Conversations with History: John R. Searle

[AarontheCurious]

@benlobato Give me a break, no one takes those professional complainers and their ethnic studies program's seriously.

[mikeyanagita1]

@benlobato

LOL at some tard critiquing Searle in youtube comments.

[pame546]

I believe Searle has contributed greatly to issues in philosophy of mind. I also agree that a good education should be intellectually rigorous. However, he is insensitive or indifferent to the experience of people who are more apathetic to the intellectual life, and I think he is making a judgement on a new crop of students who are not accustomed to that environment. I think he should rethink his presumptions about people who don't share his view about social issues in the U.S.

[wiredboy27]

Now I see where Snoop got his ideas from, finally it makes sense.

[Nademox]

I like how 'they taught us' transcribed into 'in late august' .. the transc service is obviously useless.

[thedeeliciousplum]

Thank you for sharing this vid. I have listened to John R. Searle's talks from various other reference sources. Yet this interview, puts quite a lot of what I have explored of his thoughts into a clearer perspective.

[BloodTypeRagu]

43:23 mediocre people? a little assholeish bit no?

[hauntmeinharmony]

Wow, douchebag

[OmarThePug]

I am a genius of philosophy!

[brianboru62]

would it matter if he was wearing the latest in tilgath polasser style assyrian plant pot brocade headwear and sythian stretch tights and al baba slippers? geeeeeeeeeze the amount of people who who automatically legitimise on sigh The day i walk down a high street in a shocking pink rubber suit and nobody reacts ..ill be scared

[Setzer]

There definitely is an obvious difference between the Turning Machine (Chinese program he talks about) and actual human understanding. After making that distinction he comes back and says that's the difference between computers and human consciousness. I'm not sure I agree with this. The very fact that our minds are products of our brains which are controlled by physical laws suggests that brains are just very complex computers. A sufficiently sophisticated computer would be indistinguishable

[sempreoderlibera]

XD I love your opening music XD

[CambridgeHeights]

Mills professor eh? That's pretty lame.

[leonidas14]

the music is like super marios game, you now ?

[alifeofreason]

Hard to hear this, my volume can't go any higher. :(

[jayeshchoudhari]

awesome interview...!!!

Thanks.

[Forkroute]

How does he warrant his view of scientific realism?

[larryllix]

Dimentia is nothing to laugh at!

[weav8060]

Searle has a completely wrong concept of philosophy -- "you have to know everything to do philosophy". "It's murder." Yuk. "Constantly fighting with apparently contradictory ideas." "How can matter be conscious?" You could as well ask, "How can matter be un-decided?"

[soadaw1]

@weav8060 "How can matter be conscious?" is a valid question. In fact, it's been discussed by almost all major contemporary philosophers of mind, of whom Searle is certainly a member.

[Outthereandback]

I laughed my ass off at minute 7. He regathers himself, belches furtively, and answers the question. Legendary.

[1888junkteam]

excellent work!

[renumeratedfrog]

WTF is he wearing?

[nirvanaliveson6]

Who gives a crap what he is wearing...

[maximumsatann]

@renumeratedfrog Very good point sir. Well made.

[F00dTube]

@renumeratedfrog I think it's a fucking bodywarmer (almost the same as a regular bodywarmer).

[JagSkaSotaEr]

@renumeratedfrog American clothes.

[aloofasalways]

I got a series of lectures by him from The Teaching Company and when he started explaining recursive decomposition it cracked me up every time he said "stupid homunculi"

[mashmasher]

Dustin Hoffman could play this dude

[JAYDUBYAH29]

this is magnificent. love searle!

[sdzeit]

man, that music at the start was rad...

[jonobrow]

I love Searle. His actual philosophical beliefs are insane (Chinese Room amergument, combination of a first-person ontology with a belief in the causal closure of the material world), but he's a great speaker, both in clarity and content.

[Brand0ni0]

@jonobrow

Would you mind being more specific about what it is about Searle's philosophical views that you find insane?

[polymath7]

I'll tell you.

To begin, his Chinese Room is one of the most boneheaded, effortlessly refuted thought experiments in all of Western intellectual history.

*grin*

Would you like me to tell you why?

I have no idea why any respectable university would bother top keep this clown around.

[Brand0ni0]

@polymath7

Enlighten me. I find his thought experiment rather solid, actually.

