When you were talking about why are we tethered to this body, that question borders on the philosophical. It seems akin to asking what is the purpose of life. There are people who do astral project. Robert Monroe spent his life in pursuit of astral projection. I've astral projected a few times accidentally myself, as has my brother, who correlated one of his trips with the real world.
@AnduinX "that question borders on the philosophical."
'Borders on'? I would say it IS philosophical, rather clearly. If by that you mean 'unanswerable' then yes, I'm inclined to agree. And that is a very bad think for the theory that gives rise to it, namely, dualism.
As per your claims of astral projection, I can only say I am skeptical. Knowing what I know about altered states of consciousness and the science behind them, I think there are more plausible explanations.
@AnduinX I wasn't referring to not knowing the purpose of life (phrased thusly, that's a meaningless question), I was referring to not knowing why a specific non-physical mind is tethered to a specific physical body. That's a very specific phenomena, and there should be a very specific explanation. But if it's nonphysical, then there seems to be no way we could ever explain it. It's a black box.
The case you're making here is that since we don't know how a non-physical mind could interact with a physical brain, that dualism is invalid? I don't see why this would invalidate dualism as a model. Why expect complete knowledge from dualism while physicalism has yet to solve its own hard problems?
@AnduinX "since we don't know how a non-physical mind could interact with a physical brain, that dualism is invalid?"
More like 'since dualism proposes a black-box problem that can never be solved, this is a problem with the theory. An alternative that avoids this problem would be preferable.'
@AnduinX "Why expect complete knowledge from dualism while physicalism has yet to solve its own hard problems?"
Physicalism proposes a method (science) for solving those problems, and it has made more progress towards doing so in the last 50 years than dualism has in the last 500. I don't expect 'complete knowledge' (whatever that might be), but I do reject 'it's just fucking magic' as a substitute for knowledge.
@SisyphusRedeemed: With respect, I disagree. The study of neuroscience is mostly focused on finding neural correlates of conscious states. Correlation is not causation, no amount of correlation equates to progress for proving physicalism. What in your mind has been done that gives evidence specifically to physicalism and not dualism?
@AnduinX "The study of neuroscience is mostly focused on finding neural correlates of conscious states."
That's simply not true. Correlations are, of course, a big part of neuroscience (that's key to pretty much any science) but neuroscience, like nearly all science does a lot more than that. Explanation is central to the endeavor. If all it were concerned with was correlation, then there would BE no 'hard problem of consciousness', because it would be off the table.
@SisyphusRedeemed: Right, that's why I said 'mostly' focused not 'entirely' focused on correlation. I'm aware that neuroscience has been taking stabs at the hard problem for some time, unsuccessfully. The overwhelming majority of the work being done in the field nowadays is in fact centered around correlation, which can't prove physicalism. There is nothing that neuroscience has brought to the table to my knowledge that can be taken as evidence for or against physicalism/dualism.
@AnduinX "What in your mind has been done that gives evidence specifically to physicalism and not dualism?"
Read Damasio's "Descartes' Error". Or for that matter, pretty much any book by Damasio, LeDoux, Hauser, or any neuroscientist for that matter. Each of them take mysteries that used to be explained in terms of dualism in terms of physical structures of the brain.
@SisyphusRedeemed: "Each of them take mysteries that used to be explained in terms of dualism in terms of physical structures of the brain."
What I wanted to know was if there was anything that specifically points to physicalism and not dualism, not if there were physicalist alternatives to dualist explanations.
@SisyphusRedeemed: Also, I don't think it's fair to call dualism magic. If dualism were true, it would not magic, it would just be another part of our existence. The concept of 'physical' has been ever expanding since its conception.
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
@SisyphusRedeemed: I don't think that dualism would unverifiable, dualism would be verifiable in the same way the Higgs Boson is thought to be verifiable. The Higgs Boson cannot be directly observed, it is a theoretical entity that was invented to make physics work. The only evidence there can be for it is in the effect it has on what we can observe. If we adopted dualism it would likely be for similar reasons - because it can explain things that physicalism cannot.
@SisyphusRedeemed: To quote a forum post: "Think about disembodied forces (e.g. gravity, magnetism, etc.). Think about quantum mechanics and “spooky action at a distance.” Think about strings, dark matter, etc. All these things are happily embraced by physicalism today. Do you think Lucretius, Descartes, Leibniz, or any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”? Surely not."
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
@SisyphusRedeemed: Right, I have no problem with those things being a part of physics. The entire purpose of that post was to liken the dualism=magic comment to the acceptance of various additions to physics in the past. I'm sure a pre-newtonian scientist would have scoffed off much of what we know today as magical and fantastical, until it becomes accepted.
@AnduinX, we needed those notions of physics to explain reality. We don't need dualism to explain anything. I would assert that dualism's only purpose is so that death doesn't have to be death.You say a pre-newtonian scientist would have scoffed at much of what we know today as fantastical? Not only is that irrelevant, but demonstrability makes that statement completely false. Dualism is an old concept, debunked by new info. Don't compare it to how new info would be perceived by old thinking.
If anybody wants to see a refutation against the statement that we don't possesses minds feel free to check out my videos. On my second video of the mind I explain how physical alterations seem to make the case for materialism but falls short.
But I want to point out, that all you need to make your "I" look out of another persons eyes, is a head mounted display and two cameras, as beautifully shown in the BBS Documentary "The secret You".
The awake brain seems to constantly solve the problem of where we are located in space. Mess around with the input data (head mounted display), and your sensation of "I" can easily be transferred to another persons body.
regarding the alcohol question, concieve the following - we know the brain shows an effect when alcohol is injested. I would argue that the mind itself is not directly effected by the alcohol, but the physical interface to the mind is compromised because of it. The mind, currently seated in the brain (or received by the brain) do not escape the physical effects of the brain. It is the same with a physical injury. Some people argue that Autism is just that.
Writing a paper and this was incredibly helpful. You are seriously articulate with this stuff. I am struggling really hard on Frank Jacksons position of "Epiphenomenal Qualia". Any suggestions? or a place I could look for clarification? I understand his over all point about Mary and colour and Qualia, but not when he brings the Idea of Epiphenomenalism into his idea... any good places to look online for explanations??
@DavisThegreatest The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy are both great resources. It's probably also worth noting that Jackson later changed his mind on this issue. Glad you liked the vid, thanks for saying so.
THANK YOU very interesting article. It seems that a very small percentage still hold the dualism (libertarianism?) philosophy. I still find it to be true based on not only subjective experience, but the fact that it is the one with the least limitation.
Sisyphus - with as old as this video is, and as well as you break this down, I highly suggest you change the title of the video to something more broad and recognizable. Just like Mind Body Dualism Refuted or something like that. I almost didn't watch this, even after ProfMTH recommended it in his video cause of the whole weird abortion thing (that doesn't even exist in the video lol).
Every person who thinks we have a soul should see this excellent break down, imho!
An ethereal mind or soul is an unnecessary additional agent that affords no additional explanatory power and creates additional questions and problems. The same thing can be said for a creator god with respect to the origin of our universe. After crossing things off of the list that people propose require such an agent to explain, we get to a point where one must reject the real scientific explanations outright or as insufficient, or conform their beliefs to reality.
Forget whether consciousness/the soul is separate from the brain. That is a different issue from whether the mind is separate. In regards to the latter, the mind IS separate from the brain because you can read the former (the brain), but not the latter (the mind). Neuroscience says a lot about the neurotransmitters which allow emotions to manifest themselves. But, it does not tell us about the thoughts bringing those emotions. Only the thinker can do that if he/she decides to.
You can read the brain but not the mind...yeah that makes no sense at all.
The mind isn't actually separate from the brain, that's why drugs alter consciousness, so do injuries to said brain, why mental illness and disabilities exist, why losing part of ones brain can alter someone's personality, memory, etc...
Yes it does because you can see the neurotransmitters and other elements of the brain. However, one cannot read a person's thoughts and how he/she thinks (mind). The brain allows all this to manifest themselves through the body. Of course, if the brain is damaged, such manifistation is compromised. For a mental illness to develope, one's brain need not become damaged or altered by some physical agent. He/she can merely experience a traumatic event, which becomes part of his/her thoughts (mind).
So the mind interacts with the brain and is separate, but in interacting with the brain subject to all of his physical structure, chemical and electrical activity. This doesn't increase our understanding of anything, nor does it add any explanatory power. It only adds questions.
You might as well propose a third entity. There is the brain, the mind, and the ultra mind. The ultra mind experiences traumatic stress and interacts with the mind which then developes PTSD.
"You can read the brain but not the mind...yeah that makes no sense at all."
The mind is the brain, obviously. If you get hit in the head, you can damage your brain, and damage your self, who are were, who you are etc. But you can also change your brain with your will. You can Choose to believe something that is false, and something that is true, and your brain will reflect this. Why? Why does nature let this happen?
The mind is the emergent property of the brain to be more accurate.
Your will is a product of your brain, as is volition. It's not just logical it's basically tautological that one's thoughts and beliefs effect one's brain. I don't think I fully understand your question, my guess is because you hold a position which I do not that has not been indicated.
"Your will is a product of your brain, as is volition. "
And what evidence are you basing this on, since you are only a brain yourself? Well let me rephrase. I realize that changing the brain can change your mind. But it works vise versa too. For example, yogi's in India who have bothered to have eeg scans done on them show that their brain is structured different, and is at a beta, or delta level constantly. (1)
It's parsimonious, practically tautological as I already said, and it is the minimum observed agencies. The mind is an observed phenomena of the brain.
