I suppose this gentleman is talking about Singularity. If a microchip can reach human brain computation levels then will the computer have consciousness? Isn't this the question? It is the same idea put forth in the movie 2001: Space Odyssey. It will not happen because the chip will not have Planck's Constant.
Just because Man cannot fully understand the workings of his own mind, does not mean that it is impossible that Man will create a system capable of housing his own mind. Just as the intellect that devised Godel's Theorem is an *emergent* property of a self-replicating, randomly mutating substrate, so to can the tool which is capable of housing Man's mind emerge from the development of his improving tools (microprocessors - quantum computers - thinking machines).
I read The Emperor's New Mind a few years ago (and Gödel, Escher, Bach quite a few years before that) and found Penrose's discussions quite fascinating; but I was never convinced, though I could not fully explain why. I think your argument has given me a new way to express and examine my own doubts. Thank you!
Why, exactly, couldn't we find our own algorithm? Because then the algorithm would have to contain itself? The Godel sentence is held to contain itself in a self-referencing sense. Reject 'thing containing itself' and you reject Godel's proof. Admit 'thing containing itself' and your anti-Penrose argument collapses.
@drunkagnostic For something to contain and understand its own algorithm is very different from the sort of indirect self-reference in Godel's Theorem.
@philosophertoby You may be right; perhaps the two things are different. But how? Indirectly or not, the Godel sentence supposedly contains not only itself, but the formal system in which it is formed.
Why can't an algorithm contain itself? Intuitively, it might seem impossible--ten axioms can't contain ten axioms 'cause then that'd be twenty--but formal systems routinely contain things of larger quantity than their list of axioms, right?
@philosophertoby Not true. In fact Godel's theorem motivated Kleene's recursion theorem, which proves that there are programs that "know" their own code. Google "Quine (computing)" to see some nice examples.
@eabod I suppose there are different ways of defining whether a system can contain its own algorithm. Clearly, none of these systems are exempt from Godel's Theorem. Simply being able to produce its own source code isn't really enough. But yes, I aim to be more precise than I perhaps have been in the video, and I've been making notes on the comments. The main thing I need to worry about would be a good argument as to why humans can do things computers can't. I'm still waiting!
@drunkagnostic Penrose argues that once we find our Godel sentence we'd see that it's true. It's seeing that it's true that differs from computers, not finding the sentence itself. On this basis, for a system to find its own Godel sentence is a mathematical procedure and it may have been proved whether a formal system can do this. I will do a search.
I've stated it cannot be done, and although you can argue I've not been rigorous, Penrose needs to prove it can for his proof to be valid.
@philosophertoby What about our self-awareness of our "I?" We can't generate that computationally as it is a discrete thing. This would be a fairly ready though less certain demonstration of what Penrose is saying.
Stepping away from logical theory, I think it is clear in many aspects of life that humans can think algorithmically, or choose arbitrarily if some decision cannot be made. A machine that mimics human thought would similarly need a secondary "intuition" kind of reasoning system for when standard logical computation doesn't seem to apply. Often times intuition includes acting on premises we cannot prove, but would be favorable to us if true, or "erring on the side of caution" etc.
Disregarding the physical argument, we see that Gödel Sentences are always proven true by the metalanguage. I think it is safe to say that your argument, in very condensed form, is that it would require a "meta-universe" to prove a suspected Gödel sentence true; clearly we have no access to the meta-universe, therefore we have no access to a proof that the sentence is true, and thus no guaranteed Gödel sentence. Am I right in this summary?
@okuno54 Yes, pretty much. Since a person is not limited to their own brain but can use the rest of the Universe as a "tool", to get outside the system and find their Gödel sentence and prove its truth would require being outside our Universe.
@philosophertoby Don't we intrinsically know as true certain mathematical truths which are unprovable though? Such as the consistency of the set of natural numbers?
The real problem I have with any sort of physical manifestation of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems is that current physical theory leads us to believe that the universe is finite. On the one hand, the size of the universe is bounded by our light-cone, and on the other, there is probably a limit to how much information we can pack into a small space Obviously, any physical (read: finite) algorithm is therefore incomplete with respects to an infinite semantics.
I define intelligence as a choice of Algorithmic lines of thought, which implies a transcendence of Algorithm without a negation. Any life form, carbon based or computer based, that is capable of such a choice ceases to be Algorithmic. If Penrose is right, and either the brain or the DNA molecule has a Quantum computer component, then such computing ceases to be Algorithmic in my estimation. If AI is possible like you believe, then it ceases to be "artificial" once this barrier is passed.
I've decided to block the user LooksAeterna because it has become clear that he is only here to cause trouble and has no interest in sensible discussion. I don't like doing this sort of thing but likewise I do not want the discussion thread to descend into farce.
@philosophertoby : You could allow him/her to comment without answering.
In any case I'm inclined to agree with your belief that it's possible that an algorithm can be designed to deal with statements of the "This statement is false." sort. It may be simply a matter of our gaining a more sophisticated understanding of meaning in language.
OK, let's try to end this: as far as I as understand you,
1.
you would agree (and if you want to be taken seriously among logicians you would have to), that the human mind has the power to have complete certainty regarding the truth of
"There is no proof for this sentence"
and no formal system can provide such certainty through a derivation.
Hence no Turin machine whose "knowing" depends on such formal proof can "know" it, and in that sense the human mind transcends Turing-minds.
You just simply assume (without any evidence, thus in wishful thinking) that there could be computers endowed with qualia whose mental powers themselves transcend Turing-minds (and that hence cannot be Turing machines, and one wonders why you should still call them "computers") and have in that sense similar powers as humans to realize the truth of that sentence without formal proof.
@LooksAeterna Well, there is certainly reason to believe that a computer can claim the same certainty as us of the statement "There is no proof for this sentence" and be just as reliable as us in forming such truths. It would still be a Turing machine. Whether it would be conscious to make it conscious certainty rather than a claim of certainty is another matter, not to be ruled out.
Respected academics such as Daniel Dennett, Douglas Hofstadter and David Chalmers would agree that a computer can do this. Dennett and Hofstadter would argue that the functioning itself is equivalent to consciousness, whereas Chalmers would say that consciousness comes as an extra, possibly epiphenomenally. So this isn't just something I've made up. It's an opinion you don't agree with and that's fine but nothing excuses your hostility.
@philosophertoby And if anything, Chalmers has proven that there is no such getting around the hard mind body problem, and you cannot use him for this dinosaur view.
Excuse me now, I shall henceforth discuss with those with the proper training and not with religionists who just repeat their dogmas.
It is completely irrelevant whether a computer can act as if it had certainty. The only thing that matters is whether it can have such certainty as we can based on the same insight as we can.
