 Čestno za imetavljenje, da se pravimo vse naprej, vse naprej vse naprej vse naprej vse naprej vse naprej vse naprej vse naprej Light up the wider context of the economic literature that has been developed over the years on this area. So this is what I will try to do on the academic debate on the resource core, so the debate Taj debat se komandou na vsega vsega, z kaj tudi svačnja, daj stvorim se, nekaj ju nekaj, je neko vsega vsega vsega, nekaj je neko vsega, nekaj je toga, nekaj je toga, nekaj je toga, nekaj je toga, nekaj je toga, nekaj je toga, izgleda in distralizacije v kraju, kaj je zelo izgleda resocije v naših resociju. Abruptri. Tukaj je zelo izgleda resocije. Zelo se, da se v svojih resocijov v 70. in 80. and also in early nineties was basically in.... ...a great basically with these interpretations. So, a negative effect across the board of natural resources on the competitiveness in general of the country. The competitiveness maybe defined in many ways, of course. The change in this literature started in the 90s, in the late 90s. In the late 90s two things happened. From the theoretical point of view, from a theoretical point of view, we have that, we started using theoretical models that were developed before, were developed in the 80s actually, on imperfect information to these sort of problems, to governance issues, to politicians selection, to democracy, to autocracy, to what was called political economy. Some people tried to call it political economics, but the word didn't went through, so we used political economy, which reminds us of 300 years later, earlier, something else. But okay, it's political economy, we call it political economy. And so this was one big change, so the introduction of hidden action, information, all these things that started in the 80s basically, the buildup was in the 80s and exploded in the 90s. So this was from the theoretical point of view, and the availability of data, so we had institutions, important institutions that started collecting and made public data on governance. So we had this idea of governance, and data in the beginning was a very short time span, which made life very difficult to those who were trying to do something at the beginning, but in the end this accumulated over time, and now we have some feasible data over time and over countries that allow us to make interesting, hopefully, and useful, hopefully, analysis. And in this sense, when I teach these things to my PhD students in Verona, I use this sentence that I will tell you. I say that basically the public choice school was doing the same things 20, 30 years earlier. But from a different point of view, in the public choice school, so public choice school was applying utility maximization to politicians, to bureaucrats, to non-market issues, under the idea that all politicians were bad, and so what was the purpose of this literature was to try to design institutions, constitutional institutions, to write in the constitutions the limits to the politicians in order to reduce the harm that they could do. And this was the problem 30 years earlier from public choice. The problem in political economy as I see it, as I like to see it, is that no, politicians may be good or bad, there is not a single type of politicians, bureaucrats or whatever, and the issue is to select the good politicians, because if we were able to select the good politicians, we may have, as a result, good outcomes in terms of GDP, in terms of social metrics, in many terms that, for example, Antonio has shown in the few slides, he showed at the beginning. So I think this happened, this change, happened in the late 90s, early 2000, and if I can summarize where the literature has arrived, now this literature that we have, yes, we have seen until now, is heterogeneity, heterogeneity is the word, because we have, as we have seen, different constraints on the executive, the different nature of natural resources, as Tania has shown, point resources versus diffuse resources. We have different initial conditions that may lead to different outcomes. So the heterogeneity of the starting points and all the countries and all the stories that we can tell, it's very important. This reduces the generalization that we can do in the literature, in the academic literature, but improves the ability, our ability to the realism of what we can say, what we can analyze, and how we can categorize different things in different views. Just one minute to say what is missing. I think that what is missing now in the literature, it's one thing that started very early in the state capacity literature, so the analysis of legal capacity. Legal capacity, fiscal capacity has boomed. We are part of this boom. Legal capacity has been forgotten. Probably is less tractable than fiscal capacity. It's more nuanced. There are some difficulties inherent to the data, to the definitions and so forth, but I think it would be important. It would be important because it's important, it would be relevant, very relevant for efficiency. This was named in the plenary session. So the efficiency of the rose, registration of land of many things may be extremely important for this. Last thing is that now we have new resources, new countries that are entering into this market because the net transition, that zero transition is opening up opportunities for countries that, some countries that never exported natural resources now found themselves with natural resources or all the opportunities came out. And so this would be a good thing for us, because it would create a lot of opportunities for analysis, but we should try in terms of policy to avoid the mistakes that we did before, that has been done before, we have accumulated. Analysis and evidence that goes into this direction and so we should hope to try to avoid this. One case would be Argentina. Argentina is not technically speaking a developing country. 