A Theory of Consciousness - Video 2

In this series of videos I propose a Theory of Consciousness that attempts to bridge the explanatory chasm that exists between our first-person realities (i.e., the way it feels to think) -- and our knowledge of neurology and the way the brain works.

Category:

Science & Technology

Tags:

• consciousness
• theory
• scheme
• primron
• obron
• dupron
• PATTron
• first-person
• hard
• problem
• qualia
• simulation
• mind
• brain
• psychology

[Drastam]

According to Edelman the binding problem (CAS) is not resolved by a centralising module in the brain. Apparently there is no such module yet discovered by neuroscientists. Edelman has suggested his re-entrant wiring theory; but I don't think that will do it either.

I think re-entrant wiring is part of the structure of the objective side of the chasm.

We are still left with this matter of the locus of the centre of subjective consciousness - what Kant called the 'unity of apperception'.

[jeffkosmo]

@Drastam

I address this issue in Video 4. I've depicted the CAS as being "nodular", mainly to keep the diagrams simple. However, as I say in Vid 4, my own non-expert opinion on this CAS is that it's more dispersed & distributed, and likely exists amongst the neural jungle that resides between the mid-brain and cortex.

My real hunch is that the module where the real-time external activity is depicted, is the thalamus.

However, ---- cont'd in next comment.

[jeffkosmo]

@jeffkosmo

--- in the interest of keeping the videos as short and straightforward as possible, I had to "cheat". I'm more inclined to consider that there are more than 2 "screens" of activity. One for long term mems, one for extremely short term mems, and a third that actually portrays the raw external environment.

The second one effectively is continuously hypothesizing about the various objects in the environment, doing kind of what Dennet refers to as "multiple drafts". Stay tuned...

[vsaluki]

When I experience red I don't experience some selection of neurons firing. If you open my head and look at my brain you will not see any neurons turning red as a result of what comes in at the eyes. You cannot simply say that the experience of red "arises" out of groups of neurons firing. Because if you do you will be using the word "arises" to mean "magic happens". You will have no idea what you mean by it. Your clip suggests that you don't understand the problem. Sorry.

[vsaluki]

Your definition of Qualia is wrong. Qualia is an endpoint, not an intermediate. You are wasting your time. Finding a midpoint between philosophy and neurology is also a waste of time. It doesn't matter where the explanation lies. Being half way between doesn't make anything true. Instead of all of this reductionism answer a simple question, How can neuron firing be red. Don't use the word "arising" or anything like it, because you won't have any real idea or image of what you mean.