@flameyx3 All I am saying is you can't prove there is a god or that you god it the one true god. So yes there will always be debate, and killing for god.
Van Inwagen's objection to the PSR rests on the proposition that "if there is an explanation for the actual world it would not be true of any other possible world", it is therefore itself a contingent proposition. I don't think this is sufficient, it only shows that it is possible to object (namely if his proposition is the case). That is there are other possibilities concerning the nature of the explanation; for instance, the explanation includes why other possible worlds were not actualized.
'cant you explain things are of a certain type except by appealing to things outside that type?'
He is referring to things that are contingent. Basically If we were to accept that all material things are contingent then that would mean there is something Non-material that would needed to explain contingent material things.
I dont necessarily accept that material things are all contingent. There maybe a class of non-contingent things but they may or not be material/physical.
could anyone explain what dr. peter van inwagen just said? I got a bit of it, but i lost him completely at certain parts. What is the principle of universal explanation? Why should everything have an explanation? Why cant you explain things are of a certain type except by appealing to things outside that type? A simplified answer would be greatly appreciated, as i'm really interested in what he has to say here.
A problem lies in giving a label ie:(cause) to an event preceding all events. Another problem is the assumption that the universe is the effect of a cause. It is redundant to ask what causes the north pole, and to ask what is north of the north pole. The beginning is an arbitrary construct - a label, and assigning a label to something before that is redundant.
@flameyx3 "have to be ready for the consequences"
Nobody is smarter than you are !!! ~Terrence Mckenna
watch?v=rMNAOk1bMDw
gusb232 3 months ago
@flameyx3 All I am saying is you can't prove there is a god or that you god it the one true god. So yes there will always be debate, and killing for god.
gregrutz 4 months ago
@flameyx3 And you can't explain the fossils, Neanderthals or feathers on dinosaurs.
gregrutz 4 months ago
@flameyx3 I looked, and you still can't prove your god is the one true god, or gods in the case of God and his son, Jesus.
gregrutz 4 months ago
The Flying Spagetti Monster did it. You can't prove she is not god.
gregrutz 6 months ago
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rigelrover 1 year ago
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rigelrover 1 year ago
Van Inwagen's objection to the PSR rests on the proposition that "if there is an explanation for the actual world it would not be true of any other possible world", it is therefore itself a contingent proposition. I don't think this is sufficient, it only shows that it is possible to object (namely if his proposition is the case). That is there are other possibilities concerning the nature of the explanation; for instance, the explanation includes why other possible worlds were not actualized.
rigelrover 1 year ago 2
'cant you explain things are of a certain type except by appealing to things outside that type?'
He is referring to things that are contingent. Basically If we were to accept that all material things are contingent then that would mean there is something Non-material that would needed to explain contingent material things.
I dont necessarily accept that material things are all contingent. There maybe a class of non-contingent things but they may or not be material/physical.
gusb232 1 year ago
could anyone explain what dr. peter van inwagen just said? I got a bit of it, but i lost him completely at certain parts. What is the principle of universal explanation? Why should everything have an explanation? Why cant you explain things are of a certain type except by appealing to things outside that type? A simplified answer would be greatly appreciated, as i'm really interested in what he has to say here.
saifrizwan 1 year ago
A problem lies in giving a label ie:(cause) to an event preceding all events. Another problem is the assumption that the universe is the effect of a cause. It is redundant to ask what causes the north pole, and to ask what is north of the north pole. The beginning is an arbitrary construct - a label, and assigning a label to something before that is redundant.
breaneainn 1 year ago
I agree.
cielo200100 1 year ago
Cool series! Thanks for posting! :)
HaleyMary 2 years ago