 So, we look forward to a very fruitful discussion with you and of course hearing your thoughts and views. While the ECB's climate agenda is very wide, today we will focus on banking supervision. Since a few years we have carried out a lot of activities at the supervisory front and see how banks are prepared to manage the risk. And today I'm very pleased that we can already present to you the results of the thematic review and the road ahead. But before moving to the presentations of the speakers we have in the room today. Let me first go through a few housekeeping rules with you just to be on the safe side and we run the seminar as smooth as possible. First of all, keep your microphones muted if you're not speaking. Secondly, if you can, if we move through the Q&A, could you please put on your camera so we have a bit more of an interaction with you. And please also be aware that this seminar is being recorded and will be published on our website in the coming days. And finally, if you're experiencing any technical problems, please write to host in the chat box and a member of a team will assist you right away to fix, try to fix the problems. But now let me turn your attention to the two colleagues here joining me on this panel. We have Frank Alderson, a member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board and since 2020 he's also co-chairing the work of the task force on climate related financial risk of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and of course before that a lot of work on the NGFS site. Secondly, we have today with us Patrick Camis, who is the Director General of Specialized Institutions and LSIs, and his business area was in charge of running this thematic review. And I will now hand over to Frank for some welcoming remarks. Frank, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you very much, Irene, and a good morning, afternoon, evening, wherever you are to all of you present the present here today. Let me start with two quotes. More bad news for the planet. Greenhouse gas levels hit new highs. And also the global energy crisis can be a historic turning point towards a cleaner and more secure future. Two headlines of last week. The former coming from the World Meteorological Organization and the latter from the International Energy Agency. Two headlines, two manifestations of the risks coming from the ongoing climate and environmental crises. Physical and transition risks. Two manifestations of twin crises. Two types of risks that are on the rise. It is the consensus now among central banks and supervisors globally affirmed through the central bank and supervisor network for greening the financial system. That climate related and environmental risks are a source of financial risks and therefore are squarely within our mandate. Equally so, financial institutions recognize the materiality of these risks for their business. Now there can no longer be any delay to turn this recognition into action. And this is what supervisors around the world expect from banks. Earlier this year, the Basel Comedium Banking Supervision, the main global standard set for potential regulation of banks, published its principles for the effective management and supervision of climate related financial risks. These principles confirm that supervisors from around the world now unanimously confirm not only that climate risks may be material, but also that both banks and supervisors need to contend with them urgently. This is what ECB Banking Supervision has been pursuing since 2020. Indeed, we have started to implement many of the principles that the Basel Committee has now established on a global scale. Over the last couple of years, we have launched several targeted actions in this direction. In 2020, we issued the ECB guide on climate related environmental risks. And in 2021, we conducted a supervisory review of banks approaches to managing these risks based on their own assessments. And at the start of this year, I announced that 2022 would be the year in which we would move to what I have called an immersive supervisory approach to climate related and environmental risks. The year in which these risks become fully integrated in the day to day activities of our joint supervisory teams, which are in constant contact with the banks. The year as of which climate related and environmental risks come to form an integral part of our ongoing dialogue with supervised entities and the supervisory review and evaluation process. An encompassing and integrated approach which supervisors and banks are already very familiar with for traditional risk categories. An approach that will be here to stay. Today, we published the results of our thematic review. Along with the 2022 ECB supervisory stress test, of which the results were published already in July, on-site inspections and a targeted review on commercial real estate exposures. The thematic review forms part of the ECB banking supervision roadmap. The roadmap to ensure that banks adequately incorporate climate related and environmental risks in their risk management. Now, what do we observe on where banks stand? Simply put, the glass is filling up slowly, but it is not even half full yet. Yes, the climate and environmental crises have made it to the top levels within banks and some first steps have indeed been taken. But there is a difference between talking about steps and beginning to act. And there's even bigger difference in doing what is actually needed. Patrick