Why Epiphenomenalism Must be Wrong

[bradleytough]

I really like your line of argument. At first...but then it seems to suffer from problems...upon inspection, your line of argument must be along the lines of:

The immaterial is causally inert.

We believe in the immaterial.

Belief is caused by the immaterial.

Belief is material.

If the immaterial is causally inert, the above is impossible.

Epiphenomalism is absurd.

I hope you can see this argument is not sound.

[bradleytough]

@bradleytough

1) Immaterial is not causally inert upon the immaterial.

2) Belief is immaterial.

3) Therefore, we can believe in the immaterial.

[bradleytough]

@bradleytough Another thing - How would you explain supervenience?...

Reject the idea of supervenience?

Supervenience is reducible?

[bradleytough]

@bradleytough Mayyyybe, you could question the causal process behind literature discussing the immaterial? - Infact, that's a cool idea..hmmm

[12309PanduraSt]

Dualists can stick thier qualia up thier epiphenomenalistic asses

[TeChNoWC]

Epiphenomenalism is not simply saying their is an 'immaterial' world because we can 'sense' it. The idea of an immaterial world is not fundamental to epiphenomenal theory. The primary reason people are convinced of epiphenomenalism is usually nothing to do with a belief in dualism at all; but often quite the opposite. It's just acknowledging that consciousness has no bearing on the material, therefore we do not know why it exists. Epiphenomenalists still disagree on the issue of its origin.

[yellowfish555]

i don't see a problem because if the brain generates consciousness than it's not Surprising that the brain has information about it.

i have a problem with epiphenomenalism for other reasons.

[technopagan724]

Conservation laws are not violated if we don't assume that the physical is isolated from the immaterial; so the conclusion that the immaterial cannot affect the material is based on an assumption that has no evidence to support or undermine it. Furthermore, while our actions and how we process sensory input can be explained by physical processes, why we experience those phenomena (experiences collectively called "consciousness") cannot currently be understood in those terms.

[umaidv]

ur argument arises from a narrow misconception of what epiphenomenalism is. An epiphenomenalist can claim that thought content can be generated from both real world/material things and through use of reason or through inference. so if I believe a) 2+3=5 then i also must believe b) 3+2=5. The content of both statements vary, but you can see that a can be inferred from b. In this way the belief that epiphenomenalism is true may be looked at as reflexive or inferred content.

[ORAKAR]

I'm afraid you're confusing two things: the truth-maker of a sentence (what 'causes' it to be true) and actual causal interaction. It is true that the existence of the immaterial realm would cause "there is a immaterial realm" to be true, in that the truth of the utterance would supervene on whether or not there was an immaterial realm. But that doesn't mean that the immaterial realm is actually causing anything. That we say "caused to be true" is just a trope of our language.

[SlejvSlejv]

i don't understand the contradiction? the main reason for believing in epiphenomenalism is the strong intuition you mentioned. i used to be a materialist, but calling the mind "an illusion" doesn't solve anything - that illusion is still perceived by my concioussness.

[Kedarkk25]

i think your view is right .what does it means material produce imaterial filling?the dualist are wrong .only matter produce consc.please reply me

[blitzel3]

I thought this was very interesting, but I don't think this flat out disproves epiphenomenalism. The same causal factors would exist with or without the immaterial component, but as you did mention there would consciousness, which is epiphenomenalism argues for in terms of subjective experience of qualia, and not in merely stating a belief. I, the conscious and immaterial component, am not affirming a belief. It's simply that I am conscious of what appears to be me affirming a belief.

[bridge88988]

This is a very useful video.

Uses a straightforward way of describing something which otherwise isn't quite so straightforward.

Thanks very much Cheiz!

[ManchesterBudo]

really great 8-)

[nspeert]

haha yes! the very act of proclaiming the existence of epiphenomenalism is at the same time a negations of its existence.

[nspeert]

so it defines itself out of existence!

[atheistonly]

First of all I have to thank you for making this clip.

