Opening statement in debate with Shwanerd part 4

[hilbert54]

I think we agree that we evolved from non-mind life forms.

You are saying that our minds are designed by god.

Where in the evolutionary process did god design our minds?

I figure you have a view.

[urbster1]

Frank Jackson who designed the Mary color thought experiment states that Mary acquires "all physical information there is to obtain" about what happens in the process of vision, without ever actually SEEING color. However, were someone to place a blue banana on the table, and tell her that it is yellow, she would be able to correct them, because she has ALL PHYSICAL INFORMATION already. That presupposes that she has obtained whatever future knowledge scientists would uncover about it!!

[migkillertwo]

the mary thought experiment is the fact that mary doesn't have knowledge of the experience of seeing.

[urbster1]

Ok, obviously I just explained it to you but you still didn't get it. I'll message you with a great paper by Dan Dennett where he explains this all in detail! Hope you enjoy it!

[urbster1]

what do you mean, what is the probability of minds being able to comprehend abstract entities if physicalism is true? obviously, these things can often be classified as patterns, and being able to find and recognize patterns poses a valuable tool for survival because it often entails being able to predict what happens next. Furthermore, you did not set up the thought experiment correctly. It's analogous to the Mary-the-color-scientist example but you explained it wrongly in this video.

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

You know, mig, if you applied yourself to something useful like medicine or law you would go a long way. You will never get there if you mire yourself in philosophy and religion.

[VonSchnutze]

How thoughtful of you.

[Knowntje]

wow this argument of the mind is pretty difficult to understand to be honest

[migkillertwo]

yeah, had to read through moreland's discussion on it a few times through. but here's the argument in a nutshell: being cannot come from nonbeing. since humans have minds besides their brain, it must have come from something non-physical.

the best explanation is a greater mind.

[Knowntje]

yes that I understood but I meant the arguments for dualism were pretty hard to understand

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

Mig, if pain is as you seem to think it is and exist on the the physical world of a living being, explain to me the pain of a phantom limb. How can something that does not exist feel excruciating pain?

[Kimbert91]

"since humans have minds besides their brain"

i dun get it...

If you mean that your mind is something non-physical, then i'd ask you to prove it.

[urbster1]

I hope future neuroscience will adequately refute any lingering notions of mind-body dualism, especially with regard to what you're talking about with mental states. However, in the meantime, think of the brain as computer hardware and the mind as computer software. The strongest argument against dualism remains that things like brain damage and hallucinogenic drugs radically alter the mind, therefore proving that the brain is responsible for the mind. If you don't have a brain, you're DEAD.

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

Ding ding ding. We have a winner. Tell the contestant what he's won...

[migkillertwo]

urbster, you're assuming that neuroscience will be able to give us the same knowledge someone would have through first-person acquaintance with his own mental states. Secondly, functionalism really is BS. The Chinese room thought experiment refutes this completely. lastly, I already refuted your argument about hallucinagenic drugs. Causal relationship=/= identity relationship.

[urbster1]

Yes, and in fact I am assuming that science will be able to give us MORE knowledge than first-person acquaintance with these states. Secondly, the Chinese room thought experiment proves nothing, as Richard Carrier thoroughly explains in "Sense and Goodness without God: A defense of metaphysical naturalism" which I highly recommend. It talks about the world in ways that make sense, not like what you're doing here by claiming that colors really exist. Clearly, red just refers to a wavelength.

[migkillertwo]

ahh, so how exactly does Carrier go about disproving the Chinese room thought experiment?

Furthermore, you're going WAY beyond your epistemic grounds in assuming that science will be able to give greater knowledge of our mental states than one person would know about his own mental states, especially when science can know NOTHING incorrigibly while humans can know their own mental states incorrigibly.

[urbster1]

I'm not going to explain his entire argument here, it's at least three pages long and I am not typing all of that in youtube comments. You owe it to check it out for yourself, along with the Dennett book if you want to know what I am talking about. I don't buy that humans know our own mental states incorrigibly, and it is certain that scientists in the future will be able to know more and more by interfacing directly with our brains-- Japanese scientists have already been able to extract images.

[migkillertwo]

"its 3 pages long" Bullshit, you can summarize it

"I dont buy that humans can know their own mental states incorrigibly" If I feel pain, then I can NEVER be wrong about my experience of pain, that would be a self-contradiction.

"have already been able to extract images" I'd love to see them do that without the patient recounting their own experiences. But once again, science can know NOTHING incorrigibly, we can know our own mental states incorrigibly.