Forgive me, but enumerating names of authority instead of reasonable arguments belongs to dogmatic religions, not to philosophy.
Since your argumentative approach is not philosophical, hence incorrectable and going in circles, I forfeit.
@LooksAeterna I would argue that it can have the same certainty. What mechanisms do we have that a Turing machine doesn't?
I only mentioned those names because you said that my ideas were outdated and that anyone with any logical training would know what to think, when clearly there are current academics who disagree with you on this. It's impossible to win with you, because you're determined to be rude about whatever I say.
Whatever Chalmers says about the hard problem, he agrees on this.
I don't see why my approach is unphilosophical. The biggest obstacle to this debate has been your constant rudeness, and that has prevented any reasonable flow in the actual subject matter. It's hard to argue sensibly when someone is acting like you. Can you really not see this?
You have been very unphilosophical. You have made assumptions about me all along rather than taking the posts at face value. You have been a very poor opponent and won't be missed (if you actually do leave this time).
@LooksAeterna Wrong question? Not at all. There are many reasonable questions we can ask. The point is that Penrose claims that he has proved that human thought is not algorithmic. But as far as I can see it hasn't been proved. You say I have engaged in wishful thinking, but surely this can only really happen where there is still a possibility.
Wrong again. People think wishful within the realm of the demonstrable impossible all the time. Usually, they have sufficient decency not to call that philosophy, however.
@LooksAeterna As far as I'm concerned, it's not impossible. In between your numerous insults, I haven't found any convincing argument from you to suggest otherwise.
@LooksAeterna I know you can't reply (not really my fault) but to "you would agree (and if you want to be taken seriously among logicians you would have to), that the human mind has the power to have complete certainty regarding the truth of
"There is no proof for this sentence""
I don't think a logician with his logician's hat on would make such claims about human certainty, where it comes from or how reliable it is. So we shouldn't rule out equivalent computer certainty on that basis.
LooksAeterna, you've said yourself that the comments section is too small for a full discussion. It's very difficult to make a full and clear response, although you give no benefit of the doubt based on this limitation. I would suggest now that if you have real problems with my position, then you could post a video response of your own and we can take it from there. While you may scoff at me, the Lucas/Penrose position is a minority view.
@philosophertoby Here - as so often - you commit the logial fallacy of making unwarranted assumptions and projecting them into me. It is the rhetoric behavior, not the position, which causes my lengthy reactions.
I have no camera and do not know how to produce a video and am really confrinted with other problems that need my attention.
@LooksAeterna I don't know what you are talking about, quite frankly. I have tried to be straight on in any debate about my videos, whereas you seem determined to make this an argument about the argument and the way I am arguing. Let's look at the way you are arguing!
@philosophertoby Minority view ? Are you seriously suggesting there has been a poll ? By whom ? In what population ? What were the professional consequences for outing oneself as a "Platonist" ? Gödel himself ultimately died feeling paranoid due to the proximity of his results to idealist interpretations.
If anything, among the highly gifted logicians and physicists, some type of idealism is rather the majority view.
The scientific community has an unscientific materialist bias. AND money in AI!
@LooksAeterna It appears to be the minority view from what I have read. Regardless, my point is that you have scoffed at a lot of what I have said, when it represents a view that is actually quite common amongst respected academics. Would you dismiss them so easily?
Rhetorics and exploiting desires for political correctness is one thing. Logic is another.
If I say: "Anyone with logical training will see that Gödel's proof is correct", then clearly that is neitehr philosophically disgraceful nor patronizing. It is simply the case.
1. a computer program - which reliably decides truth values of sentences - decides one to be true, thereby generates a derivation, a proof of that sentence.
2. Someone who doesn't know 1. has no sufficient knowledge of proof theory and likely the details of Gödel's proofs. He is a dilettante, a dabbler in this field.
3. Check out Penrose's "Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow".
4. Google the video Roger Penrose "Conscious Understanding: What is its Physical Basis?"
Because it is better to go to non-dabblers than be misled by dabblers about the non-dabblers.
5. You have the power to know completely and reliably, clearly seeing being able to explain why, but without proof that "There is no proof for this sentence" is true.
6. Therefore there is an aspect of your mind that transcends any mind generated by and hence conditioned by the inherent limitations of Turing machines.
7. Any AI that also has this transcendent capacity cannot be a Turing machine.
@LooksAeterna Since a computer can be designed to find truths in a less formal manner than simply as a theorem-finding device, there is no reason why number 5 cannot apply to computers as much as us.
@philosophertoby "Since ...[wishful thinking]..." What kind of philosophical discussion would that be ?
But anyone with knowledge of Gödel and Proof Theory knows that IF there ever be a computer who can decide sentences without thereby rendering a formal proof, THEN it cannot be a Turing machine. To my knowledge we as of yet have no such computer, and so aynone who makes that claim is just dreaming.
@LooksAeterna We as humans can decide sentences without the need for formal proof, although we are not always 100% correct. Similarly a computer can be programmed to say things like "I think it will be sunny today". This could be based on real data so likely to end up true but it require a formal proof (it might not turn out false). At the heart of the computer is rigid digital manipulation but it doesn't look like this from a higher vantage point. The same could apply to us.
@philosophertoby Here's the core of your assumptions: (A) because human mind is subject to error, you think (B) certainty depends on formal proof in all cases. Of course, on that basis, it is circular argumentation to argue in favor of the idea that we cannot have a certainty that a computer cannot produce. But (A) does not imply (B) and while (A) is true, (B) is not, and my sentence is a counter-example.
@LooksAeterna I did not say that certainty depends on formal proof in all cases. We can quite easily imagine that the computer that predicts the weather without formally proving it could also make other claims about which there is certainty, without formal proof. The computer could also claim certainty in this. Such as "There is no proof for this sentence". Of course we could then get back to consciousness, but we don't know how this comes about anyway!
@philosophertoby Sorry - "but it require a formal proof (it might not turn out false)." should say but it *would not* require a formal proof (it might not turn out false).
Anyway, thanks for the discussion up to this point, even though I will not reply any further, because it will give readers incentive to search in the discussion if they're interested.
Anyone with some logical training will know what to think of this kind of argumentation.
@philosophertoby That is sometimes the case, but as usual you fail to see that your retort is inppropriate:
1. an ad hominem is not always a logical fallacy, namely not in those cases where the misbehavoir of the partner in discussion makes a logical debate impossible, for instance by a repetitive logical fallacies of his own. In such cases - as here - pointing out the incapacity in the other is pertinent to the discussion.
2. You fail to see that I used criticism of you not as part of my argumentation and in absence and instead of arguments. I used it to make plausible to third witnesses why the argumentation had already ended. It was over before.
