I concede that you don't need a God to have "good" or "evil" but you do need a God for you to believe you SHOULD do good and not evil. Without a God to model this... you're still left with emotivism. ie... that you do "good" just cuz you personally like it (not because you're obligated or should).
Occam's razor would still require God I think, cuz anything more "simple" doesn't fully explain "should" or "obligation"
@PostITnoteGUY do you "really" feel obligated? cuz obligatio can only come from the idea of objective morality. You can't feel obligated to do something if you're a moral nihilist...
P1 Statements about morality are either a statement of value or a statement of truth
P2 we make statements of value about morality
C therefore statements about morality aren't about truth
My counter is that premise 1 is not true. Basically... it's not an "OR"
ie. you can make a value judgement on something that has truth value. or... saying that I really like that equation!!! That does not make equations subjective!
More importantly though... we have REASON to believe suffering is objectively wrong BECAUSE most people in history have believed that when you see someone suffering, you SHOULD do something about it.
The mere fact that your philosophy lends you to say something like "I can't say you shouldn't suffer" in and of itself is a reductio ad absurdum argument against yourself.
ie. when your philosophy necessitates things that are ridiculous, there's probably something wrong with your philosophy
The actual reductio ad absurdim is actually taking place in your argument via the idea that everyone agreeing on something's value thus necessitates it as being an objective value.
If I were to compose an historical outline that showed that the vast majority of people in history (by wide margin) have all agreed that vanilla ice cream tastes good. According to your logic this would objectively prove that vanilla ice cream tastes good. But of course, this is absurd. Hence, the problem is yours.
No, when we say people "should" do something, we are basing this commentary on a value judgment. We are saying that pain is important, in some objective sense. But, if someone's premise is that cancer cells are the most important thing in the world, then, if someone has cancer, he is convinced that we should NOT fix that pain.
This correlates to my analogy because if everyone is convinced that vanilla is the best, someone who doesn't eat is, by definition, wrong, thus he SHOULDN'T eat vanilla.
NO... I actually REALLY like Chocolate ice cream. I mean I like it a LOT!!!
But... that doesn't mean I think I SHOULDN'T eat vanilla, it just means that I WOULD NOT.
Also... my enjoyment of chocolate actually doesn't make me think that anyone else SHOULDN'T eat vanilla. I peronsally feel fine when someone eats vanilla.
This scenario is NOT the case with suffer. Not only do I not like suffering, I think I or anyone else SHOULD NOT suffer, that can only come from objectivity
Subjective morality can not reconcile the fact that people generally agree that suffering SHOULD NOT happen. You have to say that this belief is flawed, which I think is a statement which does not have substantial evidence.
That can be your belief... and you can go out on faith and believe it but... it definately has its problem with what we see to be true in the world (ie. suffering shouldn't happen)
ok so idk if you're quite getting my point... if you like vanilla ice cream, does that mean you think that you SHOULD eat it? or does it mean that you think you WOULD eat it?
I'm saying it's irrelevant. The basis for out convictions are personal sentiments. Those sentiments, regardless of how strongly we feel convicted towards them, is irrelevant.
How does thinking something shouldn't happen necessitate objective truth value?
I think suffering shouldn't happen because I dislike witnessing it.
I dislike chocolate ice-cream but don't think people shouldn't eat it because witnessing someone eating chocolate isn't a dislike to me.
There is a difference between disliking suffering that you are experiencing, and disliking seeing suffering. Most people dislike seeing and feeling suffering, unlike with ice-cream.
How do I know that I dislike chocolate icecream because I intuit an objective taste standard on icecream? I don't.
If you are to believe that you dislike suffering due to an objective intuition, then you better believe you dislike certain icecream flavors for the same reason.
I appreciate the video response, but the argument that you set forth is mildly fallacious in that it isn't an appropriate analogy.
When we make a statement about what we think is true or untrue (I feel that 2+2=4), which is itself about something objective, is not the same as when we say something like "the equation 2+2 is important".
...seems my (protracted?) attention has confirmed several impressions about stresses and their concerted results, as expected....
cdmcl3 1 year ago
I concede that you don't need a God to have "good" or "evil" but you do need a God for you to believe you SHOULD do good and not evil. Without a God to model this... you're still left with emotivism. ie... that you do "good" just cuz you personally like it (not because you're obligated or should).
Occam's razor would still require God I think, cuz anything more "simple" doesn't fully explain "should" or "obligation"
hofisito 2 years ago
@PostITnoteGUY do you "really" feel obligated? cuz obligatio can only come from the idea of objective morality. You can't feel obligated to do something if you're a moral nihilist...
hofisito 2 years ago
not really... My intuitions about morals are far different than my subjective feelings towards ice cream.
for example...
When I intuit something wrong (like murder), I think that I am obligated to do something about it and stop it.
When I dislike something, I may try to avoid it, but this is NOT done out of obligation.
