Theory and Practice of Cryptography
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thanks for your video
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@jesusisalive2 I don't it would matter at that point. If all parties are colluding, you have much bigger problems than whether your vote is accurate and/or private.
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Interesting would he still vote for obama :)))
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@tricky778 What makes you think that? Paper ballots with open access to voting area, chain of custody and counting are transparent simple and secure. Numbered voting receipts that show running total counts rather than an individuals vote are simple, transparent and and secure since they allow two individuals to come together to make sure their counts jibe. Random seizure and testing of machines on voting day is simple, transparent and secure way to detect fraud. There are more.
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@blenderpanzi The voter has their own computer - the voter has data on the ballot that their own device can verify the vote with. the candidates can verify the tally with their own devices, etc.
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@michalchik it can't be all three of transparent, simple AND secure. your demand is irrelevant.
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@jesusisalive2 If all the parties of the election are trying to rig it then who cares? At that point the vote is irrelevant.
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This is an amazing talk, I'm a high school graduate, in my first year at college and I understood it very well. I'm a bit strange though, and have been interested in cryptography for a long time and have heard of a lot of the things he talks about.
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@jiminssy After several centuries of simplifying newtons ideas the average adults doesn't understand the laws of motion. It is taught in HS but 90% of the 40% that take the class never think about them after the class is over. Try this. Ask a bunch of people you know, what happens to the passengers of a car when the driver steps on the accelerator. Most will say, the passengers get pushed back into the seats. What the exhaust port on the death star was for, they won't say thrust.
Excellent talk.
StephenWeis 4 years ago 16
There doesn't have to be one centralized bulletin board. The key property Ben is trying to get at with the bulletin board analogy is that voters can go and check that their encrypted ballot appears in some publicly accessible repository, which may be distributed.
If the vote does not appear, then the voter will have a receipt that they can turn over to an investigative agency.
Denial of service, like in the example you give, is always a risk, but can be detected and prevented.
StephenWeis 4 years ago 8