A new epistemological tool more powerful than falsifiability and Occam's razor

[GargamelGold]

@zarkoff45 He did a pretty good job.  I never thought of scientific inquiry in that way.

[Dummweltschutz]

If you have a bad explanation/theory you can't just rewrite it, you'll have to do more research. if the greeks knew there was the tilted axis MAYBE they'd have rewote it, but after that, they'd have found more evidence of not demether causing the season change -and so on, until they got explanatipon we have.

[Psychosmurf547]

Look up Bayes' Theorem and the Transferable Belief Model, etc. This is nothing new.

[zarkoff45]

@Psychosmurf547

I'll look into that eventually, but I have to say it sounds a bit off the wall since Deutsch's ideas imply more of a Popperian epistemology rather than Bayesian epistemology.

Deutsch's main point was that good explanations are "hard to vary" and I've not seen that idea expressed in a Bayesian epistemology.

[Psychosmurf547]

@zarkoff45 Sorry, I was trying to remember where I saw a concept very similar to invariance, I just can't remember what it's called now.

[MrShysterme]

@zarkoff45 I believe that falsification in a bayesian framework is seen as strong evidence against one hypothesis. So, perhaps falsification is a special case of bayesian analysis.

[17secret]

I'd ask for instance, what is a force, what is gravity, what is light..many concepts/facts stay without a real physical definition as far as i can remember, a force has always been an arrow on my paper, light is a wave or sometimes a particle, and gravity is something magic or is it a magic graviton??

We only create fragile 'functional' definitions that are not the real stuff, and it is very hazardous to try to build a so-called empirical world on such striking inaccuracies and fallacies.

[mm1979dk]

I agree with your interpretation of the talk, however I think you are overstretching the importance of "invariability" contribution. Variability is just the opposite of falsifiability -- the more degrees of freedom one allows, the harder it is to falsify.

Also falsifiability is attributed to Karl Popper, but the principle itself has been used in science long before him, even Charles Darwin said that one needs to find a single non-conforming species to falsify the theory of evolution.

[zarkoff45]

@mm1979dk "...opposite of falsifiability -- the more degrees of freedom one allows, the harder it is to falsify."

But falsifiability applies to predictions, not explanations. Invariability is about explanations and it doesn't necessarily contribute predictions.

"...the principle itself has been used in science long before him..."

Indeed. It seems most philosophers of science are just describing what scientists have been doing, not really telling them what to do.

[Torcika]

The writing interferes with the voice.hard to concentrate.should have thought it a little better

[SisyphusRedeemed]

Interesting talk! I do have to wonder if it might not undermine lots of 'genuine' scientific explanations, though. The Cartesian/Newtonian debate about 'action at a distance' is an example. Newton's laws didn't actually EXPLAIN anything, they simply described. Some philosophers of science suggest that this is all science should do, just describe reality and abandon explanation entirely. This kind of instrumentalism creates havoc for quantum mechanics. Should we just 'shut up and calculate?'

[zarkoff45]

@SisyphusRedeemed "Newton's laws didn't actually EXPLAIN anything, they simply described."

And we now have AIs that can do what Newton and Galileo did faster than they could. Google: "Eureqa, Software to Replace Scientists"

Eureqa how to:

watch?v=NhC1Qb-PQ5Q

"Should we just 'shut up and calculate?'"

That's going to be a very important question now that we have Eureqa. There is no agreed upon explanation for quantum mechanics and yet it still works.

[vickmackey24]

Invariability? "Impossible" to vary? Isn't that begging the question, the one raised by the problem with induction? Not quite seeing how this video solves the "problem" aside from an appeal to pragmatism.

[zarkoff45]

@vickmackey24 "Isn't that begging the question"

No, it's not. I can't imagine how you could think it is begging the question. Induction is reasoning from detailed facts to general principles - those principals can be vague and variable, or they can be precisely calculated and invariable and lead to mathematical models with great predictive power.

[vickmackey24]

@zarkoff45

How does the assertion of "invariability" not beg the question? The "problem of induction" is the idea that we can't know for sure whether the patterns we observe will remain that way in the future. It isn't about whether induction is useful or reliable in a *practical* sense, or whether we should use inductive reasoning (we have no choice, really). It's a theoretical problem that apologists frequently appeal to for calling certain things into doubt or making others seem possible.