You're unnecessarily separating the mind from the brain without any reason to do so, while still maintaining all of the processes and explanatory power of the connection. If the mind can change the brain that's not an issue for my position as you seem to think it is. And religious person living longer happier is false
Obviously the mind can me observed in the brain physically, it is in the left side. But what I am saying is if I were to imagine a donkey in field with a sucker in it's mouth, which neuron in my brain is the donkey, which is the field, etc.
" And religious person living longer happier is false"
Also, we have come to find that will power CAN cause physical, drastic physical, changes in the brain and body. Obviously, you know that religious people live longer and are happier. Our will power of not of the brain, it is of the mind, which is in no "place" it is non local.(2)
@AdamLore Quite the opposite, in fact: it is the argument FOR dualism that is the argument from ignorance. We don't know how the brain gives rise to consciousness, so it must be an immaterial mind. But such a position requires exposition: IF an immaterial mind is the cause/nature of consciousness then how does it work? The failure to provide such an account doesn't prove it wrong, but it does prove it worthless. We might as well just say 'It's Magic!'
The way I see it, though, we experience mind, and we do not find it in the physical realm, therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose mind is non-physical. We find representations and codings of mental things, but they are not the mental things themselves.
It is a conundrum, because it obviously can't just be "magic".
@AdamLore I'm not sure what it means to say we 'experience mind, but not in the physical realm.' That sort of seems like it's question begging; if we are, in fact, experiencing anything in a non-physical realm, then there must BE a nonphysical realm. I'm denying is the idea that there is a nonphysical realm. If there were, then there MUST be some way the physical and the nonphysical interact. An explanation, an account, a supposition at least seems called for, but none is forthcoming.
Well that is not exactly what I said. We experience mind, mental phenomena, qualia, etc. We are nearly absolutely certain that this is real because we are constantly experiencing it directly. Now, when we go out into the physical realm of wavelengths, particles, matter, etc, we do not seem to find the phenomena and qualia, just matter that somehow encodes it. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the qualia themselves are not physical unless we find evidence.
@AdamLore Okay, I understand 'we experience qualia,' but I think that's subtly mistaken; we don't experience qualia, qualia IS the experience. What we experience is objects, events, etc.--qualia is just how these things are manifest in our brains. But there's no fundamental difference between a qualitative experience in our brains and the data stored on a computer (other than the fact that one is conscious of course).
@AdamLore The problem is how do we explain consciousness. If it's a physical process, we know how to proceed; by studying the physical systems responsible for it. If it's not a physical process, then we're back to the black box: it's voodoo, it's magic. Assuming it's not physical shuts down all possibility of learn about it or explaining it. It is to embrace ignorance as if it were an explanation.
I hear you, and I understand why you would say this. I am reading Daniel Dennet right now and something I just read said basically exactly the same thing.
But I disagree. Because we ALL have direct access to consciousness. It maybe be harder to study, and perhaps even impossible to prove, but I don't think it HAS to be physical in order to be studied.
Also, I don't think we can force something to be physical just to understand it (if it is not). We may never know.
Good point. I must say that it puzzles me that some act like the discovery that there are physical elements to consciousness and emotions is something new. That is not the case because Hippocrates found the brain to be the source of mental disorders around 400 BC. It is not like "Oh, there are physical elements, monism rules." Do you know what I am saying?
I too reject Mind-Body dualism. But there is a major stumbling block for me that I can't understand.
How do you explain the existence of "first-person perspectives" without dualism? How can you tell the difference between a normal person who has such a perspective, and a "philisophical zombie" who behaves precisely as though they view the world through a first-person perspective, with emotions and awareness, but they don't have one?
@lIThorIl Yeah, that's one of the problems in philosophy of mind. First off, it's not clear that dualism can really explain 1st person perspectives either ('It's fucking magic!' isn't really an explanation.) Suffice to say, I can't give a short satisfactory explanation here. It will require a complex philosophy of mind. Personally, I think we need to eliminate the idea of '1st person perspective' as being metaphysically distinct from a '3rd person' and start from scratch.
@awesomewelles90 Interesting, but fallacious. For one, it's Descartes' argument, not Plantinga's. Second, as Plantinga himself admits, just because something is logically possible does not mean it is metaphysically possible. Just because we can imagine existing without a body does not mean that is actually possible. I can imagine a world in which a proof of the Goldbach conjecture is found, but that doesn't mean it's possible. Maybe Goldbach is unprovable.
@SisyphusRedeemed But I didn't say that it was possible, only that it is conceivable. I'm not arguing that what is conceivable is possible. If you re-read my post I think you'll see that. Is there an inconsistency in the argument the way I phrased it in my first post? I haven't seen one yet. Also I didn't know it was Descartes', thanks for the info!
@awesomewelles90 You might not have said it, but for the argument to work, that's what it needs to be. What I can conceive about X is not a fact about X, but rather about my imagination. (I can imagine myself as Barack Obama, but that's not a fact about Obama, it's a fact about me.) Hence, Leibniz's law doesn't apply, since it's not a fact about me that it's conceivable that I exist without my body, it's a fact about the human imagination.
@SisyphusRedeemed Ah I see. In that case what is the flaw in the argument? Is that "I can possibly exist without B" cannot be shown but he jumps from "I can conceive of it" to "it is possible"? Although to say that it isn't possible also seems pretty unfounded. In which case how do we assess the probability that it is possible or not?
@awesomewelles90 The flaw is that the argument is invalid. Premise 2 does not actually show a difference between X and Y, hence 3 does not follow from (1) and (2).
It doesn't have to be shown that it isn't possible to show that the argument fails. The onus is on Descartes/Plantinga to show the argument is sound.
@SisyphusRedeemed Are you saying that '"possibly exists when B doesn't" is true of me but not of B' is not true? or that it is not an actual difference since it is just a possible difference?
@awesomewelles90 I'm sorry, I can't parse what you're asking here. Can you rephrase it in a way that doesn't involve subquotations and a double negative?
@SisyphusRedeemed I'm trying to find out what your objection is to this argument:
1. (Leibniz's law)
2. 'Possibly exists when B doesn't' is true of me but not true of B.
3. Therefore: I am not identical to B.
You indicated that premise 2 is where the problem lies. So are you denying that it is possible for me to exist independently of B? Or that we cannot assess the probability of whether or not it is possible?
@awesomewelles90 The problem is that premise (2) does not actually point to a difference between my body and my mind: it points to different ways we can think about those things. For the argument to work, it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind can exist without the body. (That is, it must be shown that it is a metaphysical possibility, not merely a logical one.) But if you can do that, of course, you no longer need this argument.
@SisyphusRedeemed "For the argument to work, it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind can exist without the body."
I think that this is incorrect. It must be shown that in reality it is POSSIBLE that the mind can exist without the body. But the thing is to be open minded about this, one must assume that it IS possible. Otherwise you have already made your mind up before looking at the argument.
@awesomewelles90 "It must be shown that in reality it is POSSIBLE that the mind can exist without the body. "
That's what I said: "it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind CAN exist without the body." 'Can' here is another word for 'possible.'
@awesomewelles90 " to be open minded about this, one must assume that it IS possible. "
Nonsense. I can grant that it's logically/conceptually possible that the mind exists without the body, but to assume it is METAPHYSICALLY possible it to beg the question against materialism. The onus is on the dualist to show it is not just logically possible, but that it is metaphysically possible.
@SisyphusRedeemed So then you are saying that may or may not be metaphysically possible but we cannot assess whether it is or not and so this is the weak link in the argument?
@awesomewelles90 No, I'm saying it's metaphysical possibility has not been established. This is a substantive claim and the onus is on whomever asserts it as true.
@SisyphusRedeemed A possible difference IS a difference. if two things are identical then the possibilities of those two things must be the same. Are you outright denying premise 2?
A book that pretty much kills any notion of mind/body dualism is Oliver Sacks' "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat."
Of course, dualism goes back a long way before Descartes. It was known as a soul. The philosophers hundreds of years ago thought it was breath. If a passing invisible God exhaled just as you inhaled, you received divine inspiration. You had a spirit (same root).
I thought Minsky was positing quantum level events in the neurons was where they interacted. This makes no more sense than claiming the mind is made of dark matter, but it had some real world evidence. Quantum level events do happen.
I have a big problem with physical monism because of the hard problem of consciousness -- the categorical gap between neurochemical activity and qualitative experience -- as well as the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, which sealed the deal for me on property dualism.
And the claim that no one is a dualist anymore because physical monism is fully explanatory is BS. Behaviorism waned and cognitivism emerged in psychology because this was not the case.
I think it's also a bit unfair to suggest that all modern dualists are apologists for Cartesianism. I think of myself as an emergent dualist. I believe consciousness/mind is a distinct substance that "emerges" from the brain at some point during natural development, and that it relies on brain structure and function for its continued existence.
But I'm not so threatened by the problem of mental causation because I've never been satisfied with metaphysical explanations of physical causation. :P
"I believe consciousness/mind is a distinct substance"
So you ARE a substance dualist?
