Noam Chomsky and Pat Churchland on Mysteries and Problems in Science

[Keinlicht]

Hitchens contended that chomsky's saying the real properties of the human mind cannot be discovered in principle.

I just.. don't know how one could interpret it like that.

[MaxwellGreene1]

I find the use of the word 'stark' two comments below both shallow and pedantic. MMMmmmhmmm, shallow and pedantic.

[HyperEntity111]

A brilliant contribution from Chomsky. The contrast between his subtle analysis and the raving bullshit rants of Mrs Churchland is stark.

[ThisOneIsTaken]

@HyperEntity111

Mind you, I believe it's likely we'll eventually explain consciou experience (although, let's be honest, we are a pretty long way from it.) but P. Churchland is quite frankly embarassing - more of a preacher than a philosopher.

[gandolflink]

The intellectual mind is really like an overgrown arm of government , trying to control things that are best regulated by themselves. without balance any system fails in some way, and this is true in Humans as well. intelligence does not make one happy, or healthy, or able to be compatible with others, indeed the opposite is often the case. disliking someone because of ideas based in intellect is just one example. How silly, what do any of us really know? Consider the wholeness of totality.

[gandolflink]

yes we have a limit to mind.mind is by definition limited. it is made up of limits. everything is distinguished in the mind by contrasts. Basically finding values between dark and light will never add up to the real gold. The true cognation of nature, that realization of the wholeness of the quantum moment. what is that? Just being there. Why does this offend the mind? Because the mind is so important! at least that is what the mind says.

[rabbifilms]

@cryptickripke I noticed Chomsky continued to speak through the end of the video. Is there anymore to what he says? And if so, where can I find it and where this discussion from? Thank you!!

[12pepap]

Limit is necessary condition for knowledge. This means that we can not know anything.

[BrigitteAbbendis]

I'm an atheist materialist and I'm fairly sure that consciousness is a direct product of the brain (or at least the illusion of contiguous consciousness, if we accept Dennett's interpretation). Hell, I'm actually hoping to do a linguistic study for my dissertation with that assumption as a central tenet. But my heckles are raised a bit when "consciousness" is derided. For individuals that aren't spiritual, it's the prism through which we filter all reality. From Pope to post-modern, no sanctity!

[tokotokotoko3]

I don't even see the two at odds - even if Chomsky comes across strong. All he says is "there are some things beyond our reach". All Patricia says is that we cannot say which specific things are beyond our reach. And that consciousness might not be - as some claim.

[stephenblackman2003a]

Creating intelligent computers does not dowse Chomsky's challenge. Like humans such computers will bear the hallmarks of their ancestry and will be cognitively limited, albeit differently. The computers will have different phenomena under their 'mystery category'. It is not also a matter of the computers simply progressively striking off items on the human mystery list. They will likely be hopelessly cognitively deficient in some areas that humans can easily cognitively penetrate.

[fede2]

i think churchland is off. not that her research isn't legitimate or anything but the historical attitude of philosophers with regards to the brain and the mind is not that it was deemed an "unbridgeable mystery". the fact is it's been largely deemed irrellevant *to philosophy*. because it's fundamentally a scientific question, not a philosophical one.

[matchbox555]

@gunnerfan87

wrong

eventually we will create artificial intelligence that is smarter than humans in every sense

we already have machines that are smarter than us in some respects

[gunnerfan87]

@matchbox555

You're confusing performance with knowledge. A supercomputer computes faster than a human brain. BUT it is no where near as complex and intelligent as the human brain that regulates almost every bodily function, feelings, thoughts, memory....

A computer can't process emotions. It cannot lie... A machine that is simply programmed to perform certain functions, can't have original ideas. Those are the domain of the living.

[matchbox555]

@gunnerfan87 DICKHEAD read my statement CAREFULLY

I never said we had that technology now, i said we will eventually create it.

we will start by reverse engineering the human brain, then will will improve its design, make it faster, give it greater capacity etc this is already being worked on, google "Artificial brain '10 years away" and click on the BBC story.

now shut the fuck up and go away

[gunnerfan87]

@matchbox555

You Can't create something more complex than yourself.

You= tea bagging mother fucker

[matchbox555]

@gunnerfan87

I hate the teaFaggers

I like Chomksy, but he is wrong about this because he is not factoring in technology. (if you sat him down and asked him again he would probably say "thats assuming you exclude technology")

And you are WRONG, we WILL create AI more complex and more intelligent than ourselves.

Get over it.

[Jeddas]

@primenemisis Angel's don't have fixed cognitive structures, presumably. They don't have the same limits of knowledge as human beings.

[efarmer385]

I didn't get the comment moving my hand means I'm moving the moon. Can someone explain?