[zarkoff45]

@vickmackey24 "How does the assertion of "invariability" not beg the question?"

Starting at about 1:51 David Deutsch addresses how it's not just induction that has really informed our theories. Alas, it is very brief and needs to be fleshed out. Consider his example of how Einstein used induction, or didn't.

We are not using induction alone, there are other epistemological principles involved that sharpen our focus. Invariability is one of them.

[KrisBlueNZ]

Also, by all "variable" (redundant) information. This is why stories do not make valid scientific theories.

[KrisBlueNZ]

With a truth is claimed, the credibility of the claim is badly compromised by every statement or assumption that any effect that is not yet proven is fact.

[xxSilverPhinxx]

Just as the Greek myth only "explains" the seasons happening, genesis only "explains" the fact that we exist, nothing more.

Basically in both cases people simply noticed these two facts and thought of very elaborate but empty explanations for them. It's easy to get lost in the elaborateness and think that it actually has any value.

Using 'god did it' as an explanation is on the same level.

[malcolmbryant]

This is something new to me. Bravo, mate. Bravo.

[Ormaaj]

I remember watching this TED talk. I wish he would have gone into more detail about variables being hard to vary, and what it means for explanations to have a functional role. I'm not quite sure what he means by that.

[cibernete1974]

So it's sad to see the creationists denying all value to science, and it's sad to heard the poor arguments of the atheists.

[cibernete1974]

So an astronomical myth is simply the description of the sky, useful in order to recognize in time the dawn of the seasons, and made possible a rational organization of the agriculture. For this reason, the civilizations with a rich mythical background was the first to develop the bases of science and philosophy. It is the case of Greece and ancient India. More myth signifies more knowledge oraly transmissed, before the cognitive revolution bound to the invention of writing.

[cibernete1974]

The simple reduction fo myths to primitive and bad explanation of phaenomane is a poor theory, which ignores the base ideas of the anthropology. Myth is a language of an oral culture, in which the memorization of laws and technology is performed by significative tales. These myths are ritual prescription, and sense-orienting description of human existence. They made als trasparent the knowledge of ancient civilizations

[langengro]

(4) Finally, it seems to me quite doubtful that myths are IN PRINCIPLE incapable of being invariable in Deutsch's sense. One single myth can well explain a great many things (> explanatory power) and be constrained by adjoining narratives, i.e. other myths (> theoretical coherence).

[Ormaaj]

@langengro I agree. I'm really confused by that point. Why couldn't a myth have the exact same properties? It seems that the determiner of variance is simply the relatedness to other theories and/or myths. Doesn't really solve anything.

[bradmanthethird]

we could very well have had a myth that the seasons were caused by the earths tilted axis, and then found out that the seasons were the same all over....

[langengro]

@bradmanthethird

I think that's right. After all, who said that the statement "The earth's axis is tilted" is AS SUCH mythical or AS SUCH scientific? Taken in isolation, this statement looks reasonably similar to the statement that the earth is being carried on Atlas' shoulders. Whatever makes a statement scientific - it will hardly be an intrinsic property of the statement. What makes it scientific must have something to do with the way the statement is confirmed.

[bradmanthethird]

exactly, scientific ideas must have a method for difinitive falsification, for example, gravity is a scientific idea because it could be disproved simply by finding two pieces of neutral charged newtonian scale matter that do not attract each other, how do you difinitively disprove god?

[zarkoff45]

"What makes it scientific must have something to do with the way the statement is confirmed."

How it's confirmed is part of it. Mythological thinking is teleological (Google that term and "teleology" if you don't know it). The mythists, by using gods resorted to "why" questions instead of "how" questions. If you can't talk to your gods and get honest answers, you can't confirm a "why."

Look at that myth again. It tells you WHY Demeter created winter, but not HOW she created it.

[langengro]

(1) I think I agree that what you say is true. The myth tells us why Demeter created winter, not how she created it. And it's also correct that the myth is inferior on this count.

