I personally believe the virtues of the ancient world were largely focused on justice, courage, moderation and prudence because those are male oriented values, bound to flourish in our mostly patriarchal past. A virtue ethics in today's day and age might come off a lot more balanced.
we can hardly say anything about ethics, if there is ethics at all. Under this light I think your assumptions are assumptive and your ego, inner narcissist can't take uncertainty. It is talk, which is good, but don't use content to drive authority home.
@hyperseauton I disagree. We can actually say a lot about ethics, because differences in ethical judgment are the exception rather than the rule (and often a result of disagreement about the relevant facts of a situation), just as hallucinating is the exception rather than the rule. I don't think we have any more reason to be skeptical of ethical judgments than of empirical ones.
To my mind, the only real up-shot of deontology is the trivial imperative to do what is right. Beyond that, it risks becoming a list of the ruling class's preferences.
Now, Roderick T. Long has done pretty good job attempting to defend a deontological system of justice as part of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics, but he also holds that emergencies weaken rights (as one must to avoid perverse consequences), which makes his system look like just a sophisticated form of consequentialism to my mind.
@shiningwhiffle I'm tempted to call myself a virtue utilitarian (virtues being precisely those dispositions that promote acting in beneficent ways), but I'm not sure I buy the central utilitarian thesis that values are commensurable (or that if incommensurable, they are so only to the extent that some are higher and can't be traded against lower ones). I think there are genuine conflicts.
@shiningwhiffle Thumbs up for refering to Roderick Long. He's one of my intellectual heroes - although I ultimately don't think that the deontology part can really be virtue ethics. Or, rather, the system of justice the Long supports is actually not deontological.
I agree with an emphasis on intention. Intention must be the root of an ethical choice. As one's level of understanding of the interactions and causalities involved, it improves one's ablility to make good ethical choices (ie understand the consequences). Without an understanding of consequences, it makes the intentions less relevant/meaningful.
I also think that there may be some false divisions regarding ethical considerations.
@stefanlittle TY for the comment. I'm wondering what I think is at the root of an ethical choice. I think intention is absolutely important. The problem for me with the concept of *intention* is firstly that it seems edit out the *social self* and secondly, I don't think *intentions* reside like concrete objects in ones person. Ethical choices involve ambiguity - i'e context dependent. I think we need to be bravely self-reflexive and when it comes to *intentions*.
How can one have an intention separate from the context of the consequence? How can consequences be wieghed without consideration of the desires and intentions of the people involved?
@stefanlittle I'm in agreement. And also I am just playing with ideas and metaphors here - and I think an intention needs to include certain meta-tools such as *being open to uncertainty* and *reflexivity*.
I agree that intentions are ambigious, just as are consequences. I see no removal of context when discussing intentions, or at least no imperative to do so. I think that both the intentions and the consequences are a realistic component of all ethical considerations. In fact I think that it is quite ambigous to try to separate them.
If a virtue ethicist says things outside of your control are neither good nor bad, how can 'what are the consequences' be a good argument? It seems as though the consequentialist is still stuck with the illusion (not only that there ARE things outside of their control) but that uncontrollable things are directly under their control (the consequences)?
I get the appeal of trying to synthesize all the good parts of each normative theory, but it just seems incredibly difficult to do that without producing a lot of contradictions. It seems there must be times when virtue conflicts with consequences which conflict with duty.
@Nykytyne2 I would have a lot of trouble finding a place for deontology in my normative ethical views, since it's so acontextual and rigid.
But I do think that there is something to be said for not necessarily purely sticking to one out of three traditional options. The detailed one gets into normative ethical theories, the harder it is to boil it all down to three categories.
I can't count the number of times I have run into "a consequentialist" or "a virtue ethestist" who was all of one and none of the other, ready to debate an advocate of the other as if these things are dichotomous and mutually exclusive. I think that both attempt to avoid critical thought and fall too easily into dogmatic, inflexible thinking. Can't I have general virtues AND specific applied rules for good conduct? Can't they be mutable?
