talked a little bit about I guess some misinformation that you felt that you were receiving which contributed to you becoming radicalized. And so having different interactions, you felt kind of brought you back. Yes, yes, I agree. I think being treated well because it helps you soften your heart and give better information. Gives you better energy when you have to go in and collaborate because when you're giving information to FBI for so many hours, it can be mentally draining. But being treated well or being treated with respect does help out a lot. So that was my interactions with the FBI. And I think going off of that question that we just received, Mitch, could you tell us a little bit more about parallel networks and what this type of work is aiming to do? Sure, in the U.S., Brian is obviously a very rare commodity. An individual who joined a terrorist organization, cooperated, served his prison time and is now back in society. And in the U.S., we have approximately about 400 plus people incarcerated post-911 terrorism related offenses. Now over the next five years, about 100 of those people will also be coming back into society. And Brian has navigated a very difficult situation, very well. There are a few others who have also. But the concern is what is the rate of recidivism? Whether it's back to some type of terrorism related issue or some other type of criminality and how can in the U.S. we reduce the likelihood of that? So the idea of parallel networks is to work in the CVE space, both pre-radicalization, but also working with individuals who are likely to be released from prison and help them make that transition that Brian described as tricky and difficult and helps smooth that out with be that support system for them as they find their way into their new life back in society. So before I go back to the audience, I have one other follow-up. Just in terms of CVE and the space with counter narratives and narratives and alternative narratives, I'm wondering, do you feel, I guess both of you, it's controversial and sometimes it's difficult to find metrics that can say whether or not they're successful or these types of programs are successful. What are your thoughts just on counter narratives that either our government run or civil society run? Do you think that they can be effective if implemented correctly? Just overall your thoughts, I'd love to hear. I think it could work influence a lot of people. I don't think it could sway everybody, but I think it could help out a good chunk of people to steer away from that viewpoint of extremism. I think, yeah, it could be the government funded or nonprofit organization funded. And I think just because it's such a new category, I mean, it's not even 20 years old. So it's still in the learning process of collecting data on what works and what doesn't work, but I think it could be successful, I agree. And message versus messenger. So even if it's funded from a specific group, maybe finding the best messenger to give that message. Absolutely. Because it depends, because some people may not be interested in hearing a counter narrative from a specific kind of group, but maybe somebody who they can relate to. So I think that's another factor. And what about you, Mitch? Yeah, no, I agree. I think you've hit on the key element. The key element is who is the messenger and does that messenger have some type of legitimacy? You know, if a law enforcement person is speaking to an 18 year old who's on ISIS websites and is listening to Al-Laki trying to convince them, you know, push against that narrative, that's gonna be a difficult argument. However, if you have someone like Brian who can say, hey listen, I went to the camps, I traveled overseas, I'm the real deal. And let me tell you, you don't wanna go down that road and that goes a little bit back to your sort of gang example. Someone who has the real life experience and legitimacy as Brian can be that unique messenger and hopefully dissuade someone who otherwise would go down that road. So I think that's the key thing, is identify unique messengers who've got the legitimacy. Okay, thank you. I know we have some more audience questions. So we'll start in the back, thanks. My question is about the day you decide to go overseas to fight. So the content of the idea or the thoughts that you heard from Al-Laki, for example, from Al-Aulaki. So was it about the after death? Was it about the inequalities? Or what, I mean, could you just classify them? Because many people think about the after life, after death life, about women, who are lying and stuff and the awards that God gives you. So could you just give me the most, the ideas that are really that impacted you the most? Yes. Having martyred them on the battlefield is very honorable and that's the path that I wanted to eventually have. And the rewards in the after life, your sins are forgiven. You can ask for forgiveness on certain family members or certain friends. So yeah, there's the whore, right? But that really wasn't one of the top ones. I think just forgiveness for all the sins in my life. I think that was probably the top one that I wanted to have if I had martyred them. Yes, on the slide please. We just have a microphone, just one second. Thank you. Yeah. So I wanted to know how hard or easy was it for you to travel to Afghanistan? You went to Pakistan and then you went to Afghanistan. And what kind of connection did you see between the two? And also, if you saw any kind of support to Al-Qaeda from Pakistan. And I also have a question for Mitch, if you can give us sort of the bigger picture like how this works when an American is handed over to United States, how does that work between the countries? There has to be a