[isolateslowfaults]

@polymath7 I'll bite, Mr. Polymath, one renaissance man to another. How can the Chinese Room be effortlessly refuted?

[dsbnh]

@isolateslowfaults Searle confuses the mental qualities of one computational process, himself for example, with those of another process that the first process might be interpreting, a process that understands Chinese, for example. It is an incredibly flawed argument. I took some of Searle's courses and had a lot of fun. However, he is very stubborn and continues to be as wishy-washy with his definitions as ever. He has plenty of arguments against others, but his own arguments are a bit lacking.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh He may be trying to demonstrate that it is possible for processes to occur without understanding or consciousness. If you removed his consciousness from the machine and replaced it with a machine that followed the same rule book there would be no difference to the outside observer. The outside observer's perception is then irrelevant since their conclusion is meet in either case. Understanding that you don't understand is a sign of conciousness, the machine lacks that capability.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh I could be wrong, that's just how I interpreted it.

[dsbnh]

@5dsdouglas There is no "may" about it, you got it right. He is trying to show that. The problem is that he doesn't define what causes understanding. He places understanding as something higher than what the room is essentially doing, when that isn't necessarily the case. You make the same mistake. There is absolutely no reason to consider the room 's processes as not understanding and as lacking 'consciousness'. The only way is to attribute these things to magic. The Berkeley reply is correct.

[dsbnh]

@5dsdouglas Essentially what I am saying is that the room (everything in it) performs a role that ultimately results in essentially the same thing that we term understanding. There is no more to it than a set of processes. Consciousness is essentially just a series of processes numerous enough to create the illusion of a cohesive "thing". At least, this seems like the most likely answer. The opposite view is essentially "magic!". Funny thing is that Searle doesn't consider himself a dualist.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh Thank you for your explanation I think I now understand your argument better, but I don’t think I can agree with it. Even though reality, or the room if you like, is comprised of an unfathomable amount of processes we don’t say that reality is conscious or reality has understanding. Instead we attribute consciousness to things acting in reality.

[dsbnh]

@5dsdouglas I don't think you do understand it. The room is not reality. The room is the human brain.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh If you are making the room analogous to the brain then I suppose I agree with you. Thank you for that clarification.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh However, by making the room a brain it still doesn't seem to truly refute the scenario, seems like it only bypasses it.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh I have to agree with you though that because of the magnificent three pounds of protoplasm within the skull an illusion occurs, in the sense that it would be impossible to compute the whole truth instantaneously and simultaneously. That illusion or near truth we call consciousness, and undeniable it is the result of an incredible amount of processes making matter into mind and therefore inseparable like carbon atoms to a diamond.

[dsbnh]

@5dsdouglas I am not really sure why you say you don't agree, because it sounds like you do. Perhaps the confusion comes from my mention of Berkeley, whose work was known to touch extensively upon the nature of reality? My answer has nothing to do with that at all. I refer to Berkeley because Searle refers to such a response as the "Berkeley answer" in his essay.

[dsbnh]

@5dsdouglas Also, note that I take great care to say 'the room' rather than just 'the machine'. The machine within the room isn't understanding, it is just one part of the process. One of the many sub-processes. Basically, this is just the Berkeley answer.

[5dsdouglas]

@dsbnh I just realized that you may think my attribution of consciousness to things acting in reality as a presumption of consciousness as unfounded magic. Rather I tend to think of consciousness as objective understanding due to things acting within reality.

[5dsdouglas]

Or in other words as you mentioned the brain is trying to figure it all out.

[kirshara]

21:40, but philosophy is not just conceptual clarification it is also reflection. even if science solves a problem there is still the opportunity for reflection. Thus philosophy does not ever really 'close up shop'.

[kirshara]

biological naturalism rocks

[NAes12]

Even if this guy is extremely intelligent and has contributed greatly to his field, he is surely a dinosaur when it comes to his ramblings on education establishments and ethnicity. Any one who feels that ethnicity/gender/class should be checked at the door as if it is a pair of muddy shoes does not understand the pervasive importance of group identity. His viewpoint is certainly one of a privileged, white, male who is sheltered in his comfy ivory tower of apolitical pursuits.

[fede2]

of course. did i say anything that suggests otherwise?