Let me tell you something: Epiphenomenalism is not Dualism, it is a One-way Materialism. Here is an example:

When the engine of a car is running, it produces heat. Heat can not affect the engine! You might say, what if the engine overheats and blows up, is that not because of the heat? No it is not. it is because of overworking and not the heat!

So it is a one-way materialism!

[macsm]

It would be like wearing a VR set of goggles, where "conscience" is only taking the part of experience, or in other words, no causal interaction with the material world, just "looking". The ultimate illusion....

[hurtafly]

I am not an epiphenomenalist myself, I agree with some of its claims, but I cannot accept that the mental has not causal efficacy on my behaviour.

However, this video does nothing to refute the view.

[hurtafly]

Epiphenomenalism is not committed to substance dualism. You can be an epiphenomenalist and hold an attribute dualist view instead, positing that consciousness has a materially irreducible property, without saying that the mind and body are two different substances.

Also, I'm pretty sure epiphenomenalism accounts for the causal efficacy of the mental on the mental, contrary to your claim that the immaterial has no causal effect whatsoever.

[nspeert]

@hurtafly But if consciousness is the product of certain neural processes, whose specific nature was crafted by evolution by natural selection, which, because it is a competitive process, is a stingy penny pincher, then why would it go to all the trouble of putting on such a grand show if it registered no effects in the material world?

[Gnomefro]

@nspeert "why would it go to all the trouble of putting on such a grand show if it registered no effects in the material world?"

You're assuming that it is "a grand show" and not just the sum of your beliefs about reality. All of which are necessary to make decisions of human-like quality. Obviously, if they are necessary in that way, then the "effects in the material world" are profound and include all of human civilization.

[nspeert]

@Gnomefro Who says that consciousness is necessary for 'decisions of human like quality?' I can imagine an individual acting entirely as they normally would but lacking consciousness (this is a philosophical zombie). Also, what you say in the second part of your comment contradicts epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism is the view that consciousness lacks causal efficacy with regard to the material world, so the effects of qualia would not be able to include human civilization.

[Gnomefro]

@nspeert Another way to answer it could be that "the grand show" is a result of some emergent algorithm for reality simulation/prediction that is simple to arrive at by evolutionary mechanisms, but might be hard to grasp intuitively for humans. Evolution isn't just stingy anyway, its main feature is that it produces capable replicators and part of that may in fact involve outrageous spending.

[nspeert]

@Gnomefro But evolution is only going to produce outrageous spending when such a thing increases the organism's adaptive value. And for an something to have adaptive value it needs to give rise to effects in the material world, so if epiphenomenal qualia produce no effects in the material world, they couldn't have been selected for.

[Gnomefro]

The argument presented in this video is flawed. What you're showing is that epiphenomenalism is unfalsifiable even in principle(By showing that everything that happens in M is identical whether or not I exists), not that it's not a logical possibility.

We'll have the answer before our deaths though. Once the brain is reverse engineered, we'll either be stuck with M or be forced to look at the unscientific drivel. ;)

[garbidz]

Thanks for being interesting. It is rare!

"it has been demonstrated that we're not forced to act on them (thoughts and emotions created by our neural networks)"

In fact, it has been demonstrated that (an example) when we decide to pick up a cup from the table, at the time we think the decision is made, the motor nuclei are alreayde active, ready to execute. We have 20 msec to interfere to not to pick up the cup.

It seems that free will needs to be redefined.

[mermadeinheaven]

re/ "thoughts and emotions created by our neural networks"

The reason we're not forced to act on them is because once we become aware of them (i.e. our mental and emotional qualia), suddenly we have the option to choose to act on them, modify them, or discard them. But before that, we either believed it was not possible, or we believed that we did not have enough will-power to challenge them (because we thought they were a product of biochemical processes outside of our control.)

[garbidz]

I do not see where the difficulty rises

it is all electrochemistry even if we experience it as reality

electrochemistry that is called "consciousness" interacts with other electrochemical processes labelled "sensory input" or "memories"

looking through our seeing eyes it might be hard to accept but thus far there has been no evidence of anything else

I do remain open, though

[mermadeinheaven]

I think what you're having difficulty understanding is that 1) subjectivity and electrochemistry are not identical, and 2) subjectivity and/or consciousness can cause changes in electrochemistry.

