MONISM VS DUALISM & PSYCHIATRY 1/4 DENNET & SEARLE

[drystyx]

Dennett obviously wanted to escape from reality. Then, as now, I'm sure people had to deal with sadists and bullies on a regular basis. His theory fails miserably, because the chemical reactions, everything constantly changes. The only possible way it could work is if you were a different person, inheriting the functionalist brain, with each reaction, with only the illusion, via the brain, to make you think you were the same person. Dennett either has to believe this, or in Magic.

[PerpetualTiredness]

@PerpetualTiredness accept*

[KWrestler21]

As I said in the comment section of video three, natural dualism is still dualism. And Chalmer's hard problem is the fact that after he does asses his grievances with functionalism, as does Searle, then he secedes into dualism via not accepting that consciousness is simply a series of neuron firings. Chalmers sees the problem with not being enough of a physicalist. Yet, he can't be one himself. Rather, he seceded into a failed dualism. Dualism, by definition, can not work.

[jockmclaren47]

@KWrestler21 Consciousness is not the same as "neurons firing." It is the informational state generated by those neurons firing, which is what Dennett and Searle hinted at by saying the brain could be replaced by microchips and nobody, not even its owner, would know.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 Consciousness is not neurons firing? So, if my neurons stopped firing, then I would still have consciousness? Oh, so it is generated by neuron firings (a purely physical action). Thus, neuron firings generate consciousness. The statement you just made contradicts dualism. They can't interact. Are you sure you know what dualism is? You seem not to understand the elementary definition of it.

[mrrobertfair]

@KWrestler21 Your statement beginning with "...if my neurons..." is axiomatic to you but not to me, nor can you say as an axiom that when your neurons fire that consciousness is generated...its not an empirical statement; you have to prove that consciousness cannot exist apart from say, brain death.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 (continuing) By the way, this whole bit: "Searle hinted at by saying the brain could be replaced by microchips and nobody, not even its owner, would know." Yeah, that whole bit is pretty hilarious. Dennet, well, I'm not going to argue with you there. That is more than obvious. On the other hand, Searle would say if that is a possibility, we know nothing even close to that technology for the Chinese Room shows time and time again how mere computation does not equal consciousness.

[chaosmagegod1]

@jockmclaren47 no person or machine could ever replicate the ability of the human brain for arguments sake. remember these are philosophical views, not scientific 100% facts. All philosophy is , is one person opinion, thats why there are so many.,..

[jockmclaren47]

@chaosmagegod1 Yes indeed, but remember that your claim that "no person or machine could ever replicate the ability of the human brain" is itself a philosophical claim, not empirical (scientific).

[KWrestler21]

***BEFORE YOU WASTE YOUR TIME WATCHING THIS VIDEO, READ THIS.***

I just have once sentence for you that should help you avoid any kind of philosophical challenge you would have assumed and never gained from these videos: McLaren is a dualist.

[jockmclaren47]

@KWrestler21 Wow. Such penetrating analysis. I am, of course, a dualist but don't you ever make the same mistake as Dennett and Searle by believing that dualism = magic. It doesn't. It means "two apparently incommensurable orders of being whose existence must be reconciled if we wish to make sense of the universe as a rational place." That's all. Mind and body are NOT of the same order of nature. Listen to the videos again, or better still, read my books.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 I didn't know it takes much more language than that to see against that claim. Dualism is out-dated and vastly rejected by the philosophical community, whether that is all the leading proponents in fucntionalism, the cognitive science movement, or other forms of monism. Also, you're trying to draw everyone into your Cartesian categories. I don't have to talk of the mind and body as if they are entirely different things. To add, the whole basis against dualism is the fact

[jockmclaren47]

@KWrestler21 Dualism as magic is indeed outdated. Natural dualism (see David Chalmers) is most definitely not.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 Yeah, you must be right. Because under the new form of "natural dualism" (which, by the way, is totally rejected and not even mentioned in the argument at all) the body and mind do interact, but they are separate entities. Yep, that is totally different. Man, what was I thinking? Oh wait, I know what I was thinking. I was thinking that there is no absolute proof whatsoever that the mind interacts with the body except on purely physical explanations. That's right.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 (continuing) I mean the only reason I made a statement so simplistic is because it is so simply wrong. The mind and body interact, simply put. And if you agree with my statement, then that is not dualism. Also, your comment does not define dualism. What you just defined was a begging issue for pursuit of the mind-body problem, which we've made a decent headway for in the past century or so. I say begging issue too because they are not suppose to be weighed against each other.