Do you think that solidity is a distinct substance that emerges from the appropriate molecular structures? Is liquidity or gaseousness? Emergent properties happen all the time in nature without the need to appeal to a separate realm of reality beyond the physical. Why should mind be an exception?
I implied that I was a substance dualist when I said in my second comment that "consciousness/mind is a distinct substance" from the brain.
Solidity is one example of an emergent property, yes, but minds are are not properties. First of all, only realists concerning the problem of universals could even consider the claim that they are. Most naturalists are nominalists. Where do you stand on the issue?
Properties can, in principle, be instantiated in or shared by multiple substances, but just because I have epistemic access to my mind, it certainly doesn't follow that I know your mind. I have "a" mind, not mind-ness. So mind cannot be an emergent property, even though consciousness seems to emerge from and appears to be in causal relationship with brain activity.
I never said that naturalistic monists were closed-minded or immune to scientific evidence. Everyone makes a priori assumptions and has worldview biases of which they aren't conscious. Psychology has established a very significant correlation between brain states and mental states, but does this suggest that they are one and the same? Not at all. On the contrary, it suggests property dualism because a COrrelation is between TWO qualitatively distinct things. :P
But natural scientific methodology is more narrow than social scientific methodology. It studies the impersonally objective -- and that's all. Mind IS subjectivity. No matter how much I study your brain, I will never BE you. I will never see through your eyes or hear through your ears, though I might have perfect, objective knowledge of your nervous system and sense organs. So I don't think natural scientists have ANYTHING to say about consciousness. It's out of their scope.
I'm not defining the terms so as to avoid the problem. I already told you that I do not believe a hidden mind miraculously "produces" a consciousness. The immateriality of experience is what I'm defending. But the term "consciousness" usually describes the scope of awareness. As I conceive of it, mind also includes the bare subject -- the emergent substance conceptually apart from its properties -- and subjective elements that the subject is not aware of, such as "unconscious" desires.
You're right the term 'consciousness' usually describes awareness, but it need to be limited to that in a technical discussion. To speak of mind as if it were a noun begs the question in favor of a substance view. If mind is a property it makes sense to have an adjectival term, rather than a noun term to refer to it (otherwise we run into the linguistic problems that were tying you in knots above.) 'Conscious' works pretty well in that regard.
You're assuming that science can't speak to the subjective, but this is just false. Science says meaningful things about the subjective all the time. (e.g.-'Aspirin cures a headache.') You're certainly right that a REDUCTION of the subjective to the objective is riddled with problems, but not all science is reductive in nature. We can, and do use science to explain and account for our subjective perspectives every single day, and as science advances it gets better and better at doing so.
Science also points to a correlation between average molecular motion and heat. Yet these are, in fact, the same thing. Heat is the emergent phenomena of the motion of molecules. Correlations are not always between two things.
You're right we all have biases, but some of us are at least willing to subject them to scrutiny, when they are drawn to our attention. Not saying all theists/dualists are not so willing, but certainly some are, more so than naturalists/monists.
My table has a particular pattern of molecules that is very different from that of your table. They are both tables, they are both solid, yet they are not the same thing. This isn't a problem for solidity as emergent, so why should the parallel issue cause us worry about minds?
Your use of the noun is what's throwing you off. You don't have mind-ness, you have consciousness. For that matter, the possessive isn't a good idea either. Better to say 'you are conscious,' just as 'my table is solid.'
What makes you say most naturalists are nominalists? That doesn't seem right to me. I've never done or seen a survey, but it seems to me most naturalists are scientific realists. If one is a realist about universals then how could they be naturalists? Unless you're thinking that universals and natural kinds are the same thing?
I agree that most naturalists are probably scientific realists, but that's not what I said. Scientific instrumentalism, not nominalism, is the doctrine opposing scientific realism. The realism I'm talking about concerns the objective existence of attributes and categories (i.e., properties and kinds, Plato's Forms, etc.). Nominalists claim they exist only as useful parts of language; conceptualists claim they exist only as mental constructs; realists claim they are real, external "things."
I objected that the claim that consciousness is an emergent "property" is untenable to a nonrealist. To a conceptualist, the claim is self-defeating = "Mind is a property, which is only a mental construct? So I explain a mental construct by claiming that it's a mental construct?" It's tautological. To nominalist, it is radical skepticism. Claiming that mind is a property reduces direct experience to linguistics -- a denial of the self-evident that would make even Sextus Empiricus cringe.
You aren't reading what I write closely. I said that NATURAL scientific methodology excludes subjective evidence. Medical science can include it, and social science certainly does. But you'll never figure out what it's like to be conscious by studying the brain. There is an unbridgeable, categorical difference between objective and "intrasubjective" observation -- only YOU have the privilege of experiencing your being-in-the-world, no one else.
I would argue that calling someone "conscious" means that they "are" a subject -- that they are experiencing -- not that their brain has a particular quality. The adjective is derived from the noun, not the other way 'round. I'm not getting tied up in linguistic knots. I know exactly what I'm saying. :P But I believe we have developed subcategories of the mind, which is what I was trying to convey, successfully or not. lol
Subcategories of the mind "in our language," that is.
We all have biases, but I would strongly disagree that physicalists make fewer a priori assumptions than non-physicalists do. Some in that camp desperately try to "explain away" a reasonable and commonsense position under the guise of "scrutiny" because dualism threatens their worldview -- they have much personally invested in the problem. Dualists have mental-physical causation to deal with; monists have the hard problem of consciousness.
But it bothers me that so many physicalists act as if dualism has been done away with and is no longer a respectable position. Since when? Where is this all-powerful argument that devastated all forms of dualism? If it was the causation issue, then why have there been so many "respectable" dualists since Descartes?
I feel that the arrogant attitude shows a lack of integrity and is simply to make dualists look like uncritical, spellbound magical thinkers, which is not only wrong, but insulting.
The hard problem is hard, but dualism (property or substance) doesn't win by default. It's at least as hard to explain how a non-physical mind can account for consciousness as it is to explain how a brain can (and brains have the advantage of being sure to exist.)
You don't need to be a dualist to be a cognitivist. And while property dualism is more respectable than substance dualism, the fact remains that most cog sci/phil mind people are material monists.
Here I am equating "mind" with consciousness, not claiming that mind somehow produces consciousness. I think that the physical brain is the substratum of the mind (or consciousness, subjectivity, experience, the first-person perspective, whichever you prefer). But to say that consciousness itself is material substance seems utterly preposterous from my point of view.
I realize that the monist position is still popular among "naturalistic" philosophers (certainly not theistic philosophers), but I believe it is largely an a priori commitment, as I can't imagine non-naturalists being convinced by the arguments for monism. The mind-body causation issue has been the main criticism, and like I said, I personally don't find it very threatening because no one is able to explain how solely physical causal relationships are possible either. But that's just me.
So super-naturalists are close-minded, immune to evidence and scientific development?
You're right that causation in general is a problem, but surely we have a better grasp of how a cue-ball causes an 8-ball to move than we have of how an alleged non-physical mind moves a non-physical body. If nothing else, at least we know for sure the cue-ball exists.
Equating "mind" with "consciousness" isn't going to help you, any more than it would for me to say 'here I'm equating 'the brain' with consciousness.' You need to explain how a nonmaterial thing can explain and account for consciousness. Simply saying 'and then a miracle happens' is not an explanation.
Consciousness isn't a material substance any more than solidity is; they're both emergent PROPERTIES of material substances. And if you think that's preposterous, you're mistaking a failure of imagination for metaphysical necessity.
A lot of materialist arguments have been torn down by people like Godel, Searle and Block. Because of the failures of materialism dualism, much to the disappointment of Searle, has become respectable again.
I guess we just take the pulse of the philosophical community differently. Property dualism might be respectable, perhaps, but substance dualism? drsuessre14 gave a list of property dualists, and they're all either christian philosophers or people I've never heard of. I can't think of a single big name in the philosophy of mind right now who's a substance dualist.
I think the Searle quote is something like 'because of the shortcomings of computationalism and functionalism it looks like we're back in bed with Descartes'. Frank Jackson *was* a dualist, I'm fairly sure. I'm not sure if he was a property or substance dualist, though. He's since become a physicalist even though he put forward one of the best arguments against physicalism.
As for 'the pulse of the philosophical community'. I can't say anything authoritative on that. I'm not a philosopher.
I'm pretty sure that Searle quote is out of context (the emphasis of that quote is on 'looks'). He's not a computationlist or a functionalist, but he' not dualist, either. He thinks 'brains cause minds' in a purely physical way.
Jackson was a property dualist, I believe, but I suppose can't say for sure.
Oh no, I'm not saying Searle is a dualist. It's not out of context, in fact my initial reference to Searle was "Because of the failures of materialism dualism, much to the disappointment of Searle, has become respectable again."
Searle's answer to it all kind of reeks of emergentism, "Phenomenal experiences just emerge from the operating of lower level neurons".
Kaegwon Jim's causality argument is good too: 'We can tell one gun causes one bullet hole because of the location of the gun in reference to the bullet hole. However, when I raise my arm, since the soul is immaterial, I cannot determine whether it was my mind or yours that caused me to raise my arm'
SisyphusRedeemed, I've been subscribed to your videos for a while, but, for some reason, I don't remember watching them until now! Anyway, just wanted to say that I think you do a really good job./Which current philosophers, that you know of, are mind-body dualists? You give me your list, I'll give you mine, howabout?
