Philosophy: Explaining "Type" & "Token" Identity and Theseus's Paradox

[Israe5l]

"Laughingman" "Is". This example is misleading. Because there is no two equal tokens. 

[JoakimfromAnka]

Isn't this just a matter of an identity vs a pattern? Btw can a pattern have identity? :S

[bonzihunter]

so does this mean that if I trim my nails or cut my hair I am no longer token identical to my old self? And by extension is it true that every single moment I cease to be token identical because individual cells in my body are constantly dying and being replaced?

[LaughingMan0X]

Yes. There is no such thing as a "static and enduring self." The thing we refer to as the "self" or "ourself" is a transitory self

Although we are the same kind of thing that we are (humans), we (our bodies) go through numerable token instances in the course of our lifetime; hence, in a strict sense of the word identity, our "selves" are only identical in one token instant (to itself)

Despite obvious similarities between our analogous tokens instances, we aren't identical to our old self

[HyperColours]

@LaughingMan0X I agree in physical terms but in psychological patterns people can remain consistent as in fix identity or responses.

[nbrader]

By defining 'type' as something general and 'token' as something concrete does nothing to prevent the concepts of 'general' and 'concrete' being arbitrary themselves. Moreso, if these concepts aren't arbitrary then I don't see how anything can be refered to as a 'token' as the act of reference is inherently general.

You say the token "Theseus's ship" no longer exists after one plank is replaced, I say it only exists as a thought in my head and that the thought is only identical to itself.

[LaughingMan0X]

Of course "types" exist in your head. "Types don't exist in reality (they exist in the mind), although they "refer" to sets of objects that do exist in reality

Our concept of types is derived from empirical objects we encounter everyday.

If our concept of something is analogous to the way that thing actually is in some meaningful way, then our concept is valid (not necessarily sound), if our concept of something is disconnected from reality, then it's a floating abstraction

[DavidYeshiwas]

This is exactly what I was looking for.

[OldDaddyCane]

... therefore your criterion:

1) Object A IS category/type X. I.e - Whats true of Object A is true of Class of objects X/ ... doesn't hold, because

ship A and A' don't co-exist at any time t (this should be a property of all objects of this class of type-identicals)

BUT A' and B do co-exist at the same time t

therefore: A' and B cannot be type-identical

IF this is the case, the question, which one is the ship of Theseus in a strong sense of an self identical object has still to be answered

[OldDaddyCane]

There is another reason, why the puzzle in this form is not solved yet. In short:

Suppose you replace every part i of the original ship A. But instead of throwing these parts away, you use them to build another ship B. Thus you have two ships, both type-identical, but which one is Theseus' ship?

By the way, in my opinion it's problematic to use linguistic concepts like type/token to solve ontological puzzles.

[LaughingMan0X]

There's a difference between: "ownership" and "ontological sameness."

Ownership is a normative social construct, predicated on what people perceive (concerning land or commodities) that they out to possess (control).

Thus "who owns what when" is a different subject altogether; (although any functional theory of property dealing with the issue should account for this distinction).

Furthermore, Tokens aren't purely linguistic, they refer to the identity of an instance in time.

[OldDaddyCane]

My point wasn't a distinction between ownership and ontological sameness.

My argument says that there exist TWO concrete objects A & B. But it sounds weird to say that two things are IDENTICAL. But this follows from the type/token distinction argument given so far.

Thus type/token-distinction has a lack on explaining identity.

Right, type/token isn't purely linguistic stuff, but it's the homebase. I think it leads into philosophy of mind , but won't solve ontological puzzles.

[LaughingMan0X]

The distinction lets us establish (with sound reasoning) the kinds of identity we're referring to when we're trying to establish the sameness of an object.

Thus we can either claim

1) Object A IS category/type X. I.e - Whats true of Object A is true of Class of objects X/

or

2) Token X exists at time T; in that instance we have an identity (a 1 to 1 correspondence with itself) (per the law of identity).

[LaughingMan0X]

If all the parts of the ship are replaced, it is still type identical. It remains the same class of object.

However it is not token-identical, as its atomic and temporal nature has changed. Thus, what was true of one token instance is not true of another; hence, no "identity."

It seems to solve the puzzle by all accounts; I don't know why you seem to think otherwise.

