Alert icon
We're changing our privacy policy. This stuff matters.  Learn more  Dismiss

4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships

Loading...

Sign in or sign up now!
Alert icon
Upgrade to the latest Flash Player for improved playback performance. Upgrade now or more info.
22,078
Loading...
Alert icon
Sign in or sign up now!
Alert icon
There is no Interactive Transcript.

Uploaded by on Nov 20, 2008

Game Theory (ECON 159)

We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.

00:00 - Chapter 1. Best Response: Penalty Kicks in Soccer
15:14 - Chapter 2. Best Response: Issues with the Penalty Kick Model
24:06 - Chapter 3. Best Response: Formal Definition
29:59 - Chapter 4. Externalities and Inefficient Outcomes: The Partnership Game
01:07:23 - Chapter 5. Nash Equilibrium: Preview

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

  • likes, 1 dislikes

All Comments

Adding comments has been disabled for this video.

Alert icon
0 / 00Unsaved Playlist Return to active list
    1. Your queue is empty. Add videos to your queue using this button:
      or sign in to load a different list.
    Loading...Loading...Saving...
    • Clear all videos from this list
    • Learn more