treaty or what's the process? Go ahead, go first. Okay, generally that's happening at the federal level. The FBI, given their remit, is gonna be the primary agency there interacting with the other country through the league at. And then there's a process of bringing that individual back to the US. And that's gonna be negotiated, every case is different. So it's tough to give an overall rule as to how that's gonna happen. But generally, it's gonna be federal agencies in the lead. State departments gonna have a role there. FBI, intelligence agencies probably more behind the scene. But ultimately the goal is to get that US citizen back to the US relatively quickly. I think the first part of your question was how easy it was for me, okay? Okay, I was fortunate enough to know people to at least get me from a starting point perspective to start somewhere. If I didn't know anybody, I think it would have been impossible for me. So I had one friend, he asked around on my behalf, he knew an Afghan family in the neighborhood who had a cousin that knew people in Peshawar. So as you know somebody, you know somebody, you know somebody, you know somebody. And that's how I found my way into Afghanistan. Some people from what I heard are there for years and they never find a way into Afghanistan and I was able to get there in a few weeks. So for everybody it's different. I happen to know somebody. The stars lined up for me when I went there to figure out how to get to Afghanistan. No, actually it was never my intention to join Al-Qaeda. I just wanted to join a Sunni and Surgeon group. From the Omar Nasiri book, I thought I was gonna end up with a Taliban group because there's so many of them. But I didn't know I was in Al-Qaeda until I was actually in there already. Because a Kuwaiti friend, I asked him one day because there are many Arab groups out there and I said, what group is this? And he said, this is Al-Qaeda. So I said, this is not the way you see it in the videos but I was in there and that's how I find out I was in Al-Qaeda. I didn't plan to get into Al-Qaeda. That's just how it ended up happening. Thank you, thanks for coming and talking to us. I just had a question about kind of off ramps from jihadism. If while you were over there, you could have left or if there could have been anything that the state could have done to get you or any of the other brothers that were with you to give up arms and step down. Yeah, I never heard of any type of like a surrendering program where if you realize it's not for you, you can just show up and say, I want out. That would be actually very helpful if there was some option where you could say, I've had enough, what do you have to offer so that I could leave? That's actually a very interesting idea that I think should be explored more. If there was that option, I think a lot more people would opt out that way. Thanks, David Sturman, senior policy analyst here at New America. You've talked about the role of Anwar Al-Laki in your radicalization. Al-Laki, of course, himself was on his own sort of transformative path from someone who showed up at the Pentagon to talk about moderate Islam to open Al-Qaeda figure and whether that's radicalization or just him becoming more open. I'm wondering when you first watched Al-Laki's videos, listened to his lectures, how did you read him? Was this someone who was just a cleric? Was he a jihadi cleric? Did you see him as part of Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda representative? And did that shift over time? And if it did, did that affect your process of radicalization? A lot of his audio recordings, when you listen to them, you don't know whether he's giving a jihadi viewpoint or not. So it's kind of like on the borderline. So if you are pro-jihadi and you listen to him, you're thinking, okay, so he's leaning jihadi. That was also one of the, I guess, special qualities of his audio recording. And then later on, once he spent time in a Yemeni prison, then he just was full leaning towards jihadiism. But before that, it was borderline. And if you were pro-jihadi, that's the perspective that you listen to. So I think in the beginning, that's how I interpreted it. Thank you very much for doing this. Couple of questions. First, I'm curious, how active are you right now in talking to people who might be at risk of following a path of joining a terror group or trying to become a jihadist? Do you think, and do you think that when you were at that point where you were going down that path, would a stronger, more empowered community, whether it was the Muslim community that you were with or just other friends and family could have made more of a difference? For you, and do you think for others, would it really have taken somebody who had been on the battlefield to say your ideas are not going? And last question, when you look at what ISIS has done with their propaganda and the way they've been able to recruit and draw attention, even as they've been losing their caliphate, what do you think, how do you think you would have reacted back then to that type of propaganda? Would that have been something that would have hooked you and made you decide to go for ISIS rather than just any Sunni jihadist group? I think right now I'm in the beginning stages of trying to reach out to certain people. I did have opportunities to reach out to youths before but I turned it down and it's something that I'm considering doing right now. I spoke with a guy in England who specializes in reaching out to youths that are leaning towards jihadism. As far as ISIS propaganda, I was in prison when ISIS started forming and I haven't learned enough about ISIS and I haven't watched any ISIS videos since I've gotten out. I don't