[OldDaddyCane]

There are still the following problems:

suppose original ship A at time t1

one part is replaced at time t2 and is used to build ship B

iterate this and you have ship A' at time tx (which is the ship in your description) AND you have ship B

ship A and ship A' are type-identical over all time from t1 to tx, thus the identification is time related

the same sort of identification holds for ship A and ship B

BUT from that follows that A' and B both at tx have to be identical, too

Therefore ...

[3stringovation]

I'm wondering how the "token" identity is useful at all. By this definition it would seem I am never token-identical with myself from one minute to the next, because cells are always dying and being replaced; so I am only ever TYPE-identical with myself. (Which brings up shadows of Plato's "ideal form"...) But really, what is the point of even defining token-identicality (outside of quantum physics perhaps), when that exact particular object-state will never ever occur again?

[Rizeka]

I have two questions after watching this video.

- At what point does something (in this case the ship) stop being type-identical? And isn't the turning point subjective? Technically you can float on just a piece of wood.

[LaughingMan0X]

A ship is generally conceived of as a seaworthy object that has a hull, rudder, and a power source; however it is also functionally defined (if it functions like a ship (has the mechanistic functionality to navigate one across the rivers/seas), its a ship). Ergo that definition would be shallow for most people

Types are useful tools, useful categories (not necessarily absolute laws) that one can apply as to a set of (or as a model representing) objects for the sake of defining/manipulating them

[XOmniverse]

One possible criticism is that, by the definition of token being presented, then token identity is always fleeting. Every moment of time, everything that exists becomes slightly different, IN SOME WAY, then it used to be.

This would mean that token identity would have to be specific not only to an object in space but that object in time as well. I guess this is why, functionally, we almost always operate based on type distinctions instead.

[XOmniverse]

Object oriented programming basically applies the type/token thing to programming concepts.

Class = Type

Object = Token

Also, ancient Greek mythology is so much more awesome than Christian mythology.

[insaniac82]

Good point.

To me, this paradox is similar to the Sorites Paradox. When removing a grain of sand from a heap, do we cease to call it a heap? No. However, if we continue this process is it still a heap when we're down to 1 grain of sand?

How often can Theusus' ship be modified before it ceases being its "type". In OOP a class has properties and methods, therefore an object x of type A assumes those properties and methods (behaviours). What properties does the type "Theseus' ship" have?

[LaughingMan0X]

Well, (in any case) we need an operational definition of the class of objects known as a "ship."

I tend to side with a more functionalist approach to "types." In other-words, "if it functions like a ship, it's a ship."

or

"If the object can: (under its own power) act as a tool to move individuals across a body of water, then it is a ship."

I would argue that as long as the object can perform the function of a ship, then it's a ship; if it can't perform the function of a ship, then it's not.

[insaniac82]

I agree with you. However, philosophers are concerned about what makes something type "Theseus' ship". A type "ship", as you mentioned, can be satisfied by having the properties "seaworthy", "hull", "rudder", and "power source". To say something is "Theseus' ship" is asking for additional to that of a simple ship. To say that the it's still a type ship tells us nothing about it being Theseus' ship. There are many objects in this world that are type ship. What makes it type "Theseus' ship".

[LaughingMan0X]

"Theseus's ship" implies a conception of property or "ownership."

I.e. human beings prescribing normative standards entailing how and what someone "ought to" and "ought not to" possess.

However this conception (of ownership) is purely social, and although the type-token distinction may have implications upon what is considered "justly acquired property," the institution of property is not ontological.

I invoked "Theseus's ship" for the sake of proving a point.

[tokotokotoko3]

I don't see the paradox as solved at all.

The ship is not "an old Greek ship" anymore, if all planks are new. It's a "new ship". Besides - it is also not the ship Theseus walked on anymore.

You split the thing up in type and token as if they would be easily to separate. I don't think they are. The reconstructed ship has a different type as well. So you can still ask: How much can a type change, to still count as original type? Which is basically the same question as it was before.

[insaniac82]

You're right that it can no longer be considered an "old Greek ship" but I think the point is that we're using the same reference. You're saying "it's" a new ship. What are you referring to when you say "it". Are you not referring to the same thing I refer to when I say "theseus's ship". If not, then what is this "it" you speak of?

[fps0chris]

I just had to say this somewhere, pitt G20 riot cops were insane.

