 Good morning. My name is Brian Harding and I'm a senior expert for Southeast Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, USIP. And I'm pleased to welcome you this morning to our event, Defiance and Democracy, Understanding the Thai Protest Movement. As anyone knows who knows anything about Thai politics, having protesters in the streets in Bangkok is nothing new. But I think it's pretty clear that the youth-led movement that we saw sweep the kingdom in 2020 has really launched Thailand's long-running political struggle into a new phase. And of course, what happens in Thailand matters for the United States. So today I'm pleased that we can bring together four outstanding panelists, diverse views to explore what's happened to date in Thailand, where things might be going in the new year, including as it relates to the incoming Biden administration here in Washington, D.C. But before we start, for those who are not fully familiar with USIP, we were founded in 1984 by Congress as an independent national institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible, practical and essential for US and global security. We pursue this vision of a world without violent conflict by working on the ground with local partners globally. We provide people, organizations and tools and governments the tools, knowledge and training to manage conflicts so that it doesn't become violent and resolve it when it does. USIP has been active in Southeast Asia for decades, but right now we're in the process of significantly expanding our work in the region. And for today's events, it is a pleasure to be partnering with USIP's program on nonviolent action, including my colleague Jonathan Pinkney, who I'll introduce in a moment. So we have four panelists in only 60 minutes, so I'll try to keep things moving quickly this morning. And after each of our panelists gives remarks of five, six, seven minutes, I'll ask a few questions myself and then move to audience questions. If you're watching at home to ask a question, please use the chat box function located just below the video player on the USIP event page. You can also tweet with the hashtag Thailand USIP. Before we start, let me quickly introduce our panel in the order in which they'll speak. First up will be Ratapul Omsanid, who goes by On. On has reported on Thailand as a journalist for decades, including for the AP Bloomberg Wall Street Journal and Berends. He also taught news reporting at Thomas University in Thailand. And he's now the Thai service chief for Voice of America. I've asked On to kick us off with some thoughts on the broad political dynamics and what's happening in Thailand right now. The second speaker will be Dr. Pen Chan Ho Borusud. Pen Chan is an assistant professor at California State University Fullerton, where she researches social movements and has written extensively on Thailand. She has a PhD from the University of Utah and also happens to have a background in broadcast journalism. I've asked Pen Chan to discuss how the protesters have managed to mobilize amid a very restrictive environment in Thailand, something that she's written quite a bit about. Third up will be my colleague, Dr. Jonathan Pinkney. Jonathan is a senior researcher for USIP's program on nonviolent action. He's a well-known expert on nonviolent action in a global context. I think it brings something really interesting to this conversation. He focuses on the intersection of between nonviolent movements, democratization and peace processes and the use of statistic analysis and big data to understand nonviolent mobilization. He's the author of the forthcoming book from Descent to Democracy, The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions. And finally will be Des Walton. Des is a retired US Army foreign area officer, retired as a colonel with extensive experience in national security policy, defense cooperation and Southeast Asia, including having served as the Southeast Asia director at the National Security Council staff. But I think most relevant for today, Des was the US defense attaché in Bangkok from 2012 to 2015, meaning he played a key role in considering the US response to the events that surrounded Thailand's 2014 coup. Des is now a senior director at Bauer Gravesia, consultancy based here in the United States, the offices of Bangkok and elsewhere in the region. And so I've asked Des to share some thoughts about how the incoming US administration might be thinking about what's happening in Thailand. So without anything else, let's get to our panel and over to An to get us started. Thank you so much, Brian, for organizing this. It's a major topic about Thailand, and it's timely to talk about defiance and democracy at the beginning of 2021, because the relative calm in Thai politics since the start of the year may be betraying us. Politically, it has been quite calm because big stories from the country have been more about COVID-19 and less about political storms facing the government until a few days ago, when there was a string of activities, explosion and some arrests was made. When we expand the time horizon by two years, five years or longer, like 89 years, when Thailand had his first crack at democracy, we start to see bigger picture that has more moving parts. The resurgence of virus means that Prime Minister Pryut will do his best to keep the country from economic fallout and from public health debacles. At the same time, the reformist movement very much look forward to gathering steam. It is obvious that everyone wants COVID to go ASAP, but for Pryut and protest leaders, I would say their reasons are more particular and complicated. For example, the state of emergency law, which was extended through the end of February, is helping the authority mobilize resources quickly to combat the outbreak. Also, it lends justification for banning demonstrations, but it could also create a pent up frustration over the government's strict policy. It's more about when than if we will see pro reform protests coming back in earnest, though it would be quite hard to predict whether it will be more strategic or more organic. What I could say though is that any heavy handed approach by the government will help the movement revitalize organically, which