[lookatmepleasesir]

@KWrestler21 descartes believed that the mind and body interact

[thedeeliciousplum]

What would be a truly wonderful & thoughtful commitment, is to place Niall McLaren in a discussion with Daniel Dennett. This may help Niall's supporters to witness if Niall is being fair and if he's indeed sharing in knowledge. Or, if he's simply engaged in falsely sharing assertions and whatever else it takes, so as to sell books. There is nothing wrong in marketing one's books. But the manner in which Niall has chosen to do so, is not at all mindful. Even, if it proves economically successful.

[thedeeliciousplum]

Right on the getgo, Niall does not possess the ability to understand what a young Daniel Dennett has shared. While Daniel is sharing that the material brain is all there is, Niall is questionably placing words into Daniel's statement. I do not know what drives Niall to foolishly & unmindfully assert that two Naturalists are dualists, yet Niall is clearly demonstrating thoughts and actions in support of why no one takes him seriously.

[jockmclaren47]

@thedeeliciousplum You have clearly listened but not heard. The videos are summaries of lectures I have given to wide support and interest. More details are available in the books but your criticism as it stands is invalid: give me one example of how I have "questionably put words into (Dennett's) statements"? All my claims are supported in very great detail in my various publications, which are openly available. As for debating Dennett, I offered but he refuses.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 You have clearly written, yet you misunderstood Daniel Dennett's comments. Mind you, I will concede that I have not read your books. So, it is obvious that I cannot comment on these. If we were to simply look at your first example... "How on earth could my thoughts & feelings fit in the same world with the nerve cells & molecules that made up my brain." Are you at all aware of the context that led Dan to utter this jest?

[jockmclaren47]

@thedeeliciousplum Read the written material. The context of all his statements to the effect that brain and mind are both biological is clearly given, in considerable detail. If there is an error there, nobody has found it, including Dennett's friends who have pored over it. Dennett himself retains an Olympian silence - as well he may. I stand by my claim: Dennett is a closet dualist. He has used dualist elements to sustain his case, which fails without them.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 I would very much like for you to share how are able to take this quote: "How on earth could my thoughts & feelings fit in the same world with the nerve cells & molecules that made up my brain" and create an assertion that Dan is a closeted dualist. And tha you did this without being able to share in what context this was originally shared. It is highly probable that Dan stated that in jest. You may have misappropriated this. No one is above such misappropriations.

[jockmclaren47]

@thedeeliciousplum He was most definitely NOT speaking in jest, then or ever since. He was stating an ancient problem in theory of mind in the way he understood. All my case is set out in detail in the literature. You need to see that before making decisions such as you are making. These videos are only for introductions.

Dennett does joke a lot but he uses jokes in a subtle manner: he is not an idiot. But he is still wrong.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 You are being reasonable to press me to read your literature. I may be making a mistake by assuming that you are deliberately misappropriating Dan's words. It may just be the simple case that definitions are in order, so as to better understand your assertion. I'll need to familiarize myself with what you mean by theory of mind. The neurosciences are visibly in its infancy stage. Theory of mind is not in the classic sense a theory at all. It's a notion stemming from metaphysics.

[jockmclaren47]

@thedeeliciousplum I have argued that mind and body are ontologically distinct, albeit intimately related. Brain causes mind, mind acts back to control brain. Mine is an integrative, natural dualist theory of mind, owing quite a lot to David Chalmers but taking the concepts very much further and applying them to biology. I don't think it would disappoint you, bearing in mind that it is a work in progress. Best, Jock McLaren

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 Oh, I see. Thank you for being forward/honest by sharing that you're engaging in a form of ontology: "ontologically distinct." Expressing thru the creative tools provided by the philosophy of metaphysics is a wonderful form of creative expression, as like poetry. The natural sciences are limited to the chore of best describing the natural physical world. Whereas if one is engaging in the philosophy of metaphysics, then such creative assertions are absent of any rational limits.