Ami, Director General in ECB banking supervision and leading our climate and environmental work will go into the details of these findings. And before wrapping up, while not the topic of today's seminar, let me remind you before handing over the floor to Patrick that our climate and environmental activities in ECB banking supervision are part of an even broader agenda of the ECB to consistently incorporate these considerations in all our tasks and responsibilities, including our monetary policy. Let me reiterate our commitment to continue to engage with you on our work towards all these activities. It is with your feedback, your support, your pushing, your challenge and ideas that our work and the work of the institutions that we supervise can progress. Progress that is urgently needed in a world that is committed to the Paris Agreement while also increasingly subject to the physical risks from the climate and environmental crises. We appreciate your input in a seminar like this one and through other modalities. And I look forward to our exchange of views after the presentation. And with that, I've already talked too long. Patrick, the floor is yours for the presentation of the results of today's evaluation. Many thanks, Frank. So let me open with a slide deck already and a warm welcome from my side as well to this event. I think your feedback is really important to us. Let's move to the next slide already to guide you a little bit more to the details of the organization, the Sematic Review, and also we'll take a little bit of time to go quickly through some of the other findings we got from two also very important exercises. We run this year the stress test and an analysis of banks' disclosures. But let's start with the Sematic Review. So the objectives were three-fourths, deep diving into banks' ability to manage climate and environmental risks, assess a second how sound, effective and comprehensive banks' practices are, and finally, of course, foster banks' alignments to our supervisory expectations as published at the end of 2020. In doing so, we run four core modules, a marginality assessment module, a strategy, governance, risk management modules, and also three risk specific modules, and not all banks were subject to all of these modules depending on the specifics of their own business model, which were on credit risk, market risk and operational risk. The sample shows you how unprecedented this Sematic Review is. We had in total 186 banks, of which 107 banks under direct supervision by the ECB, the so-called significant institutions, but also very importantly, 79 so-called less significant institutions that remain supervised by the National Competent Authorities. In here, let me point to the fact that this review is very, very much a joint endeavor with our colleagues in National Competent Authorities, and we are very grateful that they also contribute to the number of LSI students' exercises. This is very important to disseminate these exercises and sound practices across the system. Let me move to the next slide, just to give you immediately a summary of the Sematic Review findings. So, the overall development compared to our previous exercise in 2021 is positive. Many banks have overall improved their capabilities, but as Frank already put it, the glass is not even half full. We still have quite a number of banks that are lacking more sophisticated methodologies and granular information. It means that most banks have devised basic practices, but half of them fail to implement them effectively. So, as a result, this means that banks continue to significantly underestimate these risks, and we have found that nearly all of them have blind spots, and you can see it very clearly in the graph on the right side of this slide. Let me move to the next slide then, with a few selected results per Sematic Review module. With respect to the materiality assessment, this is really the very basic foundational starting point of all of these. Banks need to be convinced and assess properly that they are masterly exposed to these risks. Importantly, where we had only half of the banks that saw they were materially exposed to climate risk in 2021, we now have 80% of the banks, and it means that the more banks start digging into the topic, the more they find out that it is material. And so we do expect that this materiality assessment by banks will mean that more and more banks find that they are materially exposed to climate-related and also environmental risks. Then the strategy module. I think it's a little bit of the same story in the three next modules on strategy governance and risk management. In a nutshell, banks have taken the first basic steps that needs to further embed climate and other environmental risks into their actual practices, frameworks for risk capital, governance, and risk management. As you can see, we have only a quarter of the banks that have advanced quantification methods for risk management, and this is far too low and we need to continue seeing progress. Let me move to the next slide. Also now to broaden a little bit before I come back to the follow-up of the thematic review, to broaden a little bit on what we did this year as well. I think it is important to have a broader picture of what we do in banking supervision with respect to climate-related risks. So a reminder of the recent findings from the stress test published in July this year where we show that banks continue to rely quite intensively