 Chapter 7 The Shadow of the Problem A traveller sees the hundred branches of a tree long before he is near enough to see its single and simple root. He generally sees the scattered or sprawling suburbs of a town long before he has looked upon the temple or the marketplace. So far I have given impressions of the most motley things merely as they came in chronological and not in logical order. The first flying vision of Islam as a sort of sea, with something both of the equality and the emptiness and the grandeur of its purple seas of sand. The first sharp silhouette of Jerusalem, like Mount St. Michael, lifting above that merely Muslim flood, a crag still crowned with the towers of the crusaders, the mere kaleidoscope of the streets with little more than a hint of the heraldic meaning of the colors. A merely personal impression of a few of the leading figures whom I happened to meet first and only the faintest suggestion of the groups for which they stood. So far I have not even tidied up my own first impressions of the place, far less advanced to plan for tidying up the place itself. In any case, to begin with, it is easy to be far too much of a hurry about tidying up. This has already been noted in the more obvious case of all that religious art that bewildered the tourists with its churches full of flat and gilded icons. Many a man has had the sensation of something as full as a picture gallery and as futile as a lumber room, merely by not happening to know what is really of value, or especially in what way it is really valued. An Armenian or Assyrian might write a report on his visit to England saying that our national and especially our naval heroes were neglected and left to the lowest dregs of the rabble since the portraits of Benbo and Nelson, when exhibited to the public, were painted on wood by the crudest and most incompetent artists. He would not perhaps fully appreciate the fine shade of social status and utility implied in a public house sign. He might not realize that the sign of Nelson could be hung on high everywhere because the reputation of Nelson was high everywhere, not because it was low anywhere. His bad portrait was really a proof of his good name, yet the two rapid reformer may easily miss even the simple and superficial parallel between the wooden pictures of admirals and the wooden pictures of angels. Nevertheless will he appreciate the intense spiritual atmosphere that makes the real difference between an icon and an in-sign, and makes the ins of England noble and national as they are, relatively the homes of Christian charity but hardly a Christian faith. He can hardly bring himself to believe that Syrians can be as fond of religion as Englishmen of beer. Nobody can do justice to these cults who has not some sympathy with the power of a mystical idea to transmute the meanest and most trivial objects with a kind of magic. It is easy to talk of superstitiously attaching importance to sticks and stones, but the whole poetry of life consists of attaching importance to sticks and stones, and not only to those tall sticks we call the trees of those large stones we call the mountains, anything that gives to the sticks of our own sturnature or the stones of our own backyard even a reflected or indirect divinity is good for the dignity of life. And this is often achieved by the dedication of similar and special things. At least we should desire to see the profane things transfigured by the sacred, rather than the sacred disenchanted by the profane, and it was a prophet walking on the walls of this mountain city who said that in his vision all the bowls should be as the bowls before the altar, and on every pot in Jerusalem should be written holy unto the Lord. Anyhow, this intensity about trifles is not always understood. Several quite sympathetic Englishmen told me merely as a funny story, and God forbid that I should deny that it is funny. The fact of the Armenians, or some such people, having been allowed to suspend the string of lamps from a Greek pillar by means of a nail, and their subsequent alarm when their nail was washed by the owners of the pillar, a sort of symbol that their nail had finally fallen into the hands of the enemy, strikes us as odd that a nail should be so valuable or so vivid to the imagination, and yet to men so close to Calvary, even nails are not entirely commonplace. All this regarding decent delay and respect for religion, or even for superstition, is obvious and has already been observed, but before leaving it, we may note that the same argument cuts the other way. I mean that we should not insolently impose our own ideas of what is picturesque any more than our own ideas of what is practical. The esthete is sometimes more of a vandal than a vandal. The proposed reconstructions of Jerusalem have been on the whole reasonable and sympathetic, but there is always a danger from the activities. I might almost say the antics of a sort of antiquary who is more hasty than an anarchist. If the people of such places revolt against their own limitations, we must have a reasonable respect for their revolt, and we must not be impatient, even with their impatience. It is their town. They have to live in it, and not we, as they are the only judges of whether their antiquities are really authorities, so they are the only judges of whether their novelties are really necessities. As I pointed out more than once to many of my friends in Jerusalem, we should be very much annoyed if artistic visitors from Asia took similar liberties in London. It would be bad enough if they proposed to conduct excavations in Fimlico or Paddington without much reference to the people who lived there, but it would be worse if they began to relieve them of the mere utilitarianism of Chelsea Bridge or Paddington Station. Because an eloquent Abyssinian Christian were to hold up his hand and stop the motor omnibuses from going down Fleet Street on the ground that the thoroughfare was sacred to the simpler locomotion of Dr. Johnson, we should be pleased at the Africans' appreciation of Johnson, but our pleasure would not be unmixed. Suppose when you or I are in the act of stepping into a taxi cab, an excitable Coptic Christian were to leap from behind a lamppost and implore us to save the grand old growler or the cab called the gondola of London. I admit and enjoy the poetry of the handsome. I admit and enjoy the personality of the true cab man of the old four-wheeler upon whose massive manhood descended something of the tremendous tradition of Tony Weller. But I am not so certain, as I should like to be, that I should at the moment enjoy the personality of the Copt. For these reasons it seems really desirable, or at least defensible, to defer any premature reconstruction of disputed things, and to begin this book as a mere notebook or sketchbook of things as they are, or at any rate as they appear. It was in this irregular order and in this illogical disproportion that things did in fact appear to me, and it was some time before I saw any real generalization that would reduce my impressions to order. I saw that the groups disagreed, and to some extent why they disagreed, long before I could consider seriously anything on which they would be likely to agree. I have therefore confined the first section of this book to a mere series of such impressions, and left to the last section a study of the problem of an attempt at the solution. Between these two I have inserted a sort of sketch of what seems to me the determining historical events that make the problem what it is. Of these I will only say for the moment that, whether by a coincidence or for some deeper cause, I feel it myself to be a case of first thoughts being best, and that some further study of history served rather to solidify what had seemed merely a sort of vision. I might almost say that I fell in love with Jerusalem at first sight, and the final impression right or wrong served only to fix the fugitive fancy which had seen, in the snow on the city, the white crown of a woman of Bethlehem, but there is another cause for my being content for the moment with this mere chaos of contrasts. There is a very real reason for emphasizing those contrasts and for shunning the temptation to shut our eyes to them, even considered as contrasts. It is necessary to insist that