 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Number 45 Letters of Agrippa to the Massachusetts Gazette Letter Number 7 18th December, 1787 To the People While the trade of this continent remains free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. All the estimates for the present year let them be made by what party they may suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favor. The credit of our merchants is therefore fully established in foreign countries. This is a sufficient proof that when business is unshackled it will find out that channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought therefore to be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day produces fresh proofs that people under the immediate pressure of difficulties do not at first glance discover the proper relief. The last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced many honest people to agree to a tender act, and many others of a different description to obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only increased the evil they were intended to cure. Experience has since shown that instead of trying to lessen an evil by altering the present course of things, every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the course of law, and thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which increases the resources of them all and renders the easy payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the states. Pennsylvania with one port and a large territory is less favorably situated for trade than Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly, a much larger proportion of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an interest. It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved. No man, when he enters into society, does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local interest must be disregarded is requiring of one man to do more than another and is subverting the foundations of a free government. The Philadelphians would be shocked with the proposition to place the seat of general government and the unlimited right to regulate trade in Massachusetts. There can be no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such sacrifices, however, we may delude ourselves with the form of words always originate in folly and not in generosity. Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual state of public credit that we may see whether it has not been as much represented as the state of our trade. At the beginning of the present year the whole continental debt was about 12 millions of pounds in our money. About one quarter part of this sum was due to our foreign creditors. Of these, France was the principal and called for the arrears of interests. A new loan of 120,000 pounds was negotiated in Holland at 5% to pay the arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of bad economy and has been used for the villainous purpose of disaffecting the people. But in the course of this same year Congress have negotiated the sale of as much of their western lands on the Ohio and Mississippi as amount nearly to the whole sum of the foreign debt. And instead of a dead loss by borrowing money at 5% to the amount of 120,000 pounds in one sum they make a savings of the interest at 6% on three millions of their domestic debt which is an annual saving of 180,000 pounds. It is easy to see how such an immense fund as the western territory may be applied to the payment of the foreign debt. Purchasers of the land would as willingly procure any kind of the produce of the United States as they would buy loan office certificates to pay for the land. The produce thus procured would easily be negotiated for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do not mean to insinuate that no other provisions should be made for our creditors but only to show that our credit is not so bad in other countries as has been represented and that our resources are fully equal to the pressure. The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation as far as human affairs will admit upon all parts of the empire and upon all the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will necessarily take place. One man will be obliged to travel a few miles further than another man to procure justice. But when he has traveled, the poor man ought to have the same measure of justice as the rich one. Small inequalities may be easily compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the law itself and the government ought to have the same authority in one place as in another. Evident as this truth is, the most plausible argument in favor of the new plan is drawn from the inequality of its operation in different states. In Connecticut they have been told that the bulk of the revenue will be raised by impost and excise and therefore they need not be afraid to trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at pleasure. New York and Massachusetts are both more commercial states than Connecticut. The latter, therefore, hopes that the other two will pay the bulk of the continental expense. The argument is in itself delusive. If the trade is not overtaxed, the consumer pays it. If the trade is overtaxed, it languishes and by the ruin of the trade the farmer loses his market. The farmer has, in truth, no other advantage from impost than that they save him the trouble of collecting money for the government. He neither gets or loses money by changing the mode of taxation. The government, indeed, finds it the easiest way to raise the revenue and the reason is that the tax is by this means collected where the money circulates But if the argument was not delusive, it ought to conclude against the plan because it would prove the unequal operation of it. And if any saving is to be made by the mode of taxation, the saving should be applied towards our own debt and not to the payment of the part of a continental burden which Connecticut ought to discharge. It would be impossible to refute in writing all the delusions made use of to force the system through. Those respecting the public debt and the benefit of imposts are the most important, and these I have taken pains to explain. In one instance, indeed, the impost does raise money at the direct expense of the seaports. This is when goods are imported subject to a duty and re-exported without a drawback. Whatever benefit is derived from this source surely should not be transferred to another state at least till our own debts are cleared. Another instance of unequal operation is that it establishes different degrees of authority in different states and thus creates different interests. The lands in New Hampshire having been formally granted by this state and afterwards by that state to private persons, the whole authority of trying titles becomes vested in a continental court and that state loses a branch of authority which the others retain over their own citizens. I have now gone through two parts of my argument and have proved the efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation and the disadvantages of the new system at least some of the principle. The argument has been much longer than I at first apprehended or possibly I should have been deterred from it. The importance of the question has, however, prevented me from relinquishing it. Signed, a grippa. End of Anti-Federalist Paper No. 45 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers No. 46 Letters of a Grippa to the Massachusetts Gazette Letter No. 7 25th December 1787 It has been proved by indisputable evidence that power is not the grand principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire and that when this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering justice between man and man it debases the character of individuals and renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty consists in the consciousness of that security and is best guarded by political liberty which is the share that every citizen has in the government. Accordingly all our accounts agree that in those empires which are commonly called despotic and which comprehend by far the greatest part of the world the government is most fluctuating and properly leased secure. In those countries insults are borne by the sovereign which if offered to one of our governors would fill us with horror and we should think that the government dissolving. The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one that we must then separate and form distinct confederacies. This would be true if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power. Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local advantages and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are therefore in a situation to supply each other's wants. Carolina for instance is inhabited by planters while the Massachusetts is more engaged in commerce and manufacturers. Congress has the power of deciding their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests produces commerce and commerce where there is a common equal and moderate authority to preside produces friendship. The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the west. Many supplies they want for which they must look to the older settlements and the greatness of their crops enables them to make payments. Here then we have a bond of union which applies to all parts of the empire and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended all America. We are in the strictest sense of the term a federal republic. Each part has within its own limits a guarantee over its citizens while some of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of the deficiency of the congressional powers are confined to two articles. They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation and they have not a complete regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each of these complaints there is some foundation but not enough to justify the clamor which has been raised. Congress is not to be paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. Our share of what remains would annually amount to about sixty or seventy thousand pounds. If, therefore, Congress were to put in possession of such branches of the imposed as would raise this sum in our state, we should fairly be considered as having done our part towards their debt and our remaining resources whether arising from imposed excise or dry tax or the reduction of our own debt. The principal of this last amounts to about thirteen hundred thousand pounds and the interest to between seventy or eighty thousand. This is surely too much property to be sacrificed and it is as reasonable that it should be paid as the continental debt. But if the new system should be adopted the whole imposed with an unlimited claim to excise and dry tax will be given to there will remain no adequate funds for the state debt and the state will still be subject to be sued on their notes. This is, then, an article which ought to be limited. We can without difficulty pay as much annually as shall clear the interest of our state debt and our share of the interest on the continental one. But if we surrender the imposed we shall still by this new constitution be held to pay our full proportion of the remaining had been done. The imposed will not be considered as being paid by the state but by the continent. The Federalists indeed tell us that the state debts will all be incorporated with the continental debt and all paid out of one fund. In this, as in all other instances they endeavor to support their scheme of consolidation by delusion. Not one word is said in the book in favor of such a scheme and there is no reason to think it assurances of that sort are easily given and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in forgetting what is false. No man can expect town debts to be united with that of the state and there will be as little reason to expect that the state and continental debts will be united together. Signed, a grippa. End of Anti-Federalist Paper Number 46 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Number 47 Letters of a Grippa to the Massachusetts Gazette Letter Number 9 28th of December 1787 To the People We come now to the second and last article of complaint against the present confederation which is that Congress has not the sole power to regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends not only to war and peace but to trade and naturalization. This last article ought never to be given them for though most of the states may be willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens yet reasons of equal weight may induce other states differently circumstance to keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would come there. Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point of morals, education, energy is equal to any of the eastern states. The small state of Rhode Island only accepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a century has acquired her present extent and population at the expense of religion and good morals. The eastern states have by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures acquired their present greatness in the course of a century and a half and have preserved their religion and morals. They also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for rendering them respectable in war and industrious in peace. The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely enough lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to preserve the equality of rights to the states which it is the object of the state governments to secure each citizen. First, it ought not to be in the power of Congress either by treaty or otherwise to alienate part of any state without the consent of the legislature. Second, they ought not to be able by treaty or other law to give any legal preference to one part above another. Third, they ought to be restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the Old Confederation and another in the proposed plan. The third seems to be equally necessary. After all that has been said and written on this subject and on the difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to national purposes, it does not appear that anything was more necessary to be done than framing two new articles. By one, a limited revenue would be given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited right to regulate our intercourse with nations. By such an addition we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding and receiving additions without altering its former constitution. Congress at the same time by the extent of their jurisdiction and the number of their officers would have acquired more respectability at home and a sufficient influence abroad. If any state was in such a case to avoid the rights of the union, the other states would join in defense of those rights and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the national force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of Congress over citizens should be small in proportion as the empire is extended, that in order to preserve the balance each state may supply by energy what is wanting in numbers. Congress would be able by such a system as we have proposed to regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as should effectually give the preference to the produce and manufacturers of our own country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established between the states upon the principles of mutual interest. A moderate duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to our own people while it would avoid all the disadvantages arising from a prohibition and the consequent deficiency of vessels to transport the produce of the southern states. Our country is at present upon an average 1,000 miles long from north to south and 800 miles broad from the Mississippi to the ocean. We have at least 6 million of white inhabitants and the annual increase is about 250,000 souls exclusive of immigrants from Europe. The greater part of our increase is employed in settling the new lands while the older settlements are entering largely into manufacturers of various kinds. It is probable that the extraordinary exertions of this state in the way of industry for the present year only exceed in value 500,000 pounds. The new settlements, if all made in the same tract of country, would form a large state annually and the time seems to be literally accomplished when a nation shall be born in a day. Such an immense country is not only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe but actually does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials. The restrictions on our trade in Europe necessarily oblige us to make use of those materials and the high price of labor operates as an encouragement to mechanical improvements. In this way we daily make rapid advancements towards independence and resources as well as an empire. If we adopt the new system of government we shall by one rash vote lose the fruit of the toil and expense of 13 years at the time when the benefits of that toil and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the imposts of Congress on foreign trade may tend to encourage manufacturers the excise and dry tax will destroy all the beneficial effects of the impost at the same time that they diminish our capital. Be careful then to give only a limited revenue and the limited power of managing foreign concerns. Once surrender the rights of internal legislation and taxation instead of being respected abroad foreigners will laugh at us and posterity will lament our folly. Signed a grippa. End of Anti-Federalist paper number 47. This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Robert Scott the Anti-Federalist papers section number 48. Penn Minority the address and reasons of dissent of the minority of the convention of Pennsylvania to their constituents Pennsylvania packet and Daily Advertiser 18 December 1787 it was not until after the termination of the late glorious contest which made the people of the United States an independent nation that any defect was discovered in the present confederation it was formed by some of the ablest patriots in America it carried us successfully through the war and the virtue and patriotism of the people this position to promote the common cause supplied the want of power in Congress The requisition of Congress for the 5% in post was made before the peace so early as the 1st of February 1781 but was prevented taking effect by the refusal of one state yet it is probable every state in the union agreed to this measure at that period had it not been for the extravagant terms in which it was demanded the requisition was new molded in the year 1783 and accompanied with an additional demand of certain supplementary funds for 25 years peace had now taken place and the United States found themselves laboring under a considerable foreign and domestic debt incurred during the war the requisition of 1783 