The "Total Information" Argument for Neutral Monism

[CeltoSaxonKnight]

“Ask all possible questions of the substance (or object I take it) and receive all possible answers”

Ok.

“Now ask the question is the totality of information describing the object the same as the object?”

Why? I've just asked all possible questions about the object haven't I? By now I should already know the metaphysic of the object! Conceivably that metaphysic wouldn't involve objects being made of information... So there would be no ineluctable contradiction.

[JohananRaatz]

@CeltoSaxonKnight "just asked all possible questions about the object haven't I?"

No, you're asking a metaphysical question about the information describing the object. But I was meaning all physical information of the object itself (it's color, size, composition etc. etc. etc.)

[CeltoSaxonKnight]

@JohananRaatz

1) So I ask all questions pertaining to the physical properties of the object, thereby obtaining a complete physical description. Then I ask is this “the same as the object?”

Answer is no, so... “does this non-informational substance exist?”

Which is “a metaphysical question” so will only render metaphysical information. Nothing is added to the totally of physical information therefore.

[CeltoSaxonKnight]

2) Anyway that aside, why does only answering yes to the question in step 3 add to the total information about the item? Are you really suggesting questions with no for answers don't result in more information?

For example “Is this object heavy?” “No.” You don't have more information?

Of course you do. Step three always results in a contradiction.

[JohananRaatz]

@CeltoSaxonKnight Well no, the question is tantamount to asking "Is there an answer beyond the sum of information that we have derived in the pile to the right?" If there is no answer then we are consistent. If there is an answer (corresponding to the existence of "naked matter" minus its informational content of all possible answers) then we get a contradiction.

What this is really doing is exploiting a sort of matter/info dualism -which leads to problems just like with mind/matter dualism.

[CeltoSaxonKnight]

@JohananRaatz

1) I really don't understand the logic by which: “does this non-informational substance exist?” is tantamount to: "Is there an answer beyond the sum of information that we have derived in the pile to the right?". They are different questions.

Anyway in either case I can answer yes happily because the resultant information relates to the metaphysic of the object, whereas (as per your first reply) the pile 'to the right' relates merely to its physical description

[CeltoSaxonKnight]

2) - which is conceivably not the totality of ALL necessary information about the object!

I'll have to leave it there I'm afraid, you're convinced by this argument - I'm not. If you manage to get lots of credible philosophers excited about it, I'll probably come back and have another go. But for now thanks for the exchange.

[JohananRaatz]

@CeltoSaxonKnight "which is conceivably not the totality of ALL necessary information about the object!"

Well that's the problem -it is and it isn't.

"I'll have to leave it there I'm afraid, you're convinced by this argument - I'm not."

Well fair enough. ;)

[wenaolong]

Much more conceiveable than neutral stuff. The information which conveys to me that there is an other mind is only "relatively neutral" because it is equipolarized at some point. The qualia themselves, on the other hand, are exactly as they seem. There is nothing "behind" or "inside" them, and all of our information about them is just that, "about" them, as we create stories about our experience, some scientific, some ethical. Equipolar intersubjective qualia inform only OF other minds.

[wenaolong]

I'm going to stop here, but in short, qualia are irreducible, and their relation to the mind which experiences them is direct, all other "information" being secondarily created qualia of that mind concerning qualia and or specific sets of qualia (shuttles). Since I allow that "other minds" exist, I must understand the bridge to be neutral yet polar, and what is conveyed is information to this effect at the very least (or I think it would be unimaginable). Other minds are much more conceivable.

[wenaolong]

now we ask, WHAT is between alter-minds? What bridges them so that they have contact enough for communication of "information"? Surely it is something isomorphic, because it is a bridge, yet either end is precisely not like the other (though in the same way), being that each has a pure ecceity (solipscistic mind stuff). Yet, there is this bridge, say. Then there is something conveyed across. It could only be "information", neutral yet polarizable. As to the qualia themselves, irreducible.

[wenaolong]

Of course, in the end, the problem of "other minds" shines a stark light on this issue of "what is there" (what does it really amount to). If I believe in the Chalmer zombie, then I've some consistency, but not much more, if any, than if I don't. If I claim that I am the only consciousness of my own consciousness, this doesn't contradict that there are other consciousnesses solely conscious of their own contents. I have no way to directly know, but that is by definition. This relates because

[wenaolong]

At least, that's how I see it because I have never found a "thing out there" that wasn't really "in here" from the mind's perspective. I have never found information that was not mere "about" the "thing out there/in here" rather than what that thing actually reduced to. I think you see the shuttle, then you specify the experience (its color, shape, size). Then you relate other concepts to it derived from special paradigms (atomic theory), but the qualia don't change after being informed to us

[wenaolong]

Even if what is there is always some content of our minds, it starts as some sort of qualia, thereafter being subject to further working of our minds. That further working of our minds upon the original qualia is then appended to a concept of that qualia, but not the qualia itself, which always remains "as it was". We fill the concept with information which we have selected for belonging to that concept, by whatever method, but it never replaces "what is there", it only serves as our "handle".

[wenaolong]

If there is assumed to be "something there" that is not itself merely information, the argument that what is there only is information reduces to the problem of substance which Berkeley had a famous argument concerning, namely that there is no substance that is not a function of the mind. Every time we "refer" we end up referring to something that is "in our minds" even if in our reference we mean to say something "not in our minds". The problem is, THAT is also in our minds, as labeled!

[Dhorpatan]

@wenaolong

Geez man. Did you leave enough comments?

[wenaolong]

Deriving information seems to "mimic" whatever is "already there" that we are deriving information about. But if information is separate from what is there, this is acceptable, since it is not limited to what is there in the first place. Being derived from what is there is compatible with NOT BEING whatever is there (matter or whatever). Yet, if information truly relates to "what is there", then it is definitely some kind of bridge between knower and known, and not an arbitrary one.