It makes no more sense than saying it's possible that you could experience life as a stuffed animal or a rock. If Plantinga thinks he can conceive of this coherently, he's simply mistaken.
This argument doesn't really get off the ground because Plantinga's intuition is all wrong. The mistake comes right at the beginning where he asserts that it's possible that he could exist separately from his body and says in support of this that he could imagine himself waking up in a beetle's body. The problem here is that in fact it's not possible--a beetle doesn't have the ability to support Plantinga's consciousness because its nervous system isn't complicated enough to do so.
first 6 mins- points out the obvious fact that there is a distinction between a functioning human body and its parts and properties such as the height, weight, and the property we label the "self"
When I first saw it, I thought Plantinga was talking to a priest :D Anyway, their lack of agreement is probably due to the fact that Plantinga is speaking of logical possibility, while Kuhn seems to think of some kind of physical possibility.
I don't think one can refute this argument; as far as I can see it conclusively establishes that human person is not a body or a brain. Bye, bye, physicalism, we won't miss you
This is a really good video. Alvin Plantiga is very technical sometimes; therefore not as convincing as Dr. Craig to a layperson. But when you really think about his arguments, he is very consistent and logical.
The second argument is essentially just stating the hard problem. Materialism has no answer as to how complexity in unconscious systems gives rise to consciousness. It has no explanation for how unconscious matter could possibly become sentient.
The first argument that consciousness does not equal the brain because he can imagine consciousness as separate from the brain strikes me as extremely weak, and this is coming from somebody who already believes in mind/brain duality. What does he believe consciousness is? Something non-physical? One could just as easily use his own argument to imagine oneself as different from the non-physical, and in imagining a difference it would 'prove' that we are not non-physical.
His point was that if we are just a body, we can't imagine ourselves without a body. It would be like trying to imagine yourself with no consciousness. But because we can imagine ourselves without a body, we are distinct from our bodies.
I don't think it's necessary for his argument that conceivability entails possibility. He could easily modify it by saying, "It is true to say of A that it is conceivable that A exists when B doesn't exist, but it is not true to say of B that it is conceivable that B exists when B doesn't exist." By the same principle he is employing, this demonstrates that A is not identical to B.
@LittleSn00py I agree that coneivability isn't necessarily possibility; but can you really conceive of something coming into existence out of nothing? I don't think that I can. Even if I think of something coming into existence out of a void, the void is still something; or so it seems to me. Perhaps I'm mistaken about this.
@shizfergus27 You can imagine a clean table, and the next instant an apple appears on it out of thin air. You don't see any cause bringing it into being, nor do you know an explanation for why the apple appeared on the table. Why this doesn't refute the principle of causation? Simple: the coming into being without a cause presupposes the principle that allows the coming into being without a cause; therefore, there is always something and never nothing.
@LittleSn00py I assumed you would say something like that but I find it unconvincing. All that example shows is that I may not be able to identify the cause and I can live with that. But I cannot fathom true nothingness and thus I cannot fathom something coming from nothing. Your thought experiment doesn't refute causation because conceivability (even if it can be conceived) doesn't prove possibilty like you said previously.
@shizfergus27 I didn't intend to refute the principle of causation. Its denial presupposes a principle or law which actualizes the possibility of coming into existence without a cause, and with this the causeless being has an explanation outside itself for its existence, leading to a clear absurdity if we deny that everything that begins to exists has a cause. It may be conceivable that something can begin to exist uncaused, but it's metaphysically impossible that something as this can happen.
While I agree that I am an immaterial person/mind, the fact that I can imagine this is the case doesn't seem to give me sufficient reason to think it is the case. I can imagine all sorts of things and that doesn't make any of them true. And to say an argument is strong "if it is true" does not make it strong or true.
2:16, The fact that you can imagine something, doesn't mean you become this thing (beatle) in reality. When you imagine you are a beatle, your body is still there.
2:23, "I exist when B doesn't exist..." You have imagined that you exist (as a beatle) and your body doesn't exist.
Through evolution, humans have evolved complex brains, where, by neurological activity we have developed the ability of symbolic representation of the world, we express through language to communicate it to other.
It makes no more sense than saying it's possible that you could experience life as a stuffed animal or a rock. If Plantinga thinks he can conceive of this coherently, he's simply mistaken.
gabewilner 10 hours ago
This argument doesn't really get off the ground because Plantinga's intuition is all wrong. The mistake comes right at the beginning where he asserts that it's possible that he could exist separately from his body and says in support of this that he could imagine himself waking up in a beetle's body. The problem here is that in fact it's not possible--a beetle doesn't have the ability to support Plantinga's consciousness because its nervous system isn't complicated enough to do so.
gabewilner 10 hours ago
Plantinga's argument as I see it:
first 6 mins- points out the obvious fact that there is a distinction between a functioning human body and its parts and properties such as the height, weight, and the property we label the "self"
min 6-8- I don't understand how the brain works.