Thanks, dr.suessre, I appreciate you saying so, glad you're liking them.
You know, as I sit here I cannot, off the top of my head, think of any contemporary substance dualists. I can think of two property dualists: Jackson and Robinson. I'm sure if opened a book or looked at SEP I could find a few more of each. Care to add to the list?
Here's my list of professional philosophers that have taken a substance dualist stand, printed by respected publishing houses/journals (I might think of others later): Richard Swinburne (recently retired), William Hasker, Dean Zimmerman, Alvin Plantinga, Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, David S. Oderberg, E. J. Lowe, and J. P. Moreland. Note: substance dualism, as I understand things, includes Cartesianism and Thomism.
I used the eyes as an example in a video I made against dualism as well.
Specifically I pointed out that many people believe that they can look over their family members after death even though they will no longer have a physical body (including eyes).
Also if people can see the physical world after death what limitations if any exists for their sight?
Very good questions, all. Reminds me of similar questions I've asked about sex in heaven. It's supposed to be 'pure' with no 'sins of the flesh'. This suggests there is no sex in heaven. But our sexuality is a big part of our identity; without that, are WE really surviving, or is it just some pale imitation of us?
Allso, I'm not sure I'd go as fare as to say that it was imatirial. I mean all the information is still being stored chemically, as opposed to digitally. Hell maybe an even better enalergy would be something along the lines of the Babich analitical engine.
Anyway you've already discredited the argument but I'm interested to see the next video anyway.
I just cannot understand peoples needs to inject some kind of spiritualism or supernatural phenomenon everywhere!?!? Why make it a mystery... why all the smoke and mirrors!?!?
What is so freakin hard to admit that we know this and this but no more than that yet.
Why the inexorable need for a possible trancendal mind!?!? Geez, the personal cravings taint their thoughts *facepalm of exasperation*
sorry I strayed a bit there... Good primer sisyphus.
i think the reason for that is because for the most part, many of us are still "romantics."
"to what end do we proceed so boldly if all we are is chemical reaction; what world have you so deftly sold me if [...] i have no soul to touch, no heart to love, or evil to rise up above" sorry, old song i use to listen to in high school =P
It's amazing how people somehow think the composition of love is somehow more important than the phenomenology of it. As if learning that their love for their children is just a physio-chemical state of the central nervous system somehow undermines the potency of that love.
not too sure if i agree that love is a chemical reaction but rather results from the experience(s) of. would that be fair to say? or do i have my causal sequences mixed up?
but i definitely agree. however when i use the word 'romantic' i mean the general narrative or "fabrication" of reality we use to maintain our passions, and fuel our motivations; how we convince ourselves that things really are as they seem based on how we've cultivated our experiences. am i being too vague?
External events can stimulate chemical reactions in our brain, yes. But when it comes down to it, emotions like infatuation, anger, and grief are only conceived through some form of interpretation of these chemical reactions.
Hell, take it even further and even external events are only chemical reactions.
I think it's in part a God-of-the-gaps psychology. In the words of Penn Jillette, their God can only exist in the margins of science, so they want to keep those margins as wide as possible.
The more science delves into the brain; the more really cool stuff we learn about it. What parts of the brain do what in regards to memory, feeling. Where in the brain certain instincts come, fear and panic from our old reptilian brain. Higher thinking and empathy from our frontal brain. Certain brain damage can affect certain parts of the mind. We can actually induce certain feelings. It's really neat stuff.
I have been waiting for such reasonable primer on mind-body dualism. Yes, if there is immaterial mind, how exactly does it interact with the brain? Mind-body dualism? - Baloney!
Glad I could fill a need. But don't just rely on my rendering of the issue. There's a lot of stuff on the topic out there, be sure to get a variety of opinions and perspectives.
I'll admit I may have confused terms, I have recently become facinated with the distinction between the declarative and the procedural and have come to the conclusion that any explanation that bottoms out in the declarative lacks any "real" explanatory power. This I believe follows directly from the principles of operationalism, hence my use of the term.
He rejected Cartesian dualism, yes, but he accepted a form of dualism in which all material things are just attributes of the Supreme Substance (i.e.-God). The same basic interaction problem applies.
I'm pretty sure Spinoza was a pantheistic monist (i.e. that there is no dualism between God and the world; God simply IS the world), and consequently wouldn't fall prey to the "interaction problem."
It's an understandable mistake, usually when philosophers use to term "God" they mean immaterial magical-mystery stuff, and as a result, fall prey to the "interaction problem" you mentioned before. However, Spinoza's pantheism merely elevates material existence to the level of the divine, and so is still a monistic ontology.
Sort of simplistic treatment of the subject if you ask me. There are plenty of very difficult to deal with arguments for dualism. The problems of qualia and the knowledge argument, the modal argument, etc. By the way, have you read Chalmers' book? It's fucking brilliant.
Yeah, it is a simplistic treatment, but it's a 10 minute vid, hard to be comprehensive. Never been to troubled by qualia, nor the knowledge argument. Part II deals with a version of the modal argument (but a pretty lame one).
Which book by Chalmers? I've read "The Hard Problem", but not his others. A friend of mine studied under him back when he was at UCSC.
Yea I guess I might have been a bit too censorious there. I would be interested to hear why the knowledge argument and qualia never bothered you. There are some tougher versions of the one out there than the one you respond to in part II for sure. Haha.
I meant "The Conscious Mind". Highly recommended.
Ooooh I'm jealous! Maybe I'll get in to NYU and catch him doing half time there. Fingers crossed.
Well, phil mind isn't my specialty, so I can't claim to have some powerful an original insight into those problems. I suppose if I were to identify my views with anyone's it would be John Searle (my computer analogy in this vid notwithstanding).
I actually had the chance to go to NYU for grad school, but they didn't offer me any funding. I couldn't afford rent in NYC on my own, much less tuition.
"It would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it would be for me to concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by one to an immaterial thing."
Sooooooooooooo clear and precise. Thumbs up!
MegaVldmr 3 weeks ago
When you were talking about why are we tethered to this body, that question borders on the philosophical. It seems akin to asking what is the purpose of life. There are people who do astral project. Robert Monroe spent his life in pursuit of astral projection. I've astral projected a few times accidentally myself, as has my brother, who correlated one of his trips with the real world.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "that question borders on the philosophical."
'Borders on'? I would say it IS philosophical, rather clearly. If by that you mean 'unanswerable' then yes, I'm inclined to agree. And that is a very bad think for the theory that gives rise to it, namely, dualism.
As per your claims of astral projection, I can only say I am skeptical. Knowing what I know about altered states of consciousness and the science behind them, I think there are more plausible explanations.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: Why is that bad for dualism? How does not knowing the purpose of life invalidate dualism as a model?
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX I wasn't referring to not knowing the purpose of life (phrased thusly, that's a meaningless question), I was referring to not knowing why a specific non-physical mind is tethered to a specific physical body. That's a very specific phenomena, and there should be a very specific explanation. But if it's nonphysical, then there seems to be no way we could ever explain it. It's a black box.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
The case you're making here is that since we don't know how a non-physical mind could interact with a physical brain, that dualism is invalid? I don't see why this would invalidate dualism as a model. Why expect complete knowledge from dualism while physicalism has yet to solve its own hard problems?
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "since we don't know how a non-physical mind could interact with a physical brain, that dualism is invalid?"
More like 'since dualism proposes a black-box problem that can never be solved, this is a problem with the theory. An alternative that avoids this problem would be preferable.'
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@AnduinX "Why expect complete knowledge from dualism while physicalism has yet to solve its own hard problems?"
Physicalism proposes a method (science) for solving those problems, and it has made more progress towards doing so in the last 50 years than dualism has in the last 500. I don't expect 'complete knowledge' (whatever that might be), but I do reject 'it's just fucking magic' as a substitute for knowledge.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: With respect, I disagree. The study of neuroscience is mostly focused on finding neural correlates of conscious states. Correlation is not causation, no amount of correlation equates to progress for proving physicalism. What in your mind has been done that gives evidence specifically to physicalism and not dualism?
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "The study of neuroscience is mostly focused on finding neural correlates of conscious states."
That's simply not true. Correlations are, of course, a big part of neuroscience (that's key to pretty much any science) but neuroscience, like nearly all science does a lot more than that. Explanation is central to the endeavor. If all it were concerned with was correlation, then there would BE no 'hard problem of consciousness', because it would be off the table.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: Right, that's why I said 'mostly' focused not 'entirely' focused on correlation. I'm aware that neuroscience has been taking stabs at the hard problem for some time, unsuccessfully. The overwhelming majority of the work being done in the field nowadays is in fact centered around correlation, which can't prove physicalism. There is nothing that neuroscience has brought to the table to my knowledge that can be taken as evidence for or against physicalism/dualism.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "What in your mind has been done that gives evidence specifically to physicalism and not dualism?"
Read Damasio's "Descartes' Error". Or for that matter, pretty much any book by Damasio, LeDoux, Hauser, or any neuroscientist for that matter. Each of them take mysteries that used to be explained in terms of dualism in terms of physical structures of the brain.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: "Each of them take mysteries that used to be explained in terms of dualism in terms of physical structures of the brain."