the contrasts are not easy to turn into combinations, that the red robes of Rome and the green scars of Islam will not very easily fade into a dingy russet, that the gold of Byzantium and the brass of Babylon will require a hot furnace to melt them into any kind of amalgam. The reason for this is akin to what has already been said about Jerusalem as a knot of realities. It is especially a knot of popular realities. Although it is so small a place, or rather because it is so small a place, it is a domain and a dominion for the masses. The city is never quite democratic except when it is quite direct, and it is never quite direct except when it is quite small. So soon as a mob has grown large enough to have delegates, it has grown large enough to have despots. Indeed, the despots are often much the more representative of the two. Now in a place so small as Jerusalem, what we call the rank and file really counts, but it is generally true in religions especially that the real enthusiasm or even fanaticism is to be found in the rank and file, in all intense religions. It is the poor who are more religious and the rich who are more irreligious. It is certainly so with the creeds and causes that come to a collision in Jerusalem. The great Jewish population throughout the world did hail Mr. Balfour's declaration with something almost of the tribal triumph they might have shown when the Persian conqueror broke the Babylonian bondage. It was rather the plutocratic princes of Jewry who long hung back and hesitated about Zionism. The mass of Mohammedans really are ready to combine against the Zionists as they might have combined against the Crusades. It is rather the responsible Mohammedan leaders who will naturally be found more moderate and diplomatic. This popular spirit may take a good or bad form, and a mob may cry out many things right and wrong, but a mob cries out no popery, it does not cry out not so much popery, still less only a moderate admixture of popery. It shouts three cheers for Gladstone. It does not shout a gradual and evolutionary social tendency toward some ideal similar to that of Gladstone. It would find it quite difficult thing to shout, and it would find exactly the same difficulty with all the advanced formula about nationalism and internationalism and the class-conscious solidarity. No rabble could roar at the top of its voice the collectivist formula of the nationalism of all the means of production, distribution and exchange. The mob of Jerusalem is no exception to the rule, but rather an extreme example of it. The mob of Jerusalem has cried some remarkable things in its time, but they were not pedantic and they were not evasive. There was a day when it cried a single word, crucify. It was a thing to darken the sun and rend the veil of the temple, but there was no doubt about what it meant. This is an age of minorities, of minorities powerful and predominant, partly through the power of wealth and partly through the idolatry of education. Their powers appeared in every crisis of the Great War, when a small group of pacifists and internationalists, a microscopic minority in every country, were yet constantly figuring as diplomatists and intermediaries, and men on whose attitude great issues might depend. A man like Mr. McDonald, not a workman nor a formal or real representative of workmen, was followed everywhere by the limelight, while the millions of workmen who worked and fought were out of focus and therefore looked like a fog. Just as such figures give a fictitious impression of unity between the crowds fighting for different flags and frontiers, so there are similar figures giving a fictitious unity to the crowds following different creeds. There are already Muslims who are modernists. There have always been a ruling class of Jews who are materialists. Perhaps it would be true to say about much of the philosophical controversy in Europe that many Jews tend to be materialists, but all tend to be monists, though the best in the sense of being monotheists. The worst are in a much grosser sense, materialists, and have motives very different from the dry idealism of men like Mr. McDonald, which is probably sincere enough in its way. But with whatever motives these intermediaries everywhere bridge the chasm between creeds as they do the chasm between countries. Everywhere they exalt the minority that is indifferent over the majority that is interested, just as they would make an international Congress out of the traitors of all nations, so they would make an ecumenical council out of the heretics of all religions. My old constitutionalists in our own country often discuss the possibility of a method of protecting the minority. If they will find any possible method of protecting the majority, they will have found something practically unknown to the modern world. The majority is always at a disadvantage. The majority is difficult to idealize because it is difficult to imagine. The minority is generally idealized, sometimes by its servants, always by itself. But my sympathies are generally, I confess, with the impotent and even invisible majority. And my sympathies, when I go beyond the things I myself believe, are with all the poor Jews, who do believe in Judaism, and all the Mohammedans, who do believe in Mohammedism, not to mention so obscure a crowd as the Christians, who do believe in Christianity. I feel I have more morally and even intellectually in common with these people, and even the religions of these people, than with the supercilious negations that make up the most part of what is called enlightenment. It is these masses whom we ought to consider everywhere, but it is especially these masses whom we must consider in Jerusalem. And the reason is, in the reality I have described, that the place is like a Greek city or a medieval parish. It is sufficiently small and simple to be a democracy. This is not a university town full of philosophies. It is a Zion of the Hundred Seages, raging with religions. Not a place where resolutions can be voted and amended, but a place where men can be crowned and crucified. There is one small thing neglected in all our talk about self-determination, and that is determination. There is a great deal more difference than there is between most motions and amendments between the things for which democracy will vote and the things on which a democracy is determined. You can take a vote among Jews and Christians and Muslims about whether lamp posts should be painted green, more portraits of politicians painted at all, and even their solid unanimity may be solid indifference. Most of what is called self-determination is like that. But there is no self-determination about it. The people are not determined. You cannot take a vote when the people are determined. You accept a vote or something very much more obvious than a vote. Now it may be that in Jerusalem there is not one people, but rather three or four, but each is a real people. It is not a question of persuading weak and wavering voters at a vague parliamentary election to vote on the other side for a change, to choose a fresh between two middle-class gentlemen who look exactly alike and only differ on a question about which nobody knows or cares anything. It is a question of contrast that will almost certainly remain contrasts, except under the flood of some spiritual conversion which cannot be foreseen and certainly cannot be enforced. We cannot enroll these people under our religion because we have not got one. We can enroll them under our government, and if we are obliged to do that, the obvious essential is that like Roman rule before Christianity or the English rule in India, it should profess to be impartial if only by being irreligious. That is why I willingly set down for the moment only the first impressions of a stranger in a strange country. It is because our first safety is in seeing that it is a strange country and our present preliminary peril that we may fall into the habit of thinking it of familiar country. It does no harm to put the facts in a fashion that seem disconnected. For the first fact of all is that they are disconnected, and the first danger of all is that we may allow some international nonsense or newspaper cant to imply that they are connected when they are not. It does no harm at any rate