Secular Ethics: Hume, Moore, Paintings and Naturalistic Fallacies

I'm going to do a second video soon on the responses floating around academia to the Is/ought distinction. To solve the gap of last consequence there requires a counter-example, and there are two or three compelling ones by Searle, Foot and Gewrick among others:
Part 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRf7HT23w7Y

VFX's video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y184H70tM3o

MP67's Response to VFX:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhKlmMHwkA8

Recommended Reading:

G. P. Baker and P. M. Hacker American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 4: Rules, Definitions and the Naturalistic Fallacy.
John Finnis Natural Law and the 'Is'--'Ought' Question
John Haldane. MacIntyre's Thomist revival -- Faithful Reason.
Robert Adams: Finite and Infinite Goods
After Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre
Good and Evil Peter Geach
For a somewhat similar argument that I've made here in a much more thorough way, see Stilley, S.. Natural law theory and the "Is"---"Ought" problem. Diss. Marquette. PQ'10.
Phillipa Foot Moral Beliefs

Paintings:
Daryl Turner: "Hidden Message"
Various Pollock paintings
Darko- "As Above"
Miguel Arzabe: "Infinite Regress"
Michael Chavel: "Discard of Analogy"

Category:

Education

Tags:

• Secular Ethics
• Naturalistic Fallacy
• Is ought
• David Hume
• is ought distinction
• theologica37
• GE Moore
• Gerald Moore
• Naturalism
• Naturalist
• Jackson Pollock
• VenomFangX
• MichaelPayton67
• emotivism
• virtue ethics
• thomism
• St. Thomas Aquinas
• Aquinas
• Christianity
• Ethics
• Morality
• Moral Philosophy
• Natural Selection
• Richard Dawkins
• Daniel Dennett
• Sam Harris
• Christopher Hitchens
• Peter Geach
• Alasdair MacIntyre
• Principa Ethica
• JL Mackie

[MichaelPayton67]

I'll try to reply by the end of the day if I can get to the computer quick enough :)

[Theologica37]

I'm going to be uploading the second video here soon that should have a little more on OQA's and the naturalistic fallacies. The really only quarrel I had was on the painting comparison, background knowledge differences and on evolution as a possible prime example of a teleological-function.

[JaysThoughts]

Of course the good must be self referential. Otherwise, good for what? Good to who? The irreducable primary is simple- my life. It must be. That which is of optimal benefit and not merely of most immediate gratification to my life- this is a demonstratable "good", defined by a standard which is both consistent and capable of being tested and measured. Any notion that something outside of myself, god, society, popular opinion, culture of the day.. can define Good has always proven ridiculous.

[dfpolis]

Another articulate and informative video. Technically, I think that if you replaced the black screen with reinforcing visuals, even text summaries of the points being made, that would help. Peace, DP

[dfpolis]

I don't buy Moore. Can't reason find the hand of God in nature? If it can, can't scientific reason (not natural science) see some of God's purposes in what nature, a divine activity, does or holds open for us? Why can't we say with Aristotle & Aquinas that the good lies in the completion of divinely intended natural processes? With Maslow that we desire self-realization, & see what that requires? This allows a natural law ethics & sends us back to nature to find ends & means. Peace, DP

[NoctambulantJoycean]

that identification of moral facts with any other sort of fact fails. But if there are moral facts, there must be some non-moral facts that give rise to intrinsic normativity or R properties (of which moral properties are a subset). And this is a problem regardless of whether you're a naturalist or not: how do you show that moral, reason-giving properties arise from your ontologically distinct natural or teleological or theological or... properties? That was Mackie's point + it was insightful.

[NoctambulantJoycean]

people who do (and don't) think there are so reason-giving (R) properties, and another between people who argue over what those properties attach to. I think Mackie would not only deny the existence R properties, but also deny that, even if there were such properties, R properties attach to God's commands, God's nature, teleological facts, claims about human essence, etc. I would agree. If the naturalistic fallacy is really a fallacy (which I doubt), the same sort of argument would show (cont)

[NoctambulantJoycean]

Couple of quick points.

First, Mackie's argumentative strategy is generalizable beyond just natural properties (combine Garner's "On the genuine queerness of..." with Pigden's insights into "theological naturalism" in A Companion to Ethics and Richard Joyce's views on normativity): give me any theologocial, teleological, etc. property, and I could deny that it has intrinsic normative force (or is somehow intrinsically reason-giving). There are really 2 debates going on here: one between (cont).

[rumpranger65]

@Ephemerance Do you mean like "emotivism" of Russell and such? You know about the embedding problem already right?

[Ephemerance]

I would argue that language is instructional, not descriptive. When someone says something is good, they are not referring to an objective standard of what ought be considered good but a psychological preference to specific qualities.

Great video, you and Shawn have done well illustrating the argument.

[MichaelPayton67]

@Theologica37

Good, I am making my response now and I'm really focusing only on the painting example.