 Approaching a terminus platform is one of the most important parts of a train driver's duties. This is because usually at the end of the line there is a wall, buffer stops or sand drag. Even at low speed, a collision with a solid object can be pretty catastrophic. The reason is pretty simple. A big heavy object like a train stopping, hitting something, transfers all the momentum to the vehicle's occupants. And even a collision at a few miles an hour can result in damage and injuries. An accident in 1975 would make London Underground completely rethink how it protects trains approaching terminus platforms. Resulting in an addition to the signalling system which would take the name of the tragedy, Moorgate. Before the days of transmission based train control was implemented on the northern line, drivers were taught during manual handling, Moorgate, more brake. Today's video isn't about the northern line platforms that you can visit today, but instead platforms 9 and 10 which form parts of the route called the North City Line. This short route between Moorgate and Drayton Park has had a number of operators since its 1904 opening and was under the control of London Transport up until 1976. The line when opened by the Great Northern and City Railway ran from Moorgate to Thinsbury Park low level and was pretty much isolated from the rest of the rail network. It was built using a similar construction method to the city in South London Lime. This gave the tunnels a similar look to the deep level tube lines like the Bakerloo, Central, Piccadilly, Northern and Waterloo City Lines, but with one exception. That was the tunnel diameter. On your standard deep level line the tunnel loading gauge is around 12 feet, but the new Northern City Line was built to accommodate mainline stock and as such it was built to a larger 16 feet loading gauge. During construction the route was originally planned to run beyond Moorgate to proposed Loughbury Station. These plans were abandoned, but a small runoff tunnel had been constructed which would house a sand drag. The line was never very profitable, which led to being taken over by the Metropolitan Railway, the pre-runner to the Metropolitan Line in 1913. After the formation of the London Passenger Transport Board in 1933 the Metropolitan was lumped in with the other underground railways and the line was rebranded as the Northern City Line. In 1934 it was then re-rebranded as part of the Edgeware Morden Line which was in itself renamed the Northern Line in 1937. Eventually in 1939 operations were transferred from the Metropolitan to the Northern. The inclusion into the Northern Line formed part of the Failed Northern Heights project. I'm not going to cover this here, but I do know someone who has done a video on the subject. In 1964 the Northern City Line was cut back from Thinsbury Park to Drayton Park with its former platforms becoming part of the Piccadilly and the then new Victoria Line to allow cross-platform interchange. And this would form the final chapter of the Line's London Underground operation and you guessed it this came hand in hand with another rebranding to the Northern Line Hybrid Branch. This meant that passengers wanting to travel from Thinsbury Park to Moorgate would have to travel on the Victoria Line to Hybrid in Islington and then change from the Northern City Line. Moorgate Platform 9 had a sand drag heaped up to about two feet above the rail level. Beyond this was a defunct hydraulic buffer stop then a brick wall. Entry to platforms 9 and 10 were accessible from a crossover which was protected by signal November Delta 9-10. And at the end of each platform was a fixer red light which denoted the limit of movement authority for trains in the station. In the early 1970s the route was once again pegged for change as a link was constructed from Drayton Park back to Thinsbury Park albeit at this time on the high level to allow it to be connected to the main line. As part of these plans the line would then come under control of British Rail and be operated on the national network albeit with local instructions very similar to the LUL rulebook. But this change over wasn't to happen until August 1976 and our disaster happened in February 1975 but first let's talk about the trains and their safety systems. The rolling stock used on the line were 1938 tube stock comprised of two three car units coupled together totaling 316 feet 6 inches in length weighing in at around 151 tons. The cars were body on frame construction with the body shell consisting of steel sheets welded and riveted together. This was placed onto a steel frame. The seating layout was standard for the time with a mixture of longitudinal and transverse similar but not identical to the 1972 stock on the Bakelulheim. The door arrangement was again standard for the time with single leaf doors at each end with two double leaf doors in the middle. On the driving motor cars the cab took the place that would have been occupied by the single leaf door on one end. The trains were operated as part of the two-person crew one motorman and one guard. Manual driven London Underground lines have a form of train protection called the train stop tripcock system and is part of the two main safety systems employed on the network. It in its most basic form is a mechanical way to apply the emergency brakes on a unit in situations where the driver has passed a signal at danger or entered certain sections of track too fast. You see without this type of protection there will be nothing to stop a train from going past a conflict point or into the rear of another train apart from the actions of the driver or shutting off traction current. The other safety system is called the dead man's device this is fitted to the master controller. The controller is used to control the traction motors by actuating resistors. If the handle is released then the train pipe is vented to atmosphere putting the emergency brakes on. The 1938 tube stock made use of several intertwined systems all of which had to work to allow the unit to take power. One such was the control