The Definition of Morality - Part 2 of 5

Stephen Stich takes us on a journey through recent moral philosophy, meta-ethics, numerous studies in moral psychology, a discussion of the moral/conventional task, and some interesting moral dilemmas, in an attempt to define morality.
Lots of interesting things to consider.


Stich is primarily known in philosophy for his work in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, epistemology, and moral psychology. In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Stich (1983) has argued for a form of eliminative materialism—the view that talk of the mental should be replaced with talk of its physical substrate. Since then, however, he has changed some of his views on the mind. See Deconstructing the Mind (1996) for his more recent views. In epistemology, he has explored (with several of his colleagues) the nature of intuitions using the techniques of experimental philosophy, especially epistemic intuitions that vary among cultures. This work reflects a general skepticism about conceptual analysis and the traditional methods of analytic philosophy. In The Fragmentation of Reason he briefly sketched a form of epistemic relativism "in the spirit of pragmatism."

http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Stich

http://www.semionet.com/FR/default.htm

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[Kenzofeis]

@Ramatganski Yes, this shows that moral is for a large part unreliable, the source may use it only for manipulative purposes and laughs all the way to the bank so to speak..

[Ramatganski]

It's not a given that those who define morality consider themselves to be moral through and through. So the person defining morality CAN be objective simply by allowing themselves to turn out to be also immoral by standards of their own definition.

[randyhelzerman]

Dude, the victim cannot identify themselves as a vitcim without morality. There are plenty of kids who think that their parents beating them is a sign of love, and there are plenty of battered women who think they deserve it. They are of course wrong, but they are wrong because they have an incorrect grasp on morality.

[musekiteer]

The original comment is there. I said *can* do ...

[randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) this is of course obvously bullshit. Whether somebody is the victim, or whether somebody has been harmed or not, is determined by morality, not vice versa.

[randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) For example, suppose a man beats his wife. He then says "I'm the victim here, not her--she was harming me by complaining about my drinking. That constant nagging can really cause you psychological harm, and I beat her in self-defence". You think he's wrong? What if he then says to you "I think that handing over the assessment of harm to the perpetrator to their convenient definition of morals is bazckwards. i'm the victim, and I can asses and convey harm". (cont)

[randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer). What tells what we should be doing is morality, not vice versa. We are actually not in disagreement at all about what constitutes a moral act---we both believe that beating kids is immoral. We are not in disagreement at all about what constitutes harm. We both agree that beating kids harms them. We are both liberal, and are deeply concerned with harm and fairness. But I don't think you really believe that the victim can assess and convey harm at all. (cont)

[randyhelzerman]

Hi Muskateer, a recent survey of pediatricians showed that over half of them believe that occasional beating of kids was ok. Only one third of them said that kids should never be beat. Are you sure you are comming from a physicians point of view on injury? Physicians can describe how kids are brused by beating, and psychologists can describe how behaviors of children change when beat, but neither one can tell us whether those bruises or changes SHOULD be happening. (cont)

[musekiteer]

We are obviously in disagreement over the starting point for assessment of what constitutes harm and an immoral act.

I do understand what you are saying. I still disagree, but I am coming from a physician's point of view on injury. I am liberal, so I attend to harm and fairness.

I think that handing over the assessment of harm to the perpetrator or bystander and to their possibly convenient definition of morals is backwards. The victim can assess and convey harm.

[randyhelzerman]

That we judge the harm to be the same is irrelevant--if we thought it was good for somebody to be shot in the foot, we wouldn't judge that any harm had been done to them at all, just like bad parents don't think they are harming their kids when they beat them. And the difficulty of agreeing on the definition of morals is another red herring--no matter what your definition of morals are, you use them to determine whether harm has been done, and not vice versa.