[fede2]

cognitive scientists can only describe facts about the human mind. there will always be room to speculate about the implications of scientific conclusions. in particular, searle has written interesting things on the subject of free will. cognitive science (qua science) could not tell you anything on the matter.

[Filomatia]

I have new for you too. All biologist take genetic classes, but not all biological studies are about genetics. So do the astronomers take chemistry classes, but the work with telescopes, not sample tubes. Diferent matters require different approaches.

[Filomatia]

You are totally wrong and naive.

What is science (and what isn't) is a philosophical matter. Before you answer that, you should answer what is knowable (metaphysics), how it is knowable (epistemology) and how that knowledge can be expressed (philosophy of language).

Thus, without philosophy, you couldn't even say that astronomy is science and astrology is pseudo-science, or that darwinism is a legitime scientific theory, while ID isn't.

[Krelianx]

I would argue that ontology pushes the epistemological problematic into more basic questions about consciousness, subject-object relations, substantiality and temporality. It is not at all clear to philosophy after Kant that knowledge in the traditional sense of the word is properly grounded.

[andreaandrewmilne]

Dear Filomatia, I would describe this claim itself as misguided philosophical vanity. Philosophers love the self-serving comfort of supposing:

(i) the criteria of demarcation is a logical precondition of attributing truth to scientific theories

(ii) (scientific methodology can be usefully defined) IF AND ONLY IF (a principle of demarcation is defined)

[andreaandrewmilne]

This is a deductivist, foundationalist view of knowledge. Suppose, instead, we have a pragmatic conception of provisional truth, plus a picture of knowledge as Quine's web of propositions, which lacks a layer of unquestionable or analytic or a-priori initial axioms. Next, ask which has been more "useful" (an intendedly vague concept): (i) philosophical speculation, or (ii) the bold mix of empiricism, mathematical modelling, falsification and remodelling, called science.

Regards and ♥ andrea

[silversalvo]

"I am now convinced that theoretical physics is actually philosophy." -Max Born

Mathematics is simply a language , there are limits to empiricism , and some things cannot be repeated. Science cannot know everything , and if it did , then it should be rebranded a "religion" , only religion would dare avow what the "Truth" is and how its acquired (No matter how provisional that truth may be). Science is of little or no use without the wisdom necessary to wield it in beneficial manner.

[silversalvo]

I think that philosophy is perceived as a thorn in science's sides by what i would call ( And you'll have to forgive me for saying so) the "Fanatic-rationalists"; "If it questions science in any way, than it is heresy" they would say. But it's not a "Either/Or" question, unless you have an unhealthy conviction in one of them, it is a good that doubt is present.

"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature." -Niels Bohr

[silversalvo]

One more for the road; "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." -Albert Einstein

[andreaandrewmilne]

I also agree that the same dangerous, deductivist and absolutist fantasy lurks behind (i) systems of religious ideology, especially abrahamic monotheism, (ii) eg, Kantian transcendental metaphysics, (iii) scientistic dreams of final and complete theories of everything [the GUT nonsense], and (iv) logicist-Hilbertian projects to arrive at procedures that would infallibly identify all and only valid rules of inference, or all and only well-formed mathematical statements.

[andreaandrewmilne]

A fantasy to which XY people seem particularly prone, and which I speculate is related to a hardwired genetic disposition to establish hierarchies of truth, much as XY people seem unpleasantly hooked on societies stratified by power and status.

BTW, since I see no radical discontinuity between facts and values, especially love, desire and reverence, I have no difficulty in projects to construct wisdom and justice. An atheist, feminist project, of course :-0

Regards and ♥, andrea

[andreaandrewmilne]

We observe how science has ever-evolving procedures for falsifying its own hypotheses.

I suggest we may agree that someone who tried to demarcate science and non-science would be seeking to set out an unquestionable meta-procedure for determining, in advance, what was and was not a valid shift in any particular procedure for falsification. That's a b*llsh*t ambition.

[andreaandrewmilne]

That, incidentally, is why mathematics and logic are not just language. That is the formalist error. They are merely the broadest generalisations. Even rules such as ┐(p AND ┐p) are potentially disprovable.

[silversalvo]

If mathematics (And logic?) isn't a language and is the Broadest of generalizations , then may i inquire as to what they're generalization of? And how do we gain access to it . Its quite perplexing for me to imagine math or logic as non descriptive.

