Singularity Summit 2009 - David Chalmers P3

David Chalmers at Singularity Summit 2009 -- Simulation and the Singularity

Category:

Science & Technology

Tags:

• David Chalmers
• Singularity
• Singularity Summit 2009
• philosophy
• consciousness
• qualia
• daniel dennett

[TsarNick77]

the gradual uploading slide makes an excellent point

[BigMTBrain]

@BigMTBrain - "...feeling also detached for the original self." --> "...feeling also detached from Self A." Thus, two independent and detached selfs from the same source, much like twins from the same zygote are detached and independent beings. Both Selfs will feel as though they are the original and that their has been no break in the continuum of them being the original Self. There would then be two true independent "you"s in existence. One in the real world, the other in the virtual world.

[BigMTBrain]

@AstralWink - (2) - Likewise, Self B, after *BOOT*, might turn and look out of the monitor, let's say, and be amused to see a copy of itself, feeling also detached for the original self. Each self becomes an independent self, both of which have certainty, and in fact actually are, merely a continuation of Self A. Within mere fractions of a second as new and divergent experiences ensue, each Self continues to feel that they are the original although they head down continually divergent paths.

[BigMTBrain]

@AstralWink - If you are transferring (as in a file MOVE (cut/paste)), during the period of time for transferring and up until *reboot*, you will not exist. Only until after reboot will you feel "self" again, albeit in a perhaps strange, new environment and you will notice that Self A has gone lifeless. If instead you are COPYING original self A to duplicate self B, self A will notice nothing different and will find amusement AT the new foreign self ("not me") from which it is totally detached.

[AstralWink]

@BigMTBrain Yes I follow, but my concern is located elsewhere, though maybe I'm not explaining myself well...

My personal experience is that I am 'one' being that persists through time. If I consequently upload my 'consciousness' to a numerical realm and duplicate it; what happens to my sense of uniqueness, my sense of identity? In what way can MY continuity of experience be said to persist through the upload and replication (assuming such replication happens contemporaneously)?

[BigMTBrain]

@AstralWink - Precisely! Each "I" carries forward from the history of the "I" from which they were copied. From the perspective of each "I", they are the true "I" and all others are merely amusing copies of "I". If at some moment you discover yourself in a simulation, you will know yourself as "I", an "I" separate from all other "pretenders", from your.perspective. Locale can be physical (separate parallel computing elements) or virtual (shared computing elements--time-sliced context switching).

[BigMTBrain]

@AstralWink - Precisely. It is not "I", but a "copy of I" that immediately diverges. From the original "I" perspective, the replicants will not be "I". However, from each individual replicant's perspective, it will be "I" and all others will be seen only as "copies of I". In any of the scenarios, it is important to realize that the original and all copies continue forward with the history of the "I" that they were copied from. Therefore, all of them individually view themselves as the true "I".

[AstralWink]

@BigMTBrain Which reveals the problem I have with this to begin with. If each replicant's diverging experience effectively turns them into different individuals - what claim is there that any given one of them is 'I'? Effectively either all of them are 'I' (making a nonsense of the concept of identity) or none of them is (meaning I've uploaded nothing of 'I' to begin with). What then have I uploaded? It seems not 'I'.

PS Not sure if locale is wholly the basis for identity...

[BigMTBrain]

@AstralWink - "What would identity...? And how could it be that...?" Locale is the basis for identification. Even if our world is simulated, we each feel like an individual because what we assess as being the cause of our consciousness, our brains, are physically located in partitioning skulls. Even in a simulated environment, there would be the concept of skulls. Further, at every tick of the clock, increased divergence in experience for each "replicant" would occur, furthering individuality.

[soultorment27]

@astralwink

i think the distinction is between 'qualitative' identity & 'numerical' identity. so X & Y may possess all the same properties, and yet be distinctive in spatial location...