was the case for the tidal wave of the youth activism last year. And that phenomenon was prompted by a stew of circumstances. First, the group of people who control the power are largely the same for many years since 2014 coup, but they did not necessarily make the change that millions of people want to see. The wealth of the wealthiest grows, and the people who live from hand to mouth feel that it has been excruciatingly expensive to be poor. And the youth became more unsure about their future. At the same time, household debts are at 17 years high and leading most Asian countries. Secondly, Thailand had a new monarch following the passing of King Rama IX, who received enormous respect at home and abroad. People were anxious about the transition. And the younger the observers are, the less experienced they share with their parents and grandparents, who hold a Thai monarchy as an institution with highest esteem. For them, fidelity to the monarchy equals to moral meaning of being a Thai and synonymous to faithfulness for the country. Such interpretation has been the case for a lifetime of the older generations. And I could say at a dinner table of a certain household, there could be a dissenting youth sitting next to the older generation, but deciding to be quiet. They didn't want to be judged or be told that they're clueless or even deplorable, just thinking differently. A couple of years ago, the younger generation found a party that gave them political belonging. That was future forward party. But then the party was disbanded by a court. This development sharpens their frustration. This also gives rise to a new crop of leaders who organize outside the sphere of the old politics. Unlike the earlier generation of anti-establishment activists, the younger ones have never been in the same room or at the same negotiating table with conservative power brokers. Therefore, they have a harder time establishing dialogue toward middle of the world solution. Through parliament, some work has been done to create a path to reconciliation. However, steps to amend the constitution and to create space for discussion have been discounted by the protest leaders as a ruse to help the government hold on to its power until the next election in 2022. I will stop here so that we have reasonably enough time for Q&A. Also, I look forward to hearing thoughts from other people. Thank you. Thanks, An. That's a great start. We're going to go next, as I mentioned, to Penchan, who has a presentation. I think we'll get that up on the screen right now. Great. First of all, I'd like to thank Brian Harding for organizing today's event. I will discuss how the Thai protesters have reimagined the tactics and strategies and their strife for democracy. Due to the limited time we have, I choose to examine the protesters, the use of Twitter, popular culture and also alliances. First, I will start with Twitter, which is a popular medium for political communication in the US and also in Thailand. As of July last year, Thailand had about 7 million active Twitter users, placing it 13th in the world in the number of users and Twitter hashtags connect and create networks of people who share the same interests. Sorry. Okay, Thai netizens tweet with the hashtag what's happening in Thailand to share latest updates in English and Thai and to gain international support and coverage. And also, each gathering has specific hashtags. And some have taken simplified form with the date of the rally in question, for example, Moc 16 Makara or January 16 rallies. In addition, hashtags idea of Moc or hashtag ideas for protests link fragmented, fragmented, creative ideas that decentralized individuals contributed to their next gatherings. And one of these ideas was the appropriation of popular culture, the Harry Potter themed protest. Human rights lawyer, I know Nampa addressed a crowd asking them to cast a spell on the you know who and he argued that people had mentioned some coded names for some time. And it was necessary to mention the tabu name and publicly discuss the monarchy's role in Thai politics. His statement broke the restriction of the public criticism and monarchy. Because of the strict less majestic law punishable with a three to 15 year imprisonment. The fictional theme unveiled the root cause of the country's political dysfunction and perils of criticizing the Thai monarchy and public. When Harry Potter mentions the tabu name of Voldemort in Harry Potter and the Deathly Hollows, Voldemort's snatchers are alluded to Harry Potter's whereabouts unknown was followed, charged and arrested after saying the tabu name at the rally. His speech paved the way for the students 10 point demand which calls for limits on the monarchy's power and reform. In addition to pop popular culture, digital technology allows for new forms of communication and alliances. For example, the Royalist Marketplace founded by Awin Chakchawan Pongpan, a scholar and monarchy critic based in Japan. He communicates with millions of people by means of satires, big dog video parodies, rumors and gossips criticizing the monarchy. The Thai government blocked access to this group has been unsuccessful when Awin recreated the group with the same name and regained half a million members overnight. Now it has over two million members. Meanwhile, Twitter connects a depro democracy movement with the unlikely allies, the Thai fans of K-pop bands. And these allies have moved from the center of the movement, primarily as the main source of financial support. In October, 23 K-pop fan clubs raced about $100,000 to fund protests, providing riot years, food, bail money and the legal assistance for protesters. Thai protesters have also connected with international communities such as the Hong Kong activists and foreign government. In early fall, Thai protesters have since adopted tactics used by Hong Kong protesters, packaged as a series of memes called how to mop with tips on how to protest safely and communicate in large crowds. The Thai students activists have connected with the Hong Kong student activists, Joe Xiaowang, who tweeted in solidarity with the Thai students movement using the hashtag milk tea alliance, symbolizing a coalition of Thai Hong Kong and Taiwanese movements