to start with to state the differences as irreconcilable. For the first and most unfamiliar fact the English have to learn in this strange land is that the differences can be irreconcilable. And again the chief danger is that they may be persuaded that the wordy compromises of Western politics can reconcile them. That such abysses can be filled up with rubbish or such chasms bridged with cobwebs. For we have created in England a sort of compromise which may up to a certain point be workable in England, though there are signs that even in England that point is approaching or is past. But in any case we could only do with that compromise as we could do without conscription, because an accident had made us insular and even provincial. So in India where we have treated the peoples as different from ourselves and from each other, we have at least partly succeeded. So in Ireland where we have tried to make them agree with us and with each other, we have made one never ending nightmare. We can no more subject the world to the English compromise than to the English climate. And both are things of incalculable cloud and twilight. We have grown used to a habit of calling things by the wrong names and supporting them by the wrong arguments and even doing the right things for the wrong cause. We have party governments which consist of people who pretend to agree when they really disagree. We have party debates which consist of people who pretend to disagree when they really agree. We have whole parties named after things they no longer support or things they would never dream of proposing. We have a mass of meaningless parliamentary ceremonials that are no longer even symbolic. The rule by which a parliamentarian possesses a constituency but not a surname, or the rule by which he becomes a minister in order to cease to be a member. All this would seem the most superstitious and idolatrous mummery to the simple worshipers in the shrines of Jerusalem. You may think what they say fantastic or what they mean fanatical, but they do not say one thing and mean another. The Greek may or may not have a right to say he is orthodox, but he means that he is orthodox in a very different sense from that in which a man supporting a new home-rule bill means that he is a unionist. A Muslim would stop the sale of strong drink because he is a Muslim, but he is not quite so muddleheaded as to profess to stop it because he is a liberal and a particular supporter of the party of liberty. Even in England, indeed, it will generally be found that there is something more clear and rational about the terms of theology than those of politics and popular science. A man has at least a more logical notion of what he means when he calls himself an Anglo-Catholic than when he calls himself an Anglo-Saxon. But the old Jew with the drooping ringlets shuffling in and out of the little black booths of Jerusalem would not condescend to say he is a child of anything like the Anglo-Saxon race. He does not say he is a child of the Arameco-Semitic race. He says he is a child of the Chosen Race, brought with thunder and with miracles and with mighty battles out of the land of Egypt and out of the house of bondage. In other words, he says something that means something and something that he really means. One of the white Dominicans or brown Franciscans from the great monasteries of the holy city may or may not be right in maintaining that a papacy is necessary to the unity of Christendom. And he does not pass his life in proving that the papacy is not a papacy. As many of our liberal constitutionalists pass it in proving that the monarchy is not a monarchy. The Greek priests spend an hour on what seemed to the skeptic mere meaningless formalities of the preparation of the mass. But they would not spend a minute if they were themselves skeptics and thought them meaningless formalities, as most modern people do think of the formalities about Black Rod or the Bar of the House. They would be far less ritualistic than we are if they cared as little for the mass as we do for the mace. Hence it is necessary for us to realize that these rude and simple worshipers of all the different forms of worship really would be bewildered by the ritual dances and elaborate ceremonial antics of John Bull, as by the superstitious forms and almost supernatural incantations of most of what we call plain English. Now I take it we retain enough realism and common sense not to wish to transfer these complicated conventions and compromises to a land of such ruthless logic and such rending divisions. We may hope to reproduce our laws. We do not want to reproduce our legal fictions. We do not want to insist on everybody referring to Mr. Peter or Mr. Paul as the honorable member for Wadi Walla because a retiring parliamentarian has to become a steward of the Chiltern Hundreds. We shall not insist on a retiring Palestinian official becoming a steward of the Moabitic Hundreds. But yet in much more subtle and more dangerous ways we are making that very mistake. We are transferring the fictions and even the hypocrisies of our own insular institutions from a place where they can be tolerated to a place where they will be torn in pieces. I have confined myself hitherto to descriptions and not to criticisms, to stating the elements of the problem rather than attempting as yet to solve it, because I think the danger is rather that we shall underrate the difficulties than overdue the description, that we shall too easily deny the problem rather than that we shall too severely criticize the solution. But I would conclude this chapter with one practical criticism which seems to me to follow directly from all that is said here of our legal fictions and local anomalies. One thing at least has been done by our own government which is entirely according to the ritual or routine of our own parliament. It is a parliament of Puba, where anybody may be Lord High everything else. It is a parliament of Alice in Wonderland, where the name of a thing is different from what it is called, and even from what its name is called. It is death and destruction to send out these fictions into foreign daylight, where they will be seen as things and not theories, and knowing all this I cannot conceive the reason or even the meaning of sending out Sir Herbert Samuel as the British representative in Palestine. I have heard it supported as an interesting experiment in Zionism. I have heard it denounced as a craven concession to Zionism. I think it is, quite obviously, a flat and violent contradiction to Zionism. Zionism, as I have always understood it, and indeed as I have always defended it, consists in maintaining that it would be better for all parties if Israel had the dignity and distinctive responsibility of a separate nation, and that this should be effected, if possible, or so far as possible, by giving the Jews a national home, preferably in Palestine. But where is Sir Herbert Samuel's national home? If it is in Palestine, he cannot go there as a representative of England. If it is in England, he is so far a living proof that a Jew does not need a national home in Palestine. If there is any point in the Zionist argument at all, you have chosen precisely the wrong man and sent him to precisely the wrong country. You have asserted not the independence but the dependence of Israel, and yet you have ratified the worst insinuations about the dependence of Christendom. In reason you could not more strongly state that Palestine does not belong to the Jews than by sending a Jew to claim it for the English, and yet in practice, of course, all the anti-Semites will say he is claiming it for the Jews. You combine all possible disadvantages of all possible courses of action. You run all the risks of the hard Zionist adventure while actually denying the High Zionist ideal. You make a Jew admit he is not a Jew but an Englishman, even while you allow all his enemies to revile him because he is not an Englishman but a Jew. Now this sort of confusion or compromise is as local as a London fog. A London fog is tolerable in London. Indeed, I think it is very enjoyable in London. There is a beauty in that brown twilight as well as in the clear skies of the Orient and the South. But it is simply horribly dangerous for a Londoner to carry his cloud of fog about with