100 years ago Argentina was one of the richest country in the world. This because institutions matter after all. Argentina has a history of volatility, of bad policies and so on and so forth. These resources, this resource boom that may affect Argentina may be extremely negative for the country if things continue in the way they have been doing. Sorry for being too... Thank you, Roberto, that was very valuable. And especially appreciated the point on Argentina. If you find lithium and if you have copper, like Zambia, you can be guaranteed to be a player in the market of international commodities and develop an extractive sector. So more research for us and more policy insights hopefully for other audiences, the audience of policymakers. Without any further ado, let's move to Olav. Olav Lundstol. Thank you so much. Happy to be here. Topic that is very close to my heart and also happy to hear the Zambia presentation, having lived five years and worked on this issue in Zambia as well. I'll try to be brief. I think a lot of points were mentioned earlier on in the introduction as well as in the presentation and the excellent first discussion. Just maybe three or four major points from my side. The first one is what do we mean by resource rent? This is perhaps a tedious question, but it's actually a necessary one because there is a large literature trying to figure this out. There are different schools of thoughts in terms of what it means. There is the more classical hotelling type of rent. There is the Ricardian rent. There is one could say Schumpeterian rent. So at least three or four different streams of thoughts and theories and approaches to try to say something about what is it actually. And then the second one, of course, is how to try to measure it, which is equally very difficult and there is a large literature on this going back to classics in the 60s, 70s and 80s including Stiglitz and a lot of other Nobel Prize winners in economics that have tried to figure this out. Not to talk about trying to measure it because this is also, although we have global measures on this now, to what extent are they precise? What do they incorporate? I think there is a lot of disagreement actually on this. So this, that actually is somewhat important because it also spills into the discussion of tax versus non-tax, what is resource-related and not resource-related. Some of you might have read Professor Robert Conrad, for example, at Duke. He is quite strong on saying that a lot of the discussion on rents and the resource curse is linked to a misunderstanding conceptually in terms of that a lot of what is counted in the rent is actually factor payment, which is in his mind very different from what one would normally associate with the definition and measurement of rent. So this is just to say that there is some complications there on the methodology on how to measure it also with the World Bank and others and I see you use their data. There is a large literature of disagreement on this where one finds sometimes that the rent is there, sometimes it disappears if you estimate in different ways. So that is just one. The second one is a point in terms of development over time and what stage of development different countries find themselves in. And I think here some of you alluded to this in the first presentation. It seems to be a bundle of more different countries but I think this is an important point because obviously this is linked to the quality of the institutions. One would expect and the political and other type of institutions these go hand in hand. One doesn't know exactly how the causality is but there is clear correlation here of course over time and this would of course affect then also naturally in a sort of direct way linked to the possibilities to collect both resource tax related and non-resource tax. So to try to distinguish here which I think some of the presentations try to do is actually quite interesting and needed. I think there is a necessity to distinguish between low income, low middle income, other middle income and higher because you will find a lot of associations with the different type of countries. And through that you will also perhaps find in different time periods that this also can vary so it would be interesting to see if this changes when one compares different periods over time to see if there is any change there that is significant. Maybe not so easy to measure but there are some exciting, we use some data sets that are quite exciting and quite new and has a longer time coverage which is very good. And then a third point is the difference that I think many of you made or the distinction between different type of natural resources. This I think is a very critical point because there is a huge distinction obviously recognizing the