One minor remark about this: You wouldn't call this a "teleological" explanation. Rather, it is an "intentional" explanation, i.e. an explanation in terms of Demeter's beliefs and desires. Teleological explanations, by contrast, go back to the "final causes" that things have "apart from" anybody's intentions.

[zarkoff45]

"Teleological explanations, by contrast, go back to the 'final causes' that things have "apart from" anybody's intentions."

That is not my understanding of the term. Do you have a source for that definition?

[langengro]

Do I have a "Source"? Well, Immanuel Kant, for instance, devotes a couple of hundred pages to the topic Teleology in his "Critique of Judgement". He doesn't apply this to intentional causation at all. And, since you directed me to a dictionary, I guess you yourself should be well aware of the origins of teleological thinking in Aristotle, and how "entelecheia" is unrelated to intentions.

[zarkoff45]

My understanding of the term "teleology" comes from Stephen Hawking's "A Brief History of Time." Are you familiar with the buttered toast explanation?

[langengro]

(2) This was terminological, but here are two major points:

For one, your remark has little to do with what Deutsch said in his talk. He claimed that what distinguishes scientific from mythological statements is their "invariability", not their reference to efficient, as opposed to final, causes. And secondly, I doubt very much that all myths are teleological or, rather, intentional explanations. For example, reading Genesis, I don't have any clue what God's purpose was in creating the Earth.

[zarkoff45]

"He claimed that what distinguishes scientific from mythological statements is their 'invariability', not their reference to efficient, as opposed to final, causes."

Only how answers can have the property of being invariable, and only a certain kind of how answer can be.

"... doubt ... that all myths are teleological or, rather, intentional explanations."

It only matters that some are and that no scientific explanations are.

[langengro]

You say that no scientific explanations are intentional. I guess I should've touched on this point in my posts, but that is completely wrong. Explanations in the history, economics, and the social sciences in general, are, crucially, intentional explanations. When you say that there was a bank run because people thought they might lose their money, that's an intentional explanation. And when suitably spelled out, it's perfectly scientific by everybody's standards.

[zarkoff45]

"...history, economics, and the social sciences in general."

Good point. But history, economics, and social sciences are weak sciences without the kind of certainty that physical sciences have.

And we are talking about human motivations - humans exist, gods probably don't.

[langengro]

The social sciences may be "weak sciences", okay. But the question was what distinguishes science from mythology, not what distinguishes weak from strong science.

[zarkoff45]

"But the question was what distinguishes science from mythology,"

Many things. Science uses mathematical models, mythology doesn't. Mythology will use "the gods did because they were motivated so" when you get no how from that. And I'm sure there is more.

What kind of mythology doesn't refer to a god?

[langengro]

Now you turn from the final causes vs. efficient causes distinction to the mathematics vs. narrative distinction. This is all very well. But look, these are YOUR answers. There is a vast literature on this, and heaven knows that everything you say is represented in it. It's precisely because the candidates for a distinction between science and mythology are numerous, that Deutsch's statement is so bold when he claims that INVARIABILITY is the one-and-only criterion you need.

[zarkoff45]

I never meant to drag in final causes vs. efficient causes by bringing up teleology. I'm going by Hawking's definition.

[langengro]

But maybe we shouldn't quarrel so much about this. Maybe you can explain the concept of invariability. Please note that I tried to do this myself, a month ago, further down in the comments to this video. Giving your explanation of what Deutsch means with invariability, you should explain how invariability implies the appeal to efficient causes, mathematical formalization, and everything else that may come to your mind when you think of the difference between science and mythology.

[zarkoff45]

" ...and everything else that may come to your mind when you think of the difference between science and mythology."

Not in a 500 character comment. It will take another video on this subject... if even that is enough.

Thanks for your input. I'll make use of your questions.

[langengro]

Alright, looking forward to that!

Cheers

;-)

[zarkoff45]

"...example, Genesis, I don't have any clue what God's purpose was in creating the Earth."

You also don't know how he did it, you're just given the order in which things were made.

[langengro]

Well, again, you might have a point there, but it really doesn't have very much to do with Deutsch's talk.

[zarkoff45]

"it really doesn't have very much to do with Deutsch's talk."

