"[..] that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science."
@laramidee People think that because philosophy is a less stable knowledge, there is no progress in it. Now, the reason for this is, I think, that the method of philosophy is just pure rational critique. Science, on the other hand, requires phyisically complicated experiments that are not always inside the limits of our current technology, and therefore, not possible to perform. This state of affairs causes philosophical ideas to be eaiser to refute, while it gives scientific ones relative
@unavailavle123 contingent, and therefore, always revisable, to be easier to revise than the meaning-true propositions? After all, it was easier and more intuitive for us to realize about the contingent revisable character of that kind of propositions than to realize about the contingent revisable character of the meaning-true propositions. It is because the latter is less obvious. And perhaps it is less obvious beacuse that kind of propositions are much harder to revise in the first place.
@unavailavle123 That would explain the epistemological stability in mathematics, and the epistemological unstability in philosophy. And for conclution, I recall the main idea: if performing scientific experiments was easier enough, science would be as espistemologically unstable as philosophy. But progress and knowledge does not implies epistemic stablility. Sorry, I wrote to much! But that's all, I hope you find it interesting, and sorry for bad english. Cheers.
@unavailavle123 I think math is essentially meaning estipulation and axiomatic formal deduction. If you accept Quine's revisability thesis, however, you may have some grounds on which you can still say that math is rational critique to some extent (in the sense of negative/positive thesis, or better, refutation/proposal method). I won't argue against it, because I don't think I'am prepared. But I think that at list one could say this:
@unavailavle123 We used to think that the propositions which are true in virtue of their meaning are always necessesary. But it turns out that they could be revisable (and therefore, the propositions of mathematics are revisable, because they are from this kind). Why not to expect that empirical dependent propositions, which we used to belive to be always
@unavailavle123 stability. Ergo, philosophy do progress, but it's progress is much faster than scientific progress, which makes it more unstable. As we intuitively associate knowledge with stability, that gives raise to the belief that philosophy doesn't make any progress. You may be wondering why this doesn't apply to mathematics, which is also rational critique. Well, I would not call it rational critique at all.
First thing that came up in my mind was Bertrand Russell's "The problems of Philosphy" (1912):
"If You ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historrian, or any other man of learning, what definit body of truth has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as You are willing to listen. But if You put the same question to a philosopher, hi will, if he is candid, have to cenfess [..]"
"[..] that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science."
laramidee 11 months ago
@laramidee People think that because philosophy is a less stable knowledge, there is no progress in it. Now, the reason for this is, I think, that the method of philosophy is just pure rational critique. Science, on the other hand, requires phyisically complicated experiments that are not always inside the limits of our current technology, and therefore, not possible to perform. This state of affairs causes philosophical ideas to be eaiser to refute, while it gives scientific ones relative
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@unavailavle123 contingent, and therefore, always revisable, to be easier to revise than the meaning-true propositions? After all, it was easier and more intuitive for us to realize about the contingent revisable character of that kind of propositions than to realize about the contingent revisable character of the meaning-true propositions. It is because the latter is less obvious. And perhaps it is less obvious beacuse that kind of propositions are much harder to revise in the first place.
unavailavle123 1 week ago
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@unavailavle123 That would explain the epistemological stability in mathematics, and the epistemological unstability in philosophy. And for conclution, I recall the main idea: if performing scientific experiments was easier enough, science would be as espistemologically unstable as philosophy. But progress and knowledge does not implies epistemic stablility. Sorry, I wrote to much! But that's all, I hope you find it interesting, and sorry for bad english. Cheers.
unavailavle123 1 week ago
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@unavailavle123 I think math is essentially meaning estipulation and axiomatic formal deduction. If you accept Quine's revisability thesis, however, you may have some grounds on which you can still say that math is rational critique to some extent (in the sense of negative/positive thesis, or better, refutation/proposal method). I won't argue against it, because I don't think I'am prepared. But I think that at list one could say this:
unavailavle123 1 week ago
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@unavailavle123 We used to think that the propositions which are true in virtue of their meaning are always necessesary. But it turns out that they could be revisable (and therefore, the propositions of mathematics are revisable, because they are from this kind). Why not to expect that empirical dependent propositions, which we used to belive to be always
unavailavle123 1 week ago
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@unavailavle123 stability. Ergo, philosophy do progress, but it's progress is much faster than scientific progress, which makes it more unstable. As we intuitively associate knowledge with stability, that gives raise to the belief that philosophy doesn't make any progress. You may be wondering why this doesn't apply to mathematics, which is also rational critique. Well, I would not call it rational critique at all.
unavailavle123 1 week ago
Progress in philosophy.
Ha ha! (You got me with this one!)
First thing that came up in my mind was Bertrand Russell's "The problems of Philosphy" (1912):
"If You ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historrian, or any other man of learning, what definit body of truth has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as You are willing to listen. But if You put the same question to a philosopher, hi will, if he is candid, have to cenfess [..]"
laramidee 11 months ago