think my probation officer would be very happy if I was watching ISIS videos. So I don't know enough. The little bit that I do know on watching the news is that they're a little bit more reckless and they take in just about anybody. I think having somebody reach out and saying, you know what, I was there. It's not the way it is in the videos. I think that could have made a big influence on me. Obviously, I don't know but that's what I think right now as I'm standing in front of you. And I think that could be a very good technique to help dissuade potential jihadis in the future. You had mentioned that while, I can't remember if it was in Pakistan or Afghanistan that you were approached with the idea of attacking the Long Island Railroad, I believe. How did you navigate that when you were approached with that question? Well, I was in Waziristan and there was a mid-level Al Qaeda member. And his name was Yunus, so a friend of mine. He was a close friend of mine in Al Qaeda. He says, why don't you tell this idea to Yunus about the train system? So then I was speaking with Yunus and he was asking a lot of questions on how it runs, the importance of it, the economic impact that it could have. And he was just picking my brain and he was shooting different ideas with me. So that's how I went about the discussion about the Long Island Railroad was to attack the tunnel because all the lines in Long Island Railroad connect into one tunnel that go into Manhattan. So his belief was to do an economic target, not really a death toll target, because it would have hurt the New York economy very bad. So we know that you said you weren't ready and the Imam made you say the Kalma and then you were, he said that you were a Muslim. So my question is were you a practicing Muslim and if you still are one or did you never practice the Islamic faith? Yeah, in the beginning I wasn't praying five times a day and he was very big on to eating halal all the time. After going overseas, as far as religion, I pray five times a day and I stay away from pork and alcohol but as far as it being halal chicken or halal beef, I don't do that. Yes, I pray five times a day. I mean, I'm not a strict following Muslim but I watch TV, I listen to music and stuff that you're not supposed to do but I do it anyway. As a person from Syria, I've witnessed al-Qaeda and ISIS and the first thing that they do, especially when foreign fighters come, they ask them to reach out like people they know and encourage them to call them or invite them to join the al-Qaeda or ISIS or whatever. Have they approached you to communicate with some people, call them to do attacks or call them to come and join al-Qaeda? No, that's not how it was when I was in Afghanistan with Khursan, that's not how the way it worked over there. Maybe in different regions around the world they work a little bit different but that's not how it was when I was overseas. I commend you for what you're doing now with your life. I think most of us here have some level of pride in you and so personally I'm proud of you. Thank you sir. So still being a Muslim, what does jihad mean to you now? I think the jihad that's going on right now is, even though it's portrayed as a holy war, there's so much hands behind the scene trying to grab their own personal gain from it that it's become twisted. And I don't think the pure religious jihad that you're taught in the religious books almost doesn't exist anymore. So as much as it's advertised that way, it's not. So that's how I feel about it right now. And I think there's things where I wish could be better as far as relation-wise with the Muslim world and Western policy makers. But hopefully that can help improve that a little bit. Thanks. What about the Taliban? There's a lot of chatter these days about whether we should be negotiating with them for settlement in Afghanistan. Do you feel like they can be trusted or are they evolving a lot since you were familiar with them or what was your actual direct exposure with Taliban when you were over there? Yes, I lived in a village which was a pro-Taliban village. It was a North Waziristan. The house belonged to a man that actually knew Jalaluddin Hakani personally. I think it's important to have some involvement with the Taliban in negotiating because they're everywhere. So how could you avoid the Taliban if you have to deal with them every day? I'm not an expert in policy, but I do think that some involvement has to be done. They can't be ignored. Final question? Okay, our final question is here. So yeah, and the gentleman you were talking about, the guy in North Waziristan, that's Pakistan. That's not Afghanistan you were talking about, right? Yes, even though it's within Pakistani border, within their border, it's kind of a no-man's line. It doesn't really belong to Pakistan or Afghanistan because there's no police presence there. When the Pakistani military go through, they're armed in an armored convoy. It's very tribal. So technically it is within the Pakistani border, but it's a no-man's line. So now my question was that, did you see connection between what you saw between Taliban and the Pakistan official, either the forces, ISI, or any kind of that kind of official cooperation? I personally haven't seen it, but I've heard that there is some involvement with Pakistani ISI and certain Taliban leaders. I have heard that, but I personally have no, from different people, from different Pashtuns I've heard. So that brings us to the close of our session, but I want to thank you both, Brian and Mitch, for coming. It's been a real pleasure talking to you, and I just thank you for taking the time to come to New America, so thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.