Two, a more appropriate lens to understand the situation in the middle east is anti-dictatorial and anti-colonial resistance. Without this lens, it would make very little sense why during the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, the Sunnis in Egypt chanted "Tell this to Nasrallah, We are all Hezbollah", or why Iran is so popular among the masses of the middle east (not the leaders though) for its defiant stance against US and Israel and for its support to the Palestine and Lebanon causes.
One, it may be true that in Bahrain, Yemen, East Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, etc. "Shias" and "Sunnis" may be apparently fighting with each other. But the conflict is not about doctrinal issues but of power and powerlessness. The fight is not between Sunnis and Shias but the marginalized Shias against the dictatorial families in power (like in Bahrain). These dictatorial families also happened to be supported by the Saudis and Americans.
The utility of finding "Good vs. Bad Shia" is two-fold for hegemonic powers. One, it divides up the community. Two, you coopt the "good" ones. See such a prescription given by Nasr in his new afterward.
A third problem in Nasr's analysis is that he essentializes the conflict between the "Shias" and "Sunnis" in the Middle East and elsewhere as a doctrinal+identity conflict. That may be part of the equation but one needs to consider two things.
Further, a false binary of "Good Shia" vs. "Bad Shia" runs through his argument. Ayatullah Sistani for example is praised for his "quietist" stance which is implied as Pro-Western and anti-Iranian. That is a gross simplification and misrepresentation of the complexities on the ground. For one, in all of his communiqués since the beginning of the American war, he has consistently preferred to call the American involvement as an "occupation" and refused to meet with any American officials.
I can't speak on what's in Nasr's heart, but to comment on the utility of this internal focus. It becomes easy for administration-s in White House to put the blame of their failures on the Iraqi people (it's not our fault, it's their 'ethno-sectarian' divides. we just tried to help them.)
The book is not a work of academic scholarship (the author admits that in his introduction), but a policy statement (consider that he is a professor at the Naval College and a member of CFR). Nasr wrote it in the wake of the Iraq war. It should be no surprise that the role of the 'external' factors in the politics of the Middle East is missing. The book only focuses on the 'internal' as the subtitle of the book also suggests: "How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future".
Two, a more appropriate lens to understand the situation in the middle east is anti-dictatorial and anti-colonial resistance. Without this lens, it would make very little sense why during the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, the Sunnis in Egypt chanted "Tell this to Nasrallah, We are all Hezbollah", or why Iran is so popular among the masses of the middle east (not the leaders though) for its defiant stance against US and Israel and for its support to the Palestine and Lebanon causes.
YaHussaina 1 year ago
One, it may be true that in Bahrain, Yemen, East Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, etc. "Shias" and "Sunnis" may be apparently fighting with each other. But the conflict is not about doctrinal issues but of power and powerlessness. The fight is not between Sunnis and Shias but the marginalized Shias against the dictatorial families in power (like in Bahrain). These dictatorial families also happened to be supported by the Saudis and Americans.
YaHussaina 1 year ago
The utility of finding "Good vs. Bad Shia" is two-fold for hegemonic powers. One, it divides up the community. Two, you coopt the "good" ones. See such a prescription given by Nasr in his new afterward.
A third problem in Nasr's analysis is that he essentializes the conflict between the "Shias" and "Sunnis" in the Middle East and elsewhere as a doctrinal+identity conflict. That may be part of the equation but one needs to consider two things.
YaHussaina 1 year ago
Further, a false binary of "Good Shia" vs. "Bad Shia" runs through his argument. Ayatullah Sistani for example is praised for his "quietist" stance which is implied as Pro-Western and anti-Iranian. That is a gross simplification and misrepresentation of the complexities on the ground. For one, in all of his communiqués since the beginning of the American war, he has consistently preferred to call the American involvement as an "occupation" and refused to meet with any American officials.
YaHussaina 1 year ago
I can't speak on what's in Nasr's heart, but to comment on the utility of this internal focus. It becomes easy for administration-s in White House to put the blame of their failures on the Iraqi people (it's not our fault, it's their 'ethno-sectarian' divides. we just tried to help them.)
YaHussaina 1 year ago
The book is not a work of academic scholarship (the author admits that in his introduction), but a policy statement (consider that he is a professor at the Naval College and a member of CFR). Nasr wrote it in the wake of the Iraq war. It should be no surprise that the role of the 'external' factors in the politics of the Middle East is missing. The book only focuses on the 'internal' as the subtitle of the book also suggests: "How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future".
YaHussaina 1 year ago
Vali Nasr is the author, not Seyyed, his father.
TheLuketia4 2 years ago 2