on carbon-intensive sectors. We saw that despite the stress exercise being focused on a lower number of banks and for a limited part of their exposures, we already got 70 billion of aggregate losses under a short-term exercise that was conducted as part of this overall stress test. And this means that despite again the fact that the portfolios being stress tests were rather narrow in the banks' exposures, we already have quite significant impact. And then we found out that the majority of the banks had not yet integrated climate-related risks into their stress testing frameworks. Let's move to the next slide also to say a word about our gap analysis on disclosures. This is the second time we run this one and we published it in March 2022. We intend to run another one at the end of this year or beginning of next year. Here we saw that 45% of the banks' disclosures were assessed as insufficient both from a content and substantiation perspective. Few banks were disclosing meaningful information on finance emissions, alignment metrics or energy performance certificates just to name a few examples. With respect to transparency, one third of the institutions did not yet transparently disclose that they are materially exposed to climate and environmental risks in line with their own internal materiality assessment. And finally, we saw that many banks were not substantiating enough their climate and environmental risks figures, metrics and targets that they chose to disclose. And that was raising for us concerns with respect to reputational and possibly litigation risks. And of course, we will continue working with all these banks to make sure that their disclosures progress. And before, of course, the disclosures coming from the EBA and from the European regulation become mandatory. Let's move to the next slide together with the thematic review. And when running the thematic review, we already saw which is comforting a number of good practices. Interestingly, those good practices were observed across the board. So we could not allocate good practices to speak to banks depending on their size, geography or business model. And that is comforting because it means that swift progress is possible across the board. We give two examples here that we published 25 of these so-called good practices in a separate report today together with our report on the thematic review. We hope this will be read very extensively by banks and readers of financial statements because we believe there is big avenue for progress in all of this. Just to give a few examples, the first one is the fact that some banks have already implemented data-driven due diligence for their clients. This is very important to mention and we hope this will disseminate across the entire banking industry. The second example we wanted to give here is the fact that banks are already, some of them at least, are already using scenarios for target setting used in their own transition planning tools to enhance their long-term resilience and their business models. That is very important as well. We believe that working on transition planning is the next goal for the banking industry and we will continue working on this together with the banks. Let's move to the next slide coming back to the follow-up now of this thematic review. We have set deadlines for banks to deal with the findings we and the shortcoming we evidenced during this thematic review. Banks have already received feedback letters from us with on average 55 shortcomings per bank. That's a lot. Therefore, we have decided to set institutions-specific deadlines for achieving full alignment with our expectations by the end of 2024. Of course, we will not wait for the end of 2024 to monitor progress and we have a number of intermediate deadlines making sure that all laggards do catch up on time to be more sure that we will reach this end of 2024 goal. By the end of March 23, we will already have normally all banks being able to adequately categorize climate and environmental risks and conduct a full assessment of their impact on their activities. By the end of the same year, they should be able to adequately integrate the consideration of these risks into their governance, strategy and risk management frameworks and then we expect to have adherence to our expectations in full by the end of 2024. Including with the way banks calculate their own capital needs and in their stress testing frameworks. Let's move to the next slide. So the findings that we have communicated to banks have already this year started feeding up into our so-called supervisory review and evaluation process. We have imposed already binding qualitative requirements on 30 banks in this year's SREP to ask them to address severe weaknesses. This means that these severe weaknesses are not being addressed on time. We will stand ready to make use of our full supervisory toolbox including enforcement actions. This is very important. The second topic is that for a number of banks already in 2022, we had an impact on the so-called SREP scores that in turn have an impact on the determination of capital requirements for banks. So I will stop here. I think we can now move to the Q&A sessions and I give the floor back to Irene. Thank you so much, Patrick. Thanks so much, Frank for sketching the full picture and also pressing on the urgency we see to address climate and environmental risk for the banking sector. I think you sketched really well where we stand today and