for democracy and freedom. The protesters also muster international allies when they rallied in late October at a German embassy, calling for an examination of the king's travel records to determine whether the king has ruled from Germany, whether he is liable for inheritance taxes, and whether the palace might be involved in a Thai activist disappearance, which would violate German law. The response was a Germany's in sorry, in response, a Germany's foreign minister, Heiko Maas said in November that Berlin expects the Thai king not to make political decisions that violate German law or human rights while on German soil. Last but not least, the Thai protesters connected with the past movements for democracy, the red church, the student rising in 1973 and 1976, and as far back as the 1932 revolution that overthrew the government of King British people, marking the start of the constitution monarchy and democracy in Thailand. After Prime Minister for Yuchan Ocha announced last November that the government would use all the laws, including the draconian les majeste law or Article 112 to maintain order. Over the past week, we have seen activists arbitrarily arrested, abducted at night in charge of an Article 112. However, these decentralized network of protesters empowered by new communication tools has continued to reimagine persistence in Thailand, opening their possibilities for future revolution. Thank you, Ben Shon. That was fantastic. And there's a lot to pick up there once we get into the Q&A. But first, let's turn to Jonathan Pinkney, look at these movements globally. Of course, anybody who follows Asia and Thailand, you say, oh, this is so complicated. This couldn't be as complicated anywhere else in the world. But we really look to you to share where it resonates and how it differs and how similar movements are unfolding elsewhere in the world. So over to you, Jonathan. Great. Thank you so much, Brian. Good morning, everyone. It's a real pleasure to join you today. So as Brian mentioned, the perspective that I'd like to offer here is to bring a few thoughts on what a broader comparative perspective on non violent action can tell us about the movement in Thailand, and it's likely trajectory building on the excellent points about what's currently going on in Thailand that have been brought up by our two previous panelists. So I'll mention two characteristics of the current movement that make me, I would say optimistic about its future. And one that gives me somewhat less optimism informed by other movements. So the first optimistic point is the movement's recent tactical flexibility, particularly the use of cultural icons, like Harry Potter and the Hunger Games as a pension was bringing up and dispersed relatively low risk tactics to maintain momentum. While many of the leading organizations of the movement have paused large street demonstrations, as on was bringing up before, in response to the state of emergency related to COVID-19, as well as government repression, they're largely keeping the movement going through things like unrolling banners, or short, rapid flash mob style protests that can disperse before security forces arrive. And this ability to tactically adapt, and in particular, to switch between concentrated tactics like street protests, to disperse tactics like what we're currently seeing is a key characteristic of many movements that are better able to weather tough government opposition and repression, and continue to push for change. So that's a first point for optimism. A second point for optimism is how well I would say the movement has maintained nonviolent discipline. That is not responding to government violent repression with violence on its side. Many mass movements, of course, even if primarily nonviolent often struggle with radical groups or individuals who may use violent tactics on their periphery. And this in turn can undermine popular support from the movement and legitimize greater violent government repression. Nonviolent discipline on the other hand, such as this movement has largely maintained typically delegitimizes violent repression and can cause it to backfire, increasing support for the movement and undermining support for their opponents. The third point, and a slightly more pessimistic one that I'd like to comment on, is this phenomenon of transnational solidarity that pension was mentioning before, primarily across Thailand, Hong Kong, and even Taiwan with activists in Taiwan as well, that's been captured in the Milk Tea Alliance hashtag. Now, transnational solidarity for protest movements like that in Thailand, including the specific sharing of training and tactics, is something with a long history. For instance, after the 2000 bulldozer revolution ousted Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, activists who've been involved in that movement organized trainings for youth activists in nearby countries. These newly trained activists then in turn participated in their own uprisings in the following years. So the support can have real impact. Research that USIP has done into external support for nonviolent action shows that convening spaces for activists to learn from each other and share lessons learned as one of the most consistently identified positive forms of external movement support. Yet, while social media and new information and communication technology have made it easier for this kind of broad cross national solidarity and support to emerge, these solidarity bonds may also be weaker and more transient than forms of transnational solidarity we may have seen in the past. As new movements and global crises arise, transnational attention can very easily shift, potentially causing movements that have relied on such attention to lose momentum. We saw this earlier this year, for instance, with the end SARS protests in Nigeria, which for a short period of time sparks global expressions of solidarity very soon after they emerged, but have seen international attention decline while substantive policy change has yet to be enacted. So that's a point I would say of somewhat somewhat more pessimism. But I'll close by saying that it's important to remember that even when movements of nonviolent action fail to achieve their goals in