Said another way, it's not that all changes in physical behavior emerge from changes in electrochemistry, but that changes in consciousness and/or subjectivity can cause changes in electrochemistry.

[garbidz]

"consciousness and/or subjectivity can cause changes in electrochemistry"

Subjectivity consists of electrochemistry of multiple superimposed neural networks so you have a circular argument.

True, we can change our hormone and transmitter balance by mental and physical activity as neural networks change their preferences as the soup changes its ingredients, pH and temperature.

The question "who is we" is a more demanding one.

Personally, I do not pretend to know.

[mermadeinheaven]

"The question "who is we" is a more demanding one."

You're getting ahead of the game! lol At the moment, it really just comes down to finding out if consciousness has causal power. If it does, then we keep investigating. If not, then we stay with the previous model.

So don't get ahead of yourself, otherwise you'll be biting off more than you can chew, and you might choke lol

[mermadeinheaven]

"electrochemistry that is called "consciousness" interacts with other electrochemical processes labelled "sensory input" or "memories""

While electrochemistry may be called the physical equivalent of consciousness, it is obviously not the same as a subjective experience. The point is that there's no confusing qualia with its electrochemical correlate; they're not identical, even though they are interrelated (i.e. change one, you change the other.)

[mermadeinheaven]

Now, if electrochemistry (objective) can be made to conform to different patterns by application of willful intention (subjectivity), then this can only indicate one thing; that consciousness possesses causal efficacy, because changing consciousness can change electro-/biochemistry and that can affect physical behavior and objective outcomes in profound ways.

[garbidz]

Electrochemistry is just one aspect of consciousness. You would not call a TV show electromagnetic radiation but thatäs what it is. With the two, the more interesting aspect is the information content. In our consciousness, we have self-organizing information in a wild wet media, found nowhere else in the universe.

Do you think that there is something else than electrochemical processes creating our consciousness?

What might they be?

[mermadeinheaven]

"Do you think that there is something else than electrochemical processes creating our consciousness?"

These are empirical facts, but theories are still being developed to explain how it works. Personally, I think it's too early to tell, but the fact that consciousness/subjectivity has been shown to cause significant change at the electrochemical level indicates that consciousness/subject is more than merely an emergent phenomenon. Because if it were emergent, it would have no causal power.

[mermadeinheaven]

And remember, we don't make electrochemical changes. For instance, we don't modify our brains chemistry by deliberately having our body manufacture different chemicals. But we can make changes at the level of consciousness by focusing our attention on say a specific emotion. When we do this, the body produces different chemicals. It becomes simple math i.e. 'Focus on this feeling, get these types of chemicals in these quantities'

[mermadeinheaven]

However, prior to this, it was believed that the body had its own chemistry and that we could not consciously begin to learn to how to control it. But this is actually nothing new. People in India have demonstrated this for years i.e. altering body chemistry in profound ways by brining unconscious processes under conscious control.

[garbidz]

"Because if it were emergent, it would have no causal power."

Neurophysiologists show that in each neural connection station (nucleus) in the brain signals are processed locally and relayed further to other nuclei from which different levels of feedback modify the way the information is processed.

Signals flow back and forth and in ±amplifying circles. Whatever "emerges" is interconnected with multiple layers of networks. I cannot see how in this model "emergent" would exclude "causal power".

[mermadeinheaven]

"Neurophysiologists show that in each neural connection station (nucleus) in the brain signals are processed locally"

Again, you seem to be confusing subjectivity with its neurophysiological correlates in the sense that subjectivity is a matter artifact. But subjectivity itself has never been observed objectively, that's why it's called subjective lol only its physiological correlates have been observed via neural / bio feedback technology... So you can't confuse qualia with physical events.

[garbidz]

"we don't make electrochemical changes"

I need my morning coffee which (I know) boosts the norepinephrine levels of my frontal lobes.