also the transition plan that we see from banks to move from where they are today to fulfill compliance by the end of 2024. With that I want to give the floor to you and if you would like to pose a question, please raise your electronic hand and then I'll give you a sign to unmute yourself. And then I'll guide the question to the dependents who's best suited to answer it. So if there are already any hands up, I know that we just published the result this morning. So maybe you're still seeing what you think of it, but I see hands coming up. Adua Dalakosta, looking forward to your question. Hi, thanks a lot for organizing this. My name is Adua. I'm a policy officer at Positive Money Europe. I have a question that follows up to the climate stress test of this summer, which I think is important implications for energy efficiency. In fact, the climate stress test has showed that credit risk are at least three times higher for real estate exposure with low energy performance. Because energy price crisis like the one experiencing today, translating to sky high energy bills for people when the energy efficiency of a house is low. And this can affect people's finances and their capacity to pay their mortgages, which in turn can affect banks financial stability. And the number in fact is not that low. In fact, one in 10 households are living in mortgage areas already. So I have two questions concerning that. And the first one is whether you estimate that this credit risk have increased since you elaborated this data since the intensifying of the energy crisis. And if you get as a sense of how significant you think this credit risk are for the stability of the financial system. And my second question would be from a supervisory perspective. Do you agree that banks mortgage portfolios would be better shielded if people had access to affordable credit to renovate their homes? Thanks. Thank you so much for this question. And I think Patrick, can I give this question to you? So it's really on the credit risks. Yeah, many things. So what we see undoubtedly is that the current energy crisis and the fact that energy bills do increase may have an impact on affordability for customers. Undoubtedly. And we see this across the board, of course. And so we do expect that we will be under a rise of credit risk indeed. So that's, I think that's pretty clear already. For the second part of your question, it is still a little bit too early to put a price tag on this. We are of course working with the banks and with the banking industry and making use of our quantification tools, of course, but it's a little bit too early to go to how much the impact and how big it will be. But we do expect of course that there will be an impact. And then with respect to the second question you had, but here I think Frank also can compliment, but indeed of course it will be up also to governments and civil society to see how to help people moving towards better energy efficiency of their homes. What we know for sure is that banks will have to play a role in financing as well, most likely. So this is also something we want to make sure banks prepare for and it starts with identifying in their customer base who are the customers that might be in need of solutions. Thank you. Want to add something to that? Well, thanks a lot. And since you were the first to ask a question, maybe it's fair that both of us try to contribute to answering. Maybe on that last point, a couple of things. It gives me the possibility to underline that whenever we talk about climate and environmental risks, of course as a supervisor, we are not a policymaker in terms of climate policies and environmental policies or social policies. So our job is to of course very carefully follow what governments who are elected officials, unlike us, make in terms of policies and then translate that into what does it mean for the risk profile of the banks that is one part. And the other part that I would like to say that in terms of, you know, people now being confronted with these high energy prices, which of course, to a large extent are due to the terrible war that Russia is waiting on the Ukraine. The likelihood in my assessment, the likelihood of the energy transition taking place, although at the very short end of the timeline maybe, we will be burning, if you like, more fossil fuels than we would otherwise have done. In the somewhat longer term, an even medium term, I think the likelihood of the transition taking place has increased, increased, because people now understand that also in terms of our energy of independence, we need to make this transition. And that being the case, also the transition risks for the financial sector at large and for banks specifically have increased as well. And that of course then gives us a reinforced angle, if you like, to challenge whether they are actually up to the job in managing these risks. Thanks so much, Frank, for this answer as well. I think this is a very important signal as well to give that the whole energy crisis and the green transition should really go hand in hand and point in the same direction. And this is also based on the work the ECBS done we shouldn't put climate at the back stove because we have an energy crisis to fix now we really should aim to have to tackle both and accelerate use the momentum to accelerate the green transition. So that's, that's our point there. Then I would like to move to the second question from out from the WWF. Good to see