governor. This would cut out the traction motors if there was insufficient air to operate the brakes. The train had two types of braking systems both operated the same physical brakes but provided air in different ways. But first let's look at the Westinghouse system which the brakes are based off. The system uses a reduction in air pressure in the train line to indirectly apply the brakes. It uses a triple valve which allows air into a tank ready to be used. It applies the brakes and it releases them. The braking system is a combination of the Westinghouse automatic brake and a self-lapping electroneumatic brake. The EP brake allows for multiple brake applications and releases and uses its own mainline air pipe whereas Westinghouse requires a little more thought. The Westinghouse brake isn't self-lapping meaning when you apply the brake you have to move the brake controller into lap to hold the required air in the brake cylinders and uses the train line air pipe. This system traces its heritage all the way back to the days of steam. This doesn't allow much room for error as you can only add brake pressure, thus increasing braking force. If you do overdo it then you need to release the brakes and this is not something you'd want to do when approaching a platform. LUL uses a two-aspect signalling system which only has, unsurprisingly, two aspects red for stop and green for go. Unlike national rail trains LUL rolling stock doesn't have a warning system like AWS instead relying on the driver's liner site to the next signal. If the signal visibility is obstructed say by the curvature of the track then a repeating signal is provided and can give two indications yellow meaning the signal it is repeating is at danger red and green meaning the signal ahead is clear. Each stop signal is provided with a train stop a metal bar that is next to the right-hand running rail which is electroneumatically operated that rises three inches high when the associated signal is at danger. This makes contact with a tripcock that is mounted to the right-hand shoe beam of the train when this is tripped, vents all the air out and applies the emergency brake. If you wanted to be a driver on London Underground way back when you had to follow a pretty set career path the traditional route to Motor Man at the time was to work your way through the ranks starting as a guard after which you could then go for your motors which would promote you to a guard Motor Man until a position of Motor Man came up This was the same career progression route 450 year old Motor Man L. B. Neusen who had started with the company in 1969 as a guard working out of Barking Depot He qualified as a guard Motor Man in 1974 racking up only six days of 1938 Tube Stock driving experience He'd also gained around 31 days of experience driving the C69 stock on the Hammersmith & City service In January 1975 he transferred to the hybrid branch line based out of Drayton Park Depot aged 56 His training took place on the 22nd of January 1975 His instructor noted that Neusen was cautious but competent as a driver For the next few weeks the newly qualified driver Neusen set about the usual duties of a Motor Man on the hybrid branch line Between the 23rd of January and the 28th of February 1975 Neusen had driven to Moorgate several hundred times This leads us on to the morning of the 28th of February 1975 Motor Man Neusen booking on the No. 2 duty at 6.24 driving 272 Unsurprisingly the shift would involve multiple trips to and from Moorgate including bringing the train into service at the start of the working Neusen was already at work at 6.10am with plenty of time to make a cup of tea and ready himself for the shift ahead A fellow driver asked Neusen for some sugar which he obliged saying be careful with it as I'd like to have another cup after my shift In his work bag he had his tea, milk, sugar, rulebook and a notebook and in his coat he had £270 to buy a used car for his daughter in the afternoon The day started off with Neusen's usual guard Mr Robert Harris running late and due to this another driver volunteered to work as a guard until Harris met the train en route When Harris met the train at Moorgate the two set on their usual routine and nothing unusual was noted by Harris It was well known by many of the drivers at Drayton Park that Neusen approached platforms slower than others showing a more cautious driving style The remaining journeys went as they had done hundreds of times before with Neusen driving as he normally did When 272 set off from Drayton Park at 08.38am around a minute late little did anyone know that the busy rush hour train would be taking its last trip Due to the exit stairway being at the end of the platforms at Moorgate the majority of the train's passengers occupied the front three carriages As explained by guard Harris later All seemed well with Neusen testing the Westinghouse brake at the penultimate station as per the instructions for the 1938 tube stock Harris walked around the rear carriage where the guard's panel was located in search for a newspaper But as soon as the train approached Moorgate and the station lights came into view Neusen seemed to be driving much more aggressively A signalman on platform 9 at Moorgate saw train 272 approach the platform at a speed estimated at between 35 and 40mph Spending down the platform and seeing the first couple of cars disappearing into the overrun tunnel A second later the front cab then impacted the sand drag eventually going straight into the buffers beyond This was quickly followed by car number 2 and three crushing into one another The complete 52 foot length of the first car was crushed into 20 feet of tunnel The second car had pushed under the first significantly damaging the body but not severely deforming the frame The third car was much less damaged but did show signs of the impact The thin steel body crumpled trapping passengers within The platform became engulfed with a thick cloud of dust and debris from the impact and the sound rang about the tunnels of Moorgate Station The first emergency call was sent out at 8.48pm The