the short term, they can often provide the foundation for future long term transformation. The conversations about the state of democracy in Thailand and the role of the monarchy that have been opened by this movement will doubtless have a long term impact, even if the movement itself doesn't achieve major political change in the coming months. Thank you once again for the invitation and look forward very much to our discussion. So before we turn to Des, Jonathan, let me just put one question to you before we get there. So on said something interesting in his remarks, that because these this is the first time that this generation has has taken the streets, you know, they're protesting test or novices, right? And he made the point that they haven't had that experience sitting down with the conservatives to other examples elsewhere in the world where we're lessons to be learned for, you know, first generation protesters, so to speak, when they come to the table and confronting a conservative movement. Yeah, that's a that's a great question. I think so there are sort of points of advantage and points of disadvantage for you know, these sort of first generation protesters, people who may be new to this kind of active political engagement. And I think the I think events in Thailand really really show both these strengths and the weakness weaknesses. On the strength side, movements of sort of youth led movements that have that have been led by a lot of people who haven't been involved in politics for a long time, often evidence greater creativity and tactical flexibility. You know, they don't have a single repertoire of action that they're used to doing over that they've been doing for decades. And so and this flexibility in turn can indeed give movements greater leverage over their opponents because their actions are novel, unexpected and can can grab attention. So that can be an advantage. I think a real disadvantage and a challenge that many of these movements face is exactly as on was bringing up. And as you mentioned now related to turning that sort of short term attention and leverage that they're able to get through this creativity into sustained political change. In particular, the challenge of navigating dialogue forums and political negotiation. So I think for instance of, you know, say the 2011 Revolution in Egypt, where you had similar sort of youth led protests that were able to mobilize very large numbers, they were able to get grabbed both the country's attention and the world's attention achieve short term political change. But throughout the following transition, really did struggle with knowing sort of what institutional forms to shift that mobilization into in order to in order to lead to sort of long, longer term political transformation. Addressing. Thanks. More to discuss later. Just let's turn to you. What does this matter for the United States? And how should we be thinking about this? Yeah, thanks, Brian. It's been a fascinating discussion, and I'm very pleased to be part of it. So I will talk a little bit about some recommendations about how I think the Biden administration can best approach Thailand. But before doing that, I think it's important to set some of the context and also talk about the nature of the US Thai relationship and what kind of underpins it. And then from that, we can get to some specific recommendations. But I don't think it'll be a newsflash to anyone to say that the incoming administration, you know, faces a daunting array of global challenges and challenges here at home. And so this is clearly going to be, you know, among the priorities for the incoming administration, addressing these macro level challenges are going to be the first item on the agenda, first items on the agenda. But even as you turn your attention to, you know, the Indo-Pacific region, again, there's a overarching macro context there. Of course, the US-China relationship kind of, you know, pervades all other elements critical to get that right. There are also emerging flash points, including an erratic North Korea, South China Sea. There are major alliance management issues. Our first tier alliances in the region required a great deal of care and feeding. Japan, Korea, Australia are second tier alliances with Thailand and the Philippines also also require careful management. And then we have an array of emerging partnerships that will get a great deal of attention from the administration, including first and foremost with India, also with Indonesia and Vietnam and Singapore and others. And finally, you have ASEAN. I think you'll see, and I just want to flag for you this recently declassified strategy document from the previous administration, the free and open Indo-Pacific framework. I think it was called declassified just about a week ago. It was conceived and drafted about two years ago. And I read it just yesterday. I think the incoming administration will adopt many of the precepts embedded in that strategy document. They seem to be quite sound to me. And among them are related to Southeast Asia, putting ASEAN and reinvigorating ASEAN as kind of the core multilateral institution, while also strengthening our bilateral relationships with our allied partners. And that includes Thailand. So that's kind of the overall context at the macro level. Regarding the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand, it's relatively well performing and has been for decades. There are people close Thailand watchers who always kind of have this sense that it's never quite reaching its full potential. And you can include me among them. However, if you look objectively across the major pillars of the relationship, and I would name them as security, economic relationship, people to people ties, and fourthly, the political dimension of the relationship. They're not all equally strong. I would say in fact that the security dimension of the relationship is the strongest and has historically played an outsized role in defining the U.S.