him in the crystalline era about the crags of Zion or under the terrible stars of the desert. There men see differences with almost unnatural clearness and call things by savagely simple names. He in England may consider all sorts of aspects of a man like Sir Herbert Samuel. We may consider him as a liberal or a friend of the Fabian Socialists or a cadet of one of the great financial houses or a member of parliament who is supposed to represent certain miners in Yorkshire or in twenty other more or less impersonal ways. But the people in Palestine will see only one aspect and it will be very personal aspect indeed. For the enthusiastic Muslims he will simply be a Jew. For the enthusiastic Zionists he will not really be a Zionist. For them he will always be the type of Jew who would be willing to remain in London and who is ready to represent Westminster. Meanwhile, for the masses of Muslims and Christians he will only be the aggravation in practice of the very thing of which he is the denial in theory. He will not mean that Palestine is not surrendered to the Jews, but only that England is. Now I have nothing as yet to do with the truth of that suggestion. I merely give it as an example of the violent and unexpected reactions we shall produce if we thrust our own unrealities amid the red-hot realities of the Near East. It is like pushing a snowman into a furnace. I have no objection to a snowman as part of our own Christmas festivities. Indeed, as has already been suggested, I think such festivities the great glory of the English life. But I have seen the snow melting in the steep places about Jerusalem, and I know what a cataract it could feed. As I consider these things, a deepening disquiet possessed me, and my thoughts were far away from where I stood. After all, the English did not indulge in this doubling of parts and muddling of mistaken identity in their real and unique successes in India. They may have been wrong or right, but they were realistic about Muslims and Hindus. They did not say Muslims were Hindus, or send a highly intelligent Hindu from Oxford to rule Muslims as an Englishman. They may not have cared for things like the ideal of Zionism, but they understood the common sense of Zionism, the desirability of distinguishing between entirely different things. But I remembered that of late their tact had often failed them, even in their chief success in India, and that every hour brought worse and wilder news of their failure in Ireland. I remembered that in the early Victorian time against the advice only of the wisest and subtlest of the early Victorians, we had tied ourselves to the triumphant progress of industrial capitalism, and that progress had now come to a crisis, and what might well be a crash. But now on the top of all, our fine patriotic tradition of foreign policy seemed to be doing these irrational and random things, a sort of fear to a cold of me, and it was not for the holy land that I feared. The cold wave went over me like that unreasonable change in chill with which a man far from home fancies his house has been burned down, or that those dear to him are dead. For one horrible moment at least, I wondered if we had come to the end of a compromise and comfortable nonsense, and if it lasts the successful stupidity of England would topple over like the successful wickedness of Prussia, because God is not mocked by the denial of reason any more than the denial of justice. And I fancied the very crowds of Jerusalem retorted on me words spoken to them long ago, that a great voice crying of old along the Via Dolorosa was rolled back on me like thunder from the mountains, and that all those alien faces are turned against us today, bidding us weep not for them who have faith and clarity and a purpose, but weep for ourselves and for our children. CHAPTER VIII. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DESERT. There was a story in Jerusalem so true or so well told that I can see the actors in it like figures in a colored costume on a lighted stage. It occurred during the last days of Turkish occupation, while the English advance was still halted before Gaza and heroically enduring the slow death of desert warfare. There were German and Austrian elements present in the garrison with the Turks, though the three allies seem to have held strangely aloof from each other. In the Austrian group there was an Austrian lady who had some dignity or other, like Lord Lundy's grandmother. She was very beautiful, very fashionable, somewhat frivolous, but with fits of Catholic devotion. She had some very valuable Christian virtues, such as indiscriminate charity for the poor and indiscriminate loathing for the Prussians. She was a nurse. She was also a nuisance. One day she was driving just outside the Jaffa Gate when she saw one of those figures which make the holy city seem like the eternal crisis of an epic. Such a man will enter the gate in the most ghastly rags, as if he were going to be crowned king in the city, with his head lifted as if he saw apocalyptic stars in heaven, and a gesture at which the towers might fall. This man was ragged beyond all the moving rag heap. He was as gaunt as a gallows-tree, and the thing he was uttering with arms held up to heaven was evidently a curse. The lady sent an inquiry by her German servant, whom also I can't see in a vision, with his face of wood and his air of steel trailing all the heraldic trappings of the Holy Roman Empire. This ambassador soon returned in a state and said, your serene high sublimity, or whatever it is, he says he is cursing the English. Her pity and her patriotism were alike moved, and she again sent the plenipotentiary to discover why he cursed the English, or what tale of wrong or ruin and English hands lay behind the large gestures of his despair. A second time the wooden intermediary returned and said, your ecstatic excellency, or whatever be the correct form. He says he is cursing the English because they don't come. There are a great many morals to this story, beside the general truth to which it testifies, that the Turkish rule was not popular, even with Muslims, and that the German war was not particularly popular, even with Turks. When all deductions are made for the patriot as a partisan, and his way of picking up only what pleases him, it remains true that the English attack was very widely regarded rather as a rescue than an aggression. And what complaint there really was, in many cases, a complaint that the rescue did not come with a rush, that the English forces had to fall back when they had actually entered Gaza, and could not for long afterwards continue their advance on Jerusalem. This kind of criticism of military operations is always, of course, worthless. In journalists it is generally worthless without being even harmless. There were some in London whose pessimistic wailing was less excusable than that of the poor Arab in Jerusalem, who cursed the English with the addition of being English themselves, who did it, not as he did, before one foreigner, but before all foreign opinion, and who advertised their failure in a sort of rags less reputable than his. No one can judge of a point like the capture and loss of Gaza unless he knows a huge mass of technical and local detail that can only be known to the staff on the spot. It is not a question of lack of water, but of exactly how little water, not of the arrival of reinforcements, but of exactly how much reinforcement. Not of whether time presses, but of exactly how much time there is. Nobody can know these things who is editing a newspaper at the other end of the world, and these are the things which, for the soldier on the spot, make all the difference between jumping over a pailing and jumping over a precipice. Even the latter, as the philosophic relativist will eagerly point out, is only a matter of degree, but this is a parentheses, for the purpose with which I mention the anecdote is something different. It is the text of another and somewhat more elusive truth, some appreciation of which is necessary to a sympathy with the more profound problems of Palestine, and it might be expressed thus. It is a proverb that the eastern methods seem to us slow, that the Arabs trail along on laboring camels while the Europeans flash by on motors or monoplanes, but there is another