Description of Video 4:
Argument:
1. Type PCT (including the principle of credulity) is correct.
2. Theistic experience is a well-established type of experience.
3. It seems (epistemically) to (a subject) that God exists on the basis of theistic experience, E.
4. The theistic experience, E, is not defeated.
5. Therefore, (a subject) is justified to believe that God exists.
Type Principle of Critical Trust: If it seems (epistemically) to (a subject) that p (e.g. God exists) on the basis of a noetic experience E, and (that experience) belongs to a well-established type of experience, then (a subject) has prima facie justification for belief that p (e.g. God exists), which is sufficient for justified belief that p (e.g. God exists) simpliciter in the absence of defeaters.
Principle of Critical Trust (can include all of the principles below):
Principle of Credulity: If it seems (epistemically) to me that x is present on the basis of experience, then probably x is present unless there are special considerations to the contrary.
Principle of Testimony: Other things being equal, others’ experiences are likely to be as they report them to be.
Principle of Simplicity: “In a given field, we take as most likely to be true the simplest theory which fits best with other theories of neighboring fields to produce the simplest set of theories of the world, (take from Swinburne, 1986).”
Ground level sifting: Always choose the consistent subset of our presumptive data, which has maximal weight.
Principle of Consensus: When an epistemic seeming is consensually corroborated, it is justified to a much higher degree.
Principle of Epistemic Defeat: We should not believe that things are as they seem to be in cases when such a belief is in conflict with the simplest theory compatible with a vast number of data obtained by supposing in a vast number of other cases that things are as they seem to be.
Principle of Epistemic Enhancement: When an epistemic seeming is coherent with other epistemic seemings, and its truth is coherent with or even suggested by the simplest theory which can explain many other epistemic seemings, then its degree of justification will considerably be enhanced.
Principle of Comparison: A type of experience E1 is better established than E2 if either (a) ceteris paribus, E1 has a higher degree of intra-coherence than E2, or, (b) ceteris paribus, E1 has a higher degree of intra-coherence than E2, or, (c) ceteris paribus, E1 has a higher degree of worldview coherence than E2.
Principle of Conflict Resolution: If type E1 conflicts with type E2 and that E1 is better established that E2, then E1 can sere as a defeater of E2.
Principle of Conservation: When an experience is defeated, it is rational to salvage as much noetic content as possible from that epistemic seeming, that is, to retain the highest undefeated level of epistemic seeming embedded in the at experience.
Criteria of intra-coherence: the degree of intra-coherence of a type of experience would increase with the follow factors:
1. the number of people sharing E
2. the frequency of occurrence of E to an individual
3. the variability of the situations in which E occurs
4. the explanatory coherence between the tokens of E (specific e.g. of E), and
5. the conceptual coherence of E’s ontological framework
References:
Craig, W.L., & Moreland, J.P. (2009). The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pulishing Ltd
Hick, J. (2006) The New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the Transcendent. Basingstoke, England and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moreland, J.P. (1987). Scaling the Secular City. Grand Rapids: MI, Baker Book House
Nash, R. H. (1988). Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Plantinga, A., & Wolterstorff, N. (1983). Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Norte Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press
Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 250-521
Schaefer, R.T. and Lamm, R.P. (1995) Sociology (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill
William Rowe, (1982) “Religious experience and the principle of credulity,” International Journal fro Philosophy of Religion, 13, 85-92
"Principle of Consensus"
So essentially this is an attempt to reject the logical fallacy of argumentum ad populum. Many people believing in unicorns does not improve justification of such a belief.
This all seems like BS to me. If a person on acid has the perception that there are pink elephants on the ceiling we can legitimately say they are 'wrong'. First person experience does not delegitimize reality.
itry2brational 2 years ago
The principle of consensus is not as strong as you read it, it does not imply that the number of people is what makes something true. It's proposition is much more humble suggesting rather that if there are a number of people who corroborate a testimony, then it is better justified than by one sole corroboration.
telemantros 2 years ago
Hey love your new intro but you lost me in your discussion.
likecards 2 years ago
Maybe I can help here, which part are you having problems with?
telemantros 2 years ago
hello tele , thxz for the vid bro .,.,.,.,
matmicmj 2 years ago
No problem friend.
telemantros 2 years ago