-Tai relationship. So perhaps a little bit of rebalancing needs to happen there. Economically, bilateral ties have been great. Good, I would say there is certainly room for improvement there for a variety of reasons. You've seen a decline in U.S. foreign investment into Thailand. Other destinations in the region have appeared a little bit more attractive. There's also been the Trump administration infatuation with trade deficits. And I think that has helped stymie kind of the growth in the bilateral economic relationship. People to people ties, if you look at some of the polls, the U.S. I think is polls as the highest kind of country that particularly youth segments of the population are attracted to. There are some areas of concern on the people-to-people ties. I reached out to a contact in the U.S. Embassy who reported to me that among the major universities in Thailand, all of which used to have devoted American studies departments, now there's only one. And I don't know if that's at Chualong Korn or which university were the last remaining American studies department is. But that kind of decline in the interests of students wishing to study American politics and history exacerbated by the decline of students physically traveling to the United States. That's an area of educational exchanges where I really do think we can reinforce on the people-to-people side. Lastly, the fourth pillar of the relationship, the political dimension. This has always been the most volatile portion of the relationship. Thailand, with its numerous coups, its authoritarian tendencies, its growing alignment with with China. You know, all of this kind of exacerbates the political tensions, obviously. Human rights concerns and stuff there, too. But if you look at it in the context of a four-pillared relationship with politics being problematic, this is why you've seen, I think, successive administrations choose deliberately and I think smartly not to put politics at the center of the US-Tai relationship. There are other dimensions that I think have kind of won in the tug of war. Politics always remains there, but we've chosen not to put it at the center. And I think this is kind of key to this discussion that we're having today. Should we, in fact, double down on democracy promotion and things like that. So recommendations in my remaining couple of minutes. First and foremost, we have to get our act together at home. I think US foreign policy historically has emanated from this position of strength that's been based on strong economics, political stability, and indeed, good governance at home. We need to recapture that space and then, you know, emanate forth with foreign policy that would be something akin to what we're used to over the past few decades. We need to approach foreign policy with more humility than we have in the past. I think we would all agree that we've had kind of a wake-up call. And we need to allow that, allow those lessons to kind of, you know, sink in and then figure out how we're going to project our ideals out onto a global audience. You know, interestingly, this new administration, there will definitely be some internal tensions over you know, advocates of ideals-based foreign policy and those that are kind of, you know, more real politic practitioners, you know, focused on US interests. It's always that way. I would hope that the administration will really try to seek to resolve those competing tensions before articulating and implementing foreign policies, because if you allow those tensions to manifest, if you go out, you risk inconsistency and mixed messaging at least. So resolve that first. Get, you know, let's get a consensus and then move out from there. OK, so regarding some specific recommendations, first and foremost, don't make everything about China. We cannot allow, and this pertains not just to Thailand, but to our other regional relationships. They they resent being basically positioned as a pawn in the game between the US and China. We have to avoid that mistake. China is not going away. It's influenced economically and otherwise in Thailand is destined to grow. We just need to account for that and not not futilely seek to thwart that it's happening. Instead, let's just focus on the things that we can do well. Second recommendation, I'd say our experiment with putting a political appointee as our chief diplomat in Thailand. Frankly, I don't know how to assess Ambassador Desambres's full performance. I'm just more comfortable having worked under several very excellent ambassadors in Thailand I think we need that. We need we need to bring that back. People who have a deep understanding of the region, a nuanced understanding of the various elements of Thai society and how they interact and then how to smartly make US policy recommendations back to Washington from that basis. I think we need to get back there. I think we should reinforce success where we where we have it in the relationship. And currently that's that's on the security side. I know there's some risk of reinforcing too much and then having that become like kind of an out outsized portion of our relationship. Nonetheless, you know, where you have success, reinforce it. Currently, that's on the security side. I think we should continue on that path. The economic ties that have somewhat been languishing a bit to the extent that government policy can influence those things, I think we need to explore ways to do that. You know, the incoming coordinator for Asia Policy at the White House, Kurt Campbell, he was the architect of Trans Pacific Partnership. He I think it's a core belief of his that, you know, he to US influence in the region is out the strength of our economic ties. So he's I would bet that he's going to be looking for creative ways, both regionally to resurrect TPP, perhaps, but in a bilateral context, even with Thailand, maybe finding some way, whether it's a bilateral trade agreement or something like that, to really strengthen our economic ties on the people to people side. If what I said earlier is true about the declining American studies departments in Thai campuses, we should try to address that. If there are not American centers on university campuses where students can come and learn about scholarship opportunities and find some material to study about the United States, we need to address that as well. Broadly, I would say, let's really focus on the educational exchange portion of the people to people ties. And finally, politics. Now, this is