I truly appreciate these posts, thank you. I took a class on the metaphysics of modality (namely modal logic) last quarter and your posts have helped me tremendously in understanding the material. I'm curious, are you familiar with Kit Fine and his approach to modality, generally? I've found his Priorian and broadly Aristolitan approach much more appealing than the extreme views of David Lewis and Plantinga.
Your comments are puzzling. I never discussed Hartshorne's argument, but Plantinga's argument. Admittedly, however, many of the same maneuvers that modern supports of the MOA offer fall under the three Leibnizian/Hartshornian/Cartesian/Godelian moves I have explicated.
Finally, nothing in my video nor my paper contradicted Hartshorne's presentation of the argument being such that a necessary god's possibility entails its actuality. I addressed that notion (which is also found in Plantinga) in two ways: (1) the premise that a necessary god is possible begs the question and (2) the premise that a necessary god is possible is unsound and unsupported.
Secondly, you are falling prey to the same mistakes most people make with respect to the MOA. God is *explicitly* defined in Plantinga's argument as a being that exemplifies maximal excellence. But, Plantinga *isn't* talking about the possibility of such an exemplification, but the possibility of the exemplification of *necessary* maximal excellence.
Furthermore, defining God as a being that necessarily exemplifies maximal excellence is innocuously mistaken at best and deliberate obfuscation at worst; as I explained clearly in my video and my paper, many people make the mistake of thinking that the possibility operator is scoped over God's existence, which constitutes a modest claim. It is *not*; it's scoped over His *necessity*. Therefore, redefining "God" as a necessary entity simply misleads people into this mistake.
I would simply recommend that you re-read my paper and re-watch the series. I explain in detail what is wrong with Plantinga' possibility premise. I'm somewhat astonished that you don't know what the hell I'm talking about since my points are pretty basic modal metaphysics.
R-
I truly appreciate these posts, thank you. I took a class on the metaphysics of modality (namely modal logic) last quarter and your posts have helped me tremendously in understanding the material. I'm curious, are you familiar with Kit Fine and his approach to modality, generally? I've found his Priorian and broadly Aristolitan approach much more appealing than the extreme views of David Lewis and Plantinga.
-J
snowtrot 3 years ago
I think that you have misunderstood Hartshorne's argument.
You do not seem to understand his argument at all.
If God is defined as that whose possibility ensures it necessity, (Leibnitz), and God is possible...therefore God is necessary, is a valid argument.
This is the modal ontological argument.
I have no idea as to what the hell your are trying to say!
That God is possible. is true ..is the crux of this argument.
cgo11 4 years ago
Cgo11,
Your comments are puzzling. I never discussed Hartshorne's argument, but Plantinga's argument. Admittedly, however, many of the same maneuvers that modern supports of the MOA offer fall under the three Leibnizian/Hartshornian/Cartesian/Godelian moves I have explicated.
Rayndeon 4 years ago
Finally, nothing in my video nor my paper contradicted Hartshorne's presentation of the argument being such that a necessary god's possibility entails its actuality. I addressed that notion (which is also found in Plantinga) in two ways: (1) the premise that a necessary god is possible begs the question and (2) the premise that a necessary god is possible is unsound and unsupported.
Rayndeon 4 years ago
Secondly, you are falling prey to the same mistakes most people make with respect to the MOA. God is *explicitly* defined in Plantinga's argument as a being that exemplifies maximal excellence. But, Plantinga *isn't* talking about the possibility of such an exemplification, but the possibility of the exemplification of *necessary* maximal excellence.
Rayndeon 4 years ago
Furthermore, defining God as a being that necessarily exemplifies maximal excellence is innocuously mistaken at best and deliberate obfuscation at worst; as I explained clearly in my video and my paper, many people make the mistake of thinking that the possibility operator is scoped over God's existence, which constitutes a modest claim. It is *not*; it's scoped over His *necessity*. Therefore, redefining "God" as a necessary entity simply misleads people into this mistake.
Rayndeon 4 years ago
I would simply recommend that you re-read my paper and re-watch the series. I explain in detail what is wrong with Plantinga' possibility premise. I'm somewhat astonished that you don't know what the hell I'm talking about since my points are pretty basic modal metaphysics.
Rayndeon 4 years ago
Excellent, excellent, excellent. We have found the anti-veritas48!! ;-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
Lol, thank you.
Rayndeon 4 years ago