I disagree with how Nyk claimed that virtue ethics has no way to take gradiation or balance between different virtues into account. That was the entire purpose of aristotle's golden mean.
@brainpolice2 I also don't see why virtue ethics couldn't be synthesized with a form of consequentialism, so that the evaluation of character is simply an important part of the picture while consequences are taken into account at the same time. In fact, that is roughly my own view - both consequentialist and eudaimonistic. And, as far as I'm aware, some of the contemporary reformations fo virtue ethics do exactly this.
@Nykytyne2 I see. I more got the impression that you sort of critisized it on the grounds that it doesn't take consequences into consideration, focusing everything on intention and character.
This is a good video series though. I'd like to see what else you'll do for it down the pipeline.
I personally believe the virtues of the ancient world were largely focused on justice, courage, moderation and prudence because those are male oriented values, bound to flourish in our mostly patriarchal past. A virtue ethics in today's day and age might come off a lot more balanced.
BoStevoD 1 year ago
I was under the impression that "virtue ethics" was instituted mainly thru medieval interpretations -- whereas the golden mean was pre-Aristotelian.
I really liked Varela short book: "ethical know-how' -- or the Schopenhauerian approach (although not the content of his ethics).
.
emblemOFbeing 1 year ago
Meta etchics is where its at...courage insight sympathy solitude...
f1ghtclub2k3 1 year ago
Sophrosyne.
cuntsound 1 year ago
"We can never be merely descriptive"
Hallelujah. Very well put.
SisyphusRedeemed 1 year ago
we can hardly say anything about ethics, if there is ethics at all. Under this light I think your assumptions are assumptive and your ego, inner narcissist can't take uncertainty. It is talk, which is good, but don't use content to drive authority home.
hyperseauton 1 year ago
@hyperseauton I disagree. We can actually say a lot about ethics, because differences in ethical judgment are the exception rather than the rule (and often a result of disagreement about the relevant facts of a situation), just as hallucinating is the exception rather than the rule. I don't think we have any more reason to be skeptical of ethical judgments than of empirical ones.
shiningwhiffle 1 year ago
To my mind, the only real up-shot of deontology is the trivial imperative to do what is right. Beyond that, it risks becoming a list of the ruling class's preferences.
Now, Roderick T. Long has done pretty good job attempting to defend a deontological system of justice as part of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics, but he also holds that emergencies weaken rights (as one must to avoid perverse consequences), which makes his system look like just a sophisticated form of consequentialism to my mind.
shiningwhiffle 1 year ago
@shiningwhiffle I'm tempted to call myself a virtue utilitarian (virtues being precisely those dispositions that promote acting in beneficent ways), but I'm not sure I buy the central utilitarian thesis that values are commensurable (or that if incommensurable, they are so only to the extent that some are higher and can't be traded against lower ones). I think there are genuine conflicts.
shiningwhiffle 1 year ago
@shiningwhiffle Thumbs up for refering to Roderick Long. He's one of my intellectual heroes - although I ultimately don't think that the deontology part can really be virtue ethics. Or, rather, the system of justice the Long supports is actually not deontological.
brainpolice2 1 year ago
A little off topic, but congrats on 300 videos upped. haha
I'm curious how long it will take me to reach the 100 video mark...
TheSkepticalAtheist 1 year ago
I agree with an emphasis on intention. Intention must be the root of an ethical choice. As one's level of understanding of the interactions and causalities involved, it improves one's ablility to make good ethical choices (ie understand the consequences). Without an understanding of consequences, it makes the intentions less relevant/meaningful.