and stranger sense in which we do seem to them slow, and they do seem to themselves to have a secret swiftness. There is a sense in which we here touch the limits of a land of lightning, across which, as in a dream, the motor car can be seen as crawling like a snail. I have said that there is another side to the desert, though there is something queer in talking of another side to something so bare and big and oppressively obvious. But there is another side besides the big and bare truths, like giant bones, that the Muslim has found there. There is, so to speak, an obverse of the obvious, and to suggest what I mean I must go back again to the desert, and the days I spent there, being carted from camp to camp, and giving what were courteously described as lectures. All I can say is that if those were lectures I cannot imagine why everybody is not a lecturer. Perhaps the secret is already out, and multitudes of men in evening dress are already dotted about the desert, wandering in search of an audience. Anyhow, in my own wanderings I found myself in the high narrow house of the base commandant at Canatra, the only house in the whole circle of the horizon, and from the wooden balustrade and veranda running round the top of it, could be seen nine miles of tents. Sidney Smith said that the bulbous domes of the Brighton Pavilion looked as if St. Paul's Cathedral had come down there and littered, and that gray vista of countless cones looking rather as if the Great Pyramids had multiplied itself on a prolific scale of the herring. Nor was there even such a foolish fancy without its serious side. For though these pyramids would pass, the plan of them was also among the mightiest of the works of man, and the king in every pyramid was alive. For this was the great camp that was the pivot of the greatest campaign, and from that balcony I had looked on something all the more historic, because it may never be seen again. And the dusk fell and the moon brightened above that great ghostly city of Canvas. I had fallen into talk with three or four of the officers at the base, grizzled and hard-headed men talking with all the curious and almost colorless common sense of the soldier. All that they said was objective. One felt that everything they mentioned was really a thing and not merely a thought, a thing like a post or a palm tree. I think there is something in this of a sympathy between the English and the Muslims, which may have helped us in India and elsewhere. For they mentioned many modern proverbs and traditions, lightly enough but not contemptuously, and in particular another of the proverbial prophecies about the term of Turkish power. They said there was an old saying that the Turk would never depart till denial flowed through Palestine. And this at least was evidently a proverb of pride and security, like many such, who should say until the sea is dry or the sun rises in the west. And one of them smiled and made a small gesture as of attention, and in the silence of that moonlit scene we heard the clanking of a pump, the water from the Nile had been brought in pipes across the desert. And I thought that the symbol was a sound one, apart from all vanities, for this is indeed the special sort of thing that the Prisindam can do, and that Islam by itself would hardly care to do. I heard more afterwards of that water, which was eventually carried up to the hills to Jerusalem, when I myself followed it thither, and all I heard bore testimony to this truth as so far as it goes, the sense among the natives themselves of something magic in our machinery, and that in the main a white magic, the sense of all the more solid sort of social service that belongs rather to the west than to the east. When the fountain first flowed in the holy city in the mountains, and Father Weget blessed it for the use of men, it is said that an old Arab sanding by said in the plain and powerful phraseology of his people. The Turks were here for five hundred years, and they never gave us a cup of cold water. I put first this minimum of truths about the validity of western work, because the same conversations were slowly as it were to the eastern side. These same men, who talked of all things as if they were chairs and tables, began to talk quite calmly of things more amazing than table turning. They were as wonderful as if the water had come there like the wind, without any pipes or pumps, or if Father Weget had merely struck the rock like Moses. They spoke of a solitary soldier at the end of a single telephone wire across the wastes. Hearing of something that had that moment happened hundreds of miles away, and then coming upon a casual Bedouin, who knew it already. They spoke of the whole tribes moving and on the march. Upon news that could only come a little later by the swiftest wires of the white man. They offered no explanation of these things. They simply knew that they were there. Like the palm trees and the moon. They did not say it was telepathy. They lived much too close to realities for that. That word which will instantly leap to the lips of too many of my readers strikes me as merely an evidence of two of our great modern improvements, the love of long words and the loss of common sense. You may have been telepathy, whatever that is, but a man must be almost stunned with stupidity if he is satisfied to say telepathy as if he were saying telegraphy. If everybody is satisfied about how it is done, why does not everybody do it? Why does not a cultivated clergyman in Cornwall make a casual remark to an old friend of his at the University of Aberdeen? Why does not a harassed commercial traveler in Barcelona settle a question by merely thinking about his business partner in Berlin? The common sense of it, of course, that the name makes no sort of difference. The mystery is why some people can do it and others cannot, and why it seems to be easy in one place and impossible in another. In other words, it comes back to that very mystery, which of all mysteries the modern world thinks most superstitious and senseless, the mystery of locality. It works back at last to the hardest of all the hard sayings of supernaturalism, that there is such a thing as holy or unholy ground, as divinely or diabolically inspired people, that there may be such things as sacred sites or even sacred stones, in short, that the airy nothing of spiritual essence, evil or good, can have quite literally a local habitation and a name. It may be said in passing that this genius loci is here very much the presiding genius. It is true that everywhere today a parade of the theory of pantheism goes with a considerable practice of particularism, and that people everywhere are beginning to wish they were somewhere. And even where it is not true of men, it seems to be true of the mysterious forces which men are once more studying. The words we now address to the unseen powers may be vague and universal, but the words they are said to address to us are parochial and even private. While the higher thought center would widen and worship everywhere to a temple not made with hands, the psychical research society is conducting practical experiments round a haunted house. Men may become cosmopolitan, but ghosts remain patriots. Men may or may not expect an act of healing to take place at a holy well, but nobody expects it ten miles from the well, and even the skeptic who comes to expose the ghost-haunted church yard has to haunt the church yard like a ghost. There may be something faintly amusing about the idea of demigods with door-knockers and dinner tables and demons. One may almost say, keeping the home fires burning. But the driving force of this dark mystery of locality is all the more indisputable, because it drives against most modern theories and associations. The truth is that upon a more transcendental consideration we do not know what place is any more than we know what time is. We do not know of the unknown powers, that they cannot concentrate in space as in time, or find in a spot something that corresponds to a crisis. And if this be felt everywhere, it is necessarily and abnormally felt in those allegedly holy places and sacred spots. It is felt supremely in all those lands of the near East, which lie about the holy hill of Zion. In these lands an impression grows steadily on the mind, much