Anyone with some logical training OR a truly philosophical attitude would have instictively anticipated this difference and not resorted to your latest appeal.
@LooksAeterna The argument effectively ended quite early when it was clear you weren't really up for it. When you first mentioned that it wouldn't lead to a decent discussion it was very early on and there was still a lot of potential in the discussion. I'm surprised that you've bothered to hang around just to be rude.
I believe that Gödel makes it self-evident that our minds are not Turing machines and also that - being Gödel-awanekened - it is totally unnecessary to go into the technicalities of it. It is sufficient to appeal to common language to show that everyone can intuitively know
"There is no proof for this sentence"
is true and there can be no derivation proving it. To ask "How do you know that" is to demand an algorithm and hence circular argumentation.
@LooksAeterna I'm sure you could also program a computer to "intuitively know" that "There is no proof for this sentence" is true. I think the problem is not about understanding that Gödel sentences must be true, but about recognising a Gödel sentence when we come across it. Our own Gödel sentences would be very complex and when we saw the mathematical form we would not recognise them in Gödelian terms.
@philosophertoby You are evading the point: this is not about "intuitively knowing" but about intuitively knowing. We know that intuitively and do not just "know it intuitively", and we ALREADY have the result that this cannot be programmed into a Turing machine. Any program with a formal simulation of such "knowledge" - besides lacking the characteristic first person qualia necessary for knowledge - is subject the result of the same incompleteness while our intuitive knowledge here is complete.
@LooksAeterna I don't think I'm evading the point. First of all it's far from clear that we are not subject to the same incompleteness. Intuitive knowledge is not complete and won't get us past our own Gödel sentence because we won't know that it's our Gödel sentence. As for machines lacking qualia, this is a separate argument. It may seem obvious that blind digital manipulation can't give rise to consciousness, but what's the brain if not a load of particles blindly obeying the laws of physics?
@philosophertoby I used the term "complete" in a very loose sense here, and in that loose sense, our knowledge that
"There is no proof for this sentence"
is complete, that is not in need of a derivation that is itself rooted in a stronger language of logic which is subject to the same incompleteness in principle. We don't even have to ascertain that it be a Gödel sentence. We know it, and there can be no derivation for it. Hence knowing transcends the products of Turing operations in a sense.
@LooksAeterna But as before, a computer could be programmed to deal with the sentence in the same way as us. And just because this sentence written like this does not stump us, it doesn't mean that there isn't a Gödel sentence that can't stump us. I think your use of "There is no proof for this sentence" is oversimplifying matters. What do you make of "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true"?
@philosophertoby You are bent on putting words in my mouth. I spoke of knowing, not of "dealing with". If your qualia are a behavioristic black box, speak with other dead objects (if there are such), but for me to speak with someone who denies first person qualia in himself (and only then would it make sense to identify "knowing" with "dealing with") would be admitting that I am mad. Hence, this is where the bucks should stop.
@LooksAeterna I said "dealing with in the same way as us" so if our dealing involves knowing, then so can a computer's. You may not agree but this isn't me being bent on putting words in your mouth.
It seems you are now arguing about whether a computer can have qualia, not about whether a Gödel sentence can stump us. Separate arguments. I'm willing to debate either or both but to be clear, I've seen no strong arguments from you against what I've presented in the video. I don't mention qualia.
@philosophertoby I have already pointed out several times there can be no formal proof of that sentence and hence no way to program a Turing machine to see its truth even if it had qualia. You simply repeat this claim "I am sure that", but this is just an ancient empty belief perhaps of die hard AI catholics =:)
@LooksAeterna A computer (Turing machine) can still be programmed to behave and function as if it could see the truth in "There is no proof for this sentence" without having a formal proof, just like us. And since we don't know how qualia come about, I wouldn't rule out the possibility that a computer could have qualia to match its functioning and behaviour.
@philosophertoby Excuse me, but I have no further time to waste with unphilosophical sophistry. I have answered this so many times, it is as I predicted: not a descent discussion.
The problem is certainly not that, already knowing due to our human direct and complete knowing, we can order a computer to behave as if it knows. It is that there can be no algorithm which reliably decides the truth value for sentences (and hence also decides that this sentence is true) which is not subject to incomp
@LooksAeterna But if we are also subject to incompleteness, then it's not necessarily an advantage for us over computers. I have read what you've written and you haven't given a convincing argument that Godel's theorem does not apply to us.
@philosophertoby Your kack of conviction must be due to either mischief or a lack of training.
What is your background in proof theory and theoretical computer science ? Have you got a computer that doesn't basically function as Turing machine does ?
@philosophertoby Plus "as before", that wasn't even the point, it was this:
"and we ALREADY have the result that this cannot be programmed into a Turing machine. Any program with a formal simulation of such "knowledge" - besides lacking the characteristic first person qualia necessary for knowledge - is subject the result of the same incompleteness while our intuitive knowledge here is complete."
Can you understand why it doesn't seem decent to discuss with someone who forgets whatever I say
@LooksAeterna I haven't forgotten whatever you say. I'm sorry if I've misunderstood anything but I don't think you've made a strong argument that our intuitive knowledge is complete. Saying that we can intuitively know that "There is no proof for this sentence" isn't true is not a rigorous argument for this. It is certainly no more rigorous than "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true". I'm happy to discuss this with you but only if you can keep your temper under control.
@philosophertoby If one could make a formally "strong" argument that our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete, then it couldn't be =;) It would then be subject to Gödelian incompleteness ! But I claim the human mind has the power to know that. That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has already developed that power sufficiently. But a hint as fertilizer: in an inconsistent world, the word "proof" loses all meaning.
Once you see it: welcome to the in crowd "in the know"!
@philosophertoby Re "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true" is simply another subject within the same general realm of recursive speech. It is of the type "This sentence is false." IMO, they indicate that the truth value of a sentence is not a constant function, but varies with t. But this is another subject.
@LooksAeterna OK, "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true" is not a proper Godelian sentence but I don't think that "There is no proof for this sentence" is either. I think to be Godelian it would have to specify that there is no proof within a particular formal system. And that makes all the difference because it doesn't rule out all formal proof.
@philosophertoby as I said many times, it doesn't matter whether it is formally Gödelian. What matters is that my realization of it is true is complete AND Turing machine cannot reach such complete knowing, as any algorithm that decides the truth values of sentences and decides this sentence to be true is beset with Gödelian incompleteness.
Hence clearly, human knowing "spiritually" (formulation just to annoy you) transcends any Turing machine fundamentally.