What I wanted to know was if there was anything that specifically points to physicalism and not dualism, not if there were physicalist alternatives to dualist explanations.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: Also, I don't think it's fair to call dualism magic. If dualism were true, it would not magic, it would just be another part of our existence. The concept of 'physical' has been ever expanding since its conception.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@AnduinX "If dualism were true, it would not magic,"
It would be indistinguishable from magic. We could never test it, we could never control it, we could never verify it or falsify it. Sound like magic, looks like magic, quacks like magic: I'm saying it's magic. Or maybe I'll put it to you this way: what, in your mind, would be the difference between magic and dualism?
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: I don't think that dualism would unverifiable, dualism would be verifiable in the same way the Higgs Boson is thought to be verifiable. The Higgs Boson cannot be directly observed, it is a theoretical entity that was invented to make physics work. The only evidence there can be for it is in the effect it has on what we can observe. If we adopted dualism it would likely be for similar reasons - because it can explain things that physicalism cannot.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: To quote a forum post: "Think about disembodied forces (e.g. gravity, magnetism, etc.). Think about quantum mechanics and “spooky action at a distance.” Think about strings, dark matter, etc. All these things are happily embraced by physicalism today. Do you think Lucretius, Descartes, Leibniz, or any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”? Surely not."
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@AnduinX "Do you think... any pre-Newton scientist would have been happy calling such a theory “physicalism”?"
I don't think they would have accepted non-Euclidean geometry as geometry, either, but that doesn't mean our concept of geometry is dangerously promiscuous. Our ideas change over time, this isn't a problem, it's key to progress and development. What matters is how well they work for us, both practically and theoretically. Our current idea of physicalism works very well in both regards.
SisyphusRedeemed 5 months ago
@SisyphusRedeemed: Right, I have no problem with those things being a part of physics. The entire purpose of that post was to liken the dualism=magic comment to the acceptance of various additions to physics in the past. I'm sure a pre-newtonian scientist would have scoffed off much of what we know today as magical and fantastical, until it becomes accepted.
AnduinX 5 months ago
@AnduinX, we needed those notions of physics to explain reality. We don't need dualism to explain anything. I would assert that dualism's only purpose is so that death doesn't have to be death.You say a pre-newtonian scientist would have scoffed at much of what we know today as fantastical? Not only is that irrelevant, but demonstrability makes that statement completely false. Dualism is an old concept, debunked by new info. Don't compare it to how new info would be perceived by old thinking.
DarkMatter2525 5 months ago
This has been flagged as spam show
If anybody wants to see a refutation against the statement that we don't possesses minds feel free to check out my videos. On my second video of the mind I explain how physical alterations seem to make the case for materialism but falls short.
mrstevenjake22 6 months ago
Good video (as always).
But I want to point out, that all you need to make your "I" look out of another persons eyes, is a head mounted display and two cameras, as beautifully shown in the BBS Documentary "The secret You".
The awake brain seems to constantly solve the problem of where we are located in space. Mess around with the input data (head mounted display), and your sensation of "I" can easily be transferred to another persons body.
Which I definitely want to try out one day!
smarthandsomeguy 8 months ago
Man you really diss all kinds of rationalism and a priori justification "They were just making shit up" xD
johnjamo1 8 months ago
regarding the alcohol question, concieve the following - we know the brain shows an effect when alcohol is injested. I would argue that the mind itself is not directly effected by the alcohol, but the physical interface to the mind is compromised because of it. The mind, currently seated in the brain (or received by the brain) do not escape the physical effects of the brain. It is the same with a physical injury. Some people argue that Autism is just that.
airtonyt1 9 months ago
Writing a paper and this was incredibly helpful. You are seriously articulate with this stuff. I am struggling really hard on Frank Jacksons position of "Epiphenomenal Qualia". Any suggestions? or a place I could look for clarification? I understand his over all point about Mary and colour and Qualia, but not when he brings the Idea of Epiphenomenalism into his idea... any good places to look online for explanations??
thanks. Great video again.
DavisThegreatest 11 months ago
@DavisThegreatest The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy are both great resources. It's probably also worth noting that Jackson later changed his mind on this issue. Glad you liked the vid, thanks for saying so.
SisyphusRedeemed 11 months ago
Could you have posted a link proving that most philosophers of mind are materialist?
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
@NoslemProductions check: econlog[dot]econlib[dot]org/archives/2009/12/what_do_philoso[dot]html
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed
THANK YOU very interesting article. It seems that a very small percentage still hold the dualism (libertarianism?) philosophy. I still find it to be true based on not only subjective experience, but the fact that it is the one with the least limitation.
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
Sisyphus - with as old as this video is, and as well as you break this down, I highly suggest you change the title of the video to something more broad and recognizable. Just like Mind Body Dualism Refuted or something like that. I almost didn't watch this, even after ProfMTH recommended it in his video cause of the whole weird abortion thing (that doesn't even exist in the video lol).
Every person who thinks we have a soul should see this excellent break down, imho!
YourBrainOnReligion 1 year ago
An ethereal mind or soul is an unnecessary additional agent that affords no additional explanatory power and creates additional questions and problems. The same thing can be said for a creator god with respect to the origin of our universe. After crossing things off of the list that people propose require such an agent to explain, we get to a point where one must reject the real scientific explanations outright or as insufficient, or conform their beliefs to reality.
dookiecheez 1 year ago
Forget whether consciousness/the soul is separate from the brain. That is a different issue from whether the mind is separate. In regards to the latter, the mind IS separate from the brain because you can read the former (the brain), but not the latter (the mind). Neuroscience says a lot about the neurotransmitters which allow emotions to manifest themselves. But, it does not tell us about the thoughts bringing those emotions. Only the thinker can do that if he/she decides to.
metaldude82 1 year ago
@metaldude82
You can read the brain but not the mind...yeah that makes no sense at all.
The mind isn't actually separate from the brain, that's why drugs alter consciousness, so do injuries to said brain, why mental illness and disabilities exist, why losing part of ones brain can alter someone's personality, memory, etc...
dookiecheez 1 year ago
Yes it does because you can see the neurotransmitters and other elements of the brain. However, one cannot read a person's thoughts and how he/she thinks (mind). The brain allows all this to manifest themselves through the body. Of course, if the brain is damaged, such manifistation is compromised. For a mental illness to develope, one's brain need not become damaged or altered by some physical agent. He/she can merely experience a traumatic event, which becomes part of his/her thoughts (mind).
metaldude82 1 year ago
@metaldude82
So the mind interacts with the brain and is separate, but in interacting with the brain subject to all of his physical structure, chemical and electrical activity. This doesn't increase our understanding of anything, nor does it add any explanatory power. It only adds questions.
You might as well propose a third entity. There is the brain, the mind, and the ultra mind. The ultra mind experiences traumatic stress and interacts with the mind which then developes PTSD.
dookiecheez 1 year ago
@dookiecheez
"You can read the brain but not the mind...yeah that makes no sense at all."
The mind is the brain, obviously. If you get hit in the head, you can damage your brain, and damage your self, who are were, who you are etc. But you can also change your brain with your will. You can Choose to believe something that is false, and something that is true, and your brain will reflect this. Why? Why does nature let this happen?
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
@NoslemProductions
The mind is the emergent property of the brain to be more accurate.
Your will is a product of your brain, as is volition. It's not just logical it's basically tautological that one's thoughts and beliefs effect one's brain. I don't think I fully understand your question, my guess is because you hold a position which I do not that has not been indicated.
dookiecheez 1 year ago
@dookiecheez
"Your will is a product of your brain, as is volition. "
And what evidence are you basing this on, since you are only a brain yourself? Well let me rephrase. I realize that changing the brain can change your mind. But it works vise versa too. For example, yogi's in India who have bothered to have eeg scans done on them show that their brain is structured different, and is at a beta, or delta level constantly. (1)
1. Why God Won’t Go Away, Andrew Newberg
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
@NoslemProductions
It's parsimonious, practically tautological as I already said, and it is the minimum observed agencies. The mind is an observed phenomena of the brain.
You're unnecessarily separating the mind from the brain without any reason to do so, while still maintaining all of the processes and explanatory power of the connection. If the mind can change the brain that's not an issue for my position as you seem to think it is. And religious person living longer happier is false
dookiecheez 1 year ago
This has been flagged as spam show
@dookiecheez
Obviously the mind can me observed in the brain physically, it is in the left side. But what I am saying is if I were to imagine a donkey in field with a sucker in it's mouth, which neuron in my brain is the donkey, which is the field, etc.
" And religious person living longer happier is false"
Check in box.
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
@dookiecheez
Also, we have come to find that will power CAN cause physical, drastic physical, changes in the brain and body. Obviously, you know that religious people live longer and are happier. Our will power of not of the brain, it is of the mind, which is in no "place" it is non local.(2)
2. The brain that changed itself, Norman Doidge
NoslemProductions 1 year ago
Yo sisyphus, I have a prepared script to finally respond to this video. Its a crime that I waited this long.
migkillertwo 1 year ago
@migkillertwo Fantastic. I can't wait to see it.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
pineal gland releases DMT and makes you have crazy dreams but you trip if you smoke it after extracting it from plants
blazereef 1 year ago
"Making stuff up!" That's a great way of summarizing the problem. ^^
KaraRvn 1 year ago
Hmmm.. .sounds to me like an argument from ignorance.
You seem to be saying that since we do not know how it works it simply does not exist. (correct me if I'm wrong)
"How does the mind connect and interact with the brain?" We do not know, but that does not prove that minds do not exist.
