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Published on Oct 16, 2015
In recent work, I have developed the view that sentences serve to characterize attitudinal objects, such as mental states (e.g. beliefs, intentions), modal objects (e.g. needs, permissions, abilities), cognitive products (e.g. thoughts, decisions), as well as illocutionary products (assertions, requests, promises). On this view, independent sentences as well as sentences embedded under illocutionary verbs are predicates of the illocutionary product. Following Twardowski's distinction between actions and products, I take illocutionary products to be the abstract artifacts that result from illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts in turn are performed by performing locutionary acts (which in turn are performed by performing phonologival and phonetic acts) (Austin 1969). This raises an important issue, namely what is the relation between locutionary products and illocutionary products? Are locutionary products parts of illocutionary products (and thus illocutionary products come with a physical manifestation) or are there illocutionary products that do not have locutionary products as parts? Moreover, may sentences also serve as predicates of locutionary products alone, as when they are embedded under verbs of saying and verbs of manner of speech? Finally, how can locutionary and other lower-level linguistic products be used for a novel and unified analysis of quotation?