More importantly wouldn't you need to make whatever set you used to potentially disprove ┐(p AND ┐p) also disprovable ,and make that set also disprovable by yet an other set ,and so forth Ad infinitum . I'm referring Gödel's incompleteness

[silversalvo]

In any event , perhaps i've misunderstood what you meant by "potentially disprovable". However i'm pretty sure i don't understand what the last of your comment ( The XY part ) is. Are you alluding to "XY" Chromosomes?

-Peace.

[silversalvo]

Come to think it; I'm probably making a reference to a variation of "Zeno's paradox" or "How the tortoise defeated Achilles". Still considering i'm not quite sure about your statement on math , Gödel's theorem may still be a valid counter argument . Ill wait for your reply before elaborating either point ;) .

[andreaandrewmilne]

The fact that our language makes sense even if it is radically inconsistent shows that formalisation into a consistent model does not capture the power of actual language.

Indeed, we should be able to distinguish trivial and non-trivial proofs, even in a para-consistent universe. Which I hasten to add, is the actual universe, since it contains our language, and that language is quite powerful enough to state Russell's paradox, the liar paradox and Gödel's sentence.

Regards and ♥, andrea

[silversalvo]

But then , wouldn't a paraconsistency make falsification redundant? One could argue that since both a statement and its negation could never equate falsehood ,nothing could ever be falsified. Moreover i fail to see how rejecting Explosion could rectify the problem; In fact it seems to cast further doubts on your original position that Mathematical , Empirical & Falsifiable knowledge (Or provisional truths) are not dependent on philosophical meddling, which seems necessary at this point.

[silversalvo]

If one takes empiricism , math and falsification at face value , they could not justify implicitly their own merit, (for the reasons we covered). More so when considering paraconsistency & rejecting the principle of explosion; Consequentially one needs philosophical inquiries, regulations & preconditions to vindicate , in any meaningful manner , the scientific method; Hence, i don't agree that philosophical demarcations & their definitions are simply vanity or less useful vis-à-vis science .

[silversalvo]

To this end , i'm not sure what you mean by "proof step", but i suspect that you misunderstood my objection to the falsification of ┐(p AND ┐p), so it may not matter much. Ill restate; To potentially disprove a statement that can neither be true and false at the same time, one would need to assume ┐(p AND ┐p) as both a premise and conclusion : circular logic. Alternatively one could simply go on an infinite regress without ever reaching a conclusion, like your "proof step" i believe.

[silversalvo]

Now , adding distinct rules or laws applicable at different steps does remove the fallacious result , trying to limit inference to a "step" context doesn't help either; The outcome being a cluster of axioms that never culminates in a conclusion that's derived from them. Again , perhaps i've misinterpreted what you meant ,but it seems misguided at first glance.

Of course none of this would matter if science wasn't deemed above philosophical scrutiny , Which is the crux of my arguments ;)

-Peace

[silversalvo]

A few more for the road:

 "There are trivial truths & there are great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false. The opposite of a great truth is also true."

-Neils Bohr

"Science has made us gods even before we are worthy of being men."

- Jean Rostand

[silversalvo]

Edit, Typo: It should read " To disprove THE statement that something can neither be ..." and not any statement "A statement"

[andreaandrewmilne]

Which is why, for instance, I reject the idea that rules of inference are independent of the context of a particular "proof step". This is a very machine-computational idea. Ie, a rule may be valid at step m, but not valid at step n, and the only distinction be the sequence in the proof. I also reject the "principle of explosion" as a test of validity of proof. We shouldn't allow proofs to be rejected as trivial simply because they would, if contradictory, allow the inference of all statements.

[andreaandrewmilne]

Dear silversalvo,

I keep thinking about your replies. So here's another holding response, whilst I ponder.

Yes, a demonstration of the invalidity of, say, the rule of non-contradiction, would itself be potentially disprovable. Which is why I do not define a proof as an argument proceeding from indubitable premises.

Not merely that, but such a demonstration would be itself potentially contradictory, if the proof-procedure relied upon a step involving the same rule of non-contradiction.

[1234iloveparkdoor]

Aww, andrea. Still holding off on giving something other than a holding response? Is that because you've reached the limits of your lecture notes now?