[MartyrofCake]

Whether regularity or necessitarianism is a correct metaphysical view can never be answered by science. Matters such as this simply transcends empirical methods and it is utterly arrogant to assume that people can know almost everything within this universe.

[xknowledgeisfreex]

Imho consciousness is identical with certain electrochemical processes in the brain.The electrochemical activity in the brain IS the conscious experience itself. The 'mystery' occurs, because when people hear "electrochemical activity" they only think of the physical representation of it with the help of abstract models, i.e.electrons moving around, not realizing that it's only another representation of the same thing.

[Lunis]

I don't think Chomsky is anti-Darwinian when it comes to language. You should read his paper he co-wrote with Fitch and Hauser back in 2002. They describe how language might have suddenly emerged instead of evolving piecemeal via natural selection. Instead he think our ability to think recursively was mapped onto the interfaces (sensori-motor, ect.) with a single mutation which instantly allowed us to use language.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder Thanks to you as well. I think Chomsky can be a bit unclear when it comes to his theoretical work (like Aspects of the Theory of Syntax). I very strongly recommend that you read, if you haven't, his New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. It came out about ten years ago and addresses philosophical issues head-on, and much more clearly and concisely than anywhere else. He talks about dualism-vs.-materialism, philosophical problems with universal grammar, and other core issues.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder One last thing: Chomsky is probably the last person who could be accused of cooking up "just-so stories" about how language evolved. His whole point, that he has been criticized so sharply for, is that we don't know how language arose! The people who claim to know that language was selected for because of this or that reason are the ones making the just so stories. There's nothing "mystical" about refraining from theorizing in the absence of evidence.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder You make Dennett's mistake here: "Dennett & Pinker rightly dismiss the notion that the language faculty didn't evolve via natural selection."

Obviously Chomsky is not a creationist, so he dismisses this notion as well. What he says is that it is completely unclear whether language was specifically selected for because it was adaptive, or whether it arose because of other, selected-for cognitive traits. Dennett's point is that it MUST have been selected for, which is clearly not true.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder Again, just because he makes some fair points doesn't negate the dismissive distortions like the one you quoted. I obviously did not claim that he never makes any fair points, just that the unfair ones are unfair, which I take it you agree with.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder What I meant by "unreliable" is that, if you have even one case where somebody willfully distorts another person's views, then to be prudent you should never take their word for it when they tell you what someone else thinks. I didn't mean that because he distorts once, he must always distort, just that you can't take his word on faith. Just as in a novel, when a narrator lies once, that's a clue that they are unreliable and shouldn't be trusted completely. That's all I meant.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder And though he may interpret Gould and many others correctly, I would argue that the fact that he would knowingly and falsely present even one person's views as anti-scientific when they are not (which you and I agree that he has done, to Chomsky at least) makes him a generally "unreliable narrator" about other people's views. I agree that he can be an acute critic, though. If you've read Searle's "Rediscovery of the Mind", Dennett has a fantastic review that can be found on the net.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder You're right, I should have been more specific. I was thinking more about philosophy of mind--like when he accuses dualists like Chalmers of thinking that consciousness is "magic." He has a very aggressive style in general. I find his accusation that Chomsky thinks language is not the product of evolution to border on libel, as it strongly implies that Chomsky is some kind of creationist. Saying that current evopsych does not explain language isn't even remotely close to creationism.

[cryptickripke]

@Hofsteder The point you mentioned about the infinite application of finite principles just means that there is no limit on the number of possible sentences expressible in human language. It need not, and cannot, mean that any possible linguistic item from any possible language is expressible in human language. It is a very interesting point, though. Dennett is not a very reliable interpreter of those he disagrees with; what he says about Chomsky's views on evolution is extremely dishonest.

[hlvs44]

It's funny how both approach the problem from a physicalist approach and still disagree. We do have to be humble enough to allow for the possibility that there may be things in the universe which are beyond our current "cognitive structure".

[JQisAwesome]

In response to Chomsky - Humans may someday adopt a science-fiction-like technology to alter their genetic code and become super-intelligent, solving problems once deemed unsolvable mysterious to regular humans.

[1844Freddy]

Jeez, Chomsky put a serious smackdown on "Churchland"

[cryptickripke]

@1844Freddy She is correct that whether consciousness is a mystery can't be decided until we've made much, much more progress in neuroscience and psychology.

[tokotokotoko3]

What is this from? And is there more of it? It's sad of course to see their answers cut off.

[cryptickripke]

@tokotokotoko3 I know, it is. I believe it's from a documentary, the name of which escapes me.