response was quick with the London Ambulance Service personnel reaching the station at 8.54pm At around the same time the City of London Police informed nearby St Bart's Hospital of a train collision at Moorgate but the severity of the incident was yet to be known At 8.57pm the first of the London Fire Brigade reached the scene and after an initial inspection the event was raised to major accident level A doctor who had gone to the scene from nearby offices seen a carnage requested all the morphine from a nearby boots pharmacy and by 9.00am all from the third much less damaged carriage evacuated By 9.30am many of the surrounding roads had been closed off to allow space for the constant stream of ambulances taking casualties to hospitals Byman cut holes in parts of the train structure in the floors and ceilings through which it was possible to crawl about the wreckage to retrieve casualties By now a triage and makeshift operating theatre was set up on the platform tackling the severity of some of the injuries Due to being underground radios were ineffective meaning runners had to be used to request assistance and extra medical supplies and again due to the location everything from plasters to machinery had to be moved by hand down to platform 9 By 12 noon only 5 live casualties were still stuck in the train and by 3.15 only 2 were left who were trapped together in the first carriage Because services had ceased the air in the station began to stagnate as no trains were pushing in fresh air This also had a horrible side effect of drastically increasing the temperature on the platform The final 2 were removed at 8.55pm and 10pm respectively with the first needing to have her foot amputated To clear the wreckage the main cutting equipment was used On the 1st of March the third carriage began to be winched back down the track and a true damage was revealed to the rescue workers During the 1st and 2nd of March the wreckage of the second carriage was cut away in sections and it wouldn't be until the 4th that Neusen's body could be retrieved At 3.20pm on the same day the last passenger body was removed The driver's cab normally 3 feet deep and crushed to 6 inches The investigators ascertained that Neusen was at his controls although his head had been forced through the front window Neusen's body was removed at 8.05pm on the 4th of March The remainder of the wreckage was cleared by 5pm on the 5th of March and the control of the platform was handed back to London Underground Now as always with incidents and with a death toll of 43 and over 70 people injured in the remains, how did the accident happen? Whereafter investigators checked the service history of the train and inspections of the equipment it was deemed that the units were of sound working condition They also discovered that no breaking effort was made as the handle positions were in off leaving one outcome the human element This is where we'll never actually know what the cause was as the autopsy showed no signs of any physical conditions such as a stroke or heart attack Initial tests showed no drugs or alcohol in Neusen's bloodstream and there was no evidence of liver damage from heavy drinking An analysis of Neusen's kidneys by toxicologist Dr Anne Robinson showed his blood alcohol level at the time of the post-mortem was 80mg per 100ml However this can be caused as part of the decomposition process Neusen's demeanour on the day seemed to be the same as any other working day according to his colleagues and even the guard working with him Suicide would seem unlikely as Neusen did have plans after his shift and if he was showing signs of distress someone might have picked up on it with the regular changing ends on such a short route leaving a mystery as to why Neusen didn't react to the situation I.K.A. McNaughton was tasked with setting up an inquiry and on the 4th of March 1976 his report was published concluding I must conclude therefore that the cause of this accident lay entirely in the behaviour of Motor Man Neusen during the final minute before the accident occurred whether his behaviour was deliberate or whether it was a result of a suddenly arising physical condition not revealed as a result of the post-mortem examination there is not sufficient evidence to examine but I am satisfied that no part of the responsibility for the accident rests with any other person and that there was no fault or condition of the train, track or signalling that in any way contributed to it there are many theories linked to Neusen's lack of reaction but one of the most likely is possibly due to daydreaming or distraction as cuts on his hands indicated that he had raised his arms before the point of impact leading up to the crash Neusen had had two platform overshoots in the week previously which may have hinted to a concentration issue but we will never know for sure the disaster did have a positive effect on London Underground and its train protection system a type of protection named after the crash came into effect this Morgate system used multiple time controlled train stops on approach to buffers at terminal stations these would lower the train stop once the train was doing a particular speed checking the train down to a safer velocity to reduce the damage of any potential impact if the train violated the speed the train stop would hit the tripcock putting the train's emergency brakes on this coupled with a resistor on the current rails set to reduce the amount of power a train can draw when approaching a terminus means that an accident like Morgate shouldn't happen again well, at least not on London Underground as more lines go to automatic operation the risks of human related collisions go down drastically as most ATO lines limit manual operation were not protected by the signalling system to below 10mph on the main line the implementation of TPWS on routes and stock should put accidents like Morgate firmly kept in the past I've got a Patreon and YouTube membership as well so you can check that out if you fancy supporting the channel financially all that's left to say is thank you for watching