@LooksAeterna But again, you have not convincingly explained why a human is not subject to incompleteness. Also, a computer need not be a simple theorem finding device. It can be made to behave more intuitively like us - this may result in some errors, also like us. It can make the same claims as you about its realisation of the truth being complete. And before you say it, we don't know how qualia come about in us anyway so it's not necessarily unreasonable to say a computer is a candidate.
@philosophertoby You are going in circles. Out-talking another is no philosophical argument.
a. In a consistent universe "There is no proof of this sentence" is trivially true.
b. In a non-consistent universe "proof" has no meaning.
Now notice, there is no "meaning" in a formal system, hence b. can be easily understood but not proven. Hence our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete and independent of whether or not "the human is complete" in any other sense.
"If one could make a formally "strong" argument that our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete, then it couldn't be =;) It would then be subject to Gödelian incompleteness ! But I claim the human mind has the power to know that. That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has already developed that power sufficiently. But a hint as fertilizer: in an inconsistent world, the word "proof" loses all meaning."
@philosophertoby As to "what the brain is if not a load of particles blindly obeying the laws of physics" that is indeed a separate topic but rest assured that I can find at least three or four naive and partly obviously outdated metaphysical assumptions in that question which shows me that reacting to it would hardly lead to a decent discussion.
@LooksAeterna Why would it not lead to a decent discussion? There certainly could be one from my side! Also I will not rest assured that you can find three or four such asumptions unless you can spell them out.
I can indeed spell out three or four, but you see: I already roughly circumscribed one of them 22 hours agon, directly following the comment you just reacted to. And you nevertheless exhort me to spell out while apparently completely ignoring it. That is not decent. It is the kind of waste of time and energy I'd like to avoid. You are intelligent enough to exclude the explanation of a ADS. Also, this space is too small for full dis
@LooksAeterna My comment was directly related to rather dismissive and "not decent" tone that I perceived. That you followed it up with one of your examples doesn't change matters. I didn't respond to that in the same session but that doesn't mean I ignored it. I've Googled and found a paper by Hoffman. It was quite long and admittedly I only skimmed it but to me it seems he's overstating the point that our perceptions aren't a perfect reflection of reality. But nothing against what I've said.
@philosophertoby No no Hoffman's point is not that our perceptions are not perfect reflections of whatever reality the transcendent Ding an sich has. His point is far stronger: it isn't even similar. It has as much resemblance to whatever the reality there is to the object as the Recycle bin icon on your desktop has to the reformatting of your hard disk when deleting a file.
@LooksAeterna OK. I think Hoffman is wrong, personally. But even if not, I'm not sure where this is supposed to move the argument. I imagine it's to say that I'm wrong about what I've said about brains, because my perception of what a brain is doesn't reflect reality. However, if that's the point, then I don't think anyone can claim to be right. No-one can know anything about physical reality and any one of us is as likely to be right as anyone else.
@LooksAeterna Well instead of telling me I've got the wrong conclusion and that my comment is inane, how about clearly explaining the right conclusion and the relevance of this point to the discussion? This is something that you have not done.
@philosophertoby You are not stupid enough not to be able to find that out for yourself (for instance illicitly shifting the burden of proof in context). And it is just this what I mainly accuse you of: you just delegate your own thinking job to your own opponent and do not read and think conscientiously enough by the standards of your intellectual capacity. There must hence be an element of mischief in your motivation which I find entirely disgraceful and is objectively unfitting for philosophy
@LooksAeterna If you have a point to make, surely the onus is on you to make the point. Disgraceful indeed - some of your posts are simply ridiculous.
Just this much for now: the only sure thing about "the brain" is that it is an object in your perception, not the perceiver. It is possible that there is something in reality which corresponds with what on your "multimodal user interface" appears as "brain". But most certainly that reality hasn't even got any resemblance to the "brain". Check out Donald D. Hoffman, not as authority, but as an exercise in humor+leaving naive realism. Google "The Interface Theory of Perception".
I see consciousness akin to a fire. The brain processes data and this data creates a state of excitation in.. what I call.. the Primary Field.. and it is this field that experiences consciousness.. not the brain.
The brain acts as a mediator between sensory and abstract data and the Primary Field.
Of course.. I can't prove this..:-)
Nevertheless.. it is a beautiful idea..
My Primary Field Theory can be Googled.. or found on my website..
I am pretty sure that Penrose indeed analyzed the mind's capability of constructing G(H) and concluded that it would be very close to the order of H itself. That is, it ought to be fairly easy to construct a Godel proposition on the order of the brain being able to understand its own program. I disagree with your assesment of the Lucas Penrose Thesis.
My point is not that the brain could not find a Godel proposition having found its program. It's that it could not understand its own program (or algorithm as I called it in the video) to start with.
If this can be done, why can't a computer do it? What is it that we can do that computers can't here?
If my thinking is really the running of a computer program, then it does not matter what kind of machine that program is run on for the Lucas argument (whatever machine ought to be able to prove the same things I can prove). It would seem to me however, that this machine can know its own structure if I cannot biologically, for example.
To fully know its own structure, a program would have to contain a representation of itself. And then so would this representation and so on, leading to an infinite regress. This is one way of seeing why a program cannot get "outside itself".
I suppose this gentleman is talking about Singularity. If a microchip can reach human brain computation levels then will the computer have consciousness? Isn't this the question? It is the same idea put forth in the movie 2001: Space Odyssey. It will not happen because the chip will not have Planck's Constant.
JayGatsbyOdysseus 2 weeks ago
im distracted by all the dishes
leeeejohnson 1 month ago
Pointless
dirtydonki 5 months ago 2
@dirtydonki The self-reference is quite Godelian itself. Nice.
philosophertoby 5 months ago
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AnduinX 6 months ago
This has been flagged as spam show
someone is reading my mind right now you jackass, fuck you!!!!!
mebrame09 8 months ago
Just because Man cannot fully understand the workings of his own mind, does not mean that it is impossible that Man will create a system capable of housing his own mind. Just as the intellect that devised Godel's Theorem is an *emergent* property of a self-replicating, randomly mutating substrate, so to can the tool which is capable of housing Man's mind emerge from the development of his improving tools (microprocessors - quantum computers - thinking machines).
Vortex42 10 months ago
I read The Emperor's New Mind a few years ago (and Gödel, Escher, Bach quite a few years before that) and found Penrose's discussions quite fascinating; but I was never convinced, though I could not fully explain why. I think your argument has given me a new way to express and examine my own doubts. Thank you!
macronencer 1 year ago
Why, exactly, couldn't we find our own algorithm? Because then the algorithm would have to contain itself? The Godel sentence is held to contain itself in a self-referencing sense. Reject 'thing containing itself' and you reject Godel's proof. Admit 'thing containing itself' and your anti-Penrose argument collapses.
drunkagnostic 1 year ago 5
@drunkagnostic For something to contain and understand its own algorithm is very different from the sort of indirect self-reference in Godel's Theorem.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You may be right; perhaps the two things are different. But how? Indirectly or not, the Godel sentence supposedly contains not only itself, but the formal system in which it is formed.