Therefore god dun it.
jb1262 1 month ago
When I first saw it, I thought Plantinga was talking to a priest :D Anyway, their lack of agreement is probably due to the fact that Plantinga is speaking of logical possibility, while Kuhn seems to think of some kind of physical possibility.
I don't think one can refute this argument; as far as I can see it conclusively establishes that human person is not a body or a brain. Bye, bye, physicalism, we won't miss you
dhfjal 1 month ago
This is a really good video. Alvin Plantiga is very technical sometimes; therefore not as convincing as Dr. Craig to a layperson. But when you really think about his arguments, he is very consistent and logical.
ebeatworld 1 month ago
If we were solely material, then we would have no will, no agency.
FillTheirVoid 2 months ago
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The second argument is essentially just stating the hard problem. Materialism has no answer as to how complexity in unconscious systems gives rise to consciousness. It has no explanation for how unconscious matter could possibly become sentient.
AnduinX 4 months ago
Comment removed
AnduinX 4 months ago
The first argument that consciousness does not equal the brain because he can imagine consciousness as separate from the brain strikes me as extremely weak, and this is coming from somebody who already believes in mind/brain duality. What does he believe consciousness is? Something non-physical? One could just as easily use his own argument to imagine oneself as different from the non-physical, and in imagining a difference it would 'prove' that we are not non-physical.
AnduinX 4 months ago
@AnduinX
His point was that if we are just a body, we can't imagine ourselves without a body. It would be like trying to imagine yourself with no consciousness. But because we can imagine ourselves without a body, we are distinct from our bodies.
AgApE010 2 months ago
what is death like for a simple creature??
terrigreen100 7 months ago
I don't think it's necessary for his argument that conceivability entails possibility. He could easily modify it by saying, "It is true to say of A that it is conceivable that A exists when B doesn't exist, but it is not true to say of B that it is conceivable that B exists when B doesn't exist." By the same principle he is employing, this demonstrates that A is not identical to B.
magicalhats15 9 months ago
This is where I part from Plantinga. Conceivability isn't possibility. The same way I can show that something can come into being uncaused.
LittleSn00py 1 year ago
@LittleSn00py I agree that coneivability isn't necessarily possibility; but can you really conceive of something coming into existence out of nothing? I don't think that I can. Even if I think of something coming into existence out of a void, the void is still something; or so it seems to me. Perhaps I'm mistaken about this.
shizfergus27 1 year ago
@shizfergus27 You can imagine a clean table, and the next instant an apple appears on it out of thin air. You don't see any cause bringing it into being, nor do you know an explanation for why the apple appeared on the table. Why this doesn't refute the principle of causation? Simple: the coming into being without a cause presupposes the principle that allows the coming into being without a cause; therefore, there is always something and never nothing.
LittleSn00py 1 year ago
@LittleSn00py I assumed you would say something like that but I find it unconvincing. All that example shows is that I may not be able to identify the cause and I can live with that. But I cannot fathom true nothingness and thus I cannot fathom something coming from nothing. Your thought experiment doesn't refute causation because conceivability (even if it can be conceived) doesn't prove possibilty like you said previously.
shizfergus27 1 year ago
Comment removed
LittleSn00py 1 year ago
@shizfergus27 I didn't intend to refute the principle of causation. Its denial presupposes a principle or law which actualizes the possibility of coming into existence without a cause, and with this the causeless being has an explanation outside itself for its existence, leading to a clear absurdity if we deny that everything that begins to exists has a cause. It may be conceivable that something can begin to exist uncaused, but it's metaphysically impossible that something as this can happen.
LittleSn00py 1 year ago
@shizfergus27 Apropos Plantinga: read on Kripke's modal argument against type-type and reductive physicalism.
LittleSn00py 1 year ago
@LittleSn00py I will do that; thanks for the suggestion!
shizfergus27 1 year ago
While I agree that I am an immaterial person/mind, the fact that I can imagine this is the case doesn't seem to give me sufficient reason to think it is the case. I can imagine all sorts of things and that doesn't make any of them true. And to say an argument is strong "if it is true" does not make it strong or true.
Gentle135 1 year ago
2:16, The fact that you can imagine something, doesn't mean you become this thing (beatle) in reality. When you imagine you are a beatle, your body is still there.
2:23, "I exist when B doesn't exist..." You have imagined that you exist (as a beatle) and your body doesn't exist.
Through evolution, humans have evolved complex brains, where, by neurological activity we have developed the ability of symbolic representation of the world, we express through language to communicate it to other.
dewinthemorning 1 year ago
I don't find him boring at all. I'm glued to the screen whenever he comes on, and I just can't get enough of him!
1GodOnlyOne 1 year ago