was commensurate with the interest of the debt as it was then calculated but it has been more accurately ascertained since that time the domestic debt has been found to fall several millions of dollars short of the calculation and it has lately been considerably diminished by large sales of the western lands the states have been called on by congress annually for supplies until the general system of finance proposed in 1783 should take place it was at this time that the want of an efficient federal government was first complained of and that the powers vested were found to be inadequate to the procuring of the benefits that should result from the union the impost was granted by most of the states but many refused the supplementary funds the annual requisitions were set at naught by some of the states while others complied with them by legislative acts but were tardy in their payments and congress found themselves incapable of complying with their engagements and supporting the federal government it was found that our national character was sinking in the opinion of foreign nations the congress could make treaties of commerce but could not enforce the observance of them we were suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations who had shackled our commerce while we were unable to retaliate and all now agreed that it would be advantageous to the union to enlarge the powers of congress that they should be enabled in the amplest manner to regulate commerce and to lay and collect duties on the imports throughout the united states with this view the commission was first proposed in virginia and finally recommended by congress for the different states to appoint deputies to meet in convention for the purpose of revising and amending the present articles of confederation so as to make them adequate to the exigencies of the union this recommendation the legislature of 12 states was to appoint deputies to consult their constituents on the subject and though the different legislatures had no authority from their constituents for the purpose they probably apprehended the necessity would justify the measure and none of them extended their ideas at that time further than revising and amending the present articles of confederation by the act appointing deputies expressly confined their powers to this subject and though it is probable that some of the members of the assembly of the state had at that time in contemplation to annihilate the present confederation as well as the constitution of pennsylvania yet the plan was not sufficiently matured to communicate to the public the majority of the legislature of this commonwealth were at that time under the influence of the members from the city of philadelphia they agreed that the deputies sent by them to convention should have no compensation for their services which determination was calculated to prevent the election of any member who resided at a distance from the city it was in vain for the minority to attempt electing delegates to the convention who understood the circumstances and the feelings of the people and had a common interest with them they found a disposition in the leaders of the majority of the house to choose themselves and some of their dependents the minority attempted to prevent this by agreeing to vote for some of the leading members who they knew had influence enough to be appointed at any rate in hopes of carrying with them some respectable citizens of philadelphia in whose principles and integrity they could have more confidence but even in this they were disappointed except in one member the eighth member was added at a subsequent session of the assembly the continental convention met in the city of philadelphia at the time appointed it was composed of some men of excellent characters of others who were more remarkable for their ambition and cunning than their patriotism and some who had been opponents to the independents of the united states the delegates from pennsylvania were six of them uniform and decided opponents to the constitution of this commonwealth the convention sat upwards of four months the doors were kept shut and the members brought under the most solemn engagements of secrecy footnote number one some of those who opposed their going so far beyond their powers retired hopeless from the convention others had the firmness to refuse signing the plan altogether and many who did sign it did it not as a system they wholly approved but as the best that could then be obtained and not withstanding the time spent on this subject it is agreed on all hands to be a work of haste and accommodation whilst the gilded chains were forging in the secret conclave the meaner instruments of despotism without were busily employed in alarming the fears of the people with dangers which did not exist and exciting their hopes of greater advantages from the expected plan than even the best government on earth could produce the proposed plan had not many hours issued forth from the womb of suspicious secrecy until such as were prepared for the purpose were carrying about petitions for people to sign signifying their approbation of the system and requesting the legislature to call a convention while every measure was taken to intimidate the people against opposing it the public papers teamed with the most violent threats against those who should dare to think for themselves and tarant feathers were liberally promised to all those who would not immediately join in supporting the proposed government be it what it would under such circumstances petitions in favor of calling a convention were signed by great numbers in and about the city before they had leisure to read and examine the system many of whom now they are better acquainted with it and have had time to investigate its principles are heartily opposed to it the petitions were handed into the legislature affairs were in this situation when on the 28th of September last a resolution was proposed to the assembly by a member of the house who had been also a member of the federal convention for calling a state convention to be elected within 10 days for the purpose of examining and adopting the proposed constitution of the United States though at this time the house had not received it from Congress this attempt was opposed by a minority who after offering every argument in their power to prevent to precipitate measure without effect absented themselves from the house as the only alternative left them to prevent the measure taking place under their constituents being acquainted with the business that violence and outrage which had been so often threatened was now practiced some of the members were seized the next day by a mob collected for the purpose and forcibly dragged into the house and there detained by force will stick quorum of the legislature we shall dwell no longer on this subject the people of Pennsylvania have been already acquainted there with we would only further observe that every member of the legislature previously to taking his seat by solemn oath or affirmation declares that he will not do or consent to any act or thing whatever that shall have a tendency to lessen the outrage their rights and privileges as declared in the constitution of this state and that constitution which they are so solemnly sworn to support cannot legally be altered by a recommendation of a council of censors who alone are authorized to propose alterations and amendments and even these must be published for months for the consideration of the people the proposed system of government for the United States if adopted will alter and may annihilate the constitution of Pennsylvania and therefore the legislature had no authority whatever to recommend the calling of convention for that purpose this proceeding could not be considered as binding on the people of Commonwealth the house was formed by violence some of the members composing it were detained by force which alone would have vitiated any proceedings to which they were otherwise competent but had the legislature been legally formed this business was absolutely without their power in this situation of affairs were the subscribers elected members of the convention of Pennsylvania a convention called by a legislature in direct violation of their duty and composed in part of members who were compelled to attend for that purpose to consider of a constitution proposed by a convention of the United States who were not appointed for the purpose of framing a new form of government but whose powers were expressly confined to altering and amending the present articles of confederation therefore the members of the Continental Convention in proposing the plan acted as individuals and not as deputies from Pennsylvania footnote number two the assembly who called the state convention acted as individuals not as the legislature of Pennsylvania nor could they or the convention chosen on their recommendation have authority to do any act or thing that can alter or annihilate the constitution of Pennsylvania both of which will be done by the new constitution nor are there proceedings in our opinion at all binding on the people the section for members of the convention was held at so early a period and the want of information was so great that some of us did not know of it until after it was over and we have reason to believe the great numbers of the people of Pennsylvania have not yet had opportunity of sufficiently examining the proposed constitution we apprehend that no change