too large for most of the recent religious or scientific definitions. The bogus heraldry of Hackel is obviously insufficient as of any quaint old chronicle tracing the genealogies of English kings through the chiefs of Troy to the children of Noah. There is no difference except that the tale of the dark ages can never be proved, while the travesty of Darwinian theory can sometimes be disproved. But I should diminish my meaning if I suggest that it is a mere score in the Victorian game of Scripture versus science. Some much larger mystery veils the origins of man than most partisans on either side have realized. And in these strange, primeval planes the traveler does realize it. It was never so well expressed as by one of the most promising of those whose literary possibilities were gloriously broken off by the great war. Lieutenant Ware Cornish, who left a strange and striking fragment about a man who came to these lands with a mystical idea of forcing himself back against the stream of time into the very fountain of creation. This is a parenthesis, but before resuming the more immediate matter of the supernormal tricks of the tribes of the East, it is well to recognize this is very real, if much more general, historic impression about the particular lands in which they lived. I have called it a historic impression, but it might more truly be called a prehistoric impression. It is best expressed in symbol by saying that the legendary site of the Garden of Eden is in Mesopotamia. It is equally well expressed in concrete experience by saying that when I was in these parts a learned man told me that the primitive form of wheat had just for the first time been discovered in Palestine. The feeling that fills the traveler may be faintly suggested thus, and here in this legendary land between Asia and Europe may well have happened whatever did happen, that through this eastern gate, if any, entered whatever made and changed the world. Whatever else this narrow strip of land may seem like, it does really seem to the spirit and almost to the senses, like the bridge that may have borne across archaic abysses, the burden and the mystery of man. Here have been civilizations as old as any barbarism, to all appearance perhaps older than any barbarism. Here is the camel, the enormous unnatural friend of man, the prehistoric pet. He is never known to have been wild and might make a man fancy that all wild animals had once been tame. As I said elsewhere, all might to be a runaway menagerie, the whale, a cow that went swimming and never came back, the tiger, a large cat that took the prize and the prize-giver, and escaped to the jungle. This is not, I venture to think, true. But it is true, as Pythiocanthropus and primitive man and all the other random guesses from dubious bits of bone and stone. And the truth is, some third thing, too tremendous to be remembered by men. Whatever it was, perhaps the camel saw it, but from the expression on the face of that old family servant. I feel sure he will never tell. I have called this the other side of the desert, and in another sense it is literally the other side. It is the other shore of that shifting and arid sea. Looking at it from the west and considering mainly the case of the Moslem, we feel the desert is but a barren borderland of Christendom, but seen from the other side, it is the barrier between us and a heathendom far more mysterious and even more monstrous than anything Moslem can be. Indeed it is necessary to realize this more vividly in order to feel the virtue of the Moslem movement. It belongs to the desert, but in one sense it was rather a clearance in the cloud that rests upon the desert. A rift pale but clean light in volumes of vapor rolled on it like smoke from the strange lands beyond. It conceived a fixed hatred of idolatry, partly because its face was turned towards the multitudinous idolatries of the lands of sunrise. And as I looked eastward, I seemed to be conscious of the beginnings of that other world, and saw like a forest of arms or dreamful of faces the gods of Asia on their thousand thrones. It is not a mere romance that calls it a land of magic or even a black magic. Those who carry that atmosphere to us are not the romanticists, but the realists. Everyone can feel it in the work of Mr. Rudyard Kipling. And when I once remarked on his repulsive little masterpiece called The Mark of the Beast, to a rather cynical Anglo-Indian officer, he observed moodily, it is a beastly story. But those devils really can do jolly queer things. It is but to take a commonplace example out of the countless more notable ones, to mention the many witnesses to the mango trick. Here again we have from time to time to weep over the weak-mindedness that hurriedly dismisses it as the practice of hypnotism. It is as if people were asked to explain how one unarmed Indian had killed three hundred men, and they said it was only the practice of human sacrifice. Something that we know as hypnotism will enable a man to alter the eyes in the heads of a huge crowd of total strangers wide awake in broad daylight, and if it is hypnotism it is something so appallingly magnified as to need a new magic to explain the explanation, certainly something that explains it better than a Greek word for sleep. But the impression of these special hints is but one example of a more universal impression of the Asiatic atmosphere, and that atmosphere itself is only an example of something vast or still for which I am trying to find words. Asia stands for something which the world in the west as well as the east is more and more feeling as a presence, and even a pressure. It might be called the spiritual world that loose, or a sort of psychical anarchy, a jungle of mango plants, and it is pressing upon the west also today because of the breaking down of certain materialistic barriers that have hitherto held it back. In plain words, the attitude of science is not only modified, it is now entirely reversed. I do not say it with mere pleasure. In some ways I prefer our materialism to their spiritualism, but for good or evil the scientists are now destroying their own scientific world. The agnostics have been driven back on agnosticism and are already recovering from the shock. They find themselves in a really unknown world under really unknown gods, a world which is more mystical, or at least more mysterious. For in the Victorian age the agnostics were not really agnostics. They might better be described as reverent materialists, or at any rate monists. They had at least at the back of their minds a clear and consistent concept of their rather clockwork cosmos. That is why they could not admit the smallest speck of the supernatural into their clockwork. But today it is very hard for a scientific man to say where the supernatural ends or the natural begins or what name should be given to either. The word agnostic has ceased to be a polite word for atheist. It has become a real word for a very real state of mind, conscious of many possibilities beyond that of the atheist, and not excluding that of the polytheist. It is no longer a question of defining or denying a simple central power, but of balancing the brain in a bewilderment of new powers which seem to overlap and might even conflict. Here herself has become unnatural. The wind is blowing from the other side of the desert, not now with noble truism. There is no God but God, but rather with that other motto, out of the deeper anarchy of Asia, drawn out by Mr. Kipling in the shape of a native proverb in the very story already mentioned. Your gods and my gods, do you or I know which is the stronger? There was a mystical story I read somewhere in my boyhood of which the only image that remains is that of a rose-bush growing mysteriously in the middle of a room. Taking this image for the sake of argument, we can easily fancy a man half-conscious and convinced that he is delirious, or still partly in a dream, because he sees such a magic bush growing irrationally in the middle of his bedroom. All the walls and furniture are familiar and solid. The table, the clock, the telephone, the looking glass, or what not. There is nothing unnatural but this one-hovering hallucination or optical delusion of green and red. Now that was very much the view taken of the Rose of Sharon, the