[urbster1]

sent you a link to the article

[urbster1]

Just so my last response wasn't unsatisfying, he basically states that the rulebook would have to be a person in any functional sense, once you imagine everything that Searle requires that you imagine it to be able to do in the thought experiment. The rulebook would have to be able to adapt to the future, be creative, etc and actually proves that artificial intelligence IS possible, if writing the rulebook is indeed possible. Please check out both books as they will change your mind about minds!

[migkillertwo]

ubster, being able to imitate a mind doesn't qualify something as a mind. furthermore, your statement that the room would adapt is BS and a red herring.

[urbster1]

Wrong again. If a man were to have a conversation with a rulebook so convincing that he thought it was a real human being, the rulebook would have to have some remarkable properties. It would have to remember things the man said, and remember things the room said, and adjust future responses accordingly. Thus, the rulebook would not be static, but constantly changing itself, and growing ever larger, according to its own rules. Must I keep going? What, to you, qualifies something as a mind?

[migkillertwo]

experiences, free will, consciousness, etc. Functionalism/Behaviorism is bollocks. The Artificial intelligence merely imitates a mind, it is not an actual mind. For instance, when a robot were to tell you that it feels pain, it woulden't actually experience pain.

[urbster1]

But if we designed a robot with hardware consisting of a sensitive, skinlike exterior and soft, fleshy interior supported by a bony skeleton all designed with contact sensors that send and receive a variety of data responding to physical conditions, and a control center that interprets these responses in a meaningful way to the robot so that it knows it's damaged, is that not in every meaningful way, a robot sensing pain? Pain is only how we describe the brain's interpretation of such data.

[migkillertwo]

"Pain is only how we describe the brain's interpretation of such data."

Pain is the way we describe our own experiences urbster. again, the robot would not be feeling pain. if you took away all the outputs, and the robot just stood there, how would the robot experience pain? it woulden't. Computers are just inputs and outputs.

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

"Computers are just inputs and outputs."

At this moment in time. Complexities such as the chemical cascade that is "pain" arise from emergence.

[Kimbert91]

pain is simply the brain interpreting data sent by the nerves to tell it it's hurt. You take away those nerves, you won't feel pain. Or disturb their functionality or connection. This is why people use aenesthetics. And as described by ubster, not something that you can't replicate. For all practical purposes, the robot would be feeling pain.

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

"Functionalism/Behaviorism is bollocks."

It's more real than philosophy.

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

Re: Similarity relationships? What? Who says? Are you making this crap up as you go?

[lilchrizz123]

Notice how most people only watched this video and just skipped the others.

[thecommonsenseguy]

e n. wiki pedi a. or g/wik i/ Univ ersal _( met aphys ics)

am i misinterpreting this, or are you disagreeing with what wiki says?

[Dhorpatan]

"it sounds ****ing awesome"

^^^Hahahaha! Oh, now you don't want

to curse. (shakes head)

[migkillertwo]

**** is a curse word? I didn't know.

[Dhorpatan]

"**** is a curse word? I didn't know."

^^^What? (raises right eyebrow)

[migkillertwo]

"fuck" and "shit" are curse words, but I dont think 4 asterisks are curse words.

[Dhorpatan]

@migkillertwo

Did I say four asterisks were curse words? No.

I said "now you don't want to curse", which

means YOU DIDN'T, and I was implying that you

did in the past, but, with the use of the asterisks, you didn't that time. Which is a bit hypocritical on your part, since you have

cursed previously.

[thecommonsenseguy]

00:25

colors? how are colors abstract?  They are most definetly physical entities...

why do these arguments for what is real always find their way back to infinity? tricky stuff...

[migkillertwo]

"They are most definetly physical entities"

not really. Colors are merely experiential properties (which must exist). what does exist physically are different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. oh, and another problem is the possibility of inverted color awareness.

[thecommonsenseguy]

"Colors are merely experiential properties (which must exist)"

meaning?

[migkillertwo]

if we assume nominalism, colors are words we attach to parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, hence they're abstract. but the problem of exact similarity seems to show that these abstract entities really exist. Its the same with just about every other abstract object (like numbers).

[thecommonsenseguy]

i dont follow

[thecommonsenseguy]

ok, so, lets see...by the definition of nominalism...if we assume nominalism...are we forced to assume universals dont exist?

[migkillertwo]

"are we forced to assume universals dont exist?"

pretty much.

[thecommonsenseguy]

"pretty much."

but when it comes to things like color...we know they do hold universals.

[migkillertwo]

yes, red is a universal. but if we try reductionism we can't call it a universal because who's to say that a very long wave coulden't produce violet? are we to say that violet would be red in this possible world?