you again. Hello, good to see you again. And thank you very much for this presentation. Well, I have question regarding the deadline applicable to banks in Europe now and the binding requirement to have made for some of them. So first of all, will the deadline be applicable in the same way to a significant institution and less significant institution. Second question is more on, well, can you give an example of binding qualitative and quantitative requirements you have made to some banks without giving any name obviously but it would be good to understand what could be a qualitative or quantitative requirements regarding climate related risk but also regarding environmental and environmental related risk. And the last one is more on the scope of application of those requirements and and and deadline. Will this be applicable globally to banks and to at the consolidated level or only for activities in Europe. Thank you very much. Thanks so much for this excellent questions. Patrick, I think I can give you the floor on this one. Many thanks and good to see you again. So on on the on the questions I'm trying to remember all of them please repeat them if I'm not answering. So on the examples of qualitative and quantitative requirements on quantitative requirements. We have not yet moved to quantitative to capital requirements. We have done it for a handful of banks indirectly via the change in threats course. Eventually we will move to capital requirements in the two. So we are at qualitative requirements for the time being to give you an example of qualitative requirements. We have banks that did not conduct a proper assessment of the materiality of these risks. And so they were asked to provide us with a proper materiality assessment by a certain deadline. And so we have a number of parameters to see to verify that this is a proper assessment. So meaning that they expect that they go through the full portfolio of their exposures that they look at both physical and transition risks and so on and so forth. And that they sort of get an understanding of how and when it could start impacting their own portfolios. So this is an example and we had of course this could be applicable for climate related risks but also for other environmental risks. And I take the opportunity to mention that in the thematic review we also included in our report a small chapter on other environmental related risks because we believe that they are very important as well. And we need to focus not only on pure climate risk but also on other environmental risks. And we see that banks are even at the earlier stage than climate on this and so they will continue progressing as well. What will and another example for instance banks that have not yet allocated responsibility for climate and also environmentalist topics to one of the members of their board. So this is one of our expectations and we had for instance a few binding requirements asking banks to do so. By a certain date to give two examples. What will happen if banks do not meet the deadlines and those deadlines are discussed with each and every bank. So we're not regulators we are supervisors we discuss on the bank specifics and so we expect that these deadlines are their deadlines and if they don't meet them then we will consider using the full array of all. Including enforcement measures. Maybe the question is on LSI for instance. And SSI versus LSI many thanks Frank I knew I was missing one. We have imposed those requirements so far on the SIs. And we have of course a dialogue and expectations that our colleagues in the LSI supervision so the national competent facilities will also follow. So we'll continue working together with them to make sure that the findings of the thematic review are being adequately followed up also for the LSIs. You have seen that the number of LSIs in the sample were 79 it's already a large sample. But of course the LSIs in the system are much much more. And we have north of 2200 LSIs in Europe so it means that NCA is the National Corporate Facilities and we need to continue implementing also these expectations in their own constituencies and we will very much continue working with them. Then you had the last question on whether we would have those requirements on the consolidated or European specific part of the balance sheet. Finders would correct your question so the answer is very simple. It's on a consolidated basis. So meaning the entirety of their exporters. Thank you very much. Great questions. Then I see a hand of Julia Simon from FinanceWatch. Julia. First of all thank you very much for the presentation. It's obviously very insightful and very much we are looking forward to follow your work on this and appreciate of course. I have two questions maybe one question one more like ask for a comment. So one thing relating I think to the question of more than the topic you've just you've just addressed. I've just made an interest in observation because in the report that was published today. There is a statement that 70% of banks already consider the climate and environmental risks as material over the time horizon of three to five years, which is a normal financial planning time horizon. Yes at the same time just a handful of banks have started looking into how is the how are those material risks supported by the capital in their ICAP process, which to me is a kind of an obvious discrepancy. Normally in the ICAP whatever is material has to have some kind of a capital