Why can't an algorithm contain itself? Intuitively, it might seem impossible--ten axioms can't contain ten axioms 'cause then that'd be twenty--but formal systems routinely contain things of larger quantity than their list of axioms, right?
drunkagnostic 1 year ago
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drunkagnostic 1 year ago
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drunkagnostic 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Not true. In fact Godel's theorem motivated Kleene's recursion theorem, which proves that there are programs that "know" their own code. Google "Quine (computing)" to see some nice examples.
eabod 8 months ago
@eabod I suppose there are different ways of defining whether a system can contain its own algorithm. Clearly, none of these systems are exempt from Godel's Theorem. Simply being able to produce its own source code isn't really enough. But yes, I aim to be more precise than I perhaps have been in the video, and I've been making notes on the comments. The main thing I need to worry about would be a good argument as to why humans can do things computers can't. I'm still waiting!
philosophertoby 8 months ago
@drunkagnostic Penrose argues that once we find our Godel sentence we'd see that it's true. It's seeing that it's true that differs from computers, not finding the sentence itself. On this basis, for a system to find its own Godel sentence is a mathematical procedure and it may have been proved whether a formal system can do this. I will do a search.
I've stated it cannot be done, and although you can argue I've not been rigorous, Penrose needs to prove it can for his proof to be valid.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
Clearly, this is not Mathematics, therefore i have no need of that hypothesis
PatrickLars 1 year ago
@PatrickLars Penrose has made a philsophical argument based on a mathematical theorem, and it's this philosophical argument that I'm arguing against.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby What about our self-awareness of our "I?" We can't generate that computationally as it is a discrete thing. This would be a fairly ready though less certain demonstration of what Penrose is saying.
JohananRaatz 1 year ago
Stepping away from logical theory, I think it is clear in many aspects of life that humans can think algorithmically, or choose arbitrarily if some decision cannot be made. A machine that mimics human thought would similarly need a secondary "intuition" kind of reasoning system for when standard logical computation doesn't seem to apply. Often times intuition includes acting on premises we cannot prove, but would be favorable to us if true, or "erring on the side of caution" etc.
blaqsparrow 1 year ago
Disregarding the physical argument, we see that Gödel Sentences are always proven true by the metalanguage. I think it is safe to say that your argument, in very condensed form, is that it would require a "meta-universe" to prove a suspected Gödel sentence true; clearly we have no access to the meta-universe, therefore we have no access to a proof that the sentence is true, and thus no guaranteed Gödel sentence. Am I right in this summary?
okuno54 1 year ago
@okuno54 Yes, pretty much. Since a person is not limited to their own brain but can use the rest of the Universe as a "tool", to get outside the system and find their Gödel sentence and prove its truth would require being outside our Universe.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Don't we intrinsically know as true certain mathematical truths which are unprovable though? Such as the consistency of the set of natural numbers?
JohananRaatz 11 months ago
The real problem I have with any sort of physical manifestation of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems is that current physical theory leads us to believe that the universe is finite. On the one hand, the size of the universe is bounded by our light-cone, and on the other, there is probably a limit to how much information we can pack into a small space Obviously, any physical (read: finite) algorithm is therefore incomplete with respects to an infinite semantics.
okuno54 1 year ago
It is very simple to demonstrate that humans face the exact same problem that machines do.
A computer machine X, would be unable to prove this true sentence:
"Machine X cannot prove this sentence is true".
Similarly a human being Jack (let's assume this is the only Jack in existence... otherwise replace with another unique name).
"Jack cannot prove this sentence is true."
Jack faces the same problem machine X did. anyone other than jack will be able to prove it. But Jack can't prove it.
otakurocklee 1 year ago
Comment removed
LaserBlowFish 1 year ago
I define intelligence as a choice of Algorithmic lines of thought, which implies a transcendence of Algorithm without a negation. Any life form, carbon based or computer based, that is capable of such a choice ceases to be Algorithmic. If Penrose is right, and either the brain or the DNA molecule has a Quantum computer component, then such computing ceases to be Algorithmic in my estimation. If AI is possible like you believe, then it ceases to be "artificial" once this barrier is passed.
CHistrue 1 year ago
Penrose is very clever, clever enough to recognize the obvious.
He is correct.
jonesgerard 1 year ago
I've decided to block the user LooksAeterna because it has become clear that he is only here to cause trouble and has no interest in sensible discussion. I don't like doing this sort of thing but likewise I do not want the discussion thread to descend into farce.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby : You could allow him/her to comment without answering.
In any case I'm inclined to agree with your belief that it's possible that an algorithm can be designed to deal with statements of the "This statement is false." sort. It may be simply a matter of our gaining a more sophisticated understanding of meaning in language.
DrDeist 1 year ago
OK, let's try to end this: as far as I as understand you,
1.
you would agree (and if you want to be taken seriously among logicians you would have to), that the human mind has the power to have complete certainty regarding the truth of
"There is no proof for this sentence"
and no formal system can provide such certainty through a derivation.
Hence no Turin machine whose "knowing" depends on such formal proof can "know" it, and in that sense the human mind transcends Turing-minds.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
2.
You just simply assume (without any evidence, thus in wishful thinking) that there could be computers endowed with qualia whose mental powers themselves transcend Turing-minds (and that hence cannot be Turing machines, and one wonders why you should still call them "computers") and have in that sense similar powers as humans to realize the truth of that sentence without formal proof.
Alright, can we leave that now ? Thanks.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Well, there is certainly reason to believe that a computer can claim the same certainty as us of the statement "There is no proof for this sentence" and be just as reliable as us in forming such truths. It would still be a Turing machine. Whether it would be conscious to make it conscious certainty rather than a claim of certainty is another matter, not to be ruled out.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
Respected academics such as Daniel Dennett, Douglas Hofstadter and David Chalmers would agree that a computer can do this. Dennett and Hofstadter would argue that the functioning itself is equivalent to consciousness, whereas Chalmers would say that consciousness comes as an extra, possibly epiphenomenally. So this isn't just something I've made up. It's an opinion you don't agree with and that's fine but nothing excuses your hostility.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby And if anything, Chalmers has proven that there is no such getting around the hard mind body problem, and you cannot use him for this dinosaur view.
Excuse me now, I shall henceforth discuss with those with the proper training and not with religionists who just repeat their dogmas.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You keep morphing around the subject.