I think it does. When learning that only invariable explanations can be good explanations you have to ask what makes an explanation invariable. That is how this started.

[langengro]

So what makes an explanation invariable is that it refers us to efficient, not final, causes?

Suppose I explain the rain by a rain dance. That's completely variable, and therefore, by Deutsch's standards, it is not scientific. So Deutsch is right here. But the rain dance is supposed to be an efficient, not a final, cause of the rain. So the interpretation you offer is not really parallel to what Deutsch says, is it?

[zarkoff45]

"...rain dance is supposed to be an efficient, not a final, cause.."

Efficient or final cause seems to be a category error. That type of cause is not the issue, it's the purposeful (telic) definition of teleology I was trying to get at.

[langengro]

So the rain dance is a "teleological" cause by your definition because rain was the intended consequence. Well, okay, take any old superstition. The groundhog leaves its cave too early, so it's gonna rain. I guess this explanation is not "teleological", in the way you are using that term. Still, I have a hunch that it is quite "variable", as I understand Deutsch. This shows that being variable and being teleological are not one and the same property, right?

[langengro]

(3) In doing so, it seems to me that he overlooks that explanatory power and theoretical coherence are not defining characteristics of scientific theory, but rather evaluative notions (other than truth) employed in the choice of rival theories. They determine whether something is a GOOD scientific theory, not whether it is a scientific theory at all.

[langengro]

(2) Also, it seems to me that what he calls variability is really just a bastard of two well-known items: Explanatory power (the myth only explains seasons, the eclipse explains this, and more) and theoretical coherence (the scientific hypothesis is non-variable in the sense of being constrained by other astronomical theories).

[langengro]

(1) Deutsch is certainly right in claiming that falsifiability is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for a hypothesis' counting as scientific. What has to be added? Well, most people say that what distinguishes the science after the Scientific Revolution both from Medieval (Aristotelian) science and from Baconian empiricism, is EXPERIMENTAL (as opposed to merely observational) testing. Deutsch doesn't discuss this rival account at all.

[glyderau]

Great video! I really like this idea, and will definitely use it in debate. It's one of those ideas that is kind of obvious, and yet still needs to be pointed out, and these ideas tend to be (just like scientific truths) 'invariable and irrefutable'. Another link in the armour of reason

[numberonesurvivor75]

It's a linking of the senses! You're linking one sensory experience to another!!!

I'm a Christian, and I liked this speech.

[zarkoff45]

"It's a linking of the senses! You're linking one sensory experience to another!!!"

I'm not sure what you're trying to say, but it sounds like you had a Eureka moment in which you finally grasped the concept of empiricism.

If so, then I suspect you don't really have the background you need in epistemology to understand what David Deutsch is saying. But I'm glad you liked it.

[numberonesurvivor75]

The Eureka moment came long before I posted that comment. Also, like you and the rest of the world, I began to grasp the concept of empiricism when I began to apply probabilities. I made the comment in reference to Deutsch's statements @1:17. Knowledge comes from linking multiple sensory experiences logically, not directly from the senses. When one thinks, "The red light means the stove is hot", they link the sense of sight with sense of touch. The exclamation point was for emphasis.

[zarkoff45]

"... comment in reference to Deutsch's statements @1:17. Knowledge comes from linking multiple sensory experiences logically, not directly from the senses. When one thinks, "The red light means the stove is hot", they link the sense of sight with sense of touch."

That is indeed a type of knowledge, but it isn't the kind of modern scientific knowledge that Deutsch is talking about.

Even a salivating, Pavlovian conditioned dog links that kind of sensory experience.

[numberonesurvivor75]

Yes, and a Pavlovian dog has rudimentary scientific thought.

Regarding Deutsch@1:24, we DO(at least I DO) see equations and real life experiences. We link the sensory experience of seeing that equations on paper to the sensory experiences of real life experience.

[dewinthemorning]

Wow, what a good video, full of substance!

You are a man, full of substance, for making it. I'm fav'ing it. It has to be seen more than once. I have books by David Deutsch, haven't gotten around to them yet.

To me, the greatest plus of science, is that it works on the principle of objectivity.