where I'm not going to make any broad recommendations for the incoming administration forcefully intervene on behalf of the democracy activists or forget them and just double down on the existing relationship we have with the current array of elites there. I don't know how it's going to come down on that. All I would say is tread carefully, avoid overreach. I think we need to highly leverage informed views from the ground, from our expert team in the embassy to try to figure out how to thread the needle, how to lend enough of American moral support to this reform agenda. If you want to call it the reform agenda, I think if it is a reform agenda, that's where people would be most comfortable kind of lending moral support. If it's an anti monarchy agenda, if it's an anti military, that's where you start getting more problematic politics. So we really need those informed views from our team on the ground to help us navigate this very tricky terrain. You know, it's like it's like walking through a room with, you know, nitroglycerin, you know, jars on the shelves and you don't want to upset because when they start tumbling down, you know, you could have a damaged relationship in the process. So this is the one that bears the most careful most nuanced approach. And I know that you guys have a variety of views on this, and I'd love to hear them in the Q&A. Thank you very much. Thanks, guys. Those are great points. And certainly that is the dynamic. I mean, so, you know, broader question is, you know, what upsets the broader relationship is giving more support to civil society organizations around democracy, is it making contact with the protest movement and sort of figuring out that those dynamics of the preserve it, I think is the key thing. You know, you also really remind me of, you know, a number of things in your remarks. You know, certainly the Thai conservative defense of their 2014 coup was we were having a crisis in our democracy. I think we can relate to having a crisis in our democracy. And but now I think we, in some ways, we have to be humble about it. We have to say, we're having a crisis in our democracy, too, but there are better ways to get out of this than others. And lastly, you know, another thing that really brought back memories, too, was that your point about consistency and having your global perspective set before you start approaching particular foreign policies. I mean, it was next on Thai leaders, how the United States responded to other demonstrations and coups around around the world, right? And so so Thailand is not just in its in its own vacuum. They see what the United States is doing in the Middle East and in in other places. So we have to be consistent. Before we go to some audience questions, let me go back to on and pinch on them. So while the it's been amazing what the protesters were able to do, what they're able to sustain in Bangkok and those for those who aren't totally familiar with Thailand. I mean, just in a nutshell, this is a country the size of Texas or France with 70 million people. Bangkok is the you know, the one major capital political business, et cetera, et cetera, you know, depends how you define it, you know, 10 or 15 million people here. How how widespread are these sentiments? Previous iterations of this political struggle really cast how oh, different the lands regions are. So what about on university campuses in the north, the northeast and the south? Is there solidarity? Are we just happening to see something that's happening in the among the children of Bangkok elite? So maybe on and then Pan Chan, just any thoughts on how just widespread these sentiments are among the youth or more broadly in the population. Sure, we have been we have seen new flashes about the big protest in Bangkok, many places in Bangkok, but for the youth, I think the way they think about it is less about geographical. They just think about it as a generational or philosophical and a lot of people share their ideals across the country. There have been reports at the beginning of the year of 2020 that movements have been spotted in other parts of the country as well in the north and the northeast. And, you know, different levels of schools, you know, younger students or high school students, they have that symbolic protest with that the girls have a white ribbon and and the pop culture of three fingers salute has been used among students across the country, although the big movements that you have seen are mostly in Bangkok. Yes, at the like the height of the protests, there were students led a protest across the country, but it's kind of fragmented and it's really hard to document. So for a chat, I at one point have listed almost a daily protest that scattered across the country, but I don't have the number right off the top of my head right now. But major cities in different parts also have these like Kun Rathapun said, that it's a generation sentiment for change. And also they feel that this is the generation that's going to end the political conflicts. You know, they put the hashtag let it end without a generation. And I think that in terms of the sentiments among the young, it's a very strong surge of this oppressing enthusiasm, you know, to see the change and make the change happen. Yeah. And at the beginning that of the youth movement, I think we have reported about 40 something activities at schools across China. And now I remember since Ajahn Penchan just mentioned it. Yeah. Great. And, you know, let me just dust the two of you just one more here before we go to the before we go to the audience Q&A. So I mean, it's been interesting to watch how it appears that the that the king has gotten the message that he has an image problem and needs to spend more time in Thailand. He needs to. And for those who aren't following this on a regular basis, I know, getting back to something in Penchan's presentation about international solidarity, she mentioned the German government. I mean, the fact is that the king himself was spending most of his time in Germany. Now he seems to be spending more time in Thailand. He seems to be engaging more with people. And I'm wondering if you could just share whether, you know, how new this is, you know, and whether it has the