[andreaandrewmilne]

Trouble is [ ;-) ] no such proof could be offered, at least not one itself immune to doubt. Like Macbeth's brave claim to inhabit an unassailable fortress, it would be laughed to scorn. Albeit that s/he believed s/he was so secure, and her words were an ironical mockery of herself. There are no limits to our ability to falsify any claim as to the truth of a particular proposition.

[andreaandrewmilne]

Dear silversalvo, Interesting reply - thanks.

You advance the claim: "there are limits to empiricism".

I would prefer to say: "when someone proves to us that the principle of falsification has ceased to be operable, in that we can now prove that none of our theories are falsifiable, then radical empiricism will have terminated."

[silversalvo]

The Qm collapse of the wave function , the Planck length and the event horizon of black holes are a few examples of empirical limits, and one could also argue these are also unfalsifiable; Simply its a inevitable result the scientific system (Or any knowledge based system for that matter): that nothingness exists. And "Nothing" cannot be defined or known but is a necessary element to reality; Ergo one should expect to have a material manifestation of unknowable(s?) if its describing nature.

[silversalvo]

Note that The Planck length, Schwarzschild radius etc. are the limits , much like absolute zero is for temperature, and are known as such. One could (And has) falsified to that limit ,however the limit itself isn't falsifiable since to test or observe that statement one would have to run impossible experiments: For example , it would take an instrument the size of the universe to cool something below 0K,  even then all the energy would be used in the cooling process and no record would be made

[andreaandrewmilne]

Oh, and I loved your Einstein quote: "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."

I would put it stronger still: as far as they do not refer to contingent reality, they have no truth content at all.

Regards and ♥, andrea

[andreaandrewmilne]

However, your example, of a factual limit generated by our best current theories, is, in truth, the only legitimate concept of "impossibility". Necessary, or a-priori, or analytic truths are bogus rhetoric, or merely argumentative bids to inoculate a theory from criticism.

[andreaandrewmilne]

Dear silversalvo,

Interesting examples that I did not consider. My intuition [for what it's worth since I don't have BSc, or MSc after my name] is that what renders such an experiment "impossible" is merely matters of fact about the universe, or theories currently not yet falsified. The ambitiousness of this concept of impossibility is much less than the logician's pretence to necessary truth.

[soursourapples]

Than kyou Mr A Chalmers for your original thoughts and contributions.

[Filomatia]

First, that (your first statment) is an answer to a philosophical problem. Not a scientific one.

Second, it is an answer to ONLY ONE philosophical problem.

Third, your argument - that he belives that X is ultimately explained by Y, he is interested in X, thus he should be interested in Y - is a non sequitur. If your argument were sound, so all biologist should be be geneticist, all materialist philosopher should be a natural scientist and so on.

[Filomatia]

Because discribeing how brain works isn't enought to answer many interesting questions.

[S2Cents]

That's actually a good question. Why not just get down to it and do the science if neurology and so on are indeed the way to go...

[redetrigan]

Old age certainly doesn't seem to have sapped Searle's energy.

[mc0558]

Leave it to Searle to get an hour long lecture on Youtube!

[pelikanelefant]

Galen strawsons book "real materalism" has dis"solved" the mind(mental)/body problem that is we have no good reason to belive we have any knowledge/concept (except in russels word formal/matematical) of the thing we call "body". Our insighs come from the mental phenomenologial "side"/consciousness that is to say feelings are materalistic/physical from a realistic, naturalistic (sceptical) (supportiv of panpsychism) way.

[zootsoot2006]

He's surely deluded if he thinks the mind-body problem is solved here. Why is it so difficult for professional philosophers to see that everything they think is automatically within the mental realm, therefore how can they discredit it by referance to a more real physical realm? If ever psychiatrists had reason to declare someone insane it's surely over ignorance such as this.

[ContraWagner]

No, he thinks the traditional mind-body problem of what the world is made out of is more or less solved. If you listen to him closely, he points out that we still do not know how brain processes create the seemingly mental events. So he is not entirely disregarding MB problem philosophers are currently working on.

[ShakaUVM]

Right. He holds that there's both material reality and the reality of this subjective mental life, but that the subjective mental life is caused by the physical reality (and, feasibly can influence the physical reality in turn). So that's kinda dualism and kinda materialism, but not really both.

I think that's his point, actually.

[ld7356]

Please give us more. Please.