charge. So I just like wonder what your what your stance on this is and if you've made any specific thoughts on that, because on the same hand and I go into my second question. The majority of banks of course have still a lot of difficulties of implementing those processes. There are too many unknowns with respect to measuring and having the necessary data which I think is also a known fact and the common difficulty that the whole kind of society faces now with this. So with this, my question is like if you plan any specific more specific guidance or like elaboration of best practices. I know you've put some in the report, but also any additional ones in order to make sure that the banks can enhance the quality of those processes and actual the implementation over those two years that you are planning now to work with them towards compliance. Thank you. Thank you so much Julia, very, very good questions again. So, Patrick, one on the materiality assessment and the ICAP, any other on our guidance towards banks? Yeah, so many things, very good questions, Julia. So yes, well supported, we have a discrepancy between banks finding a risk is material and then translating this into their own capital estimates. So we're not talking about pillar two, which is a supervisory process, but ICAPs. And so, indeed, we do have a discrepancy and we do expect that this discrepancy should be corrected by the end of 24. So we will continue working with them to make sure that they do incorporate material risks into their ICAP. So in order to do so, you mentioned yourself, we still have data gaps. We do not have only data gaps, we have also in some cases methodology gaps. And so for this, this is a joint journey. And so we do not have all the time already now the answer, but we will continue working with the banks to make sure that we all progress and they do progress. Towards the same journey. One important topic. It's not because banks lack data that they should look away. I mean, in front of a risk, you don't look away. Once you know you have a risk, you need to find ways to handle it. And this is what we are requesting from banks. And the positive development we see is that more and more banks have started looking into solving themselves their data gaps. Here, a number of initiatives can help and we will certainly continue helping the banks in solving and disseminating data. We have quite some work being done, not being the context of the NGFS, the network for greening the financial system. We do believe that improved disclosures, including from the corporate world will help banks solving part of this data gap. So we took out more disclosures across the board going forward. This is important to help addressing the data gap. What we cannot accept is a bank that would come to us and tell us, look, as long as you don't give me the full data and full methodology, I'm not doing anything. These are risks they need to start being addressed now. Thanks so much. Yes, Frank, please add. Well, maybe to just add briefly to the last part, because I think it's a very important aspect of course, the whole debate about data. You asked about the good practices. What we see some banks do is that they understand that the world is not perfect. They don't shy away for the reason that Patrick just mentioned. I mean, if there's a risk, there's a risk and, you know, closing your eyes doesn't make things better. It makes things worse. They identify in this imperfect world, admittedly, different data sources, external data providers, data that they can procure directly from their clients, and what they do, they rank these data sources in a priority by coming to the conclusion that, of course, it's better to directly base oneself on data that you actually get from your specific clients than from data providers at large, although that second source is much better than nothing at all. So there is increasingly what I would call a best practice how this can be done. This we have actually put, I think, in the good practices report, and the good practices report will be, at least in my mind, you know, something that we will build on. So this document has now been published, but of course, if in the, you know, in the period to come, the years to come, we see more good practices. You know, it's an obvious conservation for us would be to disseminate those as well, because we want to do, you know, it's not that we, you know, that we enjoy being a strict supervisor, which we are. What we want to do, we want to achieve something, what we want to achieve is that banks manage these climate and environmental risks in an adequate manner. We will enforce deadlines if they are not being made on a bank by bank basis as Patrick has said, but of course, if banks by learning from good practices can can make steps that of course, you know, it's very much to be to be welcomed. So, so thanks for this question because it gives me occasion to once more on the line also the important helping supporting part that is encapsulated if you like in this good practices document. Thanks, both Patrick and Frank for the answer. Thanks Julia for your great questions on this. I think indeed the good practices guide is is really something and could really really already help help banks to progress and it's good to hear that this will be advanced going forward as well. Sorry. And there's one word because I think it's important. And I don't know whether we have already highlighted this in this session. When