Somebody runs to get high, another guy shoots a molecule that targets the same receptor up his arm.

We make electrochemical (substrate) changes all the time whether we are conscious of it or not.

You want to hug someone because your networks tell you so and you feel bad if you don't. Bad feeling is neurochemistry as is good.

But who is "we"?

[garbidz]

"you cannot physically examine a subjective experience, only its neurological and physiological correlates"

Luckily, we are not so different one from another and we have languages also, different kinds of.

We can pretty safely see somebody being upset or sad or lost or aggressive or sympathetic or hilarious with no words being said. With words, she/he can tell us why.

So we hae a window open here to each others' subjective experiences. Better than most mamals can boast with.

[mermadeinheaven]

"We can pretty safely see somebody being upset or sad or lost or aggressive or sympathetic or hilarious with no words being said."

Not if they're in bed dreaming, or if they're meditating, or under hypnosis. All we may observe then are their neural / bio feedback indications; secondary, objective data.

And although using this information we can extrapolate an approximation of their state of consciousness or subjective state, we can never experience it ourselves directly. Hence, subjectivity.

[mermadeinheaven]

"I need my morning coffee which (I know) boosts the norepinephrine levels of my frontal lobes."

What i meant was that we don't consciously control our electrochemical patterns internally (via manipulating our subjective states).

[garbidz]

Right you are, we cannot manipulate our substrates consciously. It is our beautiful mammal machinery that takes care of them making us want the things it needs and avoid the things it considers harmful.

But we can use hacks to "manipulate our subjective states" as we have the privilege of self-inspection.

Meditation. Movements. Music, colours, fragrances. Thought training.

Sportsmen and soldiers have their techniques to work up adrenaline and testosterone (kill-hate-destroy).

[mermadeinheaven]

"Right you are, we cannot manipulate our substrates consciously."

You misread me. Just because i said that we don't do this doesn't mean i think that we can't do this ! lol It's already known that we can do it (i.e. consciously change our biochemistry by altering our subjective states).

[mermadeinheaven]

The "hacks" are not objects either, they're subjects.. because that's what we deal with, we change our "subjects" and observe our objects (chemicals/behavior) change to reflect that. We don't change our objects (e.g. we don't do anything physical like press some buttons on the inside of our body's to change our endocrine gland production patterns)... we just alter our qualia.. physiology follows.

[garbidz]

"You misread me"

No I did not.

As far as I can see we say exactly the same thing with slightly diferent expressions.

"we don't do anything physical like press some buttons"

That's because there are no buttons.

All we have is these hacks. You call them subjects. Why?

We hack the "qualia" or the information content of our neural networks. Same thing.

"I" (or "we) is an essential concept to have talking about anything subjective. Without it anything "subjective" cannot exist.

What is it?

[mermadeinheaven]

"No I did not."

Sorry, you're right. I misread you! lol We don't consciously manipulate our substrates, but we can consciously manipulate our subjects which result in the manipulation of our objects (physical substrates).

"You call them subjects. Why?"

Because that's what we manipulate with if we want to cause changes at the objective level. We manipulate at the subjective level. That's the level where we make decisions that cascade down into biochemical changes, behaviors and activities.

[mermadeinheaven]

And we can also manipulate our personal objects (biochemical processes) by manipulating our external objects (food, drugs, activities etc) which changes our subjective experience (qualia).

But you're right, who's doing it all... ? That's the million dollar question ..and no one's won it.. yet! ;)

btw, you're pretty interesting yourself ;P

[garbidz]

"Because that's what we manipulate with if we want to cause changes at the objective level"

No go.

You manipulate something. This something becomes an object of your manipulation, not a subject. YOU are the subject.

Neither do we want changes in objective level.

I do not care what my blood pressure is or pulse or skin conductance.

I want to be cool. Being cool is subjective, not objective as it is a feeling. Feelings are subjective.

Conscious decision is subjective.

Most decisions aren't.

[mermadeinheaven]

"You manipulate something. This something becomes an object of your manipulation, not a subject.