can take place that will affect the internal government or constitution of this commonwealth unless a majority of the people should evidence a wish for such a change but on examining the number of votes given for members of the present state convention we find that upwards of 70,000 free men are entitled to vote in Pennsylvania the whole convention has been elected by about 13,000 voters and though two thirds of the members of the convention have thought proper to ratify the proposed constitution yet those two thirds were elected by the votes of only 6,800 free men in the city of Philadelphia and some of the eastern countries the Jun-2 that took the lead in the business agreed to vote for none but such as would solemnly promise to adopt the system in total without exercising their judgment in many of the counties the people did not attend the elections as they had not an opportunity of judging of the plan otherwise did not consider themselves bound by the call of a set of men who assembled at the state house in Philadelphia and assumed the name of the legislature of Pennsylvania and some were prevented from voting by violence of the party who were determined at all events to force down the measure two such lengths did the tools of despotism carry their outrage that in the night of the election for members of convention in the city of Philadelphia several of the subscribers being then in the city to transact your business were grossly abused ill-treated and insulted while they were quiet in their lodgings though they did not interfere nor had anything to do with the set election but as they apprehend because they were supposed to be adverse to the proposed constitution and would not tamely surrender those sacred rights which you had committed to their charge the convention met and the same disposition was soon manifested in considering the proposed constitution that had been exhibited in every other stage of the business exhibited by an express vote of the convention from taking any question on the separate articles of the plan and reduced to the necessity of adopting or rejecting in TOTO tis true the majority permitted us to debate on each article but restrained us from proposing amendments they also determined not to permit us to enter on the minutes or reasons of dissent against any of the articles nor even on the final question our reason of dissent against the whole thus, situated we entered on the examination of the proposed system of government and found it to be such as we could not adopt without, as we conceived surrendering up our dearest rights we offered our objections to the convention and opposed those parts of the plan which in our opinion would be injurious to you in the best manner we were able and closed our arguments by offering the following propositions to the convention one, the right of conscience shall be held invoible and neither the legislature executive nor judicial power of the united states shall have authority to alter, abrogate or infringe any part of the constitution of the several states which provide for the preservation of liberty in matters of religion two that in controversies respecting property and in suits between man and man trial by jury shall remain as here to fore in the federal courts as in those of several states three that in all capital and criminal prosecutions a man has a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation as well in the federal courts as in those of several states to be heard by himself and his counsel to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses to call for evidence in his favor and a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinity without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself and that no man be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers four that excessive bail ought not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted five that warrants unsupported by evidence whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places or to seize any person or persons whose property not particularly described are grievous and oppressive and shall not be granted either by the magistrates of the federal government or others six that the people have a right to the freedom of speech of writing and publishing their sentiments therefore the freedom of the press shall not be restrained states seven that the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state or the United States or for the purpose of killing game and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes committed or real danger of public injury from individuals or armies in the time of peace or dangerous to liberty they ought not to be kept up and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil powers eight the inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold and on all other lands the United States not enclosed and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters and others not private property without being restrained therein by any laws to be passed by the legislature of the United States nine that no law shall be passed to restrain the legislatures of the several states from enacting laws for opposing taxes except imposts and duties on goods imported or exported and that no taxes except imposts and duties upon goods imported and exported and postage on letters shall be levied by the authority of Congress ten that the House of Representatives be properly increased in number that elections shall remain that the several states shall have power to regulate the elections for senators and representatives without being controlled either directly or indirectly by any interference on the part of the Congress and that elections of representatives be annual eleven that the power of organizing arming and disciplining the militia the manner of disciplining the militia to be prescribed by Congress remain with the individual states and that Congress shall not have authority to call or march any of the militia out of their own state without the consent of such state and for such length of time only as such state shall agree that the sovereign freedom and independency of the several states shall be retained and every power jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled twelve that the legislative executive and judicial powers be kept separate and to this end that a constitutional council be appointed to advise and assist the president who shall be responsible for the advice they give here by the senators would be relieved from almost constant attendance and also that the judges be made completely independent thirteen that no treaty which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of the United States and Congress assembled shall be valid until such law shall be repealed or made conformable to such treaty neither shall any treaties be valid which are in contradiction to the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the several states fourteen that the judiciary power of the United States to cases affecting ambassadors other public ministers and consuls to cases of admirality and maritime jurisdiction to controversies to which the United States shall be a party to controversies between two or more states between a state and citizens of different states between citizens claiming lands under grants states and between a state or the citizen thereof and foreign states and in criminal cases to such only as are expressly enumerated in the Constitution and that the United States and Congress assembled shall not have power to enact laws which shall alter the laws of dissents and distribution of the effects of deceased persons the titles of lands or goods or the regulation of contracts in the individual states after reading these propositions we declared our willingness to agree to the plan provided it was so amended as to meet these propositions or something similar to them and finally move the convention to adjourn to give the people of Pennsylvania time to consider the subject and determine for themselves but these were all rejected and the final vote was taken when our duty to you induced us to vote against the proposed plan and to decline signing the ratification of the same during the discussion we met with many insults and some personal abuse and we were treated with decency during the sitting of the convention by the persons in the gallery of the house however we flattered ourselves that in contending for the preservation of those invaluable rights you have thought proper to commit to our charge we acted with a spirit becoming free men and being desirous that you might know the principles which actuated our conduct prohibited from inserting our reasons of dissent on the minutes of the convention we have subjoined them for your consideration as to you alone we are accountable it remains with you whether you think those inestimable privileges which you have so ably contended for should be sacrificed at the shrine of despotism we contend for them with the same spirit that has so often baffled the attempts of an aristocratic faction to rivet the shackles of slavery on you and your unborn posterity our objections are comprised under three general heads of dissent vis we dissent first because it is the opinion of the most celebrated writers and confirmed by uniform experience that a very extensive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom otherwise than by a confederation of republics possessing all the powers of internal government but united in the management of