literature especially between non-renewable and renewable and non-renewable there are very firm differences and I've written a little bit about this especially when it comes to the difference between oil and gas and mining and IMF has written about this in large reports as well but not utilizing fully perhaps ex-post data. A lot of it is model based a lot of it is ex-anti so there is a large potential there I think to try to distinguish more clearly what I have found and the IMF I think overall is that on average the mining sector and it was mentioned in the introduction speech today also there is really a problem in terms of appropriating the rent and the revenue for the government in the countries in question on average it is below it's half of the ability to appropriate the rent and revenue in oil and gas this obviously is linked into the wealth issue and to the overall whether there is any any revenue stream that could cause this curse or not because I think there are large differences between mining rich countries and oil and gas rich countries and I'm happy to see that that came out clearly in the presentations as a finding and I think there are lots of complicating factors linked to that similarly also of course if one talks about renewables and there there is a lack of literature I would say trying to focus on renewables and what happens there actually revenue management in renewable sectors is very poor so this is another one maybe not directly linked to the resource curse discussion but being able in agriculture, in forestry in fishery there is some large recent literature on fishery just explaining the money at stake might be much smaller but it's actually quite important in many ways because it's very much closely linked to the larger economy in many developing countries so I just wanted to make that point I think that also I was very happy to see the attempt to try to break down for different type of resources and I think that distinction is very important to make now final point maybe I've used my time but of course I was very happy to see the Sambia presentation and as I said I lived and worked 5 years during from 2005-2010 in Sambia, very actively engaged with government on this attempt to renegotiate the mining contracts and I think the outcome of that was positive because it did improve the revenue potentially significantly after privatization this was down to 0, 0.5% it went up dramatically so I think there are a lot of complicated factors between why it went wrong later and a lot of it is politics and the ex-president and others that have but I think what the Sambia experiences did show is that it's possible I think with strong political support from the top also at that point actually a strong impartiality enhancing institutions in general Norway and Dutch work closely with that institution that improved public expenditure dramatically in Sambia during an important period so I think that sort of boosted up in the ability of Sambia and the political institutions and the government overall to push for some other right reforms thank you thank you for your comments that was opening up new research areas, thanks for the suggestions and thanks also for asking tough questions what are rents it reminds us that we should go back to the drawing board sometimes it was it was something refreshing to hear you're absolutely right these questions must be asked that takes us to the Q&A I suggest we first of all check online what's happening online are there any immediate reactions to the discussion here in the room he's asking given that developing countries have large number of informal business how can we capture the informal sector in the tax base and mobilize more revenue from the sector that's the only question thank you I would ask the panelists to try and address this one perhaps this is a question a general one not just for resource rich economies would you like to react based on your experience country experience in Sambia thank you Roberto Roberto is right Antonio is right this question was perhaps better suited for Dr. Mosi in the discussion in the informal sector it's difficult to mobilize first of all because of the absence of property rights the absence of titles for example in Sambia a lot of property that people do their own or where they run their businesses are not clearly titled so they need for capacity in that the government has been trying to digitize all this over time and they are making some headways in terms of verging the properties easier to tax and also generate revenue so I think there is a lot of work in that direction if we are to bring the informal sector and cover sectors into the into the frame under which they can make a contribution to taxes thank you we still have a few minutes questions from the room now please hi, thank you my name is Anna de Souza I'm a professor at Baruch College at the City University of New York so I guess my question has to do with corruption and of course the other side of institutions for institutions in many senses so I guess two main questions one is kind of how we think about your results with the executive constraints and then your broader results including a lot of different institutions and this may not be the time some of this is rhetorical but just thinking of how to balance the two if you had looked at I was curious as