AdamLore 1 year ago
@AdamLore Quite the opposite, in fact: it is the argument FOR dualism that is the argument from ignorance. We don't know how the brain gives rise to consciousness, so it must be an immaterial mind. But such a position requires exposition: IF an immaterial mind is the cause/nature of consciousness then how does it work? The failure to provide such an account doesn't prove it wrong, but it does prove it worthless. We might as well just say 'It's Magic!'
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed
I see your point.
The way I see it, though, we experience mind, and we do not find it in the physical realm, therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose mind is non-physical. We find representations and codings of mental things, but they are not the mental things themselves.
It is a conundrum, because it obviously can't just be "magic".
AdamLore 1 year ago
@AdamLore I'm not sure what it means to say we 'experience mind, but not in the physical realm.' That sort of seems like it's question begging; if we are, in fact, experiencing anything in a non-physical realm, then there must BE a nonphysical realm. I'm denying is the idea that there is a nonphysical realm. If there were, then there MUST be some way the physical and the nonphysical interact. An explanation, an account, a supposition at least seems called for, but none is forthcoming.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed
Well that is not exactly what I said. We experience mind, mental phenomena, qualia, etc. We are nearly absolutely certain that this is real because we are constantly experiencing it directly. Now, when we go out into the physical realm of wavelengths, particles, matter, etc, we do not seem to find the phenomena and qualia, just matter that somehow encodes it. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the qualia themselves are not physical unless we find evidence.
AdamLore 1 year ago
@AdamLore Okay, I understand 'we experience qualia,' but I think that's subtly mistaken; we don't experience qualia, qualia IS the experience. What we experience is objects, events, etc.--qualia is just how these things are manifest in our brains. But there's no fundamental difference between a qualitative experience in our brains and the data stored on a computer (other than the fact that one is conscious of course).
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@AdamLore The problem is how do we explain consciousness. If it's a physical process, we know how to proceed; by studying the physical systems responsible for it. If it's not a physical process, then we're back to the black box: it's voodoo, it's magic. Assuming it's not physical shuts down all possibility of learn about it or explaining it. It is to embrace ignorance as if it were an explanation.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed
I hear you, and I understand why you would say this. I am reading Daniel Dennet right now and something I just read said basically exactly the same thing.
But I disagree. Because we ALL have direct access to consciousness. It maybe be harder to study, and perhaps even impossible to prove, but I don't think it HAS to be physical in order to be studied.
Also, I don't think we can force something to be physical just to understand it (if it is not). We may never know.
AdamLore 1 year ago
Good point. I must say that it puzzles me that some act like the discovery that there are physical elements to consciousness and emotions is something new. That is not the case because Hippocrates found the brain to be the source of mental disorders around 400 BC. It is not like "Oh, there are physical elements, monism rules." Do you know what I am saying?
metaldude82 1 year ago
Wouldn't dualism make abortion MORE moral since you wouldn't be destroying a mind via an abortion?
geoporcupine 1 year ago
I too reject Mind-Body dualism. But there is a major stumbling block for me that I can't understand.
How do you explain the existence of "first-person perspectives" without dualism? How can you tell the difference between a normal person who has such a perspective, and a "philisophical zombie" who behaves precisely as though they view the world through a first-person perspective, with emotions and awareness, but they don't have one?
Help me work this one out! Thanks :)
lIThorIl 1 year ago
@lIThorIl Yeah, that's one of the problems in philosophy of mind. First off, it's not clear that dualism can really explain 1st person perspectives either ('It's fucking magic!' isn't really an explanation.) Suffice to say, I can't give a short satisfactory explanation here. It will require a complex philosophy of mind. Personally, I think we need to eliminate the idea of '1st person perspective' as being metaphysically distinct from a '3rd person' and start from scratch.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
migkillertwo fails on multiple levels...not JUST his argument in this instance.
middlekk 1 year ago
Alvin Plantinga's modal argument for mind-body dualism. (B=body/brain/part of brain etc)
1. If x = y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa. (Leibniz's law)
2. 'Concievably exists when B doesn't' is true of me but not true of B. (Kafka's "Metamorphosis" for example)
3. Therefore: I am not identical to B.
This is an interesting argument I think.
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 Interesting, but fallacious. For one, it's Descartes' argument, not Plantinga's. Second, as Plantinga himself admits, just because something is logically possible does not mean it is metaphysically possible. Just because we can imagine existing without a body does not mean that is actually possible. I can imagine a world in which a proof of the Goldbach conjecture is found, but that doesn't mean it's possible. Maybe Goldbach is unprovable.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed But I didn't say that it was possible, only that it is conceivable. I'm not arguing that what is conceivable is possible. If you re-read my post I think you'll see that. Is there an inconsistency in the argument the way I phrased it in my first post? I haven't seen one yet. Also I didn't know it was Descartes', thanks for the info!
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 You might not have said it, but for the argument to work, that's what it needs to be. What I can conceive about X is not a fact about X, but rather about my imagination. (I can imagine myself as Barack Obama, but that's not a fact about Obama, it's a fact about me.) Hence, Leibniz's law doesn't apply, since it's not a fact about me that it's conceivable that I exist without my body, it's a fact about the human imagination.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed Ah I see. In that case what is the flaw in the argument? Is that "I can possibly exist without B" cannot be shown but he jumps from "I can conceive of it" to "it is possible"? Although to say that it isn't possible also seems pretty unfounded. In which case how do we assess the probability that it is possible or not?
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 The flaw is that the argument is invalid. Premise 2 does not actually show a difference between X and Y, hence 3 does not follow from (1) and (2).
It doesn't have to be shown that it isn't possible to show that the argument fails. The onus is on Descartes/Plantinga to show the argument is sound.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed Are you saying that '"possibly exists when B doesn't" is true of me but not of B' is not true? or that it is not an actual difference since it is just a possible difference?
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 I'm sorry, I can't parse what you're asking here. Can you rephrase it in a way that doesn't involve subquotations and a double negative?
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed I'm trying to find out what your objection is to this argument:
1. (Leibniz's law)
2. 'Possibly exists when B doesn't' is true of me but not true of B.
3. Therefore: I am not identical to B.
You indicated that premise 2 is where the problem lies. So are you denying that it is possible for me to exist independently of B? Or that we cannot assess the probability of whether or not it is possible?
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 The problem is that premise (2) does not actually point to a difference between my body and my mind: it points to different ways we can think about those things. For the argument to work, it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind can exist without the body. (That is, it must be shown that it is a metaphysical possibility, not merely a logical one.) But if you can do that, of course, you no longer need this argument.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed "For the argument to work, it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind can exist without the body."
I think that this is incorrect. It must be shown that in reality it is POSSIBLE that the mind can exist without the body. But the thing is to be open minded about this, one must assume that it IS possible. Otherwise you have already made your mind up before looking at the argument.
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 "It must be shown that in reality it is POSSIBLE that the mind can exist without the body. "
That's what I said: "it must be shown that, in reality (not simply in our imaginations), the mind CAN exist without the body." 'Can' here is another word for 'possible.'
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 " to be open minded about this, one must assume that it IS possible. "
Nonsense. I can grant that it's logically/conceptually possible that the mind exists without the body, but to assume it is METAPHYSICALLY possible it to beg the question against materialism. The onus is on the dualist to show it is not just logically possible, but that it is metaphysically possible.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed So then you are saying that may or may not be metaphysically possible but we cannot assess whether it is or not and so this is the weak link in the argument?
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@awesomewelles90 No, I'm saying it's metaphysical possibility has not been established. This is a substantive claim and the onus is on whomever asserts it as true.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed You've just rephrased what I stated but in a more confrontational tone. Thanks anyway.
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
@SisyphusRedeemed A possible difference IS a difference. if two things are identical then the possibilities of those two things must be the same. Are you outright denying premise 2?
awesomewelles90 1 year ago
A book that pretty much kills any notion of mind/body dualism is Oliver Sacks' "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat."
Of course, dualism goes back a long way before Descartes. It was known as a soul. The philosophers hundreds of years ago thought it was breath. If a passing invisible God exhaled just as you inhaled, you received divine inspiration. You had a spirit (same root).
bdf2718 2 years ago
I thought Minsky was positing quantum level events in the neurons was where they interacted. This makes no more sense than claiming the mind is made of dark matter, but it had some real world evidence. Quantum level events do happen.
RyuDarragh 2 years ago
ProfMTH sent me this way *subs* enjoyed the vid
thepigofhappiness 2 years ago
Brilliant video. You just earned yourself another subscriber.
Rijara 2 years ago
Well explained. Clear, concise, and interesting (several features sadly lacking in a lot of videos).
dave28lax 2 years ago
I do my best. I do this for a living, so I should hope I can do better than the amateurs.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I have a big problem with physical monism because of the hard problem of consciousness -- the categorical gap between neurochemical activity and qualitative experience -- as well as the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, which sealed the deal for me on property dualism.
And the claim that no one is a dualist anymore because physical monism is fully explanatory is BS. Behaviorism waned and cognitivism emerged in psychology because this was not the case.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
I think it's also a bit unfair to suggest that all modern dualists are apologists for Cartesianism. I think of myself as an emergent dualist. I believe consciousness/mind is a distinct substance that "emerges" from the brain at some point during natural development, and that it relies on brain structure and function for its continued existence.