their general and foreign concerns if any doubt could have been entertained of the truth of the foregoing principle it has been fully removed by the concession of Mr. Wilson one of the majority on this question and who was one of the deputies in the late general convention in justice to him we will give his own words they are as follows vis the extent of country for which the new constitution prepared produced another difficulty in the business of the federal convention it is the opinion of some celebrated writers that to a small territory the democratical to a middling territory as Montesquieu has termed it the monarchical and to an extensive territory the despotic form of government is best adapted regarding then the wide and almost unbounded jurisdiction of the united states at first view the hand of despotism seemed necessary to control connect and protect it and hence the chief embarrassment rose for we know that although our constituents would cheerfully submit to the legislative restraints of a free government attempt to shackle them with despotic power and quote and again in another part of his speech he continues quote is it probable that the dissolution of the state governments and the establishment of one consolidated empire would be eligible in its nature and satisfactory to the people in its administration have given reason to shoe that so extensive a territory could not be governed, connected and preserved by the supremacy of despotic power all the exertions of the most potent emperors of Rome were not capable of keeping that empire together which in extent was far inferior to the domain of America end quote the dissent, secondly because the powers vested in Congress by this constitution must necessarily annihilate and absorb the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the several states and produce from their ruins one consolidated government which from the nature of things will be art iron-handed despotism as nothing short of the supremacy despotic's way could connect and govern these United States under one government as the truth of this position is of such decisive importance it ought to be fully investigated and if it is founded to be clearly ascertained for should it be demonstrated that the powers vested by this constitution in Congress will have such an effect necessarily to produce one consolidated government the question then will be reduced to this short issue this whether satiated with the blessings of liberty whether repenting of the folly of so recently asserting their unalienable rights against foreign despots at the expense of so much blood and treasure and such painful struggles the people of America are now willing to resign every privilege of freedom and submit to the domain of an absolute government that will embrace all America in one chain of despotism or whether they will with virtuous indignation spurn at the shackles prepared for them and confirm their liberties by a conduct becoming freeman that the new government will not be a confederacy of states as it ought but one consolidated government founded upon the destruction of the several governments of the states we shall now shoe the powers of Congress under the new constitution are complete and unlimited over the purse and the sword and are perfectly independent of and supreme over the great governments whose intervention in these great points is entirely destroyed by virtue of their power of taxation Congress may command the whole or any part of the property of the people they may impose what imposts upon commerce they may impose what land taxes, poll taxes, excise duties on all written instruments and duties on every other article that they may judge proper in short every species of taxation whether of an external or internal nature is comprised in section the eighth of article the first vis quote the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States end quote as there is no one article of taxation reserved to the state governments the Congress may monopolize every source of revenue and thus indirectly demolish the state governments for without funds they could not exist the taxes, duties and excises imposed by Congress may be so high as to render it impracticable to levy further sums on the same articles but whether this should be the case or not if the state governments should presume to impose taxes duties or excises on the same articles with Congress the latter may abrogate and repeal of laws whereby they are imposed upon the allegation that they interfere with the due collection of their taxes, duties or excises by virtue of the following clause part of section eighth article first vis quote to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or office thereof the Congress might gloss over this conduct by construing every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes to be for the general welfare and therefore as of their jurisdiction and the supremacy of the laws of the United States is established by article sixth vis quote that this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding end quote it has been alleged that the words pursuant to the Constitution end quote are a restriction upon the authority of Congress when it is considered that by other sections they are invested with every efficient power of government and which may be exercised to the absolute destruction of the state governments without any violation of even the forms of the Constitution this seeming restriction as well as every other restriction in it appears to us and delusive and only introduced as a blind upon the real nature of the government in our opinion quote pursuant to the Constitution end quote will be co-extensive with the will and pleasure of Congress which indeed will be the only limitation of their true powers we apprehend that this sovereignty will be a solicism in politics that therefore as there is no line of distinction drawn between the general and state governments as the sphere of their jurisdiction is undefined it would be contrary to the nature of things that both should exist together or the one would necessarily triumph in fullness of domain however the contest could not be of long continuance as the state governments are divested of every means of defense and will be obliged by quote the supreme law of the land end quote to yield at discretion it has been objected to this total destruction of state governments that the existence of their legislatures is made essential to the organization of congress that they must assemble for the appointment of the senators and the president general of the united states true the state legislatures may be continued for some years as boards of appointment merely after they are divested of every other function but the framers of the constitution foreseeing that the people will soon be disgusted with the solemn mockery of a government without power and usefulness have made a provision for relieving them from the imposition in section fourth of article first vis quote the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof but the congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choosing senators end quote as congress have the control over the time of the appointment of the president general and the senators of the representatives of the united states they may prolong their existence in office for life by postponing the time of their election and appointment from period to period under various pretenses such as an apprehension of invasion the factuous disposition of the people or any other plausible pretense that the occasion may suggest having thus obtained life estates in the government they may fill up the vacancies themselves by the control over the mode of appointment with this exception in regard to the senators that as the place of appointment for them must by the constitution be in the particular state they may depute somebody in the respective states to fill up the vacancies in the senate occasioned by death until they can venture to assume it themselves in this manner may the only restriction in the clause be evaded by virtue of the foregoing section when the spirit of the people shall be gradually broken when the general government shall be firmly established and when a numerous standing army shall render opposition vain the congress may complete the system of despotism in renouncing all dependence on the people by continuing themselves and children in the government the celebrated Montesquieu in his spirit of laws volume 1 page 12 says that in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by the suffrages of the people which are their will now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself the laws thereof which establish the right of suffrage are fundamental to this government in fact it is as important to regulate in a republic in what manner by whom and concerning what suffrages are to be given as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince and after what manner he ought to govern end quote the time, mode and place of the election of representatives senators and president general of the united states ought not to be under the control of congress but fundamentally ascertained and established the new constitution consistently with the plan of consolidation contains no reservation of the rights and privileges of the state governments which was made in the confederation of the year 1778 by article the second vis quote that each state retains its sovereignty freedom and independence and every power