Interview with Robert Brandom on "Making It Explicit" Part 1

[xpressivist]

Like Fodor, talks of dimensions and realms really make my skin crawl.

[xpressivist]

Pragmatism or Holism is wrong. It is wrong because it is circular and does not get to the facts which alone can provide justifications for our beliefs. In common practice, we simply do not invoke beliefs and infer from them what is true.

[Razomir]

@xpressivist I am not sure you understand pragmatism properly. It is by no means circular. And your claim fails to provide an explanation to what is true and what makes it true. Which is what pragmatism addresses.

[xpressivist]

@Razomir In an essay on William James, Bertrand Russell suggested that what is true is easier to discover than what works. Thus, what works is different from what is true. Like Russell (and DM Armstrong who followed him), my sympathy is for a correspondence theory of truth which captures most people's realist intuitions about truth. I'm very sorry if my understanding of pragmatism is very unsympathetic. But what really is "pragmatism" about truth according to you?

[Razomir]

@xpressivist You seem to speak of truth as an objective entity yet you apply it to the field of intersubjective interactions. Correct me if I am wrong on this. You do seem fairly well versed in philosophy but confusing objective truth about the world outside of the human experience with a human-made artifact such as methods of conveying meaning is quite strange. The difference can be clearly seen in the change in Wittgenstein from the Tractatus to Philosophical investigations.

[xpressivist]

@Razomir Some students of philosophy, although familiar with the early & the latter Wittgenstein, have little sympathy for his ideas & intellectual development. I am one of them. I think that when (& after) Chomsky initiated the cognitive revolution, many students of philosophy learned that Wittgenstein is no longer the philosophical heavyweight he was depicted to be. That truth is social is something that no clearheaded philosopher will deny.

[xpressivist]

@Razomir But to say that that is all we can say about truth is too narrow & contrary to common sense. Sentences in natural language are surely human artifacts, but language & communication are not. They simply happen to conscious animals. Truth is a property we attribute to statements. Truth & facts (what make statements true) on this common view exists independently of statements. That we use sentences to convey meaning socially is also uncontroversial. But is that all we can say about meaning?

[Razomir]

@xpressivist I think I see what you are saying now.The earlier distinction that I made between objective facts and meaning in the subjective sense is in fact a problem. But it is that problem specifically that has lead to the current prevalent split of the study of linguistics into "everyday language" and "technical language", the first being intersubjective and normative by definition and the second is the attempt to tie a very specific language to facts.But the two dont contradict

[Razomir]

@xpressivist My point was that one cannot say that pragmatism is wrong as it is a stepping stone for the contemporary state of affairs in this particular field. If you look at concept theories you will notice the same progression, from classical to prototype theory to now a large variety of strictly specified conceptual modes. Btw if you would like to proceed with this conversation I suggest we take it to private messages. This is getting too explicit (no pun intended) for comments.

[xpressivist]

@Razomir Pragmatism (as a philosophical view) is wrong about truth and concept acquisition. It is wrong because representing is prior to doing. Truth is not a product of conventions or practices, & concept acquisition depends on the causal relation between the mind & the world, not on other concepts or beliefs. I suggest that you write clearly & explicitly. That way, the readers here will know that you really know what you're talking about.

[xpressivist]

Brandom is mistaken. Normativity and the acquisition of concepts are not inferential. Normativity and the acquisition of concepts are simply caused by facts and properties in the world. They are not inferred from other beliefs or concepts. This is an empirical claim of course because causalism about normativity and concepts is falsifiable. Brandom's claim is not for the simple reason that he thinks philosophy is not science.

[GARIFIAN]

f---ing awful format for an interview. Absolutely stinking.

[LeftReader]

who cares, the very fact there is a robert brandom video on youtube is AWESOME!

[GodlessPhilosopher]

Thank you, LeftReader. I'm working on getting up his Locke Lectures, published as "Between Saying and Doing."

[aMyCrImSoN]

i agree

[jacksonhansonjackson]

The most exciting philosopher alive. I love this guy. Making it Explicit is one of my favourite books.