[jockmclaren47]

@thedeeliciousplum Well, I'd like to think there are rational limits to the way we conduct our affairs, but creativity has no limits. I agree about poetry: until those boring reductionists and biological psychiatrists can give a convincing account of the majesty of poetry, then we don't have to take them seriously. Can I? No, not at all, I say it's ontologically distinct from biology.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 Hey ;) Hold on a second. In all do respect, reductionists are not all boring.Tthe character trait of being boring is not reserved to soley one community. It is an international trait. No one is above the trait of being boring ;) The majesty and/or moving trait(s) of poetry can be felt equally by any human being who is so inclined. As a material naturalist, I may be equally moved by poetry as would be the most passionate & creative immaterialist who may be moved by poetry.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@thedeeliciousplum A tiny addendum, do take my replies with a few grains of salt. I do thank you for being patient with my thoughts and in responding to me. I am currently building an awareness of the term you have shared: "natural dualism". So, forgive me for not being presently able to presently reflect anything on this. Yet, I can reflect on the differences between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of metaphysics. Thank you for your patience.

[thedeeliciousplum]

@jockmclaren47 *how you are able to Please forgive my typos. I am filled with these.

[Freethinker12341]

this is stupid... i hate these promoted videos more than anything

[kerryzel77]

Interesting slide show, but riddled with errors (e.g. that the "homunculus" is a little man in the brain).

[jockmclaren47]

@kerryzel77 You should check on the definition of 'homunculus.' 

[St00sh13]

Some ant colonies behave like individual organisms. Each ant has only a few 1000 neurons and a collection of hormal responses to the environment. The ants are not intelligent in themselves, but the colony can make decisions. e.g. it can fight a predator if they are under attack and the colony can decide to move to another nest.

It is called emergent behaviour. There is no "magic" substance. It is a natural product of stuff! The brain is the same, but at a higher order of complexity.

[jockmclaren47]

@St00sh13 Agreed. Emergent properties are real, just insubstantial. This does not imply "magic stuff," it just means two apparently incommensurable orders of being which we must reconcile if we wish to see the universe as a rational place. We can easily build a computer model of ant colonies, making decisions based on distributed choices. Not difficult, not magic, and not reducible.

[St00sh13]

@jockmclaren47 Thanks for the reply. Most people who put forward dualism however, do tend to be putting it forward because they already believe in a deity / the soul and dualism, in their interpretation, supports that view.

[patheally]

I've heard it put that the brain 'excretes the mind just the way organs in the body excrete hormones. I think a better explanation is how language itself works. We'll never run out of sentences to say because language is communicative. Or better yet, I can say the word 'can' an infinite amount of times and never run out of the word. It's not like it exists like material things do, yet it seems just as real. I think the mind works something like that.

[jockmclaren47]

@patheally You're right, the silly people making that sort of claim are wrong. One of the main offenders is Daniel Dennett. If he wants to think his mind is secreted by his brain just as his bowel secretes stuff, he can go right ahead and believe it but I don't. Language and mind are inextricably interwoven, and language is infinite.

[patheally]

@jockmclaren47 Well, language may be thought of as infinite insofar as there are infinite combinations of words, most of which will turn out to be pure gibberish. Individual minds, however, probably have limits in terms of the number of 'good' ideas and combinations of words that enlighten and educate. The mind may have the potential for limitless thought (this I'm not so sure about anyway), but one can't simply ignore the limitations of the thinker due to things like beliefs and social presur.

[metaldude82]

It seems you are basically saying that Dennet contradicts himself. Am I right?

[jockmclaren47]

@metaldude82 You are right. He claims to have formulated a monist theory of mind but he uses dualist elements to complete the causal or explanatory chain in his model. His concept of a 'virtual' machine arising from the brain just is dualism. Unfortunately, Dennett equates dualism and magic, which is very old-fashioned.