Actually, the further you go into it, the more you begin to realize that you're neither the subject or the object. It's consciousness that's doing both. This is why sensations, thoughts, and emotions arise and disappear.. they're discontinuous..., but awareness is still present in spite of these changes.

"YOU are the subject."

How can you be the subject though if the subject is discontinuous?

[mermadeinheaven]

"Neither do we want changes in objective level."

But we do, which is why we're forever trying to engineer our lives to procure more happiness for ourselves.

"I do not care what my blood pressure is or pulse or skin conductance. "

You would if you understood the science behind these and how they influence virtually every aspect of your life.

[mermadeinheaven]

"I want to be cool"

Sure, but to get that subjective experience most people try to modify their objective environment (i.e. buying a bigger house, a new car, latest fashions, more magazines, more alcohol etc). Only problem is that it usually runs out and so you need to buy more lol It's a real problem actually, because all of this neediness has caused us to run our species to the brink of extinction, since we're destroying our ecology trying to satisfy our physiology / desires.

[garbidz]

"You would if you understood the science"

actually I am quite well qualified to understand the science...

[garbidz]

"but awareness is still present in spite of these changes."

which sort of hints that there is something more constant at the basement than just neural activation. Damasio thinks (as you already hinted) that our body would be an essential factor in creating the subjective experience of self, to give it continuity to patch up the holes of the storytelling creating our self-reality.

Which actually is nothing more substantial than our dreams an whims without the body messages in the background.

[garbidz]

"How can you be the subject though if the subject is discontinuous?"

In fact the subject is discontinuous but as the lapses are quite short we pay no attention. For example, we might think that our observation of our surroundings is continuous, this is the subjective feeling we have.

But it is not. Most of our subjective feeling of being there is being synthesized so that we believe it is continuous even when it is not. Our brain fills the gaps.

Magicians take advantage of this fact.

[mermadeinheaven]

"You want to hug someone because your networks tell you"

So you're saying that your neurochemistry tells you to hug someone and that's why you hug them? lol I dunno about that.. because while neurochemistry can trigger certain thoughts and emotions, it has been demonstrated that we're not forced to act on them. This is part of the process of becoming conscious of your unconscious impulses and motivations i.e. evolving.

[garbidz]

please do read a book on physiology and you will learn how patterns of electrochemical neural activation -if spatially and temporally adequately organized- just do it

is information material or immaterial?

the question is absurd

[Cheiz87]

You may be right, but in my opinion the problem is this: How can we make our mechanical, physiological view of the brain compatible with our subjective view of it? One solution that is presented is epiphenomenalism, and I try to show thatś not a good one.

Please stop being so arrogant.

[garbidz]

This time your question is relevant.

Plus, you were about to answer it yourself.

The point is that our reality is just a presentation of external and internal senses. All we experience is virtual.

Our "self" is but a sum of selected sensory mappings woven together. The question of material-immaterial is absurd in this context as would be e.g. "is a symphony material or immateria?".

Even more so, as in neuropsychology, structure and function are inseparable. See Descartes' Error by Damasio.

[mermadeinheaven]

"you will learn how patterns of electrochemical neural activation -if spatially and temporally adequately organized- just do it"

Said differently, complex matter interactions within the brain give rise to conscious experience.

But the interesting question now is, 'Can consciousness influence matter?' (i.e. is there any evidence of subjectivity causing brain states or physiological states?).. Actually, the answer is 'Yes'.

[Cheiz87]

hi! thanks for the comment & friends. Could you explain yourself a bit more? Where is your qoute from? And am I interpreting you correct if I say that you have a dualist view? Then, how exactly can "consciousness" influence "matter"?

[mermadeinheaven]

hi Cheiz,

I was quoting garbidz

"you have a dualist view?"

No. I only make the distinction between consciousness and matter in the same way you might make the distinction between a glass of water and a water molecule contained in it.

[mermadeinheaven]

Cheiz87: "Then, how exactly can "consciousness" influence "matter"?"