mystical rose of the sacred tradition of Palestine by any educated man about 1850. When the rationalism of the eighteenth century was supposed to have found full support in the science of the nineteenth, he had a sentiment about a rose. He was still glad it had fragrance or atmosphere, though he remembered with a slight discomfort that it had thorns. But what bothered him about it was that it was impossible. And what made him think it impossible was that it was inconsistent with everything else. It was one solitary and monstrous exception to the sort of rules that ought to have no exceptions. This did not convince him there were few miracles, but that there were no miracles. And why should there be miracles only in Palestine and only for one short period? It was a single and senseless contradiction to an otherwise complete cosmos. For the furniture fitted in bit by bit and better and better, and the bedroom seemed to grow more and more solid. The man recognized the portrait of himself over the mantelpiece or the medicine-bottles on the table like the dying lover in browning. In other words, science so far had steadily solidified things. Newton had measured the walls and ceiling and made a calculus of their three dimensions. Darwin was already arranging the animals in rank as neatly as a row of chairs. Or Faraday the chemical element says clearly as a row of medicine-bottles. From the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, science was not only making discoveries, but all the discoveries were in one direction. Science is still making discoveries, but they are in the opposite direction. For things are rather different when the man in the bed next looks at the bedroom. Not only is the rose-bush still very obvious, but the other things are looking very odd. The perspective seems to have gone crooked. The walls seem to vary in measurement till the man thinks he is going mad. The wallpaper has a new pattern of strange spirals instead of round dots. The table seems to have moved by itself across the room and thrown the medicine-bottles out of the window. The telephone has vanished from the wall. The mirror does not reflect what is in front of it. The portrait of himself over the mantelpiece has a face that is not his own. That is something like a vision of the vital change in the whole trend of national philosophy in the last twenty or thirty years. It matters little whether we regard it as the deepening or the destruction of the scientific universe. It matters little whether we say that grander abysses have opened in it or merely that the bottom has fallen out of it. It is quite self-evident that scientific men are at war with wilder and more unfathomable fancies than the facts of the age of Huxley. I attempt no controversy about any of the particular cases. It is the cumulative effect of all of them that makes the impression one of common sense. It is really true that the perspective and dimensions of the man's bedroom have altered. The disciples of Einstein will tell him that straight lines are curved and perhaps measure more one way than the other. If that is not a nightmare, what is? It is really true that the clock has altered, for time has turned into the fourth dimension or something entirely different, the telephone may fairly be said to have faded from view in favor of the invisible telepath. It is true that the pattern of the paper has changed, for the very pattern of the world has changed. We are told that it is not made of atoms like the dots, but of electrons like the spirals. Scientific men of the first rank have seen a table move by itself and walk upstairs by itself. It does not matter here whether it was done by the gods. It is enough that few still pretend that it is entirely done by the spiritualist. I am not dealing with doctrines, but with doubts, with the mere fact that all these things have grown deeper and more bewildering. Some people really are throwing their medicine bottles out of the window, and some of them at least are working purely psychological cures of a sort that would once have been called miraculous healing. I do not say we know how far this could go. It is my whole point that we do not know, that we are in contact with numbers of new things of which we know uncommonly little. But the vital point is not that science deals with what we do not know, but that science is destroying what we thought we did know. Nearly all the latest discoveries have been destructive, not of the old dogmas of religion, but rather of the recent dogmas of science. The conservation of energy could not itself be entirely conserved. The atom was smashed to atoms, and dancing to the tune of Professor Einstein, even the law of gravity is behaving with lamentable levity. And when the man looks at the portrait of himself, he really does not see himself. He sees his other self, which some say is the opposite of his ordinary self. This subconscious self, or his subliminal self, said to rage and rule in his dreams, or a suppressed self which hates him, though it is hidden from him, or the alter ego of a dual personality. It is not to my present purpose to discuss the merit of these speculations, or whether they be medicinal or morbid. My purpose is served in pointing out the plain historical fact that if you had talked to a utilitarian and rationalist of Bentham's time, who told men to follow enlightened self-interest, he would have been considerably bewildered if you had replied, brightly and briskly, and to which self do you refer? The subconscious, the conscious, the latent criminal, or suppressed, or others that we fortunately have in stock. When the man looks at his own portrait in his own bedroom, it does not really melt into the face of a stranger, or flicker into the face of a fiend. When he looks at the bedroom itself, in short it becomes clearer and clearer that it is exactly this comfortable and solid part of the vision that is altering and breaking up. It is the walls and furniture that are only a dream or memory, and when he looks again at the incongruous rose-bush, he seems to smell as well as see, and he stretches forth his hand and his fingers, bleed upon a thorn. It will not be altogether surprising if the story ends with the man recovering full consciousness and finding he has been convalescing in a hammock in a rose-garden. It is not so very unreasonable when you come to think of it, or at least when you come to think of the whole of it. He was not wrong in thinking the whole must be a consistent whole, and that one part seems inconsistent with the other. He was only wrong about which part was wrong, through being inconsistent with the other. Now the whole of the rationalistic doubt about the Palestinian legends, from its rise to the early 18th century, out of the last movements of the Renaissance, was founded on the fixity of facts. Miracles were monstrosities because they were against natural law, which was necessarily immutable law. The prodigies of the Old Testament, or the mighty works of the New, were extravagances because they were exceptions, and they were exceptions because there was a rule, and that an immutable rule. In short, there was no rose-tree growing out of the carpet of a trim and tidy bedroom, because rose-trees do not grow out of carpets in trim and tidy bedrooms. So far it seemed reasonable enough, but it left out one possibility. That a man can dream about a room as well as a rose, and that a man can doubt about a rule as well as an exception. As soon as the men of science began to doubt the rules of the game, the game was up, they could no longer rule out all the old marvels as impossible, in the face of the new marvels which they had to admit as possible. They were themselves dealing now with a number of unknown quantities. What is the power of mind over matter? When is matter an illusion of mind? What is identity? What is individuality? Is there a limit to logic in the last extremes of mathematics? They knew by a hundred hints that their non-miraculous world was no longer watertight, that floods were coming in from somewhere in which they were already out of their depth, and down among very fantastical deep-sea fishes. They could hardly feel certain even about the fish that swallowed Jonah when they had no test except the very true one that there are more fish in the sea than