[Freethinker12341]

@metaldude82 yes, this video is stupid

[rrodmada]

A silly, obsolete debate.

We now have a sophisticated understanding of emergent properties in complex systems. All complex systems display properties that are not reductively evident from examining their constituent parts in isolation. This is well established and well understood in complexity theory, systems dynamics, etc. No magic is needed to leap from neurons to consciousness.

[jockmclaren47]

@rrodmada I agree, but can you convince mainstream biological psychiatry? The only approach allowed is that a full understanding of the brain will give a full understanding of all aspects of human affairs, with nothing else left to explain. I think it is manifestly rubbish but orthodox academic psychiatry says that leaping from neurons to consciousness is necessarily magic. If it can't be seen under a microscope, it is necessarily fantasy. Crazy, but that's what they believe.

[Danielnoctis]

One cannot fatalistically claim that a molecule has no thinking properties, nor derive that since a single molecule can't (seemingly) think, a whole structure of them cannot. Hegel would approve.

As far as the problem (you're hinting) of a machine capable of thinking, it depends on the criteria one uses to measure thinking. In a similar fashion to machines, our mind(software) is limited by the physical capabilities(hardware) of our brain. i.e. we cannot see infrared light.

[jockmclaren47]

@Danielnoctis If molecules can think, where does it stop? Atoms? Subatomic particles? Panpsychism is infinite and thus non-explanatory. Thinking emerges from clusters of molecules undertaking ordered actions. Thinking is not random.

I agree with the idea that hardware restricts software, e.g. are we limited in the numbers of logical processes by our neurons? Interesting thought.

[Danielnoctis]

@jockmclaren47 I agree.

I started by taking on account the inherent differences between a neuron cell and say, a blood cell.

What seems to me to be occurring is that the structure of the cluster of molecules is vitally important. Not the molecule itself.

A whole structure has abilities that a single piece doesn't. That's why I said Hegel would approve, because he postulated that in order to tell the "truth" about an object, you have to also tell the role it plays to the whole.

[jockmclaren47]

@Danielnoctis Agreed. What counts is what the particular structure does. There is more to mind than biology, despite anything people like Dennett and Searle claim.

[Danielnoctis]

@jockmclaren47 Biology is a dead-end. No matter what progress it has made, it's only went towards explaining the "how" not the "why", Kant has a similar viewpoint.

Taking on account the properties that the mind posses, namely that it has "why"-s and to some extant even proceeds by that drive, one cannot comprehend the whole of mind from today's empirical bases. Either the empirical needs to be broadened(progress) or we need to accept the extra we can't explain(stagnant) .

[jockmclaren47]

@Danielnoctis I agree entirely. Unfortunately, a whole lot of very influential psychiatrists and philosophers don't. I am working on what I hope will be the definitive resolution of whether biology can explain mental precepts (it can't, but it has to be proven at a level that will convince the ideologues).

[Danielnoctis]

@jockmclaren47 That is one of the most fundamental topics you've got going there.

It's a frightening topic to argue, because it needs both extensive research and an answer we might not like (cognitive dissonance comes to mind).

The impact of a succeeding is a potentially tremendous one.

May serendipity be on your side.

[jockmclaren47]

@Danielnoctis Appreciated.

[sum1unxpected]

the monist position on mental disorders is quite clear. mental disorders arise from problems in the brain.

dualism has no explanations for what a mind is, what a soul is supposed to be, or how a soul is supposed to interact with a body. dualism cannot be reasonably accepted until there is a coherent definition for what a mind is according to dualism.