But I'm not so threatened by the problem of mental causation because I've never been satisfied with metaphysical explanations of physical causation. :P
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
"I believe consciousness/mind is a distinct substance"
So you ARE a substance dualist?
Do you think that solidity is a distinct substance that emerges from the appropriate molecular structures? Is liquidity or gaseousness? Emergent properties happen all the time in nature without the need to appeal to a separate realm of reality beyond the physical. Why should mind be an exception?
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I implied that I was a substance dualist when I said in my second comment that "consciousness/mind is a distinct substance" from the brain.
Solidity is one example of an emergent property, yes, but minds are are not properties. First of all, only realists concerning the problem of universals could even consider the claim that they are. Most naturalists are nominalists. Where do you stand on the issue?
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
If you are a realist or even a conceptualist...
Properties can, in principle, be instantiated in or shared by multiple substances, but just because I have epistemic access to my mind, it certainly doesn't follow that I know your mind. I have "a" mind, not mind-ness. So mind cannot be an emergent property, even though consciousness seems to emerge from and appears to be in causal relationship with brain activity.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
I never said that naturalistic monists were closed-minded or immune to scientific evidence. Everyone makes a priori assumptions and has worldview biases of which they aren't conscious. Psychology has established a very significant correlation between brain states and mental states, but does this suggest that they are one and the same? Not at all. On the contrary, it suggests property dualism because a COrrelation is between TWO qualitatively distinct things. :P
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
But natural scientific methodology is more narrow than social scientific methodology. It studies the impersonally objective -- and that's all. Mind IS subjectivity. No matter how much I study your brain, I will never BE you. I will never see through your eyes or hear through your ears, though I might have perfect, objective knowledge of your nervous system and sense organs. So I don't think natural scientists have ANYTHING to say about consciousness. It's out of their scope.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
I'm not defining the terms so as to avoid the problem. I already told you that I do not believe a hidden mind miraculously "produces" a consciousness. The immateriality of experience is what I'm defending. But the term "consciousness" usually describes the scope of awareness. As I conceive of it, mind also includes the bare subject -- the emergent substance conceptually apart from its properties -- and subjective elements that the subject is not aware of, such as "unconscious" desires.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
You're right the term 'consciousness' usually describes awareness, but it need to be limited to that in a technical discussion. To speak of mind as if it were a noun begs the question in favor of a substance view. If mind is a property it makes sense to have an adjectival term, rather than a noun term to refer to it (otherwise we run into the linguistic problems that were tying you in knots above.) 'Conscious' works pretty well in that regard.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
You're assuming that science can't speak to the subjective, but this is just false. Science says meaningful things about the subjective all the time. (e.g.-'Aspirin cures a headache.') You're certainly right that a REDUCTION of the subjective to the objective is riddled with problems, but not all science is reductive in nature. We can, and do use science to explain and account for our subjective perspectives every single day, and as science advances it gets better and better at doing so.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Science also points to a correlation between average molecular motion and heat. Yet these are, in fact, the same thing. Heat is the emergent phenomena of the motion of molecules. Correlations are not always between two things.
You're right we all have biases, but some of us are at least willing to subject them to scrutiny, when they are drawn to our attention. Not saying all theists/dualists are not so willing, but certainly some are, more so than naturalists/monists.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
My table has a particular pattern of molecules that is very different from that of your table. They are both tables, they are both solid, yet they are not the same thing. This isn't a problem for solidity as emergent, so why should the parallel issue cause us worry about minds?
Your use of the noun is what's throwing you off. You don't have mind-ness, you have consciousness. For that matter, the possessive isn't a good idea either. Better to say 'you are conscious,' just as 'my table is solid.'
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
What makes you say most naturalists are nominalists? That doesn't seem right to me. I've never done or seen a survey, but it seems to me most naturalists are scientific realists. If one is a realist about universals then how could they be naturalists? Unless you're thinking that universals and natural kinds are the same thing?
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I agree that most naturalists are probably scientific realists, but that's not what I said. Scientific instrumentalism, not nominalism, is the doctrine opposing scientific realism. The realism I'm talking about concerns the objective existence of attributes and categories (i.e., properties and kinds, Plato's Forms, etc.). Nominalists claim they exist only as useful parts of language; conceptualists claim they exist only as mental constructs; realists claim they are real, external "things."
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago 2
I objected that the claim that consciousness is an emergent "property" is untenable to a nonrealist. To a conceptualist, the claim is self-defeating = "Mind is a property, which is only a mental construct? So I explain a mental construct by claiming that it's a mental construct?" It's tautological. To nominalist, it is radical skepticism. Claiming that mind is a property reduces direct experience to linguistics -- a denial of the self-evident that would make even Sextus Empiricus cringe.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
You aren't reading what I write closely. I said that NATURAL scientific methodology excludes subjective evidence. Medical science can include it, and social science certainly does. But you'll never figure out what it's like to be conscious by studying the brain. There is an unbridgeable, categorical difference between objective and "intrasubjective" observation -- only YOU have the privilege of experiencing your being-in-the-world, no one else.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
I would argue that calling someone "conscious" means that they "are" a subject -- that they are experiencing -- not that their brain has a particular quality. The adjective is derived from the noun, not the other way 'round. I'm not getting tied up in linguistic knots. I know exactly what I'm saying. :P But I believe we have developed subcategories of the mind, which is what I was trying to convey, successfully or not. lol
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
Subcategories of the mind "in our language," that is.
We all have biases, but I would strongly disagree that physicalists make fewer a priori assumptions than non-physicalists do. Some in that camp desperately try to "explain away" a reasonable and commonsense position under the guise of "scrutiny" because dualism threatens their worldview -- they have much personally invested in the problem. Dualists have mental-physical causation to deal with; monists have the hard problem of consciousness.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
But it bothers me that so many physicalists act as if dualism has been done away with and is no longer a respectable position. Since when? Where is this all-powerful argument that devastated all forms of dualism? If it was the causation issue, then why have there been so many "respectable" dualists since Descartes?
I feel that the arrogant attitude shows a lack of integrity and is simply to make dualists look like uncritical, spellbound magical thinkers, which is not only wrong, but insulting.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
The hard problem is hard, but dualism (property or substance) doesn't win by default. It's at least as hard to explain how a non-physical mind can account for consciousness as it is to explain how a brain can (and brains have the advantage of being sure to exist.)
You don't need to be a dualist to be a cognitivist. And while property dualism is more respectable than substance dualism, the fact remains that most cog sci/phil mind people are material monists.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Here I am equating "mind" with consciousness, not claiming that mind somehow produces consciousness. I think that the physical brain is the substratum of the mind (or consciousness, subjectivity, experience, the first-person perspective, whichever you prefer). But to say that consciousness itself is material substance seems utterly preposterous from my point of view.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
I realize that the monist position is still popular among "naturalistic" philosophers (certainly not theistic philosophers), but I believe it is largely an a priori commitment, as I can't imagine non-naturalists being convinced by the arguments for monism. The mind-body causation issue has been the main criticism, and like I said, I personally don't find it very threatening because no one is able to explain how solely physical causal relationships are possible either. But that's just me.
ElasticGiraffe 2 years ago
So super-naturalists are close-minded, immune to evidence and scientific development?
You're right that causation in general is a problem, but surely we have a better grasp of how a cue-ball causes an 8-ball to move than we have of how an alleged non-physical mind moves a non-physical body. If nothing else, at least we know for sure the cue-ball exists.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Equating "mind" with "consciousness" isn't going to help you, any more than it would for me to say 'here I'm equating 'the brain' with consciousness.' You need to explain how a nonmaterial thing can explain and account for consciousness. Simply saying 'and then a miracle happens' is not an explanation.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Consciousness isn't a material substance any more than solidity is; they're both emergent PROPERTIES of material substances. And if you think that's preposterous, you're mistaking a failure of imagination for metaphysical necessity.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
A lot of materialist arguments have been torn down by people like Godel, Searle and Block. Because of the failures of materialism dualism, much to the disappointment of Searle, has become respectable again.
Fatimus 2 years ago 3
I guess we just take the pulse of the philosophical community differently. Property dualism might be respectable, perhaps, but substance dualism? drsuessre14 gave a list of property dualists, and they're all either christian philosophers or people I've never heard of. I can't think of a single big name in the philosophy of mind right now who's a substance dualist.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I think the Searle quote is something like 'because of the shortcomings of computationalism and functionalism it looks like we're back in bed with Descartes'. Frank Jackson *was* a dualist, I'm fairly sure. I'm not sure if he was a property or substance dualist, though. He's since become a physicalist even though he put forward one of the best arguments against physicalism.
As for 'the pulse of the philosophical community'. I can't say anything authoritative on that. I'm not a philosopher.
PunnyLolBuffalo 2 years ago
I'm pretty sure that Searle quote is out of context (the emphasis of that quote is on 'looks'). He's not a computationlist or a functionalist, but he' not dualist, either. He thinks 'brains cause minds' in a purely physical way.
Jackson was a property dualist, I believe, but I suppose can't say for sure.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Oh no, I'm not saying Searle is a dualist. It's not out of context, in fact my initial reference to Searle was "Because of the failures of materialism dualism, much to the disappointment of Searle, has become respectable again."
Searle's answer to it all kind of reeks of emergentism, "Phenomenal experiences just emerge from the operating of lower level neurons".