to what other institutions you looked at what other measures and then of course in all this work in institutions the question is how we implement the changes and so that brings me to this idea of corruption and you mentioned just now or someone mentioned the Zambia I'm not in the tax area so my language just so you mentioned kind of an increase in potential revenue and I was kind of interested in potential tax revenue versus realized tax revenue and again during the keynote speakers presentation in the morning there was a question about not exactly constraints on the government but how we can hold the government accountable and I guess that's where my question is in terms of implementing what has been done to look at accountability in terms of the government side in that makes sense thank you but that's another tough question shall we essentially you are asking we are saying that institutions matter if you want to avoid a fiscal resource curse how do you go about it how do you change institutions I'll take a second question and then we'll answer both of them thank you thank you great presentations from everyone my question is actually quite linked to the first question which also speaks about institutions I think one of the things that came out strongly was the need for institutions but also constraints on executive power so that's something that came out quite strongly I'm from Zambia by the way so so my thinking was my question was around how do we come up with sustainable solutions so how do we implement this because for Zambia like many of at least the African countries or sub-Saharan countries the constraints to the executive or maybe let me put it this way the executive also holds most of the power to actually make those changes so how do you go about making or improving those institutions so the power to make reforms doesn't necessarily sit with the individual citizens so the executive is still overall responsible for that so how do we go about implementing change so a bit related to the first question thank you a quick one yes please this is Peter Chevland from NORAD and related to the last points and questions it might be interesting to look at some work from VEDEM varieties of democracy they've looked into sequencing of accountability so what you're talking about we want to see strong executive constraints but they have some really interesting working papers from 2017 I think and they look at all countries of 100 years and they see that you never seen strong horizontal accountability like parliamentary and judicial oversight without improvement in vertical accountability which is elections and political parties and also diagonal accountability which is related to media and social civil society so if you want to improve the effective horizontal accountability the implication of this research at least says that you need to work on the vertical accountability elections and political parties and the diagonal accountability so thanks okay thank you this looks like you're already answering in part the first two questions I'm only sharing but I hope you don't mind if I say I agree with you it's good work from VEDEM and the idea there that accountability in this sense matters but I want the panelists to react to to these questions who would like to go first knowing that we have effectively run out of time can you in one minute each react one minute thank you maybe your important question about the relationship between potential tax revenues and realized tax revenues well I think that the good news is that UNU wider has been working on a project on this so there is this new database that tries to look at tax effort across countries so probably that might be one place to look at in terms of that information thank you fantastic Daniel Andrea one minute thank you very much for all the suggestions for future research I think that to answer your question maybe Roberto was right that we probably have to focus on also legal capacity and the determinants of legal capacity and the fact that could increase the incentive to invest in legal capacity there is a lot of space for future research and thank you very much thank you one minute thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you in poloviti to beesk Automotive, kworkšje Solidarje. V instructions, the data came back into the system, and gave the government a better say in the future rather than before. In this was a result of a protracted negotiation that we have put up with strong case. Staj, da ne znam, na kako se da se dobilo, ali da se zelo da je belja osevrušen, ali pa počkaj se dobarboj svojte in kapacitivni. Ľelič. Čekaj, Antri, in creo, da smo videli vse počkaj tudi vzve. Erogenati matis, vzveč vsega in vsega in ekstraktivnje in pavnevanje in politično, je nekaj vsega. Paj je nekaj vsega in vsega. In je to neko vse na svoj ročenji resursi. Zdaj smo in počušali, da je začala inčne institucije. In zelo smo počušili, da se počuši. Zato, ko sem tebečen, teži so vse skočil, inčnih inčnih inčnih je srečen, da se vse učenjali, kaj je vse zelo sega inčne rečenje, zato sega nekaj. ta vse je več politično. Preješno ne bi se praviti zapraviti, da se prikratjo, nekaj dobro seštje prikratjo, da se se našli na taj nekaj seštje za Čutvečne rezece. Nekaj sem da prikratja, da so smo v ročnih zelo. Daj pa se na odlične in vse. Zelo, da se tega praviti.