I also think that there may be some false divisions regarding ethical considerations.
stefanlittle 1 year ago
@stefanlittle TY for the comment. I'm wondering what I think is at the root of an ethical choice. I think intention is absolutely important. The problem for me with the concept of *intention* is firstly that it seems edit out the *social self* and secondly, I don't think *intentions* reside like concrete objects in ones person. Ethical choices involve ambiguity - i'e context dependent. I think we need to be bravely self-reflexive and when it comes to *intentions*.
GestaltTherapy1 1 year ago
@GestaltTherapy1
How can one have an intention separate from the context of the consequence? How can consequences be wieghed without consideration of the desires and intentions of the people involved?
stefanlittle 1 year ago
Comment removed
stefanlittle 1 year ago
@stefanlittle I'm in agreement. And also I am just playing with ideas and metaphors here - and I think an intention needs to include certain meta-tools such as *being open to uncertainty* and *reflexivity*.
GestaltTherapy1 1 year ago
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@GestaltTherapy1
I agree that intentions are ambigious, just as are consequences. I see no removal of context when discussing intentions, or at least no imperative to do so. I think that both the intentions and the consequences are a realistic component of all ethical considerations. In fact I think that it is quite ambigous to try to separate them.
stefanlittle 1 year ago
If a virtue ethicist says things outside of your control are neither good nor bad, how can 'what are the consequences' be a good argument? It seems as though the consequentialist is still stuck with the illusion (not only that there ARE things outside of their control) but that uncontrollable things are directly under their control (the consequences)?
TheWhiteSquirel 1 year ago
I get the appeal of trying to synthesize all the good parts of each normative theory, but it just seems incredibly difficult to do that without producing a lot of contradictions. It seems there must be times when virtue conflicts with consequences which conflict with duty.
Nykytyne2 1 year ago
@Nykytyne2 I would have a lot of trouble finding a place for deontology in my normative ethical views, since it's so acontextual and rigid.
But I do think that there is something to be said for not necessarily purely sticking to one out of three traditional options. The detailed one gets into normative ethical theories, the harder it is to boil it all down to three categories.
brainpolice2 1 year ago
Great video. I agree for the most part.
I can't count the number of times I have run into "a consequentialist" or "a virtue ethestist" who was all of one and none of the other, ready to debate an advocate of the other as if these things are dichotomous and mutually exclusive. I think that both attempt to avoid critical thought and fall too easily into dogmatic, inflexible thinking. Can't I have general virtues AND specific applied rules for good conduct? Can't they be mutable?
vooooom 1 year ago
@vooooom Thanks. See my video on Bakhtin and Towards a Philosophy of the Act
Professoranton 1 year ago
I disagree with how Nyk claimed that virtue ethics has no way to take gradiation or balance between different virtues into account. That was the entire purpose of aristotle's golden mean.
brainpolice2 1 year ago 4
@brainpolice2 I also don't see why virtue ethics couldn't be synthesized with a form of consequentialism, so that the evaluation of character is simply an important part of the picture while consequences are taken into account at the same time. In fact, that is roughly my own view - both consequentialist and eudaimonistic. And, as far as I'm aware, some of the contemporary reformations fo virtue ethics do exactly this.
brainpolice2 1 year ago 3
@brainpolice2 Agreed.
Professoranton 1 year ago
@brainpolice2 I sort of tried to say that in the video. One could certainly argue that a virtue ethics system produces the best consequences.
Nykytyne2 1 year ago
@Nykytyne2 I see. I more got the impression that you sort of critisized it on the grounds that it doesn't take consequences into consideration, focusing everything on intention and character.
This is a good video series though. I'd like to see what else you'll do for it down the pipeline.
brainpolice2 1 year ago
@brainpolice2 I sort of tried to say that in the video. One could certainly argue that a virtue ethics system produces the best consequences.
Nykytyne2 1 year ago
@brainpolice2 I sort of tried to say that in the video. One could certainly argue that a virtue ethics system produces the best consequences.
Nykytyne2 1 year ago
Very nice video, thank you for dissecting Nyk's brief intro.
fishzilla001 1 year ago