Because consciousness is all there is. But you have to examine this step by step.. First you make the distinction, then see how they are essentially one... What you see then is that both upward causation and downward causation exist without contradiction, because either way its just consciousness doing it.

[Cheiz87]

I don't believe in any ontological distinction between a glass water and a molecule; the only difference is the way, the level, we talk about it. I do agree that something similar is the case with the physical brain and consciousness, but saying that changing our subjective experience causes the physical brain to accomodate to that seems like a ontological distinction, dualism, to me

[mermadeinheaven]

"changing our subjective experience causes the physical brain to accomodate to that seems like a ontological distinction, dualism, to me"

It's only dualistic at the level of duality, but there's no point in denying duality either, otherwise you end up with another form of duality lol The truth is that while subject and object appear different they both derive from the same source i.e. consciousness. But it's important to begin with duality and lead to non-duality to show both coexist as one.

[SHIBBYiPANDA]

@Cheiz87 maybe he's saying there's material to consciousness that can influence matter some how?

[garbidz]

You cannot separate consciousness from matter

It is absurd, as absurd as the Cheshire Cat's smile without the cat.

Consciousness is an electrochemical process in the neural networks. These networks interact with basal (motor) ganglia of the brain. When molecules released by the motoneuron bind to the receptor cites of the synaptic cell membrane the muscle contracts.

Et, voilà, that's all. Wonderland dualism, fairytales.

[mermadeinheaven]

"You cannot separate consciousness from matter"

While they may not be fundamentally separate as such, there does still appear to be some kind of distinction between matter and consciousness (hence "the hard problem of consciousness"), since you cannot physically examine a subjective experience, only its neurological and physiological correlates.

So if consciousness is merely a physical function, as you say it is, then where is the subjective experience in physical time-space?

[garbidz]

Of course there is a difference between matter and consciousness as there is a difference between -let's say two football teams and a football match. Or a piano and a sonata. Or the smile and the cat.

For some reason people do not consider the difference hard to conceive in these contexts but as soon as the subject is consciousness they lose their cool.

As for you question: Our subjective experience is in inside our heads about 20 msec after the "now".

I am not pretending tha all is known.

[mermadeinheaven]

"Our subjective experience is in inside our heads about 20 msec after the "now""

It's not only in ur head, it's also in ur body too, b/c when different chemicals are produced by the body in reaction to physical stimulus for instance, u get a different subjective experience. But the reverse is also true i.e. If u change ur subjective experience using ur imagination & memory (i.e. without doing anything physical), ur body changes its biochemical output to match ur subjective experience.

[mermadeinheaven]

Said differently, you can use your consciousness / subjective experience to override your body's biological processes. It's placebo i.e. consciousness over matter.

[mermadeinheaven]

And from another perspective it's consciousness over consciousness. And from yet another perspective it's just consciousness.

[garbidz]

the chemical is not your personal experience even though it most definitely modifies it

it is the body/brain ensemble that creates the subjective experience but it is seated in the brain

[mermadeinheaven]

"the chemical is not your personal experience"

It's true that there's a clear distinction between subject (qualia) and object (chemical), but they're also intrinsically linked. That's why when you change a persons biochemistry their subjective experience changes, and why when you change a persons subjective experience their biology also changes.

Said differently, subjective experience has physical correlates, and it's here where you find the bridge of duality blurring.

[mermadeinheaven]

"it is the body/brain ensemble that creates the subjective experience but it is seated in the brain"

But if this were true (i.e. that subjectivity emerges from matter) then consciousness and/or subjectivity would have no causal efficacy. But they do, and to a significant degree.

[garbidz]

wow what a lot of noise of a completely irrelevant question...it is the 21st century and people are stuck with Archimedes's concepts and logic...no wonder philosophers are not getting anywhere!

[Cheiz87]

Given that mind-body dualism is what many people intuitively take as their world view and there is still a lot of debate i think it is pretty relevant indeed.

Please show us what your superior concepts are and use them to present your überphilosophy. Im pretty curious

[nspeert]

genius!

