SHOCKS AND CRISES Democratizations occur because of the transitory nature of the threat of revolution. In some situations, the collective action problem will be easier to solve, opponents to the egime easier to coordinate, and revolutions easier and less costly to carry out. These will typically be times of crisis, for example, times of harvest failures, economic depressions, international financial or debt crises, or even wars. Such crises and macroeconomic shocks are intrinsically transitory and lead to short-term fluctuations in the ability to solve the collective action problem. Our theory therefore predicts that democratizations are more likely to arise in a situation of economic or political crisis that is consistent with the observation (Therborn 1977) that democratizations often follow wars and consistent with the evidence of Haggard & Kaufman (1995), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Acemoglu et al. (2005b).
SOURCES OF INCOME AND COMPOSITION OF WEALTH An important determinant of the trade-off between democracy and repression is the source of the income of the elite. This can affect both the cost of repression, κ, and the extent of redistribution in democracy, (T c, Tc). In some societies, the elite are heavily invested in land, whereas in others, the elite are those with investments in physical and human capital. There are likely to be three major differences in the attitudes of landowners and (physical and human) capital owners toward democracy and nondemocracy. First, land is easier to tax than phy ical and human capital. Therefore, landowners have more to fear from democracy than from nondemocracy. This makes them more averse to democracy. Second, social and political turbulence may be more damaging to physical and human capital owners, who have to rely on cooperation in the workplace and in the trading process. This will make landowners more willing to use force to preserve the regime that they prefer.
Third, different sets of economic institutions are feasible in a predominantly
agrarian economy, and these influence the relative intensity of elites and citizens preferences over different regimes. For instance, labor-repressive institutions such as slavery are more efficient with agricultural technology than they are in industry. This implies that democracy is worse for elites, since the changes in collective choices that it brings will undermine their preferred set of economic institutions. All three considerations imply that democratization will be more likely in a more industrialized society, where the elite own significant physical and human capital, than in a more agricultural society, where the elite are mainly invested in land. Put differently, democracy is more likely when the elite are industrialists than when they are landowners.
AddisEmebett, politicians in every state/country with a degree of confidence one can say that they all are licensed liars and public fund thieves, this one Dr what ever his name is…am not sure if I can call him as a politician ..can u??
ZeEthiopia 1 year ago