Intention in Action

[ajaxpc]

Isn't this just a pedantic exploration of a confusion? (Searle's confusion, then McDowell's confusion ...)

Attribution of intention is indefinitely corrigible - following Kripke's observation on rule following; and it has an irreducible normative content, since we only attribute it to 'agents'. It is not a kind of empirical fact that someone, or something, is an agent.

If our intentional language has these confusing implications, we just shouldn't push it that hard.

[bluetoebeing]

@ajaxpc yeah, but McD has to pay for his lunch. And so do you. If you no know of another way, please inform.

[franco121760]

Mankind is like a mouse that keeps running in circles without real meaning in life!

Man focuses too much on the intentions and in deep thinking theories that ends missing the real point which is in my personal opinion living and using life's precious time in a productive way for him and society

[ThePastorGregory]

@franco121760 ..meaningless,meaningless,ever­ything is meaningless.

[dontonti99]

To *langengro*. I don't see the problem. DD's problem was about a deviant causal chain: actions might not be intentional, even if the action is caused by an intention. Causal chains aren't enough to make an action intentional. What in McD's talk forces a denial of that? If PI is just IA, given the typical conditions, then McD can say the same. The issue is whether IA, as Searle but not McD understands it, is required for this kind of move.

[1888junkteam]

excellent work!

[langengro]

When Searle introduced the idea of an "intention in action" (IA), as distinct from the "prior intention" (PI) that causes it, he addressed a famous problem from Davidson: Namely, that sometimes our intentions are the cause of the intended effects, but the causation doesn't happen "in the right way". By introducing an IA in between PI and bodily movement, Searle could say exactly what is wrong here: IA is missing. McDowell's claim here that IA's are just PI's brings back Davidson's puzzle.

[runciblewall]

How does McDowell bring back Davidson's puzzle? One simply says that the PI at issue ceases prematurely.

[langengro]

@runciblewall

Quoting Davidson: "A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. " It's not the case that, in this example, a prior intention ceases prematurely.

[langengro]

And then here is Searle on this: The climber "has no intention in action of loosening his hold. Even if on the basis of his belief and desire he formed a secondary desire to loosen his hold and this desire caused him to loosen his hold it is still not an intentional action if he does not have an intention in action to loosen his hold".

Not that one has to find this reply satisfactory. But this context is what motivated the term "intention in action" - and McDowell doesn't address it at all.

[JuanVoyce]

is this a funeral?

[xternalist]

@JuanVoyce Hahaha. Yeah. I think it is.LOL

[TheSophist2007]

@JuanVoyce very funny...

[TheSophist2007]

@JuanVoyce very funny...

[luannalovell]

lol i my intention is to execute the intention to perform the prior action of intention to watch this another day!

[Ajzenify]

@luannalovell -lol  sounds like you've grasped it.

[somor98]

Worst philosophy lecture... ever!!

[jonobrow]

He actually sounds bored by himself! I've never seen that quite so pronounced in any other philosopher than here with McDowell. It's unbelievable. He might as just be saying out loud "God this is so fucking boring" every few minutes.

[mrfatd]

most contemporary philosphers, like campbell, searle, fodor etc are soo ignorant of true philosophy, their philosphy compared to that of kant is like scholasticism to aristotle. they write mad non-sense about freedom of will, artificial intelligence and brain states even though most of these 'problems they try to solve have been long ago solved

[betoperdido]

solved? by which philosophy/philosopher? Wittgenstein?

[sunmanho]

any more McD?

[snowtrot]

One has a better time with McDowell if one has a firm grasp of Kant, so I've come to learn.

[intentionmanifest]

I watched this a while back and came to the conclusion that his intention is to look at his notes.

[raffen79]

Reading him is ok, but listening to him can be pure torture.

[snowtrot]

John McDowell's work in metaethics is so difficult to understand. I hate reading him! But the work is worth it. Great video.

[aub741]

great lecture , i wish i was there to ask him

great speaker

[xpressivist]

brilliant! thanks for posting this lecture by McDowell.