[cryptsub]

My apologies - You didn't say that you support interactionism. I'm tired. :)

The argument against epiphenomenalism seems to depend on regarding conciousness as immaterial. Conciousness is indeed a seemingly paradoxical phenominon, but why must we assume it is immaterial?

[mermadeinheaven]

"Consciousness is indeed a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon, but why must we assume it is immaterial?"

Because subjective experiences or states of consciousness are not material objects that can be studied in the same way that physical phenomenon can be studied. For instance, you can't take an emotion such as compassion or appreciation and put it under a microscope. Only its physiological correlate can be physically observed. But obviously an emotion is more than its physiological correlate.

[cryptsub]

Just because we cannot currently (or ever?) quantify conciousness, it does not automatically follow that it lies outside of physical reality. It may simply be an untrackable chemical phenomenon within the brain.

Epiphenominalism posits that the conscious being or state is simply passive and receptive, and that "choice" is an illusion. Every "choice" we experience is really a preordained involuntary response. This seems irrefutable to me.

[allan3141]

@cryptsub "Every 'choice' we experience is really a preordained involuntary response. This seems irrefutable to me." So this would also included your 'choice' to think and type this, yes? If I disagree with you, which I do, this too is an preordained involuntary response too, yes? Do you really not see a problem with this line of thinking?

[cryptsub]

Please show me any evidence from any hard science that upholds your belief in interactionism - a relation between physical reality and phantom properties ("immaterial" would be a good word for such phenomena - could one use it as a noun?). Interactionism seems so mystical - almost religious. I would maintain that epiphenomenalism is not disprovable. It seems to make the most sense to me.

[ianiplanet]

Liquidity cannot cause anything, still it can be observed as being real (existing).

The very fact that I can name it, is not caused by (immaterial) liquidity itself but by my (material) brain that perceived the (epi)phenomenon liquidity.

(END)

[ianiplanet]

Then you say: there is no reason to suppose it [the immaterial] exists if it cannot influence anything.

I disagree. The liquidity of water can be regarded as an epiphenomenon of the behaviour of its molecules, but yet it has no causal properties. The properties of water (for example giving enough upward force for an object to float on its surface) can be defined at the molecular level.

(cont.)

[ianiplanet]

The wrong assumption is that, in order to appear in the material world, the immaterial should have causal effects. Under certain conditions the material can cause immaterial phenomena, perceived by the material itself. The material receives back the nonmaterial information it caused, like a spectator receives back its reflection from a mirror. It is not the reflection in the mirror that causes the perception of the image, but it is the mirror property itself that does so. (cont.)

[ianiplanet]

Thanks for inserting this interesting subject here. You take the body/mind dualism as an example to prove epiphenomenalism being a false premise. You stated: if the immaterial cannot cause anything, then how can the expression that the immaterial exists, surface in the material world? The problem is: what causes the immaterial to appear in the material, if the immaterial itself has no causal power?

(cont.)

[agrier04]

The idea that something that does not have causal properties cannot cause you to debate its existance is misleading. We can debate all day about the existance of aliens; however the causal properties of aliens certainly did not cause that discussion. In the same way, we cannot say that it is logically necessary that the causal abilities of the mind caused this discussion. The mind may just witness this discussion in an epiphenominalistic way.

[Cheiz87]

I don't understand your reply. First you say "cannot cause the debate is misleading", thereby implying that it CAN cause. Then you say the causal properties of aliens DO NOT cause the debate.

I don't say the causal properties of the mind caused the discussion. I say if some hypothetical something cannot cause anything then also it can't show it's existence so then there is no reason to believe it exists.

[diegocaleiro]

Your video is good for a youtube audience, since it is both correct and simple. There are more technical ways of expressing this problem. I suggest you take a look at chalmers "The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief" which I think is the standard answer for the point you make in the video.

[viradeus]

An epiphenomenalist would reply that conscious feelings are just like the changing noises of a machine, that are not acting over each others and much less over the machine - being just some of its byproducts - that may be usefull to tell how the machine is working (and may really seem to be the acting, as the machine seems static), but that in fact only express what the machine is internally doing itself. Neutralizing materialism is just about questioning its rational motivation.

