Why the TSA's New Restrictions Are Incredibly Stupid

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently announced new flight restrictions--to prevent attacks similar to the incident in Detroit, no one can get out of their seats or have anything on their laps for the last hour of a flight. Unfortunately, this is a ridiculous restriction that won't stop any terrorists and only annoy passengers needlessly.

In this video, I explain why terrorists will still be successful despite the new restrictions using a simple game theoretical model and backward induction.

Category:

News & Politics

Tags:

• Game
• theory
• terrorism
• TSA
• transportation
• security
• authority
• planes
• Umar
• Farouk
• Abdulmutallab
• backward
• induction
• subgame
• perfect
• Nash
• equilibrium

[raymonko]

Jim. I understand your frustration and I would probably hate those rules if they were in place when I travel to the States, but the question is:

What do you suggest?

[JimBobJenkins]

The "can't have anything in your lap" restriction is just silly and should be scrapped altogether. Generally, screening should be randomly changed on a daily basis. Think of it as a "rotation," except you pull the particular day's screening strategy from a hat. Search "terrorists at an airport" for the lecture on that.

[ForbiddianSC]

Although the overall analysis is right (that the US is fucking up), the payouts are wrong and it invalidates the analysis.

Terrorists might not have an abort option, even if the restrictions are disfavorable. It might be impossible to coordinate the abort decision.

At any rate, I would rather take the chance to die than make flights so unbearable. I fly because it's convenient and because, even with no safety restrictions, it's still safer than driving.

[JimBobJenkins]

I think the set up is fine as is. This is a sequential game--the terrorists see what security precautions the Americans are making and then choose their strategy accordingly. So you can think of "not attack" as "stay at home." They wouldn't get on a plane if they knew they would be caught.

[JimBobJenkins]

There' a new video I put up today called "Game Theory 101: Terrorists at an Airport" that models it as a simultaneous move game. That might be closer to what you are thinking of.

[Pallerim]

@11cookeaw1 You're misunderstanding the method of social science: Eliminate variables until you see a connection.

It's impossible to account for the variables you're talking about as well as the billion other tiny ones

[11cookeaw1]

Actually there's something you should mention. The last hour is more dangerous, as it's easier for them to attack something using the plane then. The passengers have less chance to stop them, the air force has less chance.

Also last hour restriction isn't that bad, but whole journey lockdown is a nightmare, especially on long journey's and for people who take important medication that has the side effect of making them want to pee more. It's very not hygienic to sit around in your own pee/poo.

[HexJamXXX]

Your model is incomplete, every terrorist node should have the "option" of being accidentally caught :)

[ForbiddianSC]

It's hard to justify an abort that late. After you pass through the first wave of security screening (which I think is still the "main line of defense") and find out that your plane has additional security measures, you're probably still better off attempting to kill everyone than aborting and having to go through the process over again.

I do think that terrorism choices exist in equilibrium. E.g. flight restrictions are too high, so I'll set off the bomb in a crowded elevator.

[ForbiddianSC]

I guess I want it modeled as a non-1, non-0 probability to get caught or not.

Also, the new TSA guidelines are set up so that you won't know until you get on the plane what the restrictions are.

It's more like: They decide to attack, then they have to pass through check-in where there's a probability to get hit by additional screening (I assume that they'd only use weapons that would pass standard screening). Then they find out about additional security, which may or may not do anything.