and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the united states in congress assembled the legislative power vested in congress by the foregoing recited sections is so unlimited in its nature may be so comprehensive and boundless in its exercise that this alone would be amply sufficient to annihilate the state governments and swallow them up in the grand vortex of general empire the judicial powers vested in congress are also so various and extensive that by legal ingenuity they may be extended in every case and thus absorb the state judiciaries and when we consider the decisive influence general judiciary would have over the civil polity of several states we do not hesitate to pronounce that this power unaided by the legislative would affect a consolidation of the states under one government the powers of a court of equity vested by this constitution in the tribunals of congress powers which do not exist in Pennsylvania unless so far as they can be incorporated with jury trial would in this state greatly contribute to this event the rich and wealthy suitors would eagerly lay hold of infinite mazes perplexities and delays which a court of chancery with the appellate powers of the supreme court in fact as well as law and thus the poor man being plunged in the bottomless pit of legal discussion would drop his demand and despair in short consolidation pervades the whole constitution it begins with an annunciation that such was the intention the main pillars of the fabric correspond with it and the concluding paragraph is a confirmation of it example begins with the words quote we the people of the united states which is the style of a compact between individuals entering into a state of society and not that of a confederation of states the other features of consolidation we have before noticed thus we have fully established the proposition that the powers vested by this constitution in congress will affect the consolidation of the states under one government which even the advocates of this constitution admit could not be done without the sacrifice of liberty we dissent thirdly because if it were practicable to govern so extensive a territory as these united states includes on the plan of a consolidated government consistent with the principles of liberty and the happiness of the people yet the construction of this constitution is not calculated to obtain the object for independent of the nature of the case it would of itself necessarily produce a despotism and that not by the usual gradations but with the celerity that has hitherto only attended revolutions affected by the sword to establish the truth of this position a cursory investigation of the principles and form of this constitution will suffice the first consideration that this review suggests is the omission of a bill of rights ascertaining and fundamentally establishing those and personal rights of men without the full free and secure enjoyment of which there can be no liberty and over which it is not necessary for a good government to have the control the principle of which are the rights of conscience personal liberty by the clear and unequivocable establishment of the writ of the unbiased corpus jury trial and criminal and civil cases by an impartial jury of the facinage or county with the common law proceedings for the safety of the accused and criminal prosecutions and the liberty of the press that scourge of tyrants and the grand bulwark of every other liberty and privilege the stipulations here to form in favor of them in the state constitutions are entirely superseded by this constitution. The legislature of a free country should be so formed as to have competent knowledge of its constituents and enjoy their confidence. To produce these essential requisites, the representation ought to be fair, equal and sufficiently numerous to possess the same interests, feelings, opinions and views which the people themselves would possess were they all assembled and so numerous as to prevent bribery and undue influence and so responsible to the people by frequent and fair elections as to prevent their neglecting or sacrificing the views and interests of their constituents to their own pursuits. We will now bring the legislature under this constitution to the test of the foregoing principles which will demonstrate that it is deficient in every essential quality of a just and safe representation. The House of Representatives is to consist of 65 members. This is one for about every 50,000 inhabitants to be chosen every two years. 33 members will form a quorum for doing business and 17 of these being the majority determine the sense of the House. The Senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, consists of 26 members being two from each state appointed by their legislatures every six years. Fourteen senators make a quorum, the majority of whom, eight, determines the sense of that body except in judging on impeachments or in making treaties or in expelling a member when two thirds of the senators present must concur. The president is to have the control over the enacting of laws so far as to make the concurrence of two thirds of the representatives and senators present necessary if he should object to the laws. Thus it appears that the liberties, happiness, interests and great concerns of the whole United States may be dependent upon the integrity, virtue, wisdom and knowledge of 25 or 26 men. How inadequate and unsafe a representation. Inadequate because the sense and views of three or four millions of people diffused over so extensive a territory comprising such various climates, products, habits, interests and opinions cannot be collected in so small a body and besides it is not a fair and equal representation of the people even in proportion to its number. For the smallest state has as much weight in the Senate as the largest. And from the smallness of the number to be chosen for both branches of legislature and from the mode of election and appointment which is under the control of Congress and from the nature of the thing men of the most elevated rank in life will alone be chosen. The other orders in society such as fanners, traders and mechanics who all ought to have competent number of their best informed men in legislature will be totally unrepresented. The representation is unsafe because in the exercise of such great powers and trusts it is so exposed to corruption and undue influence by the gift of numerous places of honor and emoluments at the disposal of the executive by the arts and addresses of the great and designing and by direct bribery. The representation is moreover inadequate and unsafe because of the long terms for which it is appointed and the mode of its appointment by which Congress may not only control the choice of the people but may so manage as to divest the people of this fundamental right and become self-elected. The number of members in the House of Representatives may be increased to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants but when we consider that this cannot be done without the consent of the Senate who from their share in the legislative, in the executive and judicial departments and permanency of appointment will be the great efficient body in this government and whose weight and predominancy would be abridged by an increase of the representatives. We are persuaded that this is a circumstance that cannot be expected. On the contrary the number of representatives will probably be continued at sixty-five although the population of the country may swell to treble what it now is unless a revolution should affect a change. We have before noticed the judicial power as it would affect the consolidation of the states into one government. We will now examine it as it would affect the liberties and welfare of the people supposing such a government were practicable and proper. The judicial power under the proposed constitution is founded on the well-known principles of the civil law by which the judge determines both on law and fact and appeals are allowed from the inferior tribunals to the superior upon the whole question so that facts as well as law would be reexamined and even new facts brought forward in the court of appeals and to use the words of a very eminent civilian, quote, the cause is many times another thing before the court of appeals than what it was at the time of the first sentence, end quote, that this mode of proceeding is the one which must be adopted under this constitution is evident from the following circumstances. First, that the trial by jury which is the grand characteristic of the common law is secured by the constitution only in criminal cases. Second, that the appeal from both law and fact is expressly established which is utterly inconsistent with the principles of the common law and trials by jury. The only mode in which an appeal from law and fact can be established is by adopting the principles and practice of the civil law unless the United States should be drawn into the absurdity of calling and swearing juries merely for the purpose of contradicting their verdicts which would render juries contemptible and worse than useless. Third, that the courts to be established would decide on all cases of law and equity which is a well-known characteristic of civil law and these courts would have conuscence not only of the laws of the United States and of treaties and of cases affecting ambassadors but of all cases of admirality and maritime jurisdiction which last or