[DaedalusFly]

Hi. I enjoyed your video. Though, you should clarify that epiphenomenalism concerns property dualism, not substance dualism. You begin the video by discussing interactive substance dualism. Your conclusion is frequently expressed as the Occam's Razor principle: do not multiple unnecessarily.

[tralalars]

I agree. To put it another way, consider this:

I have an urge (a mental property) to show epiphenomenalsim wrong and what i have to do is to show that my reporting (physical event) must be caused by the mental property my urge (or wanting) I find it hard to swallow that my reporting of this wanting is in fact not caused by that that property. My question is then: how can I report about them if they cannot cause anything?

[tralalars]

I agree. To put it another way. consider this:

At this moment I have an urge, a mental property (or M-event involving some M-properties), to show epiphenomenalism wrong but this urge (or wanting) is not the cause of me reporting about it, a physical event"

[ThinkFilozofio]

Great video. Chalmers would disagree with you about this notion of causality, I think. He would say that we have epistemic access to non-physical properties, but those properties have no causal power. It seems contradictory to me too. I agree with you though.

What about idealism though? I don't know. I am inclined toward interactionism myself, but I haven't solved the problem of making this consistent with naturalism.

[ContraWagner]

I hope you continue to make these videos. It was very interesting. You might be interested in John Searle's video I uploaded. I'll send you the link to your message box.

[Cheiz87]

thanks man! I'll definitely make more videos, when i have time. There are so many more things i want to explore and make videos about. Your videos look interesting too.

Thanks for the Searle link, i'll watch it. I've already watched Searle@GoogleAuthors. I disagree with him on many points(i'll make a video about that too), but still he has very interesting things to say.

[Bramp1]

Interesting video, I agree with your point. It may be funny to find out that according to epiphenomalism the 'feeling that there must be something immaterial' is actually caused by the material world. I totally agree with that, but I don't think epiphenomalism was invented to stress that.

[Cheiz87]

What do you exactly mean by stress(benadrukken?). Do you mean that epiphenomenalism wasn't invented to account for that feeling?

I think in some way it was. The only reason to accept epiphenomalism over materialism is the addition of the immaterial to account for consciousness /subjective experience. But according to epiphenomalism itself this can never be a reason, so there are no reasons left to accept it.

[Bramp1]

To me epiphenomalism sounds like an attempt to combine materialism and the immaterial world. I consider myself a materialist, so I think this attempt is rather convulsive (krampachtig).

[Bramp1]

By "stress" I meant that I think epiphenomalism was invented by someone who didn't want to give up the immaterial world, but at the other hand didn't think it was possible that the immaterial world could influence the material world. As you pointed out, there is then no argument left for epiphenomalism, as by definition the immaterial world cannot be experienced (since the immaterial cannot influence the material).

[Bramp1]

According to epiphenomalism the feeling that there must be something immaterial can only be caused by the material world. This seems a rather strange conclusion, if the one that first came up with epiphenomalism invented it to "save" the immaterial world.

[Cheiz87]

and that is exactly my point.

And although not many philosophers may openly support epiphenomenalism, many seem to have a somehwat similar view with the same problem, like David Chalmers with his distinction between the "Easy" and the "Hard Problem", and Frank Jackson with his "Mary The Color Scientist" thought experiment. But i'll make a video about that later.

[UnBeguiled]

I find any kind of dualism incoherent, and epiphenomenalism is just a word game as it is ultimately dualistic, as you point out. From my experience, the laws of physics are not routinely broken.

Have you heard Dennett's analogy of the gremlins in a car engine?

[Cheiz87]

i cant remember reading that, in which book is that? i read consciousness explained, the mind's I, and now i'm reading Sweet Dreams

[UnBeguiled]

It's in the interview with Stephen Wright. Check it out on google videos.

[UnBeguiled]

Sorry, Robert Wright, not Stephen. (although that would be a good interview too!)

[randyhelzerman]

Hmmmm.... what I would like to see is proof that a qualia has causal powers.