[LaughingMan0X]

Do you have (or know of) video footage for this, because I was thinking of doing a news video on it.

[fps0chris]

My friend has a video of him watchin a bunch of police marching and getting tear gassed although you cant tell he is being tear gassed. Yelling and screaming, it was awful, really bad, I have a few pics on my phone of police but thats it.

[LaughingMan0X]

If you know (or are going to post) of any footage of the G20 protest let me know, and I'll make a video of it.

[fps0chris]

i'l try to get him too.

[fps0chris]

I also have a video of them goign around with a loud speaker saying it was an unlawful protest and commanding us to disperse. Even though the place I was, was peaceful, only one 3 people were arrested in 3 hours, 1 threw something at the cops, and they beat the shit out of him right in front of me, other 2 woulnt move and were beaten, awful brutality, one of my friends was shot and tear gassed another arrested, and told that the gangbangers would like him in prison because of his long hair, bad

[bananabread119]

Okay heres my question.. Going into type and token identity..

*Is a car still a car if its missing, lets say a lug nut..

*This logic can be reveresed by saying. Is a lug nut from a car still a car? If not then what all would a car need to make it one?

So when is a car a car?

[bananabread119]

Idk maybe this is the Argument Of The Beard. But I would like if you could draw a distinction..

Thanks, emily

[LaughingMan0X]

It depends on one's concept of car. Usually the type is relies on either definition or functionality

Definitive: a passenger vehicle designed for operation on roads and typically having three to four wheels and a gasoline or diesel internal-combustion engine, or an electric engine

Functional: uses electricity/internal-combustio­n for the sake of moving object X from point A to B

Under either of these conceptions, if the car has the physical characteristics or function of a car then it's a car

[the2500]

I always thought this paradox pertained to Theseus's ownership of the vessel, and/or how long we consider it to be his ship after he has passed away (assuming maintenance) You basically satisfy those with this. I reasoned it wasn't officially his until he has passed away and the very last piece from when he was alive to own it has been replaced. Still, I can see how this distinction is value based and arbitrary, but I think it still raises question. Like if we want to keep discussing this.

[the2500]

Just so you know I didn't intend for the last sentence to seem condescending, but I really had to edit down to meet the 500 character count. Now I realize I could have just done this.

[thorsmitersaw]

noticed i wasn't subbed to you. thought I was. odd

[bananabread119]

Okay I had to watch this video 5 times.. But I think I'v got it.. Thanks!! great vid!

[LaughingMan0X]

If you have any questions on anything or, if you'd like me to restate something: let me know.

[thorsmitersaw]

good video

[LaughingMan0X]

Thanks.

It was a bit of difficult at trying to concertize Token identity for people.

[thorsmitersaw]

I think you did a great job. I suck at explaining it and my idea to do it last night was even worse than the verbal explanation.

[fede2]

nicely done there, my friend. i wasn't familiar with the type/token distinction. this may open a door form me in terms of philosophical considerations.

[D4Shawn]

Most "philosophical conundrums" are the result of poor (meaningless) uses of language. Theseus's paradox is no different. Maybe it makes people feel smart by debating theses sorts of things, but the whole issue is illusory. It's not a real issue. It's a language game. When you clarify the language, the conundrum disappears. This is true of 95% of all philosophical "problems". Most of them are just silly language games.

Also, 97% of all statistics are utter bullshit.

[briano8713]

Ahh Wittgenstein.

[D4Shawn]

Apparently.

I've never actually read him, but I understand that he came to similar (or the same) conclusions, long before I ever did.

People tell me my own personal philosophy is a cross between Wittgenstein and Max Stirner. Unfortunately, I find philosophy to be far too boring to actually read about. If I was going to read anybody however, it would be those two guys.

[LaughingMan0X]

Language and method define the approach one takes to knowledge; if the language is faulty or misleading, then it can lead to faulty metaphysics in both science and philosophy.

Furthermore there are a number of Paradoxes and philosophical problems that aren't just "language games."

Mind-Body Problem (Token Physicalism is the closest we've come), Zeno's Paradox (which have been solved in mathematics with the concept of convergence of infinity, The Chinese Room, Problem of Induction, etc.

[atypicalguy]

Well, if you want to get real technical, you could say the ship never retains it's token identity as there are always little bits of wood getting chipped off and other little bits of material landing on it.