potential to change the image and change the dynamics here on any way. On, we'll go to you first. Yeah. He gave an interview to CNN several weeks ago, and it was a short interview why he was surrounded by the Thai people at the Grand Palace. And and that was unheard of. And a lot of people were not expect were not expecting that. And that marked an important moment that he's he's he's surrounded by the people in front of the media and and give remarks to the International News Organization. And what he said, I kind of resonate with, you know, what he intend to project as his image, like he is open for compromise and he loves the people. He loves all the people, however, that seems to provide ammunition for the protest later. They use those phrases in that campaign. So it's remain to be seen how it is going to play out, but you are certainly right that he is adjusting and he stayed longer in Thailand and engaged in more public events. Yes, I also would like to add to well, several points about the King's public presence in addition to the comment given to CNN. I think that the King and also his. Wife's Queen would actually introduce more of the viral opportunities, for example, by using the selfies that the people who met with the King talk and also the video that was taken with the King or the encounter with the King and the people introduced this on social media for the viral elements to I think, hopefully to gain more presence in the social media sphere. However, the government announcement to use a less majestic law, Article 112 in November. I think that's a clear statement on what the palace wants to achieve, which is to silence these student protests and also some of the police would arrest people in the middle of the night and then take them to undisclosed locations. I think that is the kind of, you know, the subtext of this, you know, that is intended to send a fear among these protesters and these protesters at this point. OK, so I'm going to go to an audience question that really gets to the heart of it. This person says that the vitality of the current youth and their organization on social media, et cetera, has made these protests really impressive. But, you know, here is the bottom line. Do you think their demands will be met? And if so, how will the country move forward? Let me go to on pension and desk for just basically the, you know, is this going to work? So for the protest leaders that we have interviewed, they seem so far has been quite purist about their demand. They say that what they are asking the government and the establishment for is supremely clear and there's no further negotiation needed. And that is kind of unique moment for Thailand, you know, who would think that compromise falling out of fashion in Thailand for the country that has been known for the land of smile. And so it would find a difficult time to make it work. And as is the case for any protest or reform agenda, if there's no compromise, it's hard to get things done. And in the past, when some some leaders have changed at here so strictly to the the purest ideals, there might be some factions within the group and that would drive the whole movement more toward the middle of the road. It we have to see what what's going to happen after this, because the government has so many tool kit, if you may say, in terms of how to reduce the tensions, they have so many tools to as pressures, pressure vows. And and they can play a lot of options and and keep that power longer while the protest leaders would have to figure out which way to make it work for them. And now everyone is looking at the Constitutional Amendment. The protests are not participating in that process. And and that raises a question like how that role is going to be in shaping the country in the next few years. And what's going to happen? Well, that's a very difficult question. There are a lot of other factors. And I think that, well, when you talk about whether this is going to work, it depends on what you mean by work, right? In this case, I think that what the movement has done worked to a certain degrees, and it's a great achievement at this point in generating the conversations that we need to have in order to move forward. You know, the conversation about the political dysfunction in Thailand and also the power, you know, the interference from the palace need to be addressed. And we cannot go on living like this, you know, with this kind of political climate and also arrangement. A lot of behind the scenes manipulation and maneuvers. I think that at least, you know, it generates a conversation, you know, to engage the public. And I what shocked me was like televisions like type PBS or mainstream media like Tyrat actually generated the conversation, you know, about the Crown Property Bureau's asset, massive amount of assets. You know, I think that this is such a big step, you know, that happened within a year. And I think that. Well, you know, like I said, you know, it depends on what you mean by work, like I think that this is the students and also the protest in the past year has taken our society and also the Thai people to this point that we can talk about this publicly. And it's been on the front page, front page of the mainstream newspapers. Certainly change the conversation. And that way, I think credibly successful. Jess, did you want to jump in? You know, you've watched Thailand for a few decades here. Yeah, I mean, points one, I would say it's hard to envision how the conservative access gives way. I mean, it's so rigid, so tightly bound. And what I mean by the conservative access is that alliance between the monarchy, the military and certain business elites. Maybe you could throw the religious elites in there as well. But it's not the type of arrangement that can kind of give way and in an accommodative way to the demands of the youth. So it's either going to shatter or perhaps reform from within. But it is very difficult to imagine how that changes. I will share one interesting anecdote that one of my friends still serving in Thailand said that a very senior royal Thai army official confided in him recently that, hey, we we the Thai military should thank the students because it's caused the king to back off a little