VoIP Encryption in a Surveillance Society

March 7, 2007 lecture by Phillip Zimmermann for the Stanford University Computer Systems Colloquium (EE 380). Phil talks about how the debate on the use of crypto has shifted since the 1990s, when it was a clash between civil liberties and law enforcement - in the 1990s, the crypto debate was about averting omniscience in governments, but today the encrypted VoIP debate may be about averting omniscience in criminals.

EE 380 | Computer Systems Colloquium:
http://www.stanford.edu/class/ee380/

Stanford Computer Systems Laboratory:
http://csl.stanford.edu/

Stanford Center for Professional Development:
http://scpd.stanford.edu/

Stanford University Channel on YouTube:
http://www.youtube.com/stanforduniversity/

Category:

Education

Tags:

• Computer
• science
• software
• engineering
• programming
• design
• application
• Phillip
• Zimmermann
• VoIP
• encryption
• crypto
• security

[Yutsoku]

Who would have thought that Stanford students can't comprehend simple man-in-the-middle sheesh... And PGP guy needs to learn how to stop trying to boast about his superior intellect and dumb things down. It's a simple concept.

[TheFusionIcon]

Who would've thought Phil Zimmermann would encounter such retards, at Stanford of all places...

[kjdavey]

@Yutsoku Tell me about it.... I picked up this concept on his first go around.... These guys are making this so much more complicated than it has to be. They are "lost in the woods" so to say.

[sabriath]

what a moron...the moment you "check" if your session keys match, you allow the MITM to know you are checking it. All he has to do is intervene with the keys and swap them out so that it "looks" like they are the same. Imagine guy on phone 1 says "I want to check my key"...the mitm says "oh shit" and pull the phone away and intercept the check (this of course is just an analogy).

also, d-h method is extremely taxing to get a big enough key not to crack, he's very arrogant.

[ognamas]

like a 69