It is completely irrelevant whether a computer can act as if it had certainty. The only thing that matters is whether it can have such certainty as we can based on the same insight as we can.
Forgive me, but enumerating names of authority instead of reasonable arguments belongs to dogmatic religions, not to philosophy.
Since your argumentative approach is not philosophical, hence incorrectable and going in circles, I forfeit.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I would argue that it can have the same certainty. What mechanisms do we have that a Turing machine doesn't?
I only mentioned those names because you said that my ideas were outdated and that anyone with any logical training would know what to think, when clearly there are current academics who disagree with you on this. It's impossible to win with you, because you're determined to be rude about whatever I say.
Whatever Chalmers says about the hard problem, he agrees on this.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
I don't see why my approach is unphilosophical. The biggest obstacle to this debate has been your constant rudeness, and that has prevented any reasonable flow in the actual subject matter. It's hard to argue sensibly when someone is acting like you. Can you really not see this?
You have been very unphilosophical. You have made assumptions about me all along rather than taking the posts at face value. You have been a very poor opponent and won't be missed (if you actually do leave this time).
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Wrong question: what mechanism does a Turing machine have that we do ? Wrong at every turn.
You might as well argue that tea pots could have the same insight. Well, perhaps. So much for this discussion.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Wrong question? Not at all. There are many reasonable questions we can ask. The point is that Penrose claims that he has proved that human thought is not algorithmic. But as far as I can see it hasn't been proved. You say I have engaged in wishful thinking, but surely this can only really happen where there is still a possibility.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
Wrong again. People think wishful within the realm of the demonstrable impossible all the time. Usually, they have sufficient decency not to call that philosophy, however.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna As far as I'm concerned, it's not impossible. In between your numerous insults, I haven't found any convincing argument from you to suggest otherwise.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I know you can't reply (not really my fault) but to "you would agree (and if you want to be taken seriously among logicians you would have to), that the human mind has the power to have complete certainty regarding the truth of
"There is no proof for this sentence""
I don't think a logician with his logician's hat on would make such claims about human certainty, where it comes from or how reliable it is. So we shouldn't rule out equivalent computer certainty on that basis.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
LooksAeterna, you've said yourself that the comments section is too small for a full discussion. It's very difficult to make a full and clear response, although you give no benefit of the doubt based on this limitation. I would suggest now that if you have real problems with my position, then you could post a video response of your own and we can take it from there. While you may scoff at me, the Lucas/Penrose position is a minority view.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Here - as so often - you commit the logial fallacy of making unwarranted assumptions and projecting them into me. It is the rhetoric behavior, not the position, which causes my lengthy reactions.
I have no camera and do not know how to produce a video and am really confrinted with other problems that need my attention.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I don't know what you are talking about, quite frankly. I have tried to be straight on in any debate about my videos, whereas you seem determined to make this an argument about the argument and the way I am arguing. Let's look at the way you are arguing!
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Minority view ? Are you seriously suggesting there has been a poll ? By whom ? In what population ? What were the professional consequences for outing oneself as a "Platonist" ? Gödel himself ultimately died feeling paranoid due to the proximity of his results to idealist interpretations.
If anything, among the highly gifted logicians and physicists, some type of idealism is rather the majority view.
The scientific community has an unscientific materialist bias. AND money in AI!
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna It appears to be the minority view from what I have read. Regardless, my point is that you have scoffed at a lot of what I have said, when it represents a view that is actually quite common amongst respected academics. Would you dismiss them so easily?
philosophertoby 1 year ago
Rhetorics and exploiting desires for political correctness is one thing. Logic is another.
If I say: "Anyone with logical training will see that Gödel's proof is correct", then clearly that is neitehr philosophically disgraceful nor patronizing. It is simply the case.
What happened here is of the same order.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
To the innocent reader. Know that
1. a computer program - which reliably decides truth values of sentences - decides one to be true, thereby generates a derivation, a proof of that sentence.
2. Someone who doesn't know 1. has no sufficient knowledge of proof theory and likely the details of Gödel's proofs. He is a dilettante, a dabbler in this field.
3. Check out Penrose's "Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow".
4. Google the video Roger Penrose "Conscious Understanding: What is its Physical Basis?"
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
Because it is better to go to non-dabblers than be misled by dabblers about the non-dabblers.
5. You have the power to know completely and reliably, clearly seeing being able to explain why, but without proof that "There is no proof for this sentence" is true.
6. Therefore there is an aspect of your mind that transcends any mind generated by and hence conditioned by the inherent limitations of Turing machines.
7. Any AI that also has this transcendent capacity cannot be a Turing machine.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Since a computer can be designed to find truths in a less formal manner than simply as a theorem-finding device, there is no reason why number 5 cannot apply to computers as much as us.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby "Since ...[wishful thinking]..." What kind of philosophical discussion would that be ?
But anyone with knowledge of Gödel and Proof Theory knows that IF there ever be a computer who can decide sentences without thereby rendering a formal proof, THEN it cannot be a Turing machine. To my knowledge we as of yet have no such computer, and so aynone who makes that claim is just dreaming.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna We as humans can decide sentences without the need for formal proof, although we are not always 100% correct. Similarly a computer can be programmed to say things like "I think it will be sunny today". This could be based on real data so likely to end up true but it require a formal proof (it might not turn out false). At the heart of the computer is rigid digital manipulation but it doesn't look like this from a higher vantage point. The same could apply to us.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Here's the core of your assumptions: (A) because human mind is subject to error, you think (B) certainty depends on formal proof in all cases. Of course, on that basis, it is circular argumentation to argue in favor of the idea that we cannot have a certainty that a computer cannot produce. But (A) does not imply (B) and while (A) is true, (B) is not, and my sentence is a counter-example.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I did not say that certainty depends on formal proof in all cases. We can quite easily imagine that the computer that predicts the weather without formally proving it could also make other claims about which there is certainty, without formal proof. The computer could also claim certainty in this. Such as "There is no proof for this sentence". Of course we could then get back to consciousness, but we don't know how this comes about anyway!
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Sorry - "but it require a formal proof (it might not turn out false)." should say but it *would not* require a formal proof (it might not turn out false).
philosophertoby 1 year ago
Anyway, thanks for the discussion up to this point, even though I will not reply any further, because it will give readers incentive to search in the discussion if they're interested.
Anyone with some logical training will know what to think of this kind of argumentation.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Indeed, those with logical training will know not to pay any attention to ad hominem arguments. Goodbye.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby That is sometimes the case, but as usual you fail to see that your retort is inppropriate:
1. an ad hominem is not always a logical fallacy, namely not in those cases where the misbehavoir of the partner in discussion makes a logical debate impossible, for instance by a repetitive logical fallacies of his own. In such cases - as here - pointing out the incapacity in the other is pertinent to the discussion.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
2. You fail to see that I used criticism of you not as part of my argumentation and in absence and instead of arguments. I used it to make plausible to third witnesses why the argumentation had already ended. It was over before.
