Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet's Experiments

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Uploaded by on Jan 18, 2011

Alfred Mele, Florida State University. Presented at the Social Trends Institute Experts Meeting on the question "Is Science Compatible with Our Desire for Freedom?" held in Barcelona, Spain, October 28-30, 2010.

More on Libet Experiments: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libet_experiments.html

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  • Our lives are based on our decisions

    Our decisions are based on our personality structure.

    Our personality is found in our brain (Yes...it is! Fuck you.)

    Our brains wiring is based on our DNA

    And our DNA is pure luck.

    Therefore our lives boil down to luck and this is inescapable.

  • @jonwalksred I don't think he opened with refutations. He opened with "Why do I care about this?" and then gave moral reasons why he cared. But his refutations were scientific, not moral.

  • That's endure this debate, not "ensure"!

  • I don't know this guy, but his opening 5 mins are extremely suspect. He refutations consist purely of moral implications. This says absolutely nothing about the fallibility of the science in the experiment. It's very difficult to ensure this debate when the opening 5 mins are so disingenuous.

  • I'm not at all impressed with this guy. None of this arguments are empirical. It's entirely based on his fear of amoral people. This joke experiment is easily discredited when you consider Libet's experiments threw out "planning ahead" from the equation. There are decades of work building upon Libet's work which confirm it.

    He mentions no parts of the brain, no circuits, no neurological counter propositions, and he neglects to acknowledge what has actually been discovered because of Libet.

  • The relation of intention and deciding needs more exploration. The "text" of a proximal intention may be regarded as containing 'now'. But this may be problematic; for if we construe deciding as forming an intention to act now, we form an intention now to act "now." The confusion exists because there is a need to distinguish volition and proximal intention. This increases the burden of interpretation, but addresses the even more complex notion of token reflexives.

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