[punxsutawneybarney]

Dr. Chomsky recently told Iranian TV that at the time the USA attacked Afghanistan, they had no evidence that al Qaeda was guilty of 9/11. See my video "Chomsky on Faith-Based Wars and 9/11"

[kpirooz92]

I agree with you that laughable is the wrong word, I didn't mean to target anyone here. Its just "funny", to me at least, since I find the argument simple enough, although the consequences are counter-intuitive.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 Fair enough. Philosophy is hard enough that if smart people--and Chalmers more than qualifies--are advocating a given view that strikes you as ridiculous, you probably haven't looked well enough at it. I've often found the views advocated by mainstream analytic philosophers like Quine and Wittgenstein to be downright ridiculous, but on closer inspection things are always more complicated than I thought they were.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 By the way, re: Chalmers, people often attack him on the zombie issue. But as he says in his book, all he really needs for his arguments is the possibility that conscious experience might have a DIFFERENT phenomenal character (as opposed to none at all, like a zombie). So pain could feel different, colors could appear differently, etc., all with the same functionality. He thinks this suggests a separation between mind and body. Point is, it gets less crazy without all the zombie talk.

[alexanth]

How about demons

[polymath7]

I.

Chomsky is, of course, as usual, pristinely, unassailably correct.

Though Churchland is quite right to scoff at the grandiosely premature boldness of philosophers likeColin McGinn, who flatly assert (or come very near to asserting) that consciousness will, perforce, forever remain inexplicable, her own position appears for all the world to be almost the exact inverse. She and Paul, and Dennett, for all their admirable talents, have an irritatingly obtuse manner of...

[polymath7]

II.

...insinuatiing this facile extrapolation from the litany of scientific problems that were once (wrongly) thought to be intractable, as if to imply that any suspiscion that any current problems will prove intractible is almost ipso facto naively obscurantist. True, such pessimsims accepted prima facie will become self-fullfilling, but this in no way renders the very act of expressing them intellectually irresponsible, and the very notion that some problems will lie forever unsolved...

[polymath7]

III.

...is surely about as far from far-fetched as one could imagine. Most annoying is Churchalnd and Dennett's shared speil of dismissing Chalmers' 'hard problem' of consciousness with this derisive colloquial reductio that goes "Ah, If *I* can't *conceive* of how an assembly of neurons could give rise to consiousness, then it isn't possible". Almost fair enough, but this can be turned on its head twice over: "If *you* can't fully explain *now* how neurons give rise to consciousness...

[polymath7]

IV.

...there seems little reason to suppose, or even to see how in principal, a more intimate knowledge neurological structure will bridge the *conceptual* gap. For the second rotation: "Just because you don't recognize Chalmers' problem, doesn't mean it is a non-problem that you can sweep under the rug". The Churchlands, Dennett, et al, are in their way almost as crudely facile as the substance dualists.

Anyway, to Chomsky's central point (I don't know who the hell is reading this...

[polymath7]

V.

...but I may as well follow through). It is entirely obvious that there are patterns in the universe that are quite beyond human comprehension, and by some astronomical distance at that. Most obviously, the universe itself construed as a single pattern. But even such subsytems of it are not terribly difficult to think of. The basic bodily of movements of every human being on Earth, in real time, over the course of five seconds, is beyond the comprehension of any human brain...

[polymath7]

IV. ...by many orders of magnitude. Even the sequence of movements of a game of Chess between Kasparov and Karpov -or certainly the strategies behind them- are hopelessy beyond the comprehension of the average human brain. To anyone who would say, "Ah, but those things are really not at all incomprehensible *in pirncipal*" I would ask, exactly what principal? -and the "exactly" is crucial.

[cryptickripke]

@polymath7 You need to give a good reason to say X is a mystery, especially where X is currently being studied by scientists (e.g., consciousness, the history of the universe). If you're claiming consciousness is a mystery, the burden is on you; the burden isn't on the scientists to predict future science. To say there's "little reason to suppose" that science could explain consciousness simply because people can't predict it is like telling scientists before Darwin that they can't explain

[cryptickripke]

@cryptickripke how species came to be, so they'll NEVER understand it.

[polymath7]

@cryptickripkeI

B-I

I am not in fact asserting that consciousness is a "mystery" (in the specialized context of this discussion). Why do you think I pointed out that views like McGinn's are premature? I was merely reversing the dynamics of Churchland's point to show how weak it is. Nor did I imply anything about predicting future science.

This was rather my point.

Consciuosness is an extraordinarly difficult, epistemically unique problem that is at present nowhere *near* being solved...

[polymath7]

B-II

...and I don't for the moment see any particular onus resting on either shoulder.