Anyone with some logical training OR a truly philosophical attitude would have instictively anticipated this difference and not resorted to your latest appeal.
Sophistry is not philosophy, my young friend.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna The argument effectively ended quite early when it was clear you weren't really up for it. When you first mentioned that it wouldn't lead to a decent discussion it was very early on and there was still a lot of potential in the discussion. I'm surprised that you've bothered to hang around just to be rude.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby It ended one step earlier when you inserted 3 - 4 philosophically rather unwarranted assumptions into your speech.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Being patronising isn't either, old man.
soapmode 1 year ago
Anyone with some logical training will see that you claiming 'the right kind of people will see I'm right' is 'philosophically disgraceful' too.
soapmode 1 year ago
I agree with the basic Lucasian intutition.
I believe that Gödel makes it self-evident that our minds are not Turing machines and also that - being Gödel-awanekened - it is totally unnecessary to go into the technicalities of it. It is sufficient to appeal to common language to show that everyone can intuitively know
"There is no proof for this sentence"
is true and there can be no derivation proving it. To ask "How do you know that" is to demand an algorithm and hence circular argumentation.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I'm sure you could also program a computer to "intuitively know" that "There is no proof for this sentence" is true. I think the problem is not about understanding that Gödel sentences must be true, but about recognising a Gödel sentence when we come across it. Our own Gödel sentences would be very complex and when we saw the mathematical form we would not recognise them in Gödelian terms.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You are evading the point: this is not about "intuitively knowing" but about intuitively knowing. We know that intuitively and do not just "know it intuitively", and we ALREADY have the result that this cannot be programmed into a Turing machine. Any program with a formal simulation of such "knowledge" - besides lacking the characteristic first person qualia necessary for knowledge - is subject the result of the same incompleteness while our intuitive knowledge here is complete.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I don't think I'm evading the point. First of all it's far from clear that we are not subject to the same incompleteness. Intuitive knowledge is not complete and won't get us past our own Gödel sentence because we won't know that it's our Gödel sentence. As for machines lacking qualia, this is a separate argument. It may seem obvious that blind digital manipulation can't give rise to consciousness, but what's the brain if not a load of particles blindly obeying the laws of physics?
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby I used the term "complete" in a very loose sense here, and in that loose sense, our knowledge that
"There is no proof for this sentence"
is complete, that is not in need of a derivation that is itself rooted in a stronger language of logic which is subject to the same incompleteness in principle. We don't even have to ascertain that it be a Gödel sentence. We know it, and there can be no derivation for it. Hence knowing transcends the products of Turing operations in a sense.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna But as before, a computer could be programmed to deal with the sentence in the same way as us. And just because this sentence written like this does not stump us, it doesn't mean that there isn't a Gödel sentence that can't stump us. I think your use of "There is no proof for this sentence" is oversimplifying matters. What do you make of "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true"?
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You are bent on putting words in my mouth. I spoke of knowing, not of "dealing with". If your qualia are a behavioristic black box, speak with other dead objects (if there are such), but for me to speak with someone who denies first person qualia in himself (and only then would it make sense to identify "knowing" with "dealing with") would be admitting that I am mad. Hence, this is where the bucks should stop.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I said "dealing with in the same way as us" so if our dealing involves knowing, then so can a computer's. You may not agree but this isn't me being bent on putting words in your mouth.
It seems you are now arguing about whether a computer can have qualia, not about whether a Gödel sentence can stump us. Separate arguments. I'm willing to debate either or both but to be clear, I've seen no strong arguments from you against what I've presented in the video. I don't mention qualia.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby I have already pointed out several times there can be no formal proof of that sentence and hence no way to program a Turing machine to see its truth even if it had qualia. You simply repeat this claim "I am sure that", but this is just an ancient empty belief perhaps of die hard AI catholics =:)
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna A computer (Turing machine) can still be programmed to behave and function as if it could see the truth in "There is no proof for this sentence" without having a formal proof, just like us. And since we don't know how qualia come about, I wouldn't rule out the possibility that a computer could have qualia to match its functioning and behaviour.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Excuse me, but I have no further time to waste with unphilosophical sophistry. I have answered this so many times, it is as I predicted: not a descent discussion.
The problem is certainly not that, already knowing due to our human direct and complete knowing, we can order a computer to behave as if it knows. It is that there can be no algorithm which reliably decides the truth value for sentences (and hence also decides that this sentence is true) which is not subject to incomp
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna But if we are also subject to incompleteness, then it's not necessarily an advantage for us over computers. I have read what you've written and you haven't given a convincing argument that Godel's theorem does not apply to us.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby I had replied to that same point at least once, but I suspect it was several times.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna You may have replied, but not convincingly.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Your kack of conviction must be due to either mischief or a lack of training.
What is your background in proof theory and theoretical computer science ? Have you got a computer that doesn't basically function as Turing machine does ?
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Plus "as before", that wasn't even the point, it was this:
"and we ALREADY have the result that this cannot be programmed into a Turing machine. Any program with a formal simulation of such "knowledge" - besides lacking the characteristic first person qualia necessary for knowledge - is subject the result of the same incompleteness while our intuitive knowledge here is complete."
Can you understand why it doesn't seem decent to discuss with someone who forgets whatever I say
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna I haven't forgotten whatever you say. I'm sorry if I've misunderstood anything but I don't think you've made a strong argument that our intuitive knowledge is complete. Saying that we can intuitively know that "There is no proof for this sentence" isn't true is not a rigorous argument for this. It is certainly no more rigorous than "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true". I'm happy to discuss this with you but only if you can keep your temper under control.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby If one could make a formally "strong" argument that our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete, then it couldn't be =;) It would then be subject to Gödelian incompleteness ! But I claim the human mind has the power to know that. That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has already developed that power sufficiently. But a hint as fertilizer: in an inconsistent world, the word "proof" loses all meaning.
Once you see it: welcome to the in crowd "in the know"!
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Re "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true" is simply another subject within the same general realm of recursive speech. It is of the type "This sentence is false." IMO, they indicate that the truth value of a sentence is not a constant function, but varies with t. But this is another subject.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna OK, "LooksAeterna cannot see that this sentence is true" is not a proper Godelian sentence but I don't think that "There is no proof for this sentence" is either. I think to be Godelian it would have to specify that there is no proof within a particular formal system. And that makes all the difference because it doesn't rule out all formal proof.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby as I said many times, it doesn't matter whether it is formally Gödelian. What matters is that my realization of it is true is complete AND Turing machine cannot reach such complete knowing, as any algorithm that decides the truth values of sentences and decides this sentence to be true is beset with Gödelian incompleteness.