matters belonging exclusively to the civil law in every nation in Christendom. Not to enlarge upon the loss of the individual right of trial by an unbiased jury so dear to every friend of liberty the monstrous expense and inconveniences of the mode of proceedings to be adopted are such as will prove intolerable to the people of this country. The lengthy proceedings of the civil law courts in the chancery of England and in the courts of Scotland and France are such that few men of moderate fortune can endure the expense of it the poor man must therefore submit to the wealthy. Length of purse will too often prevail against right and justice. For instance we are told by the learned judge Blackstone that a question only on the property of an ox of the value of three guineas originating under the civil law proceedings in Scotland after many interlocutory orders and sentences below was carried at length from the court of sessions the highest court in that part of Great Britain by way of an appeal to the house of lords where the question of law and fact was finally determined. The ads that no pick or spirit could in the court of King's bench or common pleas at Westminster have given continuance to such a cause for a tenth part of the time nor have cost a twentieth part of the expense yet the costs in the courts of King's bench and common pleas in England are infinitely greater than those which the people of this country have ever experienced. We abhor the idea of losing the transcendent privilege of trial by jury with the loss of which it is remarked by the same learned author that in Sweden the liberties of the commons were extinguished by an aristocratic senate and that trial by jury and the liberty of the people went out together. At the same time we regret the intolerable delay, the enormous expense and infinite vexation to which the people of this country will be exposed from the voluminous proceedings of the courts of civil law and especially from the appellate jurisdiction by means of which a man may be drawn from the utmost boundaries of this extensive country to the seat of the Supreme Court of the Nation to contend perhaps with a wealthy and powerful adversary. The consequence of this establishment will be an absolute confirmation of the power of aristocratical influence in the courts of justice for the common people will not be able to contend or struggle against it. Trial by jury in criminal cases may also be excluded by declaring that the libeler for instance shall be liable to an action of debt for a specific sum thus evading the common law prosecution by indictment and trial by jury and the common course of proceeding against a ship for breach of revenue laws by information which will be classed among civil cases will at this civil law be within the resort of a court where no jury intervenes besides the benefit of jury trial in cases of a criminal nature which cannot be evaded will be rendered of little value by calling the accused to answer far from home there being no provision that the trial be by a jury of the neighborhood or country thus an inhabitant of Pittsburgh on a charge of crime committed on the banks of the Ohio may be obliged to defend himself at the side of the Delaware or so vice versa to conclude this head we observe that the judges of the courts of Congress would not be independent as they are not the barred from holding other offices during the pleasure of the president and senate and as they may derive their support in part from fees alterable by the legislature the next consideration that the constitution presents is the undue and dangerous mixture of powers of government the same body possessing legislative executive and judicial powers the senate is a constituent branch of the legislature it has judicial power in judging on impeachments and in this case unites in some measure the characters of judge and party as all the principal officers are appointed by the president general with the concurrence of the senate and therefore they derive their offices in part from the senate this may bias the judgments of the senators and tend to screen great delinquents from punishment and the senate has moreover various and great executive powers viz in concurrence with the president general they form treaties with foreign nations that may control and abrogate the constitutions and laws of the several states indeed there is no power privilege or liberty of the state governments or of the people but what may be affected by virtue of this power for all treaties made by them are to be the supreme law of the land anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not withstanding and this great power may be exercised by the president and ten senators being two-thirds of fourteen which is a quorum of that body what an inducement with this offer to the ministers of foreign powers to compass by bribery such concessions as could not otherwise be obtained it is the unvaried usage of all three states whenever treaties interfere with the positive laws of the land to make the intervention of the legislature necessary to give them operation this became necessary and was afforded by the parliament of great britain in consequence of the late commercial treaty between that kingdom and france as the senate judges on impeachments who is to try the members of the senate for the abuse of this power and none of the great appointments to office can be made without the consent of the senate such various extensive and important powers combined in one body of men are inconsistent with all freedom the celebrated montesquieu tells us quote when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates there can be no liberty because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner again there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers were it joined with the legislative the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control for the judge would then be legislator were it joined to the executive power the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor there would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body of nobles or of the people to exercise these three powers that of enacting laws that of executing the public resolutions and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals and quote the president general is dangerously connected with the senate his coincidence with the views of ruling junta in that body is made essential to his weight and importance in the government which will destroy all independence and purity in the executive department and having the power of pardoning without the concurrence of a council he may screen from punishment the most reasonable attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people when instigated by his co agitators in the senate instead of this dangerous and improper mixture of the executive with the legislative and judicial the supreme executive powers ought to have been placed in the president with a small independent council made personally responsible for every appointment to office or other act by having their opinions recorded and that without the concurrence of majority of the quorum of this council the president should not be capable of taking any step we have before considered internal taxation as it would affect the destruction of the state governments and produced one consolidated government we will now consider that subject as it affects the personal concerns of the people the power of direct taxation applies to every individual as congress under this government is expressly vested with the authority of laying a capitation or poll tax upon every person to any amount this is a tax that however oppressive in its nature and unequal in its operation is certain as to produce and simple in its collection it cannot be evaded like the objects of imposts or excise and will be paid because all that a man half he will give for his head this tax is so congenial to the nature of despotism that it has ever been a favorite under such governments some of those who were in the late general convention from this state have long labored to introduce a poll tax amongst us the power of direct taxation will further apply to every individual as congress may tax land cattle trades occupations etc in any amount and every object of internal taxation is of that nature that however oppressive the people will have but this alternative except to pay the tax or let their property be taken for all resistance will be in vain the standing army and select militia would enforce the collection for the moderate exercise of this power there is no control left in the state governments whose intervention is destroyed no relief or redress of grievances can be extended as here to for by them there is not even a declaration of rights to which the people may appeal for the vindication of their wrongs in the court of justice they must therefore implicitly obey the most arbitrary laws as the worst of them will be pursuant to the principles and form of the constitution and that strongest of all checks upon the conduct of administration responsibility to the people will not exist in this government the permanency of the appointments of senators and representatives and the control the congress have over their election will place them independent of the sentiments and resentment of the people and the administration having a greater interest in the government than in the community there will be no consideration to restrain them from oppression and tyranny