Berit Brogaard: Making Sense of Ontological Commitment Part 1

Making Sense of Ontological Commitment
Berit Brogaard (Missouri/ANU)

Abstract:
According to Quine, a sentence S commits us to Fs just in case there must be Fs in order for S to be true. I argue that this and related criteria of ontological commitment are inadequate, as they trivialize the notion of ontological commitment. I then offer a different criterion of ontological commitment in terms of what we are rationally required to believe. This alternative criterion is in line with characterizations of ontological commitment offered by Quine in central works. If, however, this alternative criterion is correct, then a rather surprising consequence follows: ontological commitment is not a relation between a sentence and an object or a class of objects but is rather a relation between an intentional act and a hyperintension.

The paper that grew out of this talk can be read at http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/FullTextInscrutabilityandOntological.pdf

Category:

Education

Tags:

• Philosophy
• Berit
• Brit
• Brogaard
• Ontology
• Ontological
• Commitment
• Quine