LIKE the CIA study, claimed that some 2.5-3 million people who lived in rural areas before the revolution (the "old people" in the CIA study) "did not suffer nearly as much under the Pol Pot administration" (which is still, of course, different from claiming that they did not suffer, or that they didn't make out badly). "The old people - those living in rural areas when Pol Pot gained control - fared somewhat better. They too, however, suffered from food shortages, lack of medical care, and hard labour." Those are just the peasants who remained in the countryside when Pol Pot took control. The peasants who fled to the cities (implied from the estimates in the paper, approximately 2 million people, or about a quarter of the population, based on UN estimate that about a quarter of population would be urban in 1975, when in fact more than half was) and were then, by definition, "new people", suffered significantly more, but the report in no way implies or suggests that "few peasants really suffered" or "most peasants didn't make out badly".
Time has shown that this report has serious flaws, most notably the complete lack of any discussion of the purges of 1977 and 1978. Some scholars (particularly Michael Vickery) have suggested that this omission represented a deliberate attempt to whitewash the Khmer Rouge, to justify U.S. opposition to the government installed by the Vietnamese invasion.
The old people - those living in rural areas when Pol Pot gained control - fared somewhat better. They too, however, suffered from food shortages, lack of medical care, and hard labour. We estimate that their births slightly outnumbered their deaths and that the old people population increased negligibly during this period.
The idea that Khmer Rouge attacks on Thailand and Vietnam indicate that the Khmer Rouge had popular support is bewildering. This presents a rather unique yardstick for measuring a regime's popularity: apparently, according to this logic, any country that attacks its neighbours must surely be endowed with the support of its populace.
Moreover, Chomsky and Herman's arguments ignore a very basic fact: the military was a privileged class in the Khmer Rouge regime. Khmer Rouge soldiers were not part of the suffering masses. They were part of the apparatus of control.
Finally, it is should be remembered that the book went to press after the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978. The earlier strikes that Vietnam had launched in response to the Khmer Rouge border raids had been limited, and, given that Vietnam quickly withdrew, one could claim that the attacks had been repelled. The December 1978 invasion, however, was the real thing. The result? The Khmer Rouge regime collapsed like a house of cards, in part because of a complete lack of support from the population they had enslaved.
JAN. 4, 1976 Serious fighting erupts on Tral Island or Phu Quoc (according to a month report by Khmer Rouge soldier on Seh Island to Son Sen - Dep. PM and Defense Minister alias Brother 89 or Khieu). Plans, helicopters and cannons are used. Ships carried red flags with pictures of Angkor Wat temple and white flags are shot at by people on Tral Island.
JAN. 23, 1976 Khmer Rouge soldier reports to Son Sen that on the night of Jan. 22, the Vietnamese attacked their force. The Khmer Rouges who were one Kilometre from Pou Nhek Mountain were ordered to withdraw by the Vietnamese, who claim that it is their land.
FEB. 8, 1976 Khmer Rouge soldier reports to Son Sen about the border problem with Vietnam and seeks the minister's advise: "I'd like to report to Brother about the border problem in which the Vietnamese established their base in our territory: Our soldiers met with Teu Dic who is in charge of the planting section. They camped along the Huch Stream in Pou Trakk Village. The info that the Region's soldier gave is that they move 1 Kilometre into our territory. We went to inspect all together. The Vietnamese did not recognize this borderline. They said that our map is not correct. Our Soldiers ordered them to withdraw from that place completely but they did not withdraw...Does Brother have any comment on the above issues?"
SEPT. 28, 1977 Pol Pot began his state visit to China; he was greeted at Peking's airport by Communist Party Chairman and PM Hua Guofeng and other top Chinese leaders. A crowd of 100,000 cheered Pol Pot and his delegation as they were driven through the city's main square. At a banquet given in his honor later of the day, Pol Pot said conditions in his country "excellent" and he made references to his country's recent border clashes with Vietnam and Thailand.
Is there an English Version, Can't Understand French,. =(
Khmerville 3 years ago
Sorry no, but you can read the description
AhmekKhmer 3 years ago