Here is what I don't understand which is why I want to read Husserl, is how can we get a description of reality if we are not using meaning. I totally get the idea of not covering up our pure experience with interpretations but to describe it is to use concepts. How can meaning not be representational? If I talk about the car in my garage while I am sitting in my living room, is not the meaning in my mind representational of the car?
"If I talk about the car in my garage while I am sitting in my living room, is not the meaning in my mind representational of the car?"
That ought not to be representation of the physical car, if (!) we are doing phenomenology. You are right, that language essentially is representative. However we can reserve our right to choose what it represents. In this case phenomenological description ought not to describe physical car in garrage (since it's bracketed by epoche), but idea.
@EndureTemptation Oh yeah the bracketing, yeah that makes sense. Cause bottom line is that the car in my imagination is only an experience which I take to be representative of another experience, namely the empirical car. I get what you are saying. But as you would agree we do use the image as being representational, even though we don't necessarily have to, correct?
thank you very much.
MrMarktrumble 1 month ago
Here is what I don't understand which is why I want to read Husserl, is how can we get a description of reality if we are not using meaning. I totally get the idea of not covering up our pure experience with interpretations but to describe it is to use concepts. How can meaning not be representational? If I talk about the car in my garage while I am sitting in my living room, is not the meaning in my mind representational of the car?
ex0gen 6 months ago
@ex0gen
"If I talk about the car in my garage while I am sitting in my living room, is not the meaning in my mind representational of the car?"
That ought not to be representation of the physical car, if (!) we are doing phenomenology. You are right, that language essentially is representative. However we can reserve our right to choose what it represents. In this case phenomenological description ought not to describe physical car in garrage (since it's bracketed by epoche), but idea.
EndureTemptation 2 months ago
@EndureTemptation Oh yeah the bracketing, yeah that makes sense. Cause bottom line is that the car in my imagination is only an experience which I take to be representative of another experience, namely the empirical car. I get what you are saying. But as you would agree we do use the image as being representational, even though we don't necessarily have to, correct?
ex0gen 2 months ago
good
ClaisseHume 7 months ago
Who is the lecturer, please?
anthropicus77 7 months ago
@anthropicus77 Lawrence Cahoone speaking in Lecture 19 - Rise of 20th-Century Philosophy—Phenomenology .
SonytoBratsoni 7 months ago
Excellent overview!
What would you say was the difference between Husserl's Transcendental Ego and Kant's Pure Apperception?
Ontologistics 8 months ago
Great stuff
taratasarar 1 year ago