Fatimus 2 years ago
Kaegwon Jim's causality argument is good too: 'We can tell one gun causes one bullet hole because of the location of the gun in reference to the bullet hole. However, when I raise my arm, since the soul is immaterial, I cannot determine whether it was my mind or yours that caused me to raise my arm'
Fatimus 2 years ago
SisyphusRedeemed, I've been subscribed to your videos for a while, but, for some reason, I don't remember watching them until now! Anyway, just wanted to say that I think you do a really good job./Which current philosophers, that you know of, are mind-body dualists? You give me your list, I'll give you mine, howabout?
drsuessre14 2 years ago
Thanks, dr.suessre, I appreciate you saying so, glad you're liking them.
You know, as I sit here I cannot, off the top of my head, think of any contemporary substance dualists. I can think of two property dualists: Jackson and Robinson. I'm sure if opened a book or looked at SEP I could find a few more of each. Care to add to the list?
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Here's my list of professional philosophers that have taken a substance dualist stand, printed by respected publishing houses/journals (I might think of others later): Richard Swinburne (recently retired), William Hasker, Dean Zimmerman, Alvin Plantinga, Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, David S. Oderberg, E. J. Lowe, and J. P. Moreland. Note: substance dualism, as I understand things, includes Cartesianism and Thomism.
drsuessre14 2 years ago
This video was a lot more impressive than your second video TBH.
and yes, I will also include a response to THIS in my upcoming video series on metaphysics.
migkillertwo 2 years ago
I look forward to the series.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I used the eyes as an example in a video I made against dualism as well.
Specifically I pointed out that many people believe that they can look over their family members after death even though they will no longer have a physical body (including eyes).
Also if people can see the physical world after death what limitations if any exists for their sight?
Can the dead see through walls?
Do they have 360 degree vision?
Is the range of their sight infinite?
smpunditz 2 years ago
Very good questions, all. Reminds me of similar questions I've asked about sex in heaven. It's supposed to be 'pure' with no 'sins of the flesh'. This suggests there is no sex in heaven. But our sexuality is a big part of our identity; without that, are WE really surviving, or is it just some pale imitation of us?
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
And it only gets worse from there. Then there is the correlation between brain and mind development.
Do children minds continue to develop?
Do the mentally disabled remain that way after death?
Do those suffering from amnesia get their memory back?
The correlation between the brain and mind in terms of development and damage alone is sufficient to disregard the problems of dualism.
smpunditz 2 years ago
I thought the exact same thing. This about dualism not abortion.
smpunditz 2 years ago
Allso, I'm not sure I'd go as fare as to say that it was imatirial. I mean all the information is still being stored chemically, as opposed to digitally. Hell maybe an even better enalergy would be something along the lines of the Babich analitical engine.
Anyway you've already discredited the argument but I'm interested to see the next video anyway.
Disthron 2 years ago
mmmmmmmmmmmm drunk, cheers for the idea
great channel thought, only found you through ffreethinker
mambuduomally 2 years ago
Thanks. I owe ffreethinker more than a few beers for the publicity.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I just cannot understand peoples needs to inject some kind of spiritualism or supernatural phenomenon everywhere!?!? Why make it a mystery... why all the smoke and mirrors!?!?
What is so freakin hard to admit that we know this and this but no more than that yet.
Why the inexorable need for a possible trancendal mind!?!? Geez, the personal cravings taint their thoughts *facepalm of exasperation*
sorry I strayed a bit there... Good primer sisyphus.
Paxmax 2 years ago
i think the reason for that is because for the most part, many of us are still "romantics."
"to what end do we proceed so boldly if all we are is chemical reaction; what world have you so deftly sold me if [...] i have no soul to touch, no heart to love, or evil to rise up above" sorry, old song i use to listen to in high school =P
xblindx 2 years ago
What difference does it make if love is chemical or supernatural, whatever the source it remains as potent and powerful as any other.
Toledosteal 2 years ago
It's amazing how people somehow think the composition of love is somehow more important than the phenomenology of it. As if learning that their love for their children is just a physio-chemical state of the central nervous system somehow undermines the potency of that love.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
not too sure if i agree that love is a chemical reaction but rather results from the experience(s) of. would that be fair to say? or do i have my causal sequences mixed up?
but i definitely agree. however when i use the word 'romantic' i mean the general narrative or "fabrication" of reality we use to maintain our passions, and fuel our motivations; how we convince ourselves that things really are as they seem based on how we've cultivated our experiences. am i being too vague?
xblindx 2 years ago
We're only aware of experience through chemical reactions in our brain.
Greywyn7 2 years ago
what of external events? or are they irrelevant in stimulating these chemical reactions?
xblindx 2 years ago
Maybe I misunderstood what you were asking.
External events can stimulate chemical reactions in our brain, yes. But when it comes down to it, emotions like infatuation, anger, and grief are only conceived through some form of interpretation of these chemical reactions.
Hell, take it even further and even external events are only chemical reactions.
Greywyn7 2 years ago
I think it's in part a God-of-the-gaps psychology. In the words of Penn Jillette, their God can only exist in the margins of science, so they want to keep those margins as wide as possible.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
There are a lot of delicious problems of conscious experience that dualism is utterly impotent to answer, also.
Great into.
DasAmericanAtheist 2 years ago
The more science delves into the brain; the more really cool stuff we learn about it. What parts of the brain do what in regards to memory, feeling. Where in the brain certain instincts come, fear and panic from our old reptilian brain. Higher thinking and empathy from our frontal brain. Certain brain damage can affect certain parts of the mind. We can actually induce certain feelings. It's really neat stuff.
happysplodie 2 years ago
It sure is. There is more majesty in our own skulls than in all the holy books of human history.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I have been waiting for such reasonable primer on mind-body dualism. Yes, if there is immaterial mind, how exactly does it interact with the brain? Mind-body dualism? - Baloney!
dewonthegrass 2 years ago
Glad I could fill a need. But don't just rely on my rendering of the issue. There's a lot of stuff on the topic out there, be sure to get a variety of opinions and perspectives.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Nice video.
I find that if you treat "mind" as a verb rather than as a noun the problems of dualism seem to dissapear.
Operationalism FTW
TheSameDonkey 2 years ago
Not to pick nits, but that sounds more like 'functionalism' to me. The only 'operationalism' I'm familiar with is in the philosophy of science.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I'll admit I may have confused terms, I have recently become facinated with the distinction between the declarative and the procedural and have come to the conclusion that any explanation that bottoms out in the declarative lacks any "real" explanatory power. This I believe follows directly from the principles of operationalism, hence my use of the term.
TheSameDonkey 2 years ago
Didn't Spinoza categorically reject Cartesian mind/body dualism?
CousinoMacul 2 years ago
He rejected Cartesian dualism, yes, but he accepted a form of dualism in which all material things are just attributes of the Supreme Substance (i.e.-God). The same basic interaction problem applies.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
I'm pretty sure Spinoza was a pantheistic monist (i.e. that there is no dualism between God and the world; God simply IS the world), and consequently wouldn't fall prey to the "interaction problem."
LennyBound 2 years ago
Hmm, guess you're right. Looks like I screwed that one up. Thanks for the clarification.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
It's an understandable mistake, usually when philosophers use to term "God" they mean immaterial magical-mystery stuff, and as a result, fall prey to the "interaction problem" you mentioned before. However, Spinoza's pantheism merely elevates material existence to the level of the divine, and so is still a monistic ontology.
LennyBound 2 years ago
Sort of simplistic treatment of the subject if you ask me. There are plenty of very difficult to deal with arguments for dualism. The problems of qualia and the knowledge argument, the modal argument, etc. By the way, have you read Chalmers' book? It's fucking brilliant.
Looking forward to Pt. II
anrchyvk 2 years ago
Yeah, it is a simplistic treatment, but it's a 10 minute vid, hard to be comprehensive. Never been to troubled by qualia, nor the knowledge argument. Part II deals with a version of the modal argument (but a pretty lame one).
Which book by Chalmers? I've read "The Hard Problem", but not his others. A friend of mine studied under him back when he was at UCSC.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Yea I guess I might have been a bit too censorious there. I would be interested to hear why the knowledge argument and qualia never bothered you. There are some tougher versions of the one out there than the one you respond to in part II for sure. Haha.
I meant "The Conscious Mind". Highly recommended.
Ooooh I'm jealous! Maybe I'll get in to NYU and catch him doing half time there. Fingers crossed.
anrchyvk 2 years ago
"the one" is somehow meant to refer to "the modal argument" in the above comment. Hahaha.
anrchyvk 2 years ago
Well, phil mind isn't my specialty, so I can't claim to have some powerful an original insight into those problems. I suppose if I were to identify my views with anyone's it would be John Searle (my computer analogy in this vid notwithstanding).
I actually had the chance to go to NYU for grad school, but they didn't offer me any funding. I couldn't afford rent in NYC on my own, much less tuition.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
What is your specialty, by the way?
drsuessre14 2 years ago
Ethical theory and applied ethics.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago
Cool. I'm reading "The Moral Problem" by Michael Smith. right now for a reading group. Have you read it?
drsuessre14 2 years ago
"It would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it would be for me to concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by one to an immaterial thing."
- Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
:-)
LennyBound 2 years ago
Hadn't heard that one before. Most interesting.
SisyphusRedeemed 2 years ago