[thecommonsenseguy]

"but if we try reductionism we can't call it a universal because who's to say that a very long wave couldn't produce violet?"

the wave length is what makes the color...it would defy physics to have a red wave make violet. Thats like saying..."whos to say gravity cant make you go up?"

[thecommonsenseguy]

ohh...i think i know what you mean...are you trying to say...like...why is it specifically that specific wave lengths make specific colors rather than other colors?

and by getting to this point youre dwelving into unknown manifestations...like...what makes gravity work.

[thecommonsenseguy]

"and by getting to this point youre dwelving into unknown manifestations...like...what makes gravity work."

which would support that there is some sort of unknown situation...which could possibly be answered through other dimensions or god or something.

is this what youre getting at?

[migkillertwo]

thecommonsenseguy, we're dealing with metaphysics. you may want to abandon your physical paradigm and start discussing metaphysics like I am.

[thecommonsenseguy]

im just trying to figure out exactly what your motives are.

[thecommonsenseguy]

are you trying to say...what makes specific waves make specific colors...or?

[thecommonsenseguy]

ok, well, i guess this topic just osnt open for discussion.

[migkillertwo]

your response doesn't make much sense. If we say that colors=part of the visible light spectrum, then then colors are not absolute.

[thecommonsenseguy]

"If we say that colors=part of the visible light spectrum, then then colors are not absolute."

the colors are just the name we give for the types of waves we see. There is nothing supernatural or abstract about them. They all do have universals.

[thecommonsenseguy]

how are colors not absolute?

[migkillertwo]

they can't be universal for one reason: It is metaphysically possible for different parts of the light spectrum to produce different colors. for instance, who's to say that in some possible world, a 450nm wave of light woulden't produce red?

[thecommonsenseguy]

" It is metaphysically possible for different parts of the light spectrum to produce different colors."

is it?

[thecommonsenseguy]

"It is metaphysically possible for different parts of the light spectrum to produce different colors."

how do you know...for example...something like an xray, has the capability of creating a color?

[thecommonsenseguy]

and im not trying to be all gung ho evolution, but as far as human evolution goes...i dont see how it could be possible for a human to interpret a color in a different way unless they have some sort of eye deficiency

[migkillertwo]

why woulden't it? there is no contradiction. if we assume nominalism, then violet and red become mere words we ascribe to what we percieve. So who is to say that our retinas or brains coulden't react differently to electromagnetic radiation.

[thecommonsenseguy]

"So who is to say that our retinas or brains coulden't react differently to electromagnetic radiation"

bleh...i suppose...then again...its hard to say because we really couldnt know such a thing.

given that such a thing is possible...for what purpose are you trying to make this point?

[migkillertwo]

my point is you really can't call colors universals if you accept that they are not metaphysically necessary.

dont forget, we're dealing with metaphysics.

[thecommonsenseguy]

im looking at wiki, and their introductory paragraph seems to be describing colors as universals.

"a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities."

this is precisely what a color is, both by definition, traits, properties, relations...etc.

[migkillertwo]

its sort of hard to articulate this, which is why I sort of butchered the argument in our exchange. if you dont mind I'm going to PM you the link for a much more thorough discussion on this topic.

[thecommonsenseguy]

ohh ok

[thecommonsenseguy]

your idea of a more thorough discussion is sending me an ebook?

[migkillertwo]

the chapter contains the most thorough discussion. if you dont want to read it that's totally fine, I can try to argue this further with you here.

[thecommonsenseguy]

which chapter?

[migkillertwo]

I sent you the link to the chapter, but its chapter 10. the link should link you to the chapter I wanted you to see.

[thecommonsenseguy]

the link you sent me was an ebook that spanned about 600 pages...ill check out chpt ten though.

[thecommonsenseguy]

so for this debate...it will be necissary for shwanerd to read this too? doesnt sound user friendly

[migkillertwo]

no I dont think he will have to. If I have, say, a couple hours to write a response I can adequately respond without butchering the arguments. but this comment exchange we are having is causing me to butcher the arguments

[thecommonsenseguy]

ohh i see...ok then

[bamboo4tameshigiri]

"so for this debate...it will be necissary for shwanerd to read this too? doesnt sound user friendly"

Exactly. He makes countless presuppositions, many outrageous demands of this sort and expects us to take dozens premises on faith for his philosophy to even have feeble legs to stand on.

[migkillertwo]

no unfortunately, but I can almost gurantee that I will read it sometime this year (2009). From what I've been able to gather so far, it sounds ****ing awesome.

[facilisdescenus]

I heard Veritas say it was the most complicated book he ever read

[facilisdescenus]

You should read some John Frame. He is one of the better Calvinist theologians and ministers around.