[dfpolis]

You've missed the middle ground: We are 1 substance with 2 subsystems. The paradigmatic act of mind is knowing. Knowledge is a relation between a knowing subject & a known object. The brain is a data processing organ, but processing data is not knowing data. To know, we must stand as a subject aware of objective content. There is no naturalist model or hope of one, because of the methodological exclusion of subjective data. Having no data on being a subject, there can be no theory. Peace, DP

[dfpolis]

Like most contemporaries, you miss the middle ground of the Thomist position: We are 1 being, ostensible thing or substance, having 2 aspects. The paradigmatic act of mind is knowing. All knowing has a known object & a knowing subject. The brain is a data processing and control organ transforming object content, but it does not explain awareness of the data it processes. Processing data is not being aware of data. An intentional subsystem is needed to explain the data. Oeace, DO

[updownleftrightinout]

Dennett and Searle are not dualists.

[jockmclaren47]

@updownleftrightinout Prove it, but do so independently of their claims. It is of no value simply to list their claims because my case is that their claims are wrong.

[jlke45]

Regarding 2:14 ff, could you please give some citations on this point? In my own (and seemingly everybody's) reading of Descartes, he was quite sincere about his dualism. After all, Descartes seemed to regard substance dualism as necessary consequence of the cogito, and (for Descartes) with the cogito stands and falls the very possibility of science.

[jockmclaren47]

@jlke45 Will do, but there is no suggestion that Descartes wasn't sincere. Plenty of people have detected the drift of his thinking even though he was careful not to take it to its logical conclusion. A bit like people these days trying to advance a pluralist viewpoint in an autocracy, they have to be careful.

[jlke45]

@jockmclaren47 Well, no doubt plenty of people have noted that Cartesian epistemology tends toward epiphenomenalism, if that's what you're getting at, though I wouldn't say that amounts embracing materialist monism. But either way, please let me know what passages you're referring to so we can be on the same page, so to speak.

[jockmclaren47]

@jlke45 Due to cyclones and other messes, I will have to delay this some time. Will be in touch.

[jlke45]

@jockmclaren47 Very well, take your time.

[Chuichupachichi]

Only somebody that shares cognitive commonalities with Dennett can't realize what a cretin is he

[jockmclaren47]

@Chuichupachichi I think that's a bit rough. Dennett is pretty bright but he is simply wrong, for the reasons I set out in my paper and in the first chapters of my most recent book. There is nothing wrong with being wrong; it becomes wrong when the philosopher refuses to answer criticism on the basis that he doesn't believe there are any errors in his work. Science and philosophy progress by constant criticism of ideas; without criticism, we end up with religion or fanaticism.

[fishybishbash]

@jockmclaren47 I'm a layman but I agree with your point. What Dennett says seems quite logical; its just that its incorrect.

[jockmclaren47]

Yes, I have reviewed that paper in my own paper ("Monist models of mind and biological psychiatry," in Ethical Human Psychol. Psychiat). The question is not what he claims but what his model actually does. My point is that he uses dualist concepts at crucial points in his explanatory chain. There is more detail in Chap. 2 of my latest book, "Humanizing Psychiatrists" (see Amazon)

[1noen1]

So far I've just seen this first part -- but -- I can't speak for Dennet but John Searle is not a dualist. He has a paper on his website titled "Why I am not a property dualist". Now I'm off to view the rest of the series.

[jockmclaren47]

We cannot "read" the informational content of the brain as we would 'read" the content of DNA, say, without first being told a reference point. You cannot learn a foreign language just by memorizing a dictionary. There has to be a start, and the only way we can do this is by understanding the brain's basic codes (the machine code, in IT terms). That cannot be done without dismantling the brain in a sort of reverse engineering.

[jockmclaren47]

@metaldude82 Dennett does "cross into dualism" by incorporating frankly dualist explanatory elements to do the "heavy lifting" in his monist model. A virtual machine, as he uses it, just is dualist, but he makes the mistake of thinking dualism means supernatural. See my books for further details.

[metaldude82]

Good points. Please check your inbox because I just e-mailed you a joke I made up about the whole "brain versus mind" thing.

[teddywinroth]

Really nice. Thanks.

[jockmclaren47]

Thank you, there'll be more as soon as I get over the jet lag. Best, Jock

[metaldude82]

Is it me or does Dennett just about cross the line into dualism at 7:32?

[Lucius133]

Thanks very much for this. Keep 'em coming.