bit. And what I mean by that is, you know, the king has been insinuating themselves in not just the Crown Property Bureau, but in military management and creating this kind of guard force, this petroleum guard around him. And so even though the conservative access is quite tight, you can still see by that comment that there's an indicator of certain tensions between elements of the access. So who knows whether that can, you know, be exploited or whether that can just kind of fall apart on its own. So, you know, and last point is it's interesting that among the student demands is not like a message of economic populism, because if you look at Thailand, it is one of the most disparate, you know, economic systems in the world right now, globally. And the, you know, the 1% who enjoy this concentrated abundance of wealth and then kind of everyone else, you would think that would be the animating, you know, power within Thai domestic politics. And perhaps you could say, yes, that that was true under toxin and it was tried and maybe we need to go a different route. Maybe populism is toxic in the Thai context. But it still astonishes me that that is not one of the driving impulses of this reform movement. It's interesting. I mean, I suppose the ties together, the main demands are really structural in a sense. They're not they're not about policy issues. It's about the political life of the nation. We have time for one, maybe two more. And I'd like to turn to you on, so COVID how is COVID this is an audience question. How is the COVID-19 pandemic affected the socio-political situation in Thailand and did the response of the military and the monarchy erode legitimacy or contributed to polarization? Certainly, you know, Thailand was an early success story, but there's a major wave now and how does this intersect with politics? Yeah, for COVID, the government really hoped that they can perform well into public health crisis. The government is trying to show up the economy at the same time. Tourism in Thailand has been tanking very drastically because of COVID-19. And another fast set of it is the vaccine vaccination effort that has been, you know, start to gather steam. But it won't likely to pick up as fast as people expected. In terms of how this issue would become a political issue, we start to see criticism from political activists about how the government plan to provide a vaccine maybe too slow or not enough demand. And just yesterday, they just respond to that that they have enough for 50% of their countries and there will be more coming down the road. So earlier, we have seen that. About 12 months ago, this is the kind of deja vu how COVID-19 becomes a political issue. When at that time, the government seems to do well to bring people back from Wuhan, China. But a few weeks later, they were engulfed in a scandal of N95 mass profiteering. So and at that time, the government also faced challenges in the parliament, the future forward party was still existed. But right now, the challenge is different. The resistance of the government is now in the streets and that would make it trickier for general pursuit. Great. And so we have, we have a few more minutes. So let me sneak in one more here. And I'd like to direct this to Pan Chan. This is another audience question. And it's a good one. At what point will it take and what would it take for this movement to develop from a youth movement to a more popular people's movement? Maybe Jonathan can jump in on this too. If there are any other examples where something that was a youth-based movement, all of a sudden they convince their parents to get out on the streets there as well. Yes, I think that right around October and September, that's when the student-led movement has morphed into the people's movements. I think that it has converged with well, the red shirts, you know, which is the kind of movement that has fought for democracies in the 2010, like after the 2006 Code data. And then they merge with people in first jobbers and people in their 30s, first-time voters and gain a lot of support from these people who shared the frustration of the economy and also the economic downturn affected by, because of the COVID-19 and the shutdown. I think that that's the turning point that it's not the student's movement or the society's including celebrities who used to be on the margins of something like this. You know, they came out and they voiced their support on Twitter. And that's the way to persuade more people, you know, who might not have pay attention to politics at all, you know, to take notice and then join and then protest on this week. Great. Jonathan, we'll give you the last word here. Yeah, I think it's a really crucial question because oftentimes in these kinds of movements, youth are sort of the first movers, but they're likely unable to achieve sort of a lasting political change without those broader alliances. I think one of the key things to look at, and this relates to what Pancheon just brought up, is the backfire to violent repression. This is often a moment when you see a shift from sort of initial youth first movers into a broader alliance throughout society. When people see government violence towards peaceful protesters and then that can serve as a powerful frame for broad-based grievances against the government that then mobilizes additional constituencies. So I think that's something that's, you know, seen across many movements and has been seen to some degree in Thailand as well. Great. And I mean, you know, it does strike me that just the fact that these are young people have certainly put the government response in a quandary here, a lack of ties to discredited former politicians or anything so that innocence in a way certainly makes this a difficult problem for the government. So thank you, Dez, Jonathan, Pancheon, An, I think this has been a great discussion. This is, this movement is something that we're gonna keep following at USIP. My colleague at USIP, Gabriella Sagan and I published something on the subject last week. We'll be doing more of that and we'll be having more conversations like this. Certainly this movement is not going away. So thank you for tuning in and thank you to our panelists. Thank you, Brian. Thank you.