we look at the good practices, it's not that we see this in just one type of bank in one type of jurisdiction. We have seen good practices, big banks, small banks, different business models, different jurisdictions. So to me it shows that what we are asking banks to do, and what we will require banks to do is something that is doable across the board. Thanks for the good addition there to it is doable. So I think that's a good signal there to give. Then I want to move to the next question and then we have you read from positive money. Thank you. Thank you very much. I don't I don't hear you so well yet. Hello, can you hear me. Yeah, okay. Thank you so much for the presentation. It was very insightful. And from my side, I guess I have a bit of a general question. So the ECB's recommendation on dividend distribution expired in September 2021. And the ECB decided not to renew it. Kind of first of all, my question is given the very highly uncertain macroeconomic situation and fast changing policy environments. Why did the ECB decided against prolonging the recommendation on dividends? And secondly, related to the to the climate environmental risk in your assessment, you mentioned that blind spots were detected in 96% of their bank and their identification of climate and environmental risks. And while there's a lot of talk of action, there are actually actual shifts in revenue sources remain rare. So given the overwhelming need to kind of recapitalize and act against climate on climate environments or risk. Why is the case that the governance of banks and their dividend decisions remain not tied to their climate performance? And what can ECB as a supervisor do about it? And you mentioned before enforcement tools. What could be kind of concrete enforcement tools on this? Thank you. Thank you so much. I think there are a lot of questions. And the first one is on the dividend distribution. Can I give the floor to Patrick on this? Yes, on the other one. On dividend distribution, I think the SSM took a rather unprecedented initiative to ask banks not to distribute dividends across the board during the COVID period. It was an unprecedented events. As you know, where we were in lockdown, we knew the whole economy would be somehow frozen at some time. And so we had also quite a number of initiatives being taken to provide further financing from public transfers to maintain the economy, a flow, etc. And so it was all in place of very immediate risks and the lockdown situation to make sure that banks across the board would conserve capital. That being said, our role as supervisors and not regulators, so we're not doing regulations, is to look at banks on a bank-specific basis. So one by one. And so it means that although the dividend recommendation across the board was withdrawn, we continue looking at the capital trajectory in business plans and profitability prospects of all banks in looking at their distribution plans and challenging their distribution plans. So this is what we will continue doing across the board. And we do expect, of course, over time as climate-related risk will continue materializing in the economy that they will take more and more time and more and more impact on the profitability and business plans of the banks. And so this is what we will expect to see with respect of, of course, tying dividend policies to transition planning or IDs like this. I think this is more for the regulation, we say, and not for us. So we will, we will need to see whether the regulation and how the regulation evolves. And of course, we will follow up if and when the regulation evolves. And again, we do believe that having works working on transition plans and fully embedding the climate dimension and also environmental risk dimension into the capital planning on the medium term makes an awful lot of sense. And we expect that this will be taking place across the board in the coming years. With respect to your question on what does it mean enforcement actions. So we have, I'm sure, a place in our placeholder in our website where we explain what are enforcement actions. I think the first one that comes to mind is what we call periodic penalty payments. It means that a bank that would not implement one of our expectations would be ultimately upon, of course, decision from the supervisory board and government counsel. Would be subject to periodic penalty payments until it does implement the binding requirements that was communicated to it before. Thank you, Patrick Frank. Maybe very, very shortly adding to this last last question. Of course, you know, the toolbox has a lot of things that we will do things in a proportional manner. So if a bank acts just because, you know, we asked them politely, that is, of course, the best that we can send operational letters. There are shred letters. There is periodic penalty movements. So the entire toolbox is rather risk rich. We will use them in a proportional manner. And also to just say that, you know, the deadlines that we have said, what we did last year when we asked the banks to self assess against our, our supervisor expectations, the guide that we published at the end of 2020. We also asked all banks to make action plans. And if we, you know, looking at these action plans, we actually saw that banks, you know, are planning themselves to comply by, you know, more or less the deadlines that we have now set. So, so, so actually I would be disappointed if we needed to skill up in that, in that