The same goes for time. There is a sense in which all past and all future are present "now," there is another very real sense in which there is a difference between the past and future. Similarly again, even if people exist intersubjectively, a theory cannot make it impossible to account for the fact that they are still not all the same person. I highly recommend Heidegger's Being and Time and Sartre's Being and Nothingness for discussions of time, object-ness, and intersubjectivity.
The idealist response was to posit that the subject and the object are actually the same thing, using Spinoza as an inspiration, who eliminated the mind-body problem in a similar way (note that Spinoza did not solve as much as dissolve the problem). The problem, though, is how do you account for the fact that objects are different from the subject in a very real way. Representations are imposed on the subject whether it wants them or not.
Your comment about there being an identity is somewhat similar to Hegel, but I want to point out a few possible problem areas. German idealism grew out of the failure of Kantianism to account for the relationship between the transcendental ego and the noumenal world. Critics very quickly realized that saying that noumena "cause" phenomena is a misappplication of the category of causality, which can only be applied to phenomena.
@vriver707 What?
theprodigy2186 1 year ago
@theprodigy2186 i think hes a fag. oh yeah, a freak too.
vriver707 1 year ago
I would literally PAY good money to have Phil make more videos.
I true modern philosopher. Why has he stopped?
theprodigy2186 2 years ago
was that all that was in the interview? it seems like there should have been more.
PressureX311 2 years ago
The same goes for time. There is a sense in which all past and all future are present "now," there is another very real sense in which there is a difference between the past and future. Similarly again, even if people exist intersubjectively, a theory cannot make it impossible to account for the fact that they are still not all the same person. I highly recommend Heidegger's Being and Time and Sartre's Being and Nothingness for discussions of time, object-ness, and intersubjectivity.
--Chris
Buescher18 2 years ago
The idealist response was to posit that the subject and the object are actually the same thing, using Spinoza as an inspiration, who eliminated the mind-body problem in a similar way (note that Spinoza did not solve as much as dissolve the problem). The problem, though, is how do you account for the fact that objects are different from the subject in a very real way. Representations are imposed on the subject whether it wants them or not.
Buescher18 2 years ago
Your comment about there being an identity is somewhat similar to Hegel, but I want to point out a few possible problem areas. German idealism grew out of the failure of Kantianism to account for the relationship between the transcendental ego and the noumenal world. Critics very quickly realized that saying that noumena "cause" phenomena is a misappplication of the category of causality, which can only be applied to phenomena.
Buescher18 2 years ago
Mumbjo jumbo.
Dangerman5 2 years ago
this is better with sound down ;]
richardmccaul 2 years ago 2
Sorry but it sounds like he's spewing a bunch of nonsensical bullshit. How many times can you redefine the word love in 10 minutes?
qpwnsall 2 years ago