[D4Shawn]

The ship has changed (been altered). Thus, it is not "the same" as it was before. It is different than it was before. What has not changed, is the ship's ownership. It is still Theseus's ship (despite the fact that the ship itself has changed over time).

Theseus's paradox is simply the result of linguistic imprecision.

[contrarianbastard]

How can it still belong to Theseus? He was dead for decades, if not centuries. He no longer owned anything.

[D4Shawn]

Well... ownership can certainly change as well. I wasn't real sure in what sense the ship was Theseus'.

My point, is that the question ("Is it the same ship?") is meaningless, because it isn't specific enough. Is it the same in terms of ownership? In terms of it's construction? In terms of it's color? Those would be meaningful questions.

The question asked, was too vague to hold meaning.

There's no paradox; it's just a meaningless question, much like:

"Should I go to the store?"

[LaughingMan0X]

"Should I go to the store" -entails a proposition of value.

"Is this ship the same ship" - entails a proposition of fact.

- Your analogy breaks down.

It isn't a meaningless question, it necessitate (to answer it) a logical method for determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the kinds of identity there are; and what we mean when we say two things are identical.

[D4Shawn]

Jesus...

I don't have enough space to explain just how much you're missing my point.

The phrase "the same" doesn't mean anything by itself. It's not specific enough. It needs to specified IN WHAT SENSE the ship is or isn't the same, when asking the question. In some sense, the ship is the same. In other senses, the ship isn't the same. The "paradox" is created by the fact that the question isn't specific enough to be interpreted one way or another. We don't really know what it is asking.

[LaughingMan0X]

Which is what the type-token distinction clears up. As, if we mean the kind of 1 to 1 parallel we we get in fields like: mathematics, we're SOL.

However if we mean that it is the same kind of thing that it is; that is to say that what is true of the category of ship (what it describes/entails), and the ship in reality are: an equality (we have success) .

And yes, I know it really isn't a genuine paradox, as paradoxes are merely a problem of language (and metaphysics to some extent).

[D4Shawn]

Is it the same ship?

Um... "the same" in WHAT SENSE? "In what sense?" is the question that needs to be answered, before the original question can be answered.

In other words, the original question isn't meaningful/specific enough to merit a definite answer.

If I come up to you and ask you, "Should I go to the store", you have no reason by which you could give me a definite answer, because I have not specified a goal, or reason why I might want to go to the store.

[D4Shawn]

An analogy is much like a metaphor:

A metaphor compares two DIFFERENT things, in an attempt to point out the SIMILARITIES between them. The fact that the two things are different, does not mean that a metaphor can not clarify what they have in common.

If I compare an orange (fruit) to the sun, my analogy/metaphor doesn't "break down" because an orange isn't made of fire. Obviously, "made of fire" is not the similarity I was attempting to point out when forming the metaphor.

[LaughingMan0X]

If the analogy was meant to indicate that they were both of an orangish color, then you have success. If the analogy was meant to indicate that: "they are both are equal givers of life" then it is false.

In any discussion/debate, there are 3 propositions one can make: Fact (POF), Value (POV), and Policy (POP).

POF aren't continent upon policies or values for their truth value. POP are continent upon both POF & POV. POV are contingent upon the emotive weighing of two items (and is not a POF).

[LaughingMan0X]

No, the paradox goes far beyond property rights (despite implications on it)

It goes to nature of identity; and what it means.

For something to be identical, whatever is true of it, must be true of the thing we're comparing it to: i.e. things are the way they are

Thus, as different things are true of the original ship & the rebuilt ship (weight, height, mass, color, shape, atomic particles, etc) they can't be token identical

However what is true of the "Type" (ship) is true of Theseus's ship

[VirtualHolocaust]

nice job sexy man

[ArtisanPartisan]

Its funny, I we just got to the type-token distinction in my Phil textbook; you had a good explanation man.

Five stars

[organdva]

Very interesting.

Is that your pajamas?

[LaughingMan0X]

No it isn't. It is an odd shirt though (and the edge detection features really makes it stick out).

[schizoapriori]

5*****

[HighResolutionMan]

Interesting video, keep it up

[bananabread119]

AHHHHHHHHAHAHHHHH Ohh its you!!

[GreenAnarchism]

Theism is type identical to stupidity. XD

[AAPLATFORM]

***** Stars