enforcement letter, if you like, but we do have these tools, and we will use them if we need. Thanks so much, Patrick and Frank for your answers to your questions. We have six minutes left. We have three questions here. So if we don't make it to the end to have everybody ask a question, please put them in the chat and we'll get back to you. But let's give it a try. So I want to have that. Please keep it short and to the point. And then I want to give the floor to Berger Gasali from New Europeans International. Thank you very much. Question to Frank and Patrick as you supervise banks on their journey towards greater adequacy and transparency. Have you noticed any patterns emerging in terms of what is conditioning their behavior in being more compliant? What seems to be working best in terms of helping towards more adequacy and transparency and what could be the role of civil society? How can, if any, in helping with that, particularly in relation to transparency? Thank you. Thank you. That's a behavioral question. Patrick, can I give the floor to you first? Yeah, I think what is, it's a very, it's a very almost philosophical question. But I think one thing that works, of course, is the banks understanding that they have our full interest. And that we are ready to go to the bottom of it. So that's, of course, a profound helper in having them moving. But I think if you, if one wants to have real progress at the end of the day, what is extremely important that they get themselves convinced and that their governance is convinced of the urgency and importance of the matter. And so this is one of the reasons why we insisted so much on having banks first conducting good materiality assessments, because when they do so, they do realize. And second, having responsibility for climate-related topics at both levels. Very important as well. Maybe the third point from the civil society, of course, having the regular pressure from the civil society will continue being important. Because banks also react, of course, to civil society, react to their customer demands, and react to their investors, community, and so on and so forth. And from that perspective, I think having intrusive reading of banks' financial disclosures and the so-called philosophy disclosures and so on and so forth, what we call in our jargon the market pressure is extremely important to our mind as well. And having banks that no one sees that civil society customers, investors look at what they commit and whether they explain what they commit to and whether they follow up on their own commitments are important to us, of course. And I know the time is running, but I think it's such an important question that I want to add a little bit as well. I think that on board level, people have started to get in the sense that they now, you know, I don't think there is now bankers that say, you know, we have to be, you know, we have to have a Paris compatible balance sheet just because they think that civil society or their stakeholders are large or us want to hear that. I think most really want that. But now the question is, how do you put that into practice? It's easy to say my balancing bill be net zero by 2050. But the challenge needs to be, what are you going to do tomorrow? And how are you going to measure this? And how are you going to be transparent about this? And how are you going to ramp up if you don't get to where you need to be on these intermediate milestones? So going from the more conceptual understanding, which I think, more or less now is there, and it's very important, because, you know, the tone at the top, the understanding at the top, the conviction at the top is an absolutely necessary condition. But it's certainly not a sufficient condition. And now this needs to be translated into real intermediate action. And there I think, you know, we will be relentlessly pushing and I think you can as well. Thanks, thanks so much. I'm afraid that this was the last questions we could answer during this session. And I have to say, I very, very much enjoyed it. So, Alexander, Lucas, if you please send the questions to us, we'll make sure that we'll get back to you in another way. Because it's time to wrap up. And I would like to thank you all for joining us today and for making your valuable interventions. As I close this seminar today, we would strongly encourage you to answer a couple of questions in the feedback survey, which is now appearing on your WebEx screen if that's all going according to plan. It's completely anonymous, but it's just to help us tremendously when we think about how to improve our next edition of our seminar series or other things we can take into account. So while you fill in the survey now, I would like to take a moment to thank Frank and Patrick both for being here today with us and for providing some really, really insightful views on the work of the SSM and climate risks and the results of the thematic review. I think we can all agree that climate risk is a very pertinent issue to discuss. And it's very important for both the ECB and the civil society to ensure transparency regarding the ECB's actions as well as hearing from you, your opinions and working together to weather the storm. With that, I would like to very much thank you for your presence here today, for your great questions and your interactions. And I wish you all a very lovely afternoon and looking forward to seeing you all back in the future in the next edition. Thank you so much.