Now... you can believe we don't have obligations (but I think that's denying reality).
hofisito 2 years ago
Basically here's your argument
P1 Statements about morality are either a statement of value or a statement of truth
P2 we make statements of value about morality
C therefore statements about morality aren't about truth
My counter is that premise 1 is not true. Basically... it's not an "OR"
ie. you can make a value judgement on something that has truth value. or... saying that I really like that equation!!! That does not make equations subjective!
hofisito 2 years ago
More importantly though... we have REASON to believe suffering is objectively wrong BECAUSE most people in history have believed that when you see someone suffering, you SHOULD do something about it.
The mere fact that your philosophy lends you to say something like "I can't say you shouldn't suffer" in and of itself is a reductio ad absurdum argument against yourself.
ie. when your philosophy necessitates things that are ridiculous, there's probably something wrong with your philosophy
hofisito 2 years ago
The actual reductio ad absurdim is actually taking place in your argument via the idea that everyone agreeing on something's value thus necessitates it as being an objective value.
If I were to compose an historical outline that showed that the vast majority of people in history (by wide margin) have all agreed that vanilla ice cream tastes good. According to your logic this would objectively prove that vanilla ice cream tastes good. But of course, this is absurd. Hence, the problem is yours.
JasperAvi 2 years ago
I'd have to disagree...
Your analogy is pretty flawed yourself.
People don't JUST "dislike" suffering (a mere subjective opinion), they think it SHOULDN'T happen (which necessitates objective truth value).
People don't go around saying that everyone SHOULD eat vanilla ice-cream, they could potentially go around thinking it's enjoyable.
Again, you're mixing up a statement of value with a statement of truth.
hofisito 2 years ago
No, when we say people "should" do something, we are basing this commentary on a value judgment. We are saying that pain is important, in some objective sense. But, if someone's premise is that cancer cells are the most important thing in the world, then, if someone has cancer, he is convinced that we should NOT fix that pain.
This correlates to my analogy because if everyone is convinced that vanilla is the best, someone who doesn't eat is, by definition, wrong, thus he SHOULDN'T eat vanilla.
JasperAvi 2 years ago
NO... I actually REALLY like Chocolate ice cream. I mean I like it a LOT!!!
But... that doesn't mean I think I SHOULDN'T eat vanilla, it just means that I WOULD NOT.
Also... my enjoyment of chocolate actually doesn't make me think that anyone else SHOULDN'T eat vanilla. I peronsally feel fine when someone eats vanilla.
This scenario is NOT the case with suffer. Not only do I not like suffering, I think I or anyone else SHOULD NOT suffer, that can only come from objectivity
hofisito 2 years ago
Subjective morality can not reconcile the fact that people generally agree that suffering SHOULD NOT happen. You have to say that this belief is flawed, which I think is a statement which does not have substantial evidence.
That can be your belief... and you can go out on faith and believe it but... it definately has its problem with what we see to be true in the world (ie. suffering shouldn't happen)
hofisito 2 years ago
That's a complete non-sequitur....
JasperAvi 2 years ago
ok so idk if you're quite getting my point... if you like vanilla ice cream, does that mean you think that you SHOULD eat it? or does it mean that you think you WOULD eat it?
hofisito 2 years ago
I'm saying it's irrelevant. The basis for out convictions are personal sentiments. Those sentiments, regardless of how strongly we feel convicted towards them, is irrelevant.
What is the argument for why we SHOULD do it?
JasperAvi 2 years ago
How does thinking something shouldn't happen necessitate objective truth value?
I think suffering shouldn't happen because I dislike witnessing it.
I dislike chocolate ice-cream but don't think people shouldn't eat it because witnessing someone eating chocolate isn't a dislike to me.
There is a difference between disliking suffering that you are experiencing, and disliking seeing suffering. Most people dislike seeing and feeling suffering, unlike with ice-cream.
Woootloops 2 years ago
"I think suffering shouldn't happen because I dilike witnessing it."
How do you know that's the case?
How do you know that you think suffering shouldn't happen because you intuit an objective moral standard on suffering?
hofisito 2 years ago
How do I know that I dislike chocolate icecream because I intuit an objective taste standard on icecream? I don't.
If you are to believe that you dislike suffering due to an objective intuition, then you better believe you dislike certain icecream flavors for the same reason.
Woootloops 2 years ago
Comment removed
Woootloops 2 years ago
I appreciate the video response, but the argument that you set forth is mildly fallacious in that it isn't an appropriate analogy.
When we make a statement about what we think is true or untrue (I feel that 2+2=4), which is itself about something objective, is not the same as when we say something like "the equation 2+2 is important".
JasperAvi 2 years ago
Thanks :) but yea... That's actually pretty much my point!
There IS a huge different between saying an equation is true and saying an equation is important or that you like an equation.
My point is that the two are NOT mutually exclusive, and that your argument relies on this idea...
see above argument for clarification
hofisito 2 years ago