in the government of this state under the old confederation the members of the legislature are taken from among the people and their interests and welfare are so inseparably connected with those of their constituents that they can derive no advantage from oppressive laws and taxes for they would suffer in common with their fellow citizens would participate in the burdens they impose on the community as they must return to the common level after a short period and not withstanding every exertion of influence every means of corruption a necessary rotation excludes them from permanency in the legislature the large state is to have but ten members in that congress which is to have the liberty property and dearest concerns of every individual in this vast country and absolute command and even these ten persons who are to be our only guardians who are to supersede the legislature of pennsylvania will not be of the choice of the people nor amenable to them for the mode of their election and appointment they will consist of the lordly and high-minded of men who will have no congenial feelings with the people but a perfect indifference for and contempt of them they will consist of those harpies of power that prey upon the very vitals that riot on the miseries of the community but we will suppose although in all probability it may never be realized in fact that our deputies in congress have the welfare of their constituents at heart and will exert themselves in their behalf what security could even this afford what relief could they extend to their oppressed constituents to attain this the majority of the deputies of the twelve other states in congress must be alike well disposed must alike forgo the sweets of power and relinquish the pursuits of ambition which from the nature of things is not to be expected if the people part with a responsible representation in the legislature founded upon fair certain and frequent elections they have nothing left they can call their own miserable is the lot of that people whose every concern depends on the will and pleasure of their rules our soldiers will become janissaries and our officers of government boshos in short the system of despotism will soon be completed from the foregoing investigation it appears that the congress under this constitution will not possess the confidence of the people which is an essential requisite in a good government for unless the laws command the confidence and respect of the great body of people so as to induce them to support them when called on by civil magistrate they must be executed by the aid of a numerous standing army which would be inconsistent with every idea of liberty for the same force that may be employed to compel obedience to good laws might and probably would be used to rest from the people their constitutional liberties the framers of the constitution appear to have been aware of this great deficiency to have been sensible that no dependence could be placed on the people for their support but on the contrary that the government must be executed by force they have therefore made a provision for this purpose in a permanent standing army and a militia that may be subjected to as strict discipline and government a standing army in the hands of government placed so independent of the people may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties it may be employed to enforce the collection of most oppressive taxes and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures an ambitious man who may have the army at his own devotion may step up into the throne and seize upon absolute power the absolute unqualified command that congress have over the militia may be made instrumental to the destruction of all liberty both public and private whether of a personal civil or religious nature first the personal liberty of every man probably from sixteen to sixty years of age may be destroyed by the power congress have in organizing and governing of the militia as militia they may be subjected to fines to any amount levied in a military manner they may be subject to a corporal punishment of the most disgraceful and humiliating kind and to death itself by the sentence of a court martial to this our young men will be more immediately subjected as a select militia composed of them will best answer the purpose of government secondly the rights of conscience may be violated as there is no exemption of those persons who are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms these compose a respectable portion of the community in the state this is more remarkable because even when the distresses of the late war and the evident disaffection of many citizens of that description inflamed our passions and when every person who is obliged to risk his own life must have been exasperated against such as on any account kept back from the common danger yet even then when outrage and violence might have been expected the rights of conscience were held sacred at this momentous crisis the framers of our state constitution made the most express and decided declaration and stipulations in favor of the rights of conscience but now when no necessity exists those dearest rights of men are left insecure thirdly the absolute command of congress over the militia may be destructive of public liberty for under the guidance of an arbitrary government they may be made the unwilling instruments of tyranny the militia of pennsylvania may be marched to new england or virginia to quell an insurrection occasioned by the most galling oppression and aided by the standing army they will no doubt be successful in subduing their liberty and independence but in doing so although the magnanimity of their minds will be extinguished yet the meaner passions of resentment and revenge will be increased and these in turn will be the ready and obedient instruments of despotism to enslave the others and that with an irritated vengeance thus may the militia be made the instruments of crushing the last efforts of expiring liberty of riveting the chains of despotism on their fellow citizens and on one another this power can be exercised not only without violating the constitution but in strict conformity with it it is calculated for the express purpose and will doubtless be executed accordingly as this government will not enjoy the confidence of the people but be executed by force it will be a very expensive and burdensome government the standing army must be numerous and as a farther support it will be the policy of this government to multiply officers in every department judges collectors tax gatherers excise men and the whole host of revenue officers will swarm over the land devouring the hard earnings of the industrious like the locusts of old impoverishing and desolating all before them we have not noticed the smaller nor many of the considerable blemishes but have confined our objections to the great and essential defects the main pillars of the constitution which we have shown to be inconsistent with the liberty and happiness of the people as its establishment will annihilate the state governments and produce one consolidated government that will eventually and speedily issue in the supremacy of despotism in this investigation we have not confined our views to the interests or welfare of the state in preference to others we have overlooked all local circumstances we have considered this subject on the broad scale of the general good we have asserted the cause of the present and future ages the cause of liberty and mankind Nathaniel Bredding John Smiley Richard Baird Adam Orth John A. Hannah John Whitehill John Harris Robert Whitehill John Reynolds Jonathan Hogue Nicholas Lutz William Todd James Edgar John Baird William Findley James Martin Joseph Powell Joseph Heister John Bishop Abraham Lincoln John Ludwig the yeas and nays upon the final vote were as follows vis yeas George Latimer James Wilson John Hun Benjamin Rush Thomas McKeehan George Gray Hillary Baker William McPherson Samuel Ashmeade Enoch Edwards Sebastian Graff William Wilson Henry Weinkoop John Hubley John Boyd John Barkley Jasper Yates Thomas Scott Thomas Yardley Henry Slagle John Neville Abraham Stout Thomas Campbell John Allison Thomas Bull Thomas Hartley Jonathan Roberts Anthony Wayne David Greer John Richards William Gibbons John Black F. A. Mullenberg Richard Downing Benjamin Paddan James Morris Thomas Cheney John Ampt Timothy Pickering John Hanham Stephen Ballyit Benjamin Elliott Stephen Chambers John Horsfield Robert Coleman David Deschler 46 yeas the nays John Whitehill John Bishop James Edgar John Harris Joseph Heister Nathaniel Bredding John Reynolds James Martin John Smiley Robert Whitehill Joseph Powell Richard Baird Jonathan Hogue William Findley William Brown Nicholas Lutz John Baird Adam Orrith John Ludwig William Todd John Andrew Hannah Abraham Lincoln James Marshall nays 23 Philadelphia December 12 1787 footnote 1 the journals of the conclave are still concealed footnote 2 the Continental Convention in direct violation of the 13th article of the confederation have declared quote that the ratification of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same end quote thus has the plighted faith of the states been sported with they had solemnly engaged that the confederation now subsisting should be invoyably preserved by each of them and the union thereby formed should be perpetual unless the same should be altered by mutual consent end of section 48 recorded by Robert Scott June the 19th 2007