(3 of 3) The Collapse of the Analytic Synthetic Distinction: Insights from Science

Comments on what was for a long time one of the main empiricist dogmas: the supposed distinction between the exclusive classes of analytic and synthetic statements. The analytic statements can be thought of as the truths of the dictionary (they are simply giving us the meaning of words or terms), synthetic statements can be thought of as the truths of the encyclopaedia (they are attempts to give us information about the world). However, these two sets seem to overlap in difficult to map ways. Of course, one can adopt what is known as a stipulative definition in which the term defined is simply adopted by convention as short-hand for the longer expression that is supposed to define it. For example, "a bacholor is an unmarried man" the term "bachelor" is just short-hand for "unmarried man". This is common in science and mathematics. But most statements are not of this kind. The philosopher W.V. Quine in his paper The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" argued against the analytic synthetic distinction, insisting that our set of beliefs about the world form a web of logically interconnected units. Some of these beliefs are closer to the periphery than others (e.g. "There are 8 students in this room"), and can be more easily modified or given up in the light of evidence. Others are more deeply rooted in the web and many other beliefs are dependent on them (e.g. the law of the excluded middle), and therefore cannot be so easily modified or given up in the light of evidence. This is, arguably, a better, more subtler way to capture what the original analytic/synthetic distinction was after (along with the A priori/A posteriori distinction). I conjecture along with Karl Popper that the answer is that our words embody our theories about the world. Many of these - perhaps most - are tacit and lie in the background, and only become evident when they are refuted or disappointed. When these background theories are tacit, they form the "meaning" of the terms at issue and hence any statement predicating this theory of the term seems analytic (it seems contradictory to deny it). Popper's view is more subtle than Quine's as Popper does not maintain that every statement or belief is connected with every other belief, and Popper also points out that most of our knowledge is non-belief or exosomatic, embodied in libraries, the internet etc. In any case, in this series of three videos I explore some interesting examples from science to illustrate how the distinction breaks down and how Quine's and Popper's views are more adequate to understanding language.

Category:

Education

Tags:

• Analytic synthetic distinction
• concept of cause
• quantum theory
• uncertainty principle
• principle of locality
• Kant
• Karl Popper
• W. W. Quine
• Rupert Sheldrake
• Morphic resonance
• meaning of words

[bhigr]

Yes, non-locality follows from quantum mechanics if you interpret QM in a certain way. Look for Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox.

[FritsIV]

Thank you for the lecture. definitely made things more clear to me. now let's see about tomorrow's test on Quine. Though if I may give a suggestion, stay with the analytic-synthetic distinction a little more, and a little less on detail on the various examples.

[cornificius22vain]

nice lecture, i think that what quine shows is only that most of the time we are being ambiguous, and not that there is no true diff between analytic and synthetic

anyway, what happened at 4:02?