Hence clearly, human knowing "spiritually" (formulation just to annoy you) transcends any Turing machine fundamentally.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna But again, you have not convincingly explained why a human is not subject to incompleteness. Also, a computer need not be a simple theorem finding device. It can be made to behave more intuitively like us - this may result in some errors, also like us. It can make the same claims as you about its realisation of the truth being complete. And before you say it, we don't know how qualia come about in us anyway so it's not necessarily unreasonable to say a computer is a candidate.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You are going in circles. Out-talking another is no philosophical argument.
a. In a consistent universe "There is no proof of this sentence" is trivially true.
b. In a non-consistent universe "proof" has no meaning.
Now notice, there is no "meaning" in a formal system, hence b. can be easily understood but not proven. Hence our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete and independent of whether or not "the human is complete" in any other sense.
It transcends formality
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
Now notice, I had made this point before:
"If one could make a formally "strong" argument that our knowledge of the truth of that sentence is complete, then it couldn't be =;) It would then be subject to Gödelian incompleteness ! But I claim the human mind has the power to know that. That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has already developed that power sufficiently. But a hint as fertilizer: in an inconsistent world, the word "proof" loses all meaning."
Those who CAN follow will, else relax.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna correction: there might be "meaning" in a formal system, but no meaning and only that is the point.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@philosophertoby As to "what the brain is if not a load of particles blindly obeying the laws of physics" that is indeed a separate topic but rest assured that I can find at least three or four naive and partly obviously outdated metaphysical assumptions in that question which shows me that reacting to it would hardly lead to a decent discussion.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Why would it not lead to a decent discussion? There certainly could be one from my side! Also I will not rest assured that you can find three or four such asumptions unless you can spell them out.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Why ? Because I would have to do all the work.
I can indeed spell out three or four, but you see: I already roughly circumscribed one of them 22 hours agon, directly following the comment you just reacted to. And you nevertheless exhort me to spell out while apparently completely ignoring it. That is not decent. It is the kind of waste of time and energy I'd like to avoid. You are intelligent enough to exclude the explanation of a ADS. Also, this space is too small for full dis
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna My comment was directly related to rather dismissive and "not decent" tone that I perceived. That you followed it up with one of your examples doesn't change matters. I didn't respond to that in the same session but that doesn't mean I ignored it. I've Googled and found a paper by Hoffman. It was quite long and admittedly I only skimmed it but to me it seems he's overstating the point that our perceptions aren't a perfect reflection of reality. But nothing against what I've said.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby No no Hoffman's point is not that our perceptions are not perfect reflections of whatever reality the transcendent Ding an sich has. His point is far stronger: it isn't even similar. It has as much resemblance to whatever the reality there is to the object as the Recycle bin icon on your desktop has to the reformatting of your hard disk when deleting a file.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna OK. I think Hoffman is wrong, personally. But even if not, I'm not sure where this is supposed to move the argument. I imagine it's to say that I'm wrong about what I've said about brains, because my perception of what a brain is doesn't reflect reality. However, if that's the point, then I don't think anyone can claim to be right. No-one can know anything about physical reality and any one of us is as likely to be right as anyone else.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby That's also a wrong conclusion and also disregards the position of mentioning Hoffman in the discussion.
Inane.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna Well instead of telling me I've got the wrong conclusion and that my comment is inane, how about clearly explaining the right conclusion and the relevance of this point to the discussion? This is something that you have not done.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby You are not stupid enough not to be able to find that out for yourself (for instance illicitly shifting the burden of proof in context). And it is just this what I mainly accuse you of: you just delegate your own thinking job to your own opponent and do not read and think conscientiously enough by the standards of your intellectual capacity. There must hence be an element of mischief in your motivation which I find entirely disgraceful and is objectively unfitting for philosophy
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@LooksAeterna If you have a point to make, surely the onus is on you to make the point. Disgraceful indeed - some of your posts are simply ridiculous.
philosophertoby 1 year ago
@philosophertoby Not if I had made it repeatedly and you just reiterate as if I had not made it. That is psycho-terror.
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
@philosophertoby
Just this much for now: the only sure thing about "the brain" is that it is an object in your perception, not the perceiver. It is possible that there is something in reality which corresponds with what on your "multimodal user interface" appears as "brain". But most certainly that reality hasn't even got any resemblance to the "brain". Check out Donald D. Hoffman, not as authority, but as an exercise in humor+leaving naive realism. Google "The Interface Theory of Perception".
LooksAeterna 1 year ago
The Primary Field unites all other fields..
Gravity is a response in the PF to mass energy.
Magnetism is a response in the PF to electrical energy.
Nuclear fields are a response in the PF to nuclear energy.
And our field of consciousness is a response in the PF to the activity of our brains.
Etc.. etc.
AcceleratorPlus 1 year ago
I see consciousness akin to a fire. The brain processes data and this data creates a state of excitation in.. what I call.. the Primary Field.. and it is this field that experiences consciousness.. not the brain.
The brain acts as a mediator between sensory and abstract data and the Primary Field.
Of course.. I can't prove this..:-)
Nevertheless.. it is a beautiful idea..
My Primary Field Theory can be Googled.. or found on my website..
AcceleratorPlus 1 year ago
There are many things that can't be proved.. For sure.. the idea that every concept should be provable is long out-dated.
AcceleratorPlus 1 year ago
I am pretty sure that Penrose indeed analyzed the mind's capability of constructing G(H) and concluded that it would be very close to the order of H itself. That is, it ought to be fairly easy to construct a Godel proposition on the order of the brain being able to understand its own program. I disagree with your assesment of the Lucas Penrose Thesis.
PlatonicUniverse 2 years ago
My point is not that the brain could not find a Godel proposition having found its program. It's that it could not understand its own program (or algorithm as I called it in the video) to start with.
If this can be done, why can't a computer do it? What is it that we can do that computers can't here?
philosophertoby 2 years ago
If my thinking is really the running of a computer program, then it does not matter what kind of machine that program is run on for the Lucas argument (whatever machine ought to be able to prove the same things I can prove). It would seem to me however, that this machine can know its own structure if I cannot biologically, for example.
PlatonicUniverse 2 years ago
To fully know its own structure, a program would have to contain a representation of itself. And then so would this representation and so on, leading to an infinite regress. This is one way of seeing why a program cannot get "outside itself".
philosophertoby 2 years ago
Comment removed
PlatonicUniverse 2 years ago