If one atom is not conscious, and two atoms are not conscious - and if one neuron does not have consciousness and two neurons do not have consciousness, and you believe that consciousness is a side effect of a sufficiently complex system, what is the minimum level of complexity at which some arrangement of non-conscious objects attain the property of consciousness and why?
It would be interesting if there were a purely logical answer.
youre making a logical fallacy with logic like this. on a gradient scale of white to black, there is no pinpointing exactly where one area is white and the next is black, but that doesnt mean one end isn't white and the other black.
just like the minimum level for consciousness may not be able to pick out, but that doesnt mean consciousness isnt present once you are at one end of the complexity scale.
Yes I suppose there are gray areas as far as levels of consciousness. But this would mean that you might consider a single transistor or any mechanism capable of Turing-completeness.
A bigger, faster computer isn't more conscious, only does the same computation in less time. Even a brain simulated in software might only appear to be conscious but lack sentience like a philosophical zombie. This makes me think there are no gray areas if the physical system implementing the logical system matters
@Ormaaj Those are hardly problems of consciousness. If one atom is not a chair and two atoms are not a chair, then what is the minimum count of atoms that one must be to be a chair? So, there's not just no logical answer to answer to that question, but no answer to such questions to any macroscopic property. Putnam talks about this in relation to color in Realism and the Aim of Science, but I don't think his account is flawless.
@GolumTR Eh, chairness isn't really a property in the same as consciousness. I'd say things either have consciousness to some degree or to no degree. What consciousness is and what gives rise to it are good questions, and what some minimal conscious unit might be could be part of understanding that.
This guy, like most modern philosophers, hasn't discovered free will. Free will is an irreducible primary, an explanation point beyond which one cannot go. Free will is the explanation of our actions. There is no explaining free will.
"If we are to construe free will deductively, can we not seek an explanation of how the deductive method might proceed, MrC?"
If we DID construe it deductively, sure, but that is a study of the methods of logic, not a study of free will. But we arrive at the idea of free will through induction, not deduction.
There is also no explaining existence (it exists, end of story) nor identity - things are what they are with no further elucidation necessary. These three untouchable, unexplainable concepts are axioms and they are available directly to the five senses.
Thank you very much for posting this, I have only briefly looked into Putnam, and only really as historical reference to later works of computationalism and his ideas of multiple realizability. It would be nice to hear it from his mouth. I can certainly see your problems with Putnam and will have more to say when I have time to watch the entire series, thanks again - kyle
If one atom is not conscious, and two atoms are not conscious - and if one neuron does not have consciousness and two neurons do not have consciousness, and you believe that consciousness is a side effect of a sufficiently complex system, what is the minimum level of complexity at which some arrangement of non-conscious objects attain the property of consciousness and why?
It would be interesting if there were a purely logical answer.
Ormaaj 2 years ago
youre making a logical fallacy with logic like this. on a gradient scale of white to black, there is no pinpointing exactly where one area is white and the next is black, but that doesnt mean one end isn't white and the other black.
just like the minimum level for consciousness may not be able to pick out, but that doesnt mean consciousness isnt present once you are at one end of the complexity scale.
portino 2 years ago
Yes I suppose there are gray areas as far as levels of consciousness. But this would mean that you might consider a single transistor or any mechanism capable of Turing-completeness.
A bigger, faster computer isn't more conscious, only does the same computation in less time. Even a brain simulated in software might only appear to be conscious but lack sentience like a philosophical zombie. This makes me think there are no gray areas if the physical system implementing the logical system matters
Ormaaj 2 years ago
@Ormaaj Those are hardly problems of consciousness. If one atom is not a chair and two atoms are not a chair, then what is the minimum count of atoms that one must be to be a chair? So, there's not just no logical answer to answer to that question, but no answer to such questions to any macroscopic property. Putnam talks about this in relation to color in Realism and the Aim of Science, but I don't think his account is flawless.
GolumTR 3 months ago
@GolumTR Eh, chairness isn't really a property in the same as consciousness. I'd say things either have consciousness to some degree or to no degree. What consciousness is and what gives rise to it are good questions, and what some minimal conscious unit might be could be part of understanding that.
Ormaaj 3 months ago
This guy, like most modern philosophers, hasn't discovered free will. Free will is an irreducible primary, an explanation point beyond which one cannot go. Free will is the explanation of our actions. There is no explaining free will.
MrCropper 3 years ago
If we are to construe free will deductively, can we not seek an explanation of how the deductive method might proceed, MrC?
sssswwwsssss 3 years ago
"If we are to construe free will deductively, can we not seek an explanation of how the deductive method might proceed, MrC?"
If we DID construe it deductively, sure, but that is a study of the methods of logic, not a study of free will. But we arrive at the idea of free will through induction, not deduction.
MrCropper 3 years ago
How would you go about making an inductive inference to the proposition 'free will is irreducibly primary'? I'm curious.
sssswwwsssss 3 years ago
"There is no explaining free will."
Interesting.
zorio 3 years ago
""There is no explaining free will."
Interesting."
There is also no explaining existence (it exists, end of story) nor identity - things are what they are with no further elucidation necessary. These three untouchable, unexplainable concepts are axioms and they are available directly to the five senses.
MrCropper 3 years ago
I would be interested in hearing how free will, existence, and identity are available to the five senses.
zorio 3 years ago
"I would be interested in hearing how free will, existence, and identity are available to the five senses."
Existence exists [MrC sweeps his arm at the room's contents]
Consciousness is conscious (and knows so only through its senses).
A is A - we know a thing only through our senses. We know what it is and what it is not only through the senses.
MrCropper 3 years ago
We don't have free will, at least in the philosopher's sense, which is the sense about which I think you are talking, even if indeterminism is true.
Also, not to sound too positivistic, "existence exists" is a nonsensical statement. What could it mean?
GodlessPhilosopher 3 years ago
Comment removed
exponentu 2 years ago
Thanks s.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
Thank you very much for posting this, I have only briefly looked into Putnam, and only really as historical reference to later works of computationalism and his ideas of multiple realizability. It would be nice to hear it from his mouth. I can certainly see your problems with Putnam and will have more to say when I have time to watch the entire series, thanks again - kyle
LordImmolation 3 years ago