[cryptickripke]

@polymath7 I was referring to this: "Almost fair enough, but this can be turned on its head twice over: "If *you* can't fully explain *now* how neurons give rise to consciousness there seems little reason to suppose, or even to see how in principal, a more intimate knowledge neurological structure will bridge the *conceptual* gap."

[polymath7]

@cryptickripke Alright, what are you asking me for? An interpretation of Chalmers' Hard problem? Not to be smug, but are are you capable of holding up your end of this or am I going to be tutoring you here? If the latter, I'd rather take it up tomorrow, I'm tired.

[cryptickripke]

@polymath7 ...?

I've read The Conscious Mind, I don't need any "tutoring," nor did I ask for anything. In the passage I quoted, you argued that if you can't explain how consciousness is created by neurons now then there is "little reason" to think that any neurological theory will ever explain it, even "in principle." If we can never explain something, then it's a mystery. In my opinion you need a better reason than that to think that consciousness can't be explained, i.e. is a mystery.

[polymath7]

@cryptickripke I'm tired. If like I'll continue this tomorrow. Better yet, do you have a skype account? That would be much easier, I hate text boxes.

[kpirooz92]

@polymath7

"Phenomenal Consciousness", on Chalmer's and any non interactionist-dualistic conceptions, is an epiphenomenal property. That means we can't possibly be justified in believing that it exists, - that, by definition, those who believe it exists are believing so for the wrong reason. Chalmers is smart enough to realize this, calling it the "paradox of phenomenal judgement", adding that if he were a reductionist he'd be one for this reason.

[kpirooz92]

(cont'd) He goes on to address the fundamental objection to his work by saying that we need a "new epistemology" for consciousness i.e. an epistemology that allows for eschewing justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. That "qualia" and other nonsense, IS nonsense is not hard to see, that it remains a "problem" for philosophers is laughable. Actually the first explicit version of this "paradox of phenomenal judgement" was given by Dennett in a footnote.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 What's funny is that real philosophers are respectful and take each others' ideas seriously, whereas YouTube Philosophers call other ideas "nonsense" and "laughable." I think the problem is that so many of them worship Dennett, who tends to be very dismissive of people who disagree with him. Chalmers' problems, and the problems of phenomenal qualities ("qualia") are serious, and not laughable at all.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 Also, you should read Chalmers' book--he isn't an epiphenomenalist.

[kpirooz92]

@cryptickripke

The "problem" doesn't exist. I directly quoted from Chalmers, he believes that he believes there is a "hard problem" for the wrong reason. I'm waiting to hear why that isn't absurd.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 The problem of explaining how conscious experience arises from neuronal activity "doesn't exist"? Believe that if you want, scientists and philosophers will continue to work on it regardless.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 Also keep in mind that he isn't an epiphenomenalist. He thinks consciousness is explanatorily irrelevant (because zombies are possible) but he doesn't deny that it plays causal roles in actual human behavior in the actual non-zombie world. Besides, he devotes Chapter 5 of his book entirely to this problem, so if you're curious I suggest you take a look.

[kpirooz92]

Apparently I took a look, since I quoted from it. Recall he says we have the same justification for belief in "C-Qualia" (what I'll call Chalmer's conception of "Qualia") as Zombies i.e. none, since the "causal roles" played are irrelevant to the formation of the belief. He even says if we looked at the brain, we would learn why we believed in C-Qualia (what erroneous justification we used). Is it okay to believe it is irrational to believe p and believe p? (Remember Moore's Paradox?)

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 The beliefs actual humans have about consciousness may be causally overdetermined, as they are caused both by neurological mechanisms shared by zombies and actual conscious experience; zombies only have the first, but it's the second that is the "truth-maker" for those beliefs. So given that we do have actual conscious experience, our beliefs about consciousness are justified; since zombies don't, their beliefs are not justified, as the truth-making relation is absent

[cryptickripke]

@cryptickripke That's why consciousness is "explanatorily irrelevant," as you can explain phenomenal judgment without appeal to it; nonetheless, in our case, there is an actual relation between belief and fact that makes our beliefs genuine instances of knowledge, namely the existence of conscious experience.

Some argue that the need for this appeal to causal overdetermination is grounds enough to reject a theory.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 Nor did I say it did.

[kpirooz92]

@cryptickripke

No. There is ONE reason why humans and Zombies believe in C-Qualia (p), because of structural isomorphism. (The process of reasoning is exactly the same.) That reason is unjustified, (obviously). We both believe p through some method m, m is unjustified, since it isn't appropriately caused by p. Whether or not p is true, S can never "know" p through m, since true belief doesn't constitute knowledge. Since there was no other reason for believing p, we have to drop it.

[cryptickripke]

@kpirooz92 I agree, let's drop it.

[LothairApoclyane]

Maybe we are angels..