ever came out of it. Probably they would find it quite as hard to draw the line at the miraculous draw to fishes. I do not mean that they or even I need here depend on those particular stories. I mean that the difficulty now is to draw a line, and a new line after the obliteration of an old and much more obvious line. Anyone can draw it for himself as a matter of mere taste in probability, but we have not made a philosophy until we can draw it for others. And the modern men of science cannot draw it for others. Men could easily mark the contrast between the force of gravity and the fable of the ascension. They cannot all be made to see any such contrast between the Leviathan that is now discussed as a possibility and the ascension which is still derided as a miracle. I do not even say that there is not a great difference between them. I say that science is now plunged too deep in new doubts and possibilities to have authority to define the difference. I say the more it knows of what seems to have happened or what is said to have happened in many modern drawing-rooms, the less it knows what did or did not happen on that lofty and legendary hill where a spire rises over Jerusalem and can be seen beyond Jordan. But with that part of the Palestinian story which is told in the New Testament, I am not directly concerned till the next chapter, and the matter here is a more general one. The truth is that, through a thousand channels, something has returned to the modern mind. It is not Christianity. On the contrary, it would be true to say that it is paganism. In reality it is a very special sense of paganism, because it is polytheism. The word will startle many people, but not the people who know the modern world best. When I told the distinguished psychologist at Oxford that I differed from his view of the universe, he answered, Why universe? Why should it not be a multiverse? The essence of polytheism is the worship of gods who are not God, that is, who are not necessarily the author and the authority of all things. Men are feeling more and more that there are many spiritual forces in the universe, and the wisest men feel that some are to be trusted more than others. There will be a tendency, I think, to take a favorite force, or in other words a familiar spirit. Mr. H. G. Wells, who is, if anybody is, a genius among moderns and a modern among geniuses, really did this very thing. He selected a God who was really more like a demon. He called his book God, The Invisible King, but the curious point was that he specially insisted that his God differed from other people's God in the very fact that he was not a king. He was very particular in explaining that his deity did not rule in any almighty or infinite sense, but merely influenced, like any wandering spirit, nor was he particularly invisible, if there can be said to be any degree in invisibility. Mr. Wells' invisible God was really like Mr. Wells' invisible man. You almost felt he might appear, at any moment, at any rate, to one devoted worshipper. And that, as if in old Greece, a glad cry might ring out through the woods of Essex. The voice of Mr. Wells crying, We have seen, he has seen us, a visible God. I do not mean this disrespectfully, but on the contrary very sympathetically. I think it worthy of so great a man to appreciate and answer the general sense of a richer and more adventurous spiritual world around us. It is a great emancipation from the leaden materialism which weighed on men of imagination forty years ago. But my point for the moment is that the mode of the emancipation was pagan, or even polytheistic, in the real philosophical sense that it was the selection of a single spirit out of many there might be in the spiritual world. The point is that while Mr. Wells worships his God, who is not his creator or even necessarily his overlord, there is nothing to prevent Mr. William Archer, also emancipated from adoring another God in another temple. Or Mr. Arnold Bennett, should he similarly liberate his mind, from bowing down to a third God in a third temple? My imagination rather fails me, I confess, in evoking the image and symbolism of Mr. Bennett's or Mr. Archer's idolatries. And if I had to choose between the three, I should probably be found an acolyte in the shrine of Mr. Wells. But anyhow the trend of all this is to polytheism, rather as it existed in the old civilization of paganism. There is the same modern mark in spiritualism. Polytheism also has the trend of polytheism. If it be in a form more akin to ancestor worship, but whether it be the invocation of ghosts or of gods, the mark of it is it invokes something less than the divine. Nor am I at all quarreling with it on that account. I am merely describing the drift of the day, and it seems clear that it is towards the summoning of spirits to our aid, whatever their position in the unknown world, and without any clear doctrinal plan of that world. The most probable result would seem to be a multitude of psychic cults, personal and impersonal, from the vaguest reverence for the powers of nature to the most concrete appeal to crystals or mascots. When I say that the agnostics have discovered agnosticism, and have now recovered from the shock, I do not mean merely to sneer at the identity of the word agnosticism with the word ignorance. On the contrary, I think ignorance is the greater thing, for ignorance can be creative, and the thing it can create, and soon probably will create, is one of the lost arts of the world. A mythology. In a word, the modern world will probably end exactly where the Bible begins. In that inevitable setting of spirit against spirit, or God against God, we shall soon be in a position to do more justice, not only to the New Testament, but to the Old Testament. Our descendants may very possibly do the very thing we scoff at the Old Jews for doing. Groupe IV and Kling II their own deity, as one rising above rivals, who seem to be equally real. They also may feel him not primarily as the soul or even the supreme, but only as the best, and have to abide the miracles of ages to prove that he is also the mightiest. For them also he may at first be felt as their own, before he is extended to others. He also, from the collision with colossal idolatries and towering spiritual tyrannies, may emerge only as a God of battles and a Lord of hosts. Here between the dark wastes and the clouded mountain was fought out, what must seem even to the indifferent a wrestle of giants driving the world out of its course. Jehovah of the mountains, casting down Be'el of the desert and Dagon of the sea. Here wandered and endured at strange and terrible and tenacious people, who held high above all their virtues and their vices, an indestructible idea, that they were but the tools in that tremendous hand. Here was the first triumph of those who, in some sense beyond our understanding, had rightly chosen among the powers invisible, and found their choice a great God above all gods. So the future may suffer not from the loss, but the multiplicity of faith, and its fate be far more like the cloudy and mythological war in the desert, than like the dry radiance of theism or monism. I have said nothing here of my own faith, or of that name on which I am well persuaded, the world would be most wise to call. But I do believe that the tradition founded in that far tribal battle, in that far eastern land, did indeed justify itself by leading up to the lasting truth, and that it will once again be justified of all its children. What has survived through an age of atheism, as the most indestructible, would survive through an age of polytheism, as the most indispensable? If among many gods it could not presently be proved to be the strongest, some would still know it was the best. Its central presence would endure through times of cloud and confusion, in which it was judged only as a myth among myths, or a man among men. Even the old heathen test of humanity, and the apparition of the body, touching which I have quoted the verse about the pagan polytheist, as sung by the neo-pagan poet, is a test which that incarnate mystery will abide the best. And however